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ABSTRACT

In this nontypical dissertation the author develops a McLuhan-like style of writing and presents a holistic, humanistic social theory. This dissertation is a break with past approaches because it makes the humanistic assumptions that human action is: 1) value-centered and, 2) intricately holistic. The humanistic approach overcomes some current problems of overspecialization and underemphasis of values in understanding human action. Also, it breaks with the current disciplinary techniques by exhibiting a value-systemed, holistic approach leading towards an interdisciplinary theory. The majority of this dissertation describes, formalizes, and shows uses of the humanistic general social systems theory. The thesis is that the self subsystem is becoming prevalent in our society, with the characteristics of idiosyncratic style, reference to oneself, a valuing orientation and self consciousness. Thus, the author blends the self subsystem with the expertise subsystem. He also emphasizes the importance of the internal interrelatedness, interdependence, and circularity within a system of thought. The dissertation's three sections are: 1) theory, 2) the theory as a set of concepts for reanalyzing some studies of higher education, and 3) the theory as a base for applications and speculations in higher education, society, and the social sciences. (Author/AWW)

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A HUMANISTIC SOCIAL THEORY:

A HUMAN SYSTEMS THEORY APPLIED TO YOUTH, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND OUR CULTURAL METAMORPHOSIS.

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SECTION 1

THE THEORY

and I choose not to use just one academic style too. When I refer to myself, I plan to use the word "I," and when I refer to you readers, I plan to use "you." While this might not seem like much of an advance, writers who fail to do so commit methodological, aesthetic, and moral barbarisms that I'm going to try to avoid. Sometimes I'll use an unconventional style; other times I'll probably lapse into a usual academic style. It is hard enough to try to break intellectual set alone. Compounding this by breaking stylistic set is harder. But I'll try both.

You may find this mixture confusing too. Think of both of us developing our full potentials. If I can potentially use several styles, I contribute to my personal growth by doing so. Right? If you can taste a variety of styles and the ways they blend, wouldn't I limit the richness of your life if I present only 1 stylistic flavor?

Style is supposed to fit content, and this work has various contents; hence, various styles. Also, the style of this work is part of its content and its message (more about this under moral objections to using only one style).

In this note on style I've separated the methodological, aesthetic, and moral in order to talk about the various shortcomings, but they are, of course, related to each other and actually are different abstractions from the same data. Their intertwinements, and essential oneness, or unity, should be kept in mind for a more accurate, synthetic picture. But this analytic conceptualization is useful for talking about how they are related to each other and to my values and purposes.

The methodological criticism I have is The Myth of Objectivity. I don't mean that objectivity is bad, but it is erroneous to pretend to be objective or to report that one is merely an observer when, in fact, he isn't. The values of objectivity are well known and widely held. I agree that they are valuable, but not exclusively so. There are also values of non-objectivity, of total immersion (including emotional) with a problem, topic, experiment, theory. As a lover knows a beloved, or a parent a child, so a thinker, scientist, or artist who is immersed in his problem has knowledge and interest that a dispassionate observer lacks. Both can contribute to our knowledge, the more perspectives, the better.

The second part of the Myth of Objectivity is that often scientists and others with insight are immersed, but try to pretend they aren't. Many scientific and academic writing styles abet this illusion. Their impersonality gives the impression that people were almost absent. Yet people design studies, participate in them, and evaluate them. At every step personal bias can enter. By neglecting to mention people, non-personal styles falsely suggest that "human error" could not enter in. An accurate report includes an estimation of error and of insight. A non-personal style evades the problem by not bringing up human assets or liabilities.

Before going on to the moral complaints I have about the non-personal style, I'd like to turn to the aesthetic reasons. (In fact, if part of ethical conduct is to build things which are beautiful, one can consider these aesthetically oriented statements as a variety of moral statements.) Any sensitive reader of academic writing knows what I'm talking about - the passive voice, awkward phrases, pompous jargon, circumlocutions, redundancies - all the ugly, barbarous academicisms that infest our writing.

I don't guarantee that I'll escape from them entirely, but I'll try.

Finally, and most important, are my moral reasons for objecting to the frequent academic styles.

The Valuelessness of Valuelessness

In addition to their being both methodologically misleading, and incomplete, as well as aesthetically ugly, I object to the usual impersonal styles because of their connotations about the values of humans. I think their downgrading of humans is immoral.

First, the impersonal styles give a warped view of science and of scientists. This is bad itself, but it is doubly bad when we look at scientists as human beings and at science as a kind of human activity. Any group of people or their activities, when downgraded, smudges its lowered esteem to other humans and their activities, but in our society science and scientists are held in relatively high esteem. When they are lowered, what does this say of the rest of humanity and of their actions?

An impersonal style gives the impression that scientists are cold, inhuman, mechanical drudges who go about their work in a detatched automatic way. These styles fail to give the picture of scientists as people fascinated with their world and as constantly trying to understand it and looking for new fascinations. The impersonal styles give the impression of detatchment, noncommitment and noninvolvement. Furthermore, they suggest that these qualities are in some sense "good." Yet many people are looking for some kind of personal involvement with their world, and many scientists are excellent examples of how people can become involved for their own growth and for the benefit of society. But this doesn't come across. The authorial distance of the style and the misemphasized value of objectivity give the impression that one should go through life at arm's length, never becoming involved, committed, fascinated, etc.

Scientific activity can be looked at (and I think should be) as one example of how personal good and public can be the same. A dedicated scientist can be an example, as can a dedicated artist or parent, of how one can use social roles for his own development.

In addition to doing a disservice to humanity in general, the academic styles do a disservice to the scientific communities. People who might otherwise enjoy one of the scientific activities are put off by the apparent coldness and never investigate a scientific career as a possibility for them. I think many of the students of the humanities see science as a forbidding tundra rather than as an exciting, warm, human activity because the writings of scientists seldom transmit warmth or the joy of insight.

My second series of moral reasons for preferring a personal ✓ style also have to do with the denigration of humanity via impersonal styles but are more general than those working through the mistaken views of science and scientists. The lack of personalizing leads to a general dehumanizing; people are seen as objects rather than as persons. In some cases and in some relationships people are related to things as objects. People are (among other things) objects, but they have additional qualities too. A personal style would help recognize these. An impersonal style contributes to a feeling of powerlessness too. There is a certain non-agency bias in much scientific writing. Individuals are not seen as deciding to do something. The second and third words of this dissertation are "I choose." I chose these words to emphasize the feeling of agency, the ability to decide. It helps me as a person determine myself and this work. I hope it will show others that they as persons have similar decisions within their power too, that they have a constant sense of conscious decision-making.

Finally, the apparent valuelessness of scientific writing is that it contributes to a feeling that valuelessness is a desired goal. Scientists do not generally feel that values are unimportant, but their writing often gives this impression. While there seem to be assumed values implicit in many journal articles, scientists (or journal editors) seem to feel that there is no place for value statements in reports. I would like to see this changed for several reasons. It would give more "respectability" to values, and people would have more practice thinking about values. It would help make explicit some assumed values so that readers can understand the intent of the article better, and also possible biases. It would help journal authors who write articles become more conscious of themselves and their values. It would help integrate scientific writing into the rest of human culture through values; i.e. Why is this study of value to humanity? If it is because the researcher enjoys finding out about this topic, because he is fascinated with it, fine! He is confirming the value of personal curiosity to himself and to his readers. If it is because some practical use may come from it and help the rest of humanity, fine! He is showing how science and scientists are not inhuman automatons, and he is showing the value of caring for others, and of social consequences. He may want to show that his work is contributing to a more fully developed person (himself) and/or to a more fully-developed humanity. In both cases he is enriching the world and encouraging others to do so by his example and his positive value placed on this. Humanity would be enriched if journal articles would include a section such as "Values of and Speculations About This Study." Because values are part of a scientist's world, the articles would be more accurate. And because scientists are part of the human world, both groups would benefit from considering, examining, questioning, building, and encouraging the human values they feel are important.

One aspect of values is the duty one has to himself and to others. The usual writing styles fall down here too. One way to learn about oneself is to make statements about oneself, "I hope," "I feel," "I am excited about...," and so forth. Making statements about oneself is one way to self knowledge and requires some self-examination, hopefully resulting in some intrapersonal honesty, authenticity and insights. These are likely to be valuable to the writer, researcher, or experimenter as a person.

The more public side of the coin is that by expressing his own values and relationships to his writing, a writer is clearer to others about what he sees in his efforts. This may inspire them as it has him.

This blends in with the methodological comments made above. When a person knows how he relates to something, it is easier for him and for others to spot any bias he may have. By leaving out statements about oneself and one's values, the account is not only less complete, but may be less open to accurate interpretation and criticism.

By bringing some humanness into his work and by setting an example of someone who is trying to be honest (although probably not fully achieving it) he implies that these traits are valuable, and he encourages others to attempt them too. When he sets an example of someone who is developing his self-awareness, self-esteem, self-worth, etc., he may encourage others to see and to develop these qualities in themselves and in other people.

In communications "the 'message' of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces ✓ into human affairs," (McLuhan, Understanding Media, 1964, p. 8). Analogously, in the sciences the "message" of any theory or method is the change of scope or data or pattern that it introduces into human conceptual affairs. The values and actions I recommended above are part of a larger change in our society. Just as McLuhan claims human work and association are being reshaped, I claim our thinking is transferring from disciplinary to interdisciplinary conceptualization. McLuhan's observations about the production of goods can be transposed into observations about the formation of ideas. Comparing mechanization and automation on the production of goods and on human relations, McLuhan says (p. 8):

> The restructuring of human work and association was shaped by the technique of fragmentation that is the essence of machine technology. The essence of automation technology is the opposite. It is integral and decentralist in depth, just as the machine was fragmentary, centralist, and superficial in its patterning of human relationships.

The same sort of changes are happening in the world of ideas. We might paraphrase McLuhan:

> The restructuring of thinking and research were shaped by the technique of fragmentation that is the essence of disciplinary concept formation. The essence of interdisciplinary concept formation is the opposite. It is integral and decentralist in depth, just as the disciplinary was fragmentary, centralist, and superficial in its patterning of thinking and research.

If automation technology has brought integration and decentralization to the production of goods, information technology (a kind of automation technology) may bring about integrated and decentralized theory formation. Instead of being centralized and stemming from one discipline, the new theories may be decentralized, broader systems of integrated knowledge, growing from many points simultaneously.

I think one such interdisciplinary theory has been growing unrecognized in our midst. In the rest of this dissertation I partially describe, formalize, and show some uses of this theory. I call it a "humanistic general social systems theory."

TOWARD AN EMERGING HUMANISTIC GENERAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS THEORY

According to Abraham H. Maslow, there is a "Humanistic Revolution," a new Zeitgeist, that is affecting our social institutions, work, leisure, education, science, philosophy, and religion, in short, almost everything we do and think ("Further Reaches of Human Nature," 1967b, p. 1):

> It is increasingly clear that a philosophical revolution is underway. A comprehensive system is swiftly developing like a fruit tree beginning to bear fruit on every branch at the same time. Every field of science and human endeavor is being affected.
>
> ...In all these areas work is being done by persons who are unknown to each other yet are linked by a common core of belief and intention.

One of my purposes in writing this dissertation is to show ✓ how this humanistic revolution is beginning to affect the social sciences and education and to speculate on how it is likely to do so in the future. A first step toward investigating a possible conceptual merger among education, the social sciences, and the humanistic revolution is to be clear about the meaning of "humanistic."

20th Century Humanism - Man, Values, and Synthesis

The words "humanism" and "humanistic" have 4 types of related meanings but with different emphases. These are in the fields of religion, values, education, and social sciences. I mean the last field when I use the words, but in order to make their meanings clearest, I'll first give the three types of meanings I don't mean.

When people are talking about religion, "humanism" can mean 4 things. It can mean a belief in the "mere humanity of Christ," (Oxford English Dictionary, 1961). It can mean an interest in human concerns, as opposed to divine interests (Oxford English Dictionary, 1961). It can mean a philosophy or religion "that rejects the supernatural, and regards man as a natural object, and asserts the essential dignity and worth of man and his capacity to achieve self-realization through the use of reason and scientific method," (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1961). A variety of this type of humanism, Christian Humanism, asserts that fulfillment comes within Christian principles (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1961).

When the discussion is about social values, "humanism" refers to a "devotion to human welfare" and concern for mankind. "Humanitarian" and "humane" emphasize this consideration and compassion. Sometimes, as with a Humane Society, this sympathy is broadened to include animals (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1961).

The third type of humanism is the one that I've found most often mistaken for the social sciences meaning I want, especially among people with academic backgrounds and interests. Their 2 uses of "humanism" are closely related to the academic "humanities" and to each other. The more general meaning refers to "studies which promote human culture," (Oxford English Dictionary, 1961). A special sub-meaning of this emphasizes the classical studies of the 14th through 16th centuries during the "Revival of Learning," or "The Age of Humanism," especially the studies of ancient Greece and Rome (Oxford English Dictionary, 1961). This meaning is related to the second religious use of "humanism" as this humanistic spirit emphasized secular instead of sacred learning.

The "humanistic" of this humanistic general social science theory is somewhat related to the religious and value meanings of "humanism." Like the religious use, it sets "human" concerns against other concerns. But instead of seeing the primary opposition between human and divine, it sees the split between human and nonhuman. This is not to suggest that human and nonhuman are opposed or in conflict, for we humans share a great deal with our fellow organisms and fellow objects. The emphasis is on a human view. The appropriate psychology, for instance, is humanistic psychology, based on "the prime reality - human experience itself - and starting from there to derive the concepts, the necessary abstractions and the definitions of real human experience and human needs, goals and values...." (Maslow, "Further Reaches of Human Nature," 1967b, p. 2). This is not to say that rodent psychology does not have something to say about human behavior, for inasmuch as rats and humans are alike, it does. But the humanistic emphasis and starting point is with human behavior. This use of "humanism" is compatible with either an atheistic or with various theistic humanisms. 20th-century humanism asks, "What does it mean to be a human?"

In the field of values, 20th-century humanism suggests that values may not be merely a matter of choice or of social learning. Inasmuch as humans are biologically different from other species, we may have different values. Inasmuch as we are alike, we may share values. For example, we may behave similarly to our fellow animals when we have not had food, drink, sex, or sleep for a time or when we are in pain. And much psychology is based on this common ground. However, inasmuch as we differ from our fellow animals, our interests or needs may differ. Humanistic psychology and this humanistic general social science theory try to get at these particularly human traits. Whether these qualities have biological roots, as Maslow says (Motivation and Personality, 1954; "A Theory of Metamotivation: The Biological Rooting of the Value-Life," 1967a) or whether they are unique due to human social existence, it is part of the business of humanistic theories to examine them. 20th-century humanism asks, "Is there a set of human values that can be arrived at and studied empirically?"

The people I know who consider themselves humanists, in this sense, or whom I consider humanists, share a devotion to human welfare, a compassion, and an interest in self-fulfillment and the development of the human multi-potentiality. While this set of values is not a necessary part of either a concentration on human concerns or an interest in what is uniquely human, 20th-century humanists do ask, "What can we do to benefit mankind and to be of value to the world?"

At the present, humanism is an informal collection of attitudes, values, beliefs, and observations. If one were to compile these, he would have a tangled, confused mass of empirical generalizations, unconnected hypotheses, and descriptions, but with little systematization or order. It is my opinion that the time for random, unconnected exploration and description is past, and that it is now time to link these into a coherent system. One purpose of this dissertation is to systematize this disarray. (I by no means intend to imply that the system is the only possible one or that it covers everything that goes under the rubric "humanism." In fact, I hope to show what might be done so that others will attempt their own systematizations as well. I consider the model I'll build to be one of many possible models.)

Chapter 2 presents a set of concepts to be used as conceptual tools in the humanistic general social systems theory presented there and in the rest of this work. The theory starts with a 5-part typology. Carl Hempel describes how a typology can become a theory ("Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," 1963, p. 230):

> The constructed type can serve as a theoretical system by (a) specifying a list of characteristics with which the theory is to deal, (b) formulating a set of hypotheses in terms of those characteristics, (c) giving those characteristics an empirical interpretation, which assigns to the theory a specific domain of application, and (d) as a long-range objective, incorporating the theoretical system as a "special case," into a more comprehensive theory.

Chapter 2 describes the 5-part typology of subsystems of the social system, first by specifying what I mean by a subsystem and mentioning some of the manifestations of these in the social sciences, second by describing the 5 categories of the typology. This is the (a) in Hempel's formulation.

Chapter 3 presents the dynamics among the types, the hypotheses about how they are related to each other. This is Hempel's (b). Thus a theory emerges which Sections 2 and 3 (Chapters 4-14) use to reorganize, simplify, and reinterpret some findings in the social sciences and in education, Hempel's (c).

Before going on to describe the theory, I'd like to be clear about how I see this humanistic theory and the benefits I hope will accrue from it.

First, verification, criticism, and evaluation of this type of humanism as a workable system will have a target and standard instead of a mass of disorganized observations and shifting hunches. As Francis Bacon aptly said, "Truth emerges more readily from error than from confusion," (1869). It is difficult (if not impossible) to spot inconsistencies between theory and data when the theories, observations, etc. are not clearly exposed.

Second, until the conceptual categories, structural relations, and mechanisms are specified, a coherent system cannot even be said to exist. Obviously, it cannot be used.

Thus, part of my dissertation will consist of specifying categories (Chapter 2), relations among them, and mechanisms (Chapter 3), in order that the theory can be tested by its applications.

A Paradigm Nominee

Third, a system acts as a goad to further study. Hopefully, the categories, relations, and mechanisms are in some regular relationship to each other, and as such give rise to hypotheses and predictions. These, in turn, lead to observational language and operational definitions and to the appropriate instrumentation and experiments to test the predicted relationships. Thus, building a humanistic paradigm may open the door for a whole field of further interpretation, investigation, and development, for another body of "normal science" as Thomas Kuhn calls it (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1968, pp. 10-34).

A paradigm, in Kuhn's usage, is a milestone in scientific activity. It is a model which changes scientific practice by (1) "attracting an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity" and by (2) being "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve," (p. 10). It is primarily an important historical occurrence in the history of science. A paradigm, thus, casts its shadow (or its light) on what scientists do afterwards, usually in some particular field or specialty. A paradigm gives a new way of thinking about or doing things. Unlike a theory, law, or model which may be only proposed, however, a paradigm, in Kuhn's usage, is more than proposed. In the history of a science or of science in general, it is (or has been) "successful" or "influential" by providing the base for a coherent tradition of scientific research. A paradigm is, so to speak, a founding father of a line of further investigation. This further investigation is what Kuhn calls "normal science." It consists primarily of further articulation and specification of the original paradigm, seeing where it applies and doesn't apply, emending it, refining it, filling in the sketch which it provides.

Pitirim A. Sorokin describes the study of human social relations as fertile ground for sowing new paradigms, and he shows the humanistic traits of conceptual synthesis, value-centeredness, and human concerns. Describing the history of science and philosophy in "Sociology of Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," (1965) he says that periods of synthesizing-generalizing activity alternate with analytical-factfinding periods. For the past 40 or 50 years, he says, sociology has been in an analytical-factfinding stage, which he describes as Kuhn might describe "normal science": Its (sociology's) theories and research represent mainly reiteration, variation, refinement, and verification of methods and theories developed by sociologists of the preceding period (1965, p. 833).

Sounding much like the humanistic psychologists who criticize Freudian, dynamic, and behavioral psychology for forming their views of man by looking at the example of lower animals, pathological or deviant behavior (Maslow, "Further Reaches of Human Nature," 1967b; Motivation and Personality, 1954; Toward a Psychology of Being, 1962; Bugental, Challenges of Humanistic Psychology, 1967), Sorokin says that sociologists also show an "accentuation of 'negative' social phenomena like crime, insanity, conflicts, and their forms of sociocultural pathology instead of concentrating on such positive phenomena as genius, creativity, altruism, and so on," (pp. 834-835).

And, like the humanistic psychologists who are trying to develop a psychology broad enough to include all kinds of human behavior, pathological and eupsychian, abnormal and normal, animal and human, Sorokin anticipates a sociology which can combine diverse and scattered sociological theory into "a growing concordance among the existing analytical and factfinding theories, their progressive convergence toward an expanding set of principles and propositions consistent with all or most of them," (p. 838).

However, as Sorokin points out, in addition to the organizational and group aspects there are cultural and personal aspects of socio-cultural behavior. These are complementary and cannot be studied independently. Whether we are studying an individual person, group, or a cultural system, "A study of a system has to proceed not only 'from parts to the whole' and 'from each part to other parts' but still more 'from the whole to the parts,'" (p. 841). A complete explanation, then, synthesizes first of all, events within the system itself, second, the system's relations to other systems, and, finally, seeing the system as a part, or subsystem, of a still larger system. In terms of size of units, we look at the parts that make up the system, at the system's relations to other more or less equal systems, and at the system as a part of an even larger system. A house, for a mundane and material example, might be described (among other ways) as (1) the collection and arrangement of the materials that it is made of, (2) as it is related to other houses, and (3) as it is related to a larger system such as a neighborhood, state, or nation.

This is where the humanistic general social systems theory comes in. If a systems approach requires thinking about and expressing ideas that have to do with the parts of a system, its relations to other systems, as well as its relationships to still larger systems, or supersystems, then it will be simpler to have one broad, or general, set of ideas, categories, and relationships that can be adapted to different levels than to have a large number of different and disorganized ones. This, of course, applies to a systems approach, which tries to keep track of all these individual, group, and cultural relationships at once. For a nonsystems approach, various independent and explicit theories may or may not be most helpful.

Lacking humility, I nominate this humanistic general social systems theory for a possible paradigm for a new normal science, a humanistic social science that combines humanistic psychology, humanistic sociology, humanistic anthropology, and so forth. I hope this paper will help recruit people to this kind of scientific activity. Occasionally, I'll point out areas for further study, but you will probably think of many of your own.

Benefits to the Social Sciences Community

The previous paragraphs on the development of the paradigm focused on the benefits to accrue from the paradigm itself and on the way in which paradigm building gives rise to a new practice of "normal science puzzle solving," (Kuhn, 1968, pp. 35-42). This section focuses on possible benefits to already established theories and disciplines from this humanistic paradigm.

The social sciences burgeon with classification systems.

While this has the benefit of producing various schemes for various purposes, it has the unfortunate effect of proliferating hypotheses and observations unconnected with each other, a fragmentation of intellectual techniques. This humanistic paradigm reduces the number of objects and relationships to 5 major categories, survival, stability, sociability, expertise, and self. Some previously disparate classification schemes are seen as particular instances of a larger method of classification. For example, specific instances of the "social type of subsystem" are evident in social psychology (effects of interpersonal relations), social stratification (middle-class congeniality, social ethic, and other-directedness), socialization (middle-class mothers preparing their children to get along with others in school), and development psychology (peer orientation of adolescents).

I do not mean to imply that the already established categories should be dispensed with. They are useful for their purposes; I am suggesting that seeing them as specific cases of a broader conceptual scheme suggests hypotheses and predictions among previous typologies. For example I hope to show that it is not just a matter of correlation that lower-middle classes stress obedience while middle classes stress sociability. These results are to be expected on the basis of their major humanistic types. Also, I do not intend to imply that the categories in the humanistic paradigm are in any absolute sense "better," for goodness depends on the purpose intended.

When burgeoning classification is pruned back and when items previously thought of as disparate are put in the same conceptual box, the resulting conceptual framework simplifies the fields within its scope. As a simplification it is a useful heuristic device for structuring the data at hand and for teaching previously unrelated theories and observations. Thus, the humanistic paradigm may be useful to those teaching the social sciences and to students trying to relate them to each other.

An abstraction or simplification results in the loss of individual qualities, however. So this general theory may be useful for large-scale systematization and the subtheories useful for understanding particular cases with more fullness.

The categories of the humanistic paradigm can be thought of as pervasive factors (in the sense of "factor" analysis) in the social sciences (See Chapter 2.) As such it helps in handling complicated, simultaneous interrelations among many variables in different disciplines and among a variety of empirical observations. Some interactions of societies, groups, and individuals are especially clear. For example, the lower-middle class' dislike of introspection, their preference for kin groups, and their desire for political law and order can all be interpreted as components of a "stability" factor, nonchallenge to self, familiar associates, stable society. (Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality, 1950; Cohen and Hodges, "Characteristics of the Lower-Blue-Collar Class," 1963; Kohn, "Social Class and Parent-Child Relationships: An Interpretation," 1963; Hess, "Social Class and Ethnic Influences Upon Socialization," 1970; and more.)

The construction of these theoretical factors is a conceptual attempt to bring order out of diversity. In addition to making thinking easier by reducing the number of conceptual boxes and the number of relationships needed to link them, the system poses questions about why these factors do "hang together," and how one component of a subsystem influences other components or how these subsystems influence each other and the whole social system.

In addition to using data which fits in with current theories and embedding it in a new conceptual format, the humanistic paradigm can be used to explain some data that does not fit into the usual molds. For example, in his study of Bennington College, Theodore M. Newcomb was puzzled by the fact that some girls who were politically and economically most conservative in their freshman year became most liberal in their senior year (Personality and Social Change, 1943). He also notes 3 types of girls which were not greatly affected by Bennington. These types and the liberal seniors can be explained with the humanistic paradigm as can the liberal shift among the main body of girls. In fact, his study would be exceedingly surprising if these results hadn't shown up.

Social Change Theory: Needed, A Psychological Change Theory

Another example of a useful spinoff from the humanistic paradigm candidate is a theory of social change. W. E. Moore ("A Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change," 1960; "Social Change," 1968), Walter Buckley (Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, 1967), and John McKinney (Constructive Typology and Social Theory, 1966) all note that a theory of social change is needed. Moore says that most social scientists appear "defensive, furtive, guilt-ridden, or frightened" at the mention of a "theory of social change" (1960). The humanistic paradigm suggests that at least part of this lack is due to the lack of a psychological theory compatible with a theory of social change, one that makes change an integral part of the theory rather than as a result of forces that are outside the theory.

At least one reason for the lack of a theory of social change may be due to the lack of a psychology that can supply hypothetical constructs for such a social change theory. MacCorquodale and Meehl ("On a Distinction Between Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variable," 1948) recommend that theory constructors use hypothetical constructs which are compatible with general knowledge at the next lower level of the explanatory hierarchy. Our normal psychology does not do this. Its paradigm may be thought of as:

inactivity → deprivation → activity → satiation → inactivity

Thus, restoration or equilibrium is the end of activity, and this does not account for change except as it is instrumental in the activity stage, i.e., the organism does something new as part of the activity stage. Satiation, however, ends the activity.

In the humanistic model, however, change is an integral part of the model:

activity 1 → success → activity 2

Activities 1 and 2 are different sorts of behavior, with different rewards, etc. With this model, success on the individual level (or extra resources on the organizational level) results in changed activity (goals). Hopefully, the humanistic types will be adaptable enough to use hypothetical constructs which are compatible at both a higher and lower level of the explanatory hierarchy.

Various sections of this work point toward a theory of social change, and other sections rely on the basic change orientation of the paradigm to partially account for other phenomena, especially some instances of personal and social change. For example, one of the great transitions in western society was from the church-dominated medieval period to the nation-state dominated present. If one considers the church as primarily an institution which gives order to the universe and if he also considers the democratic nation-state as a form of social participation (The reasons for these will be explained in more detail in Chapter 14) then this massive and long transition can be seen as a swing from the second humanistic category, the stability orientation, to the third, the sociability. Many of the various conflicts during this period resolve themselves into conflicts between the legitimate, stabilizing forces of a hierarchically oriented world (stability) and the emerging, disrupting forces of a democratically oriented world (sociability). Then one notes that this stability/sociability split also holds between the authoritarianism of the lower-middle class and the social ethic of the middle class and that during this time there was a slow emergence of a middle class. This is especially evident during the middle of the last century, as Hans Kohn has pointed out in his appropriately titled *Absolutism and Democracy* (1965), or in humanistic terms, *Political Stability and Sociability*.

On a smaller scale we note that much of the unrest around universities seems centered among those students who come from relatively wealthy homes and in those universities that have high concentrations of such students (Keniston, "Notes on Young Radicals," 1969). To someone who uses the normal psychology that satisfaction brings lack of activity, this is puzzling because one would expect that these students have more of their wants satisfied than the less well-off students. But to one who uses the humanistic assumption that satisfaction brings about new desires, then the emergence of new goals and new activities for these students is the normal expectation.

METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

The fact that many current theories and typologies can be subsumed under a more general one seems to me to be an instance of the interplay of theory and empirical observation. If current theories, generalizations, descriptions, and typologies can be subsumed under a more general theory and typology, then the old observations can claim increased plausibility as instances of more general phenomena. Likewise, the new, general theory can claim that it is grounded in empirical observation by citing the older theories and their evidence as verification of the general theory. These are the moves I plan to make in the body of my dissertation for the benefit of both old theories and typologies and of the humanistic paradigm. The humanistic paradigm is coherent with many subviews, but it is more comprehensive than they are.

The type of statements and the intent of the paragraphs just above referring to the social science community are likely to be misunderstood by people who have been trained in unswerving loyalty to their disciplines' citystates. I am proposing an interdisciplinary approach as an additional approach, not as a replacement. I am trying to offer a system that allows interaction between and among the disciplines. As Alex Inkeles states this approach ("Personality and Social Structure," 1965, p. 261):

> ...the action propensities in the individual are derived, not from society, but from a general theory of the human personality. In turn, culture and social structure are perceived historically, not as derived from or reduced to personality factors. But they act on personality and, according to their mode of influence, produce reactions from personality which may generate movements of social change in the original sociocultural system.

An approach that values data from more than one discipline may give rise to a whole series of studies that connect 2 or more disciplines. The black boxes of intervening variables are not necessarily Pandora's boxes. A particular area that seems ready for multi-disciplinary studies is the area of linking personality to organizations.

Intellectuals, especially researchers, like to portray themselves as searchers after truth. It seems strange, therefore, that they would neglect a method of adding confirmation/disconfirmation to their studies. Logan's discussion, "The Hull-Spence Approach," provides an example of how a person from one sect of the intellectual world blinds himself to the other sects. Logan discusses Hull's intervening variables, which "are around the level of physiological processes" (1959, p. 300):

> ...physiological implications may be disregarded because the theory is properly evaluated only by the correctness of its psychological implications.
> (underlining mine)

Logan is correct in seeing that psychological concepts are not reducible to physiological ones (i.e., "habit strength" is not just a name for a physiological change or process), but he misses the fact that useful intervening variables (hypothetical constructs to MacCorquodale and Meehl) which are of a reductionist sort cannot be contradicted by the findings of the reducing science. For example, psychological hypotheses cannot require impossible physiological intervening variables, or sociological independent and dependent variables cannot be linked via impossible psychological variables. A political theory that makes use of plausible sociological theory is more credible than one that refers to no sociological theory and is definitely superior to one that cites an implausible sociological theory. For judging a theory, I suggest both interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary evaluations. A theory that meets both interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary criteria is doubly confirmed.

MacCorquodale and Meehl expect further interaction among disciplines and types of variables ("On a Distinction Between Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables," 1948, p. 105):

> Another consideration may be introduced here from the standpoint of future developments in scientific integration. Even those of us who advocate the pursuit of behavioral knowledge on its own level and for its own sake must recognize that some day the 'pyramid of the sciences' will presumably catch up with us. ...For this reason it is perhaps legitimate, even now, to require of a hypothetical construct that it should not be manifestly unreal in the sense that it assumes inner events that cannot conceivably occur.

Most theories and hypotheses make use of some sort of "inner events" or "black box" between independent and dependent variables. Often these are not made explicit or are ignored in order to maintain the "purity" of the science, as Logan did. Aside from the problem that bothers policy makers (The real world perversely refuses to present itself in the ideas of only one, pure discipline) this approach illegitimizes the immense field of interdisciplinary knowledge and blocks the potentiality for investigating it. Physiology is one of the psychologist's black boxes; personality theory is the sociologist's (Inkeles, 1954).

Hypothetical Construct Validity - (Black Box Validity)

Following the suggestion of MacCorquodale and Meehl, I propose that theories and hypotheses that use hypothetical constructs be required to pass a criterion of "hypothetical construct validity" which may be known among the cognoscenti as "black box validity." A theory or hypothesis will be said to have hypothetical construct validity when its constructs are compatible with general knowledge and particularly with whatever relevant knowledge exists at the next lower level and the next higher level in the explanatory hierarchy. A hypothetical construct is invalid if it requires the existence of entities or the occurrence of processes which cannot be seriously believed because of other knowledge.

Using the humanistic theory as a basis for combining information from diverse fields such as economics, sociology, psychology, and history, I hope to show (among other things) that information from one of these disciplines can be used to make hypotheses from another more plausible. If a sociologist can show that his hypothesis is consistent with knowledge from economics or history, as well as with other sociological knowledge, then his case is so much the better. By using a typology that spans parts of several disciplines, I hope to encourage this.

SUMMARY

Although individuals in academia may wish to help solve social problems, the structure of departmentalized specialization in institutions of higher education may impede their understanding of social problems and contributions to solving them. Kenneth E. Boulding points out this possible influence of organizational structure on thinking, rather, the lack of appropriate thinking, "...the question must be asked whether the existing structure (of academic departments) does not at many points seriously hinder the study of the social system as a totality, and whether it does not operate to prevent the development of that general social theory which the nature of the system itself would seem to require," ("Dare We Take the Social Sicences Seriously?" 1967, p. 884).

One of the limits on academic departments is the scope of the concepts they use. The ideas of a discipline help set the boundaries of the discipline. When someone wants to consider phenomena that link different sorts of concepts, then whose province is it? An organizational structure appropriate to the breadth of the required ideas is needed. But one of the status characteristics appropriate to discipline formation is a body of concepts and theory that can be labeled the "content" of that discipline, not of other disciplines. Perhaps the theory in this paper can serve as the beginning of a content that transcends disciplinary departments and around which an organizational structure can condense.

If the humanistic philosophical revolution can be thought of as a tree bearing fruit on many branches at the same time, this paper might be thought of as a partial sketch of the tree's limbs and trunk. In some cases I'll use the humanistic typology and dynamics to show that the varied fruit are actually from one tree. In other cases I'll point to underdeveloped branches and fruit in hopes of encouraging you to nurture them, and/or I may come back to some of them myself. In this conceptual sketch of the humanistic tree, I'll draw the lines with 5 major concepts, the typology, in the next chapter.

Although the stylistic changes in this dissertation are only minor ones, I hope they will encourage others who are more daring and more creative than I am to use styles that express themselves rather than being constrained to what they, accurately or erroneously, think is the accepted academic style. The biographical incidents I use, the occasional changes in style, the statements of personal opinions, and the other idiosyncrasies are more than a demonstration of a freer style, however. They also are part of the content of this dissertation. Part of what I want to describe in this work is a change in society that includes a greater appreciation, encouragement, and demonstration of multiple human, unique, and personal styles. These qualities and others are described somewhat in Chapter 2 under the heading "Self." They are further developed and investigated in the remaining chapters, especially in Chapter 12. Thus, I am trying to make this work a partial description and exemplification of this new way of looking at things.

To understand and judge this dissertation it is important to note the holism and value-centeredness of the conceptual part of the overall humanistic revolution, which Maslow points to. From within the new framework 2 major faults appear in "prerevolutionary" conceptualization. First, it claims to be value free in the sense of not judging what it studies and not letting values interfere with methodology of interpretation. Second, it is fragmented. The new, humanistic conceptualization is both value-centered and holistic. When I speak of this humanistic theory as one possible paradigm for new conceptualization, I include the meaning that it is both value-laden and holistic, departures from the usual academic style.

This humanistic theory might well be considered a study in society-and-values, how they influence each other. In the next chapter, where I develop a social system typology of 5 subsystems, the names of the subsystems - survival, stability, sociability, expertise, and self - are the dominant values of each subsystem. They are seen as influencing and manifested by other cultural, societal, and individual components of these subsystems. In older conceptual systems values are sometimes seen as one object of possible study. Here the emphasis on them is stronger; they are seen as central to almost all human action. In one sense this theory can be seen as a study in 5 values and how they affect human behavior. This theory also "takes sides" and claims that one set of values is preferable to the others. This is explained in the next chapter; for now it is enough to see that the general humanistic approach and the specific humanistic theory I am propounding form a possible paradigm because it breaks with current nonvaluing conceptualization.

A second reason that I nominate this theory as a possible paradigm is that it partially overcomes the fractionalization of previous theories. Although comprehensiveness is valued somewhat under disciplinary approaches, it is strongly valued and assumed under a humanistic approach. Thus, when I claim that this humanistic theory applies to most cultural, societal, and individual human action, this claim looks overbroad and overweening to one trained to a disciplinary approach, in which boundaries between disciplines are emphasized (although by no means always clearly demarcated). Within a humanistic frame of reference, however, all behavior is assumed to be interlocked, and a theory which treats only a small portion of human action is likely to be seen as overly specialized and of little relevance if it does not make connections with many other types of human behavior. The 5 values described in Chapter 2 are seen as organizing these complexes of interactions.

This dissertation, then, is a break with past approaches because it makes the humanistic assumptions that human action is (1) primarily value-centered and (2) intricately holistic. In judging this dissertation as an attempted achievement within this humanistic frame of reference, then, it is important to ask 2 questions. First: Can an observation under consideration be explained by referring to the value-system typology and relations among types proposed by this theory? This question examines the value assumption. Second: How many different types of observations can be explained by the theory? This question examines the holistic assumption. Under a humanistic orientation when one compares the usefulness of theories, he should especially evaluate them for breadth. For example in Chapters 4-10 I show that a great many kinds of findings about higher education can be explained using this humanistic theory. Range, scope, or breadth is of major importance within a humanistic orientation.*

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* I speculate that the definition of truth most applicable to this humanistic interpretation emphasizes different attributes of truth than does the definition used by specialized

(footnote continued on next page)

experts in a disciplinary approach. Both seem to desire the same attributes, but the emphasis switches. The experts of the specialized disciplinary approach stress exactness, precision, neatness, empirical fit, and the objective-outside nature of truth, often as an object of knowledge. They are interested in their particular specialities and are most interested in truths that contribute to these interests. The disciplinary-expertise use of statistics, for example, seems to emphasize the degree to which exactness and precision are achieved, the amount of deviation from precise prediction and likelihood of error, for example.

In the holistic-humanistic tradition a truth is seen as a good or valuable truth primarily if it is true for many different things (scope) and if it is true to one's own feelings and experience (the subjective nature of truth). People in this tradition are most interested in truths which tell them most about themselves and organize the most relationships in the world. Whether an appropriate form of statistics has been or can be developed to help analyze scope and personal relevance, I do not know. Can there be a statistics of holism?

In Chapter 13 I summarize the previous 9 chapters to show that a broad range of empirical observations of American higher education can be brought under the scope of a humanistic theory, and I speculate about other observations that can be included in the spread of this approach.

In this dissertation as a whole I try to show that a humanistic approach overcomes some current problems of overspecialization and underemphasis of values in understanding human action. This dissertation breaks with the current disciplinary techniques by exhibiting a value-systemed, holistic approach. As such I nominate it as a sample achievement, as a paradigmatic prototype for builders of other humanistic theories and for more investigations based on this specific humanistic theory, a first link in a chain of further humanistic development and investigation, "normal science," as Kuhn calls it. Chapter 13 suggests more links.

Kuhn states that often the mere realization that they are using the same paradigm results in a "school" of thought or study, a group that sees itself as working together on related problems with the same conceptual methodology (p. 19). Perhaps this dissertation will help humanistic investigators organize themselves to share information and techniques. Perhaps it will be possible, eventually, to develop a department or institute of humanistic studies for studies of social problems using this or other general social systems theories and for the further sophistication of humanistic points of view.

A HUMANISTIC SOCIAL THEORY:
A HUMAN SYSTEMS THEORY APPLIED TO YOUTH, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND OUR CULTURAL METAMORPHOSIS

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Chapter 2

A HUMANISTIC TYPOLOGY:
A SOCIAL SYSTEM COMPOSED OF 5 SUBSYSTEMS

Typologies

> It would seem evident that the primary function of types is to identify, simplify, and order concrete data so that they may be described in terms that make them comparable.
>
> (McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory, 1966, p. 216)

As the quotation from Hempel in Chapter 1 pointed out, and as he elaborated in his article "Typological Methods in the Social Sciences" (Hempel, 1963), forming a typology is one of the first steps in building a theory. Hempel points out 3 varieties of typologies, each appropriate for a different use. A "classificatory type" forms neat pigeonholes for data. Usually these are naturally occurring categories such as male/female, animal/vegetable/mineral, or past/present/future. While there may be some questionable cases, most, if not all cases (as would be hoped), fit into the categorization scheme.

Hempel's second type of typology is the "extreme" or "ordering" typology. Here the boundaries between categories are artificial because the phenomena are often gradations along a continuum. For example, the day-night continuum is one of degree, as is short-tall. The absolute or essential quality may never be fully exemplified. But it is useful for ordering, i.e., X is shorter than Y. In some ordering types one quality or trait (T) is expressed while its opposite is merely (non-T), i.e., Mai is blonder than Sammy. It is not specified whether the opposite (non-T) of blond (T) is brunette, redhead, bald, or whatever. The third kind of typology is the kind I use in this theory. I develop the categories in this chapter, the dynamics in the next chapter, and applications in later chapters. It is the "ideal type." Hempel describes the ideal type (p. 217):

> ...isolating and exaggerating certain aspects of concrete, empirical phenomena, as limiting concepts which are not fully exemplified but at best approximated...constructive types are usually introduced without even an attempt at specifying appropriate criteria of order, and they are not used for the kind of generalizing characteristic of ordering (extreme) types; rather they are invoked as a specific device for the explanation of social and historical phenomena. I shall try to argue now that this conception reflects an attempt to advance concept formation in sociology from the state of descriptions and "empirical generalization," which is exemplified by most classificatory and ordering types, to the construction of theoretical systems or models.

This sort of ideal type, the constructed concept, should not be confused with another ideal type, which is "ideal" in the sense of a desired standard of perfection. The "mental image" use, which I am using here, allows us to have ideal types of things which people do not want as a desired situation. For example, an ideal type (constructed type) of a plague would describe the characteristics of plagues, but would not be something wished for by most people.

McKinney concurs with Hempel and stresses that typologies are "constructed" as part of pragmatic research policy. As such, they are purposive and planned to be appropriate to the type of study or research. Since one of the purposes of this study is to present a view of man that includes individual, group, cultural, and social phenomena, the types in my typology, the "subsystems" of the whole social system, are very broad and combine many different sorts of phenomena into the various categories. Their breadth, of course, means that much richness of individual detail is ignored. They, like any abstraction, select and combine properties of phenomena, thus emphasizing certain characteristics and deemphasizing or omitting others. Constructed types are analytic, as opposed to synthetic, according to McKinney, because they stress differences among phenomena rather than similarities.

On the basis that typological categories stress differences among phenomena according to their types, I believe he is correct. However, in my opinion, typologies are also synthetic in the sense that they may combine into one category phenomena which had previously been thought to be disparate, while individual differences among them are neglected. For example, later in this work I combine certain individual, group, and cultural phenomena as well as various economic, political, social, and historic phenomena, together into various categories within the humanistic typology. These are usually treated as separate categories, but inasmuch as I put these together as instances of the same type, the humanistic typology is synthetic. Inasmuch as they are differentiated from other individual, group, cultural, economic, political, social and historical phenomena the humanistic paradigm is analytic. That is, this categorization scheme combines things previously thought to be different and differentiates among things previously thought to be similar.

Although the use of constructed types and typologies is an early step in scientific inquiry, the procedures of building types is far from highly specified (McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory, 1966, pp. 1-8). McKinney suggests, however, a preliminary set of 8 steps for their construction and use in scientific endeavors, especially in the social sciences ("Toward a Codification of Typological Procedure" in McKinney, 1966, pp. 199-216). Discussing these steps and using them to analyze this humanistic typology will help to clarify it and what I feel to be its potential uses.

While McKinney speaks of these 8 activities as "steps" and calls them a "series," he also says that there is no standard procedure that typologists follow. I find, for example, that the various activities he mentions don't form a sequence so much as 8 different strands of activities that are mutually interacting, not a clear sequence. What may have started as empirical varification of a type, step 7, may have switched to familiarization with relevant data, step 2, then to simplification of the type, step 5, or delineation of empirical uniformities, step 4. These, in turn, may have suggested a widening or narrowing of the problem situation, step 1.

The first step is delineation of the problem situation. McKinney's view that we start with the problem is consistent with his assumption that type construction is undertaken as a purposive, planned part of research methodology, that types and typologies are instrumental and have problem relevance. As I pointed out in the last chapter, I am attempting to build a theory of human social action within the metatheoretical holistic assumption of 20th century humanism. As such, I must try to encompass as much behavior and as many different sorts of behavior as I can. One of the primary criteria of judging this theory is its scope: How many different sorts of things does it attempt to explain? With this holistic problem, I am faced with the problem of trying to build a typology that will include personal, group, and cultural phenomena.

Step 2 is familiarization with the relevant available data. The examples McKinney uses are relatively narrow problems in the social sciences, and this step is appropriate there. In this investigation, however, the problem is trying to build a general theory of human behavior. The relevant data would maximally include everything about human behavior at all times, obviously a huge body of knowledge which one person could not become familiar with.

This is where Maslow's theory becomes useful. In Personality and Motivation (1954) we find a scheme for the holistic interpretation of human action in terms of motivation. The question then becomes: To what extent can Maslow's humanistic theory of motivation be used as a basis for understanding the mass of what we know about human behavior? As my specific site of investigation I decided to select the general domain of American higher education and to choose some studies and problems to focus on, Chapters 4-12.

Because Maslow's scheme was already formulated in terms of individual behavior, step 2, familiarization with his theory, led directly to step 3, derivation of hypotheses about relationships and sequences. In this work I discuss the hypotheses and sequences of my types of subsystems in Chapter 3. My method of arriving at them was to adapt Maslow's findings. While he focuses on individual behavior, I generalized his dynamics to include cultural and social change, too. This is more fully described in Chapter 3.

The 4th step consists of delineation of empirical uniformities and pragmatic reduction to type. This consists of specifying the attributes that are significantly representative for a composite picture of the type. The selection and composite are supposed to list those attributes that are most important in investigating the relationships of step 3. The definition of those attributes may be exaggerated to stress the unique characteristics of the type or types.

Since the types in this humanistic theory group together individuals and groups of various sizes, the composite picture must be general enough to fit 1 person, a society, and groups of different sizes in between. Thus, from this delineation of general attributes of the types more specific subtypes are derived. For each of the 5 general types of subsystems, there is an appropriate type of person, group, and society. But these are all seen as instances of the general types.

In this dissertation the next section of this chapter describes the characteristics of the types, but because of the broad nature of this theory and the fact that this is an exploratory study, I am making a point of leaving their complete definition open to further change as the theory is further developed in other works. Furthermore, since I am focusing on American higher education I will more carefully delineate the types as they apply to American higher education, leaving the development of other applications for other studies. Of course, most, if not all, theories leave themselves open for refinement and adjustment, but because of the especially broad scope of this theory, I think it is important to stress that I am examining only part of its empirical reference and that further clarification of this working model and example is needed.

The 5th step in type construction is simplification of the type by reducing the number of attributes included in the types. For example, in the next section of this chapter I list many different characteristics as traits of the stability subsystem, one of my major types. As further investigation of this subsystem increases, the defining traits for research investigations may be reduced, or eliminated. For example, suppose that lack of introspection in the stability type is empirically found not to correlate positively with the proposed stability subsystem. In that case the attribute can be dropped. Conversely, if it is found to correlate perfectly with other traits of the subsystem, for example the desire for a strong leader, then it can be dropped in order to simplify the description and use of the subsystem in empirical investigations. That is, if "lack of introspection" always occurs when "strong leader" occurs, then one of them can be dropped to simplify research.

This step, it should be noted, is firmly embedded in McKinney's assumption that type construction is undertaken as part of a problem-centered research program, and this desire for parsimony is based, I assume, on his desire to make research easily managed. While I certainly concur with him on this goal, a holistic approach which tries to explain a wide variety of behavior with one set of categories and relationships, as this theory tries, would want to include as many attributes under its types and relationships as it can. While McKinney's orientation toward type construction is as an investigator of specific problems and/or narrow-scope theories, a humanistic theory-building approach would try to include as many kinds of traits as it can.

In one sense this whole humanistic theory and my particular investigation of it in higher education falls within this step. One of the points I try to demonstrate is that a great variety of attributes can be simplified by seeing them as derived from 5 values, or dominant characteristics, of 5 subsystems, my 5 major types. Thus, I propose that the number of separate attributes, traits, properties, or characteristics we use when studying social systems can often be reduced to a set of 5 traits, general factors, or groups of highly correlated traits.

McKinney's 6th step is the adaptation of available theories and principles to give a tentative explanatory accounting of the type. For this step he is thinking of going beyond the level of one type of person in one sort of social system to consider more types in more social systems - from the particular to the more general. He suggests that it may be possible to develop a series of hypotheses about these additional types in additional situations.

The spirit of this step, broad scope, is in keeping with both the specialization approach of disciplinary studies, which tries to obtain wide application by extending the limited scope of a particular theory or observation, and with the holistic approach of 20th century humanism, which starts with the assumption that broad scope is the beginning of investigation and that narrow particularities develop out of a wider view. McKinney's technique of starting with the narrow scope and enlarging it is more characteristic of the specialized approach than the holistic approach. With its emphasis on going from the general to the particular, the humanistic approach makes this desire for increased scope a *fait accompli*. Specialization then follows this general view instead of leading to it.

In another sense, however, the move from more narrow scope to wider scope is an essential part of the development of this humanistic theory. In developing this theory, one of my starting points was Abraham Maslow's more specialized theory of human motivation, and I widened it to include group action as well as individual action. This is an example of how typology formation is not so much a sequence as it is a conglomeration of ongoing contemporaneous events. My 6th-step activity, adaptation of available theories was also part of the 3rd step's derivation of hypotheses about relationships and sequences, and the second step, familiarization with relevant data.

The next to the last step in the use of types is empirical verification of the types and examination of the rates of incidence and degree of approximation. Since the type is an exaggeration of certain qualities which are theorized as occurring together, it is likely that the empirical findings will show that the actual instances only approximate the ideal type. If the attributes have been carefully delineated, then the distributions of the approximations to the type can be studied, too. For example, it may be that those cases that deviate from the ideal type in one way are also likely to deviate in other ways. We may suppose, for the sake of illustration, that a stability type of person who does not show the expected lack of introspection may also fail to show the desire for a strong leader. From this information subtypes may be formed and hypotheses relating them to the main typology might be formulated. Here too, some attributes may be so highly correlated that they are redundant and can be omitted, thus simplifying the type, step 5. Others may be so seldom associated with the type that they can be dropped.

The degree to which actual instances match the ideal is also a matter for possible investigation. Do they, for example, all closely resemble the type in most traits, or are they distributed in some particular pattern?

The main body of this dissertation is an investigation of verification of the types. Chapter 4 especially concentrates on a study of approximately 13,000 college freshmen in an attempt to see whether the attributes posited by the typology show up in that sample. That chapter presents some justification for using the humanistic typology, and Chapters 5-10 present some additional information about the attributes of the types. These chapters also use the types in explanations of others' studies of higher education, bringing us to the final step in type construction.

The 8th step is interpretation. In Chapters 11-12 I use the typology as a basis for interpreting some kinds of student activism and conflict in American higher education. The mere existence of the posited types gives some credence to these interpretations, but is not conclusive evidence for them. For example, in Chapter 2 one of the student types I construct is the "self type." In Chapters 4-10 I present some evidence for believing that this type exists; then in Chapters 11 and 12 I use the type as part of an explanation for some kinds of student unrest. Further verification would have to be done to see whether the suppositions of Chapters 11 and 12 actually do hold up. Are the self types active in the way I suppose them to be? This remains for further investigation.

A second fruit of interpretation is that some instances will be found not to fit the pattern expected by the theory. These may, in turn, result in another typology which includes them. Investigation of this humanistic typology has not proceeded far enough yet to spin-off additional typologies or subtypologies. Perhaps someday it will.

In summary, McKinney stresses that the important thing to notice is that the making of types, collecting data based on them, and comparing empirical cases with the ideal type and with each other present a systematic way of studying social phenomena and can lead to more refined ways for additional studies. The problem I am working on is a holistic analysis of the social system. Instead of categorizing the system into constituent groups of various sizes and individuals, I categorize them into 5 types of behavior. This is the business of the next part of this chapter.

SUBSYSTEMS*

Note on usage - The words that I have chosen to name the subsystems and as characteristic of the subsystems and their components are all nouns, "survival," "stability," "sociability," "expertise," and "self." I will adopt the convention of using them as adjectives too. For example, instead of saying, "the subsystem characterized by expertise," I'll call that subsystem "the expertise subsystem." And instead of writing such things as "the values found in the self subsystem" I'll write "self values," or "stability organizations" and "sociability orientation" for these components of the stability subsystem and sociability subsystems.

In this view of the social system there are 5 major factors, or subsystems. Each of these subsystems is characterized by a dominant core, value, theme, general factor, or trait that characterizes the subsystem and each of its parts, or components. Each subsystem is a general factor in the sense of involving a "reduction or simplification of a large number of variates so that some hypothetical variates, fewer in number ...can be used to replace them" (Humphries, 1968, p. 281).

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*If you are familiar with thinking of things in terms of types of consciousness, you can consider these as 5 types of consciousness. If you don't understand the previous sentence, don't let it bother you.

The 5 traits that name the subsystems and characterize their parts are (1) survival, (2) stability, (3) sociability, (4) expertise, and (5) self. The parts of each subsystem which they characterize include individual, group, and cultural components: values, beliefs, attitudes, goals, actions, perceptions, thoughts, morals, reason, consciousness, meaning, intent, ethics, aesthetics, freedom, view of man, feelings, language, worldview, culture, social structures, organizational style, style of life, norms, etc. These components are the "large number of variates" that are simplified into the "hypothetical variates, fewer in number," the 5 subsystems.

If we think of the social system as portrayed by this theory as a matrix, we can derive several, or perhaps many, humanistic matrices such as the following:

Humanistic Subsystems

(Types of Consciousness)

	survival	stability	sociability	expertise	self
Components					
values					
styles					
attitudes					
social structure					
perceptions					
goals					
definition of the good					
etc. ...					

The major questions asked by this theory are: To what extent can the components of the social system be characterized by the 5 subsystems, and what components can and cannot be characterized by them? In other words, to what extent can these and other items be included in the first column? This theory assumes that all the items listed in the previous paragraph and more can be listed in the component column. And this dissertation is a partial examination of some items to see to what extent they can be classified by the 5 subsystem characteristics, or traits. Chapters 4-10 rehang data from some other studies of higher education on humanistic matrices. I hope you will find applications of humanistic matrices useful in whatever interests you.

There is a characteristic emphasis on certain values, styles, attitudes, etc. for the survival subsystem, a different emphasis for the stability subsystem, another for the sociability subsystem, and still different ones for the expertise and self subsystems. Another way of using this theory is to study one of our usual social science abstractions or the things it refers to, such as values or organizational structure, and note whether and how it takes on the general traits of, or changes in, the various subsystems. Our object of study can be seen as a variable capable of taking on 5 values (the 5 subsystem traits) as it becomes a component of the various subsystems. The extent to which these components and others can usefully be characterized by the subsystems is part of the investigation in this work and remains wide open for further studies.

Instead of referring to each of these components separately, "stability values, stability goals, stability behavior, etc.," we can simplify matters by referring to the whole cluster by the name of the subsystem, "the stability subsystem." The overall social system can then be characterized and studied as the interactions among the various subsystems and their components.

When a general trait is used to characterize a subsystem and its components, it is meant as a dominant characteristic. While one of the 5 characteristics may be dominant, the others may exist to a lesser extent. They are not exclusive characteristics. Maslow suggests (1954, p. 100-101), "... the average citizen is satisfied perhaps 85 percent in his physiological (survival) needs, 70 percent in his safety (stability) needs, 50 percent in his love (sociability) needs, 40 percent in his self-esteem (expertise) needs, and 10 percent in his self-actualization (self) needs." It is the relative emphasis from one subsystem to another that changes rather than an all-or-nothing characteristic in each subsystem. For example, the desire to organize, systematize, categorize, catalog, name, etc. exists in all the subsystems, but it is posited here as being *especially* characteristic of the stability subsystem (see below).

To understand and to use this theory accurately it is important to be aware of the ordinal nature of the types and of the general propositions in the next chapter. What this theory states is that the various subsystems and their components have *more* of their characteristic attributes than do the other subsystems and their components. These attributes pervade their respective subsystems and are the major value in them, but they also exist to lesser extents in other subsystems (where other attributes or traits are dominant). Statements within this humanistic theory are claims of *more* or less, not claims of the absolute presence or absence, and not claims of specific numerical amounts. This is discussed further in the introduction to Part 2 of Chapter 4 under "Ordinal Nature of This Theory."

The sociability culture or individual, for example, can be seen as predominantly that of sociability, but the other traits are likely to be present too, but a lesser extent. In a society with a predominantly stability culture, for example, we would expect to find stability characteristics more frequently than other characteristics. In Alternative Futures: An Exploration of a Humanistic Approach to Social Forecasting, Arnold Mitchell (1967) speaks of "need-profiles" of societies. He says that the society in the United States is predominantly sociability oriented (he uses Maslow's "love") and is moving toward an expertise orientation (Maslow's "esteem"). Likewise, we might speak of a profile of subsystems as applied to groups, individuals, and cultures or as applied to our usual objects of study. For example: What is the distribution of educational institutions by humanistic types? How many schools, classes, pupils, etc. are stability oriented? How many self oriented? Or: How can we characterize the structure of an organization? Of the organizations that compose a society?

It is important to remember that typological classification can characterize by noting dominant traits but that not all instances are likely to be subsumed by the traits. Hempel's statement that typologies exaggerate, isolate, and accentuate certain features and ignore others is a caveat as well as an observation on methodology.

In what sense are these subsystems pervasive? I believe, and hope to partially demonstrate in the rest of this work, that they influence an immense number of human actions. The subsystems are perceptual screens influencing the way people perceive and interpret the world. One might think of there being 5 pairs of glasses, or types of consciousness, through which people see the world. The subsystems are conceptual boxes and provide the categories people think with. They are basic to differences in economic, social, political, and philosophical thought. Each type has a distinct pattern of actions, attitudes, feelings, values, goals, and needs of individuals and groups.

I find the phrase "subsystem relativity" useful to point out: (1) this theory stresses the idea that the interpretation of a person's or group's activities must be done in relation to his (its) subsystem. (2) When talking about most human behavior, we do so from one or another of these subsystems ourselves. (3) What people see and do is relative to their worldview and it is helpful to understand it as such. (4) Various interpretations of human behavior are built from one or another of these subsystems or pay attention to one or another subsystem. They are more understandable when seen as such. For example, the "human relations" school of interpersonal and intergroup behavior is basically a sociability type interpretation due to its emphasis on smooth interpersonal relations (see "sociability" later in this chapter).

Considering the scope of the theory, which is a wide-open field for further examination, and its types and the variety of human behavior that they encompass, it would be exceedingly difficult at this exploratory stage to give explicit, complete descriptions of the types. In fact, much of this work expands and contracts the meanings of the categories so that their meaning becomes clearer through use. I do not consider the definitions given here to be the final ones, but to be working definitions which will become constantly refined here, and I hope in your and others' investigations. They are, in Carnap's sense, "open" theoretical concepts (1956, pp. 53, 59, 67).

I will here assume a wide-scope to the theory and concepts, but further investigation will or will not substantiate this. Perhaps sharing a holistic bent with humanistic theory, I choose to start with a broadly inclusive theory and possibly whittle it down empirically rather than start with a narrow, but clearly defined theory and add to it by accretion. My approach is, in my opinion, more in keeping with the humanistic assumption that human behavior is and should be looked at as united rather than studied in separate compartments, disciplines, and, hopefully fitted together someday.

In the sense of concept and theoretical development, the rest of this work can be considered a partial investigation of the concepts' openness and the extent of the theory, to find some instances of where they fit and where they don't, to demonstrate some contexts in which they are useful, but not to limit the theory or the types to only the content and contexts in this work. Considering the early formative and developmental stage of this theory any attempted finalization of it would be premature and presumptuous in my opinion. This work may be a beginning of a humanistic research, analysis, conceptualization, and investigation, "normal science" (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1968). But it is only a beginning.

Hopefully, these theoretical types will help us develop comprehensive laws (Chapter 3) that will account for a multiplicity of uniformities in observations and empirical generalizations, generalizations; and statistical relationships about observables can be subsumed under these theoretical subsystems and the hypothetical relations among them (Chapters 4-10).

Related Research

I developed these categories originally from Abraham H. Maslow's "A Theory of Human Motivation" (1954, pp. 80-106), but his categories were for individuals only. I have made his categories of human motivation more abstract and generalized them to apply to groups as well as individuals. In the sections of this paper following the next chapter on the dynamics of the system, I'll make repeated moves from this more general level of abstraction back to individual behavior and also to group behavior.

Maslow's approach to his theory of motivation is to look at what he considers the generally healthiest people psychologically and build an ideal type (both desired and constructed ideal type). In this investigation and related studies (1954, 1962, 1964, 1967, 1970) he reports that he discovered that human needs and values can be grouped into 5 major clusters. They form a chain of prepotency; that is, when one group of needs is satisfied, the next group emerges, and so forth from step to step. In this study I am starting from his findings. Sometimes I use them as assumptions. At other times I offer some evidence for them and for the general statements of this humanistic social sciences theory. Maslow's categories and my generalizations are:

	Maslow	Humanistic Paradigm
1	Physiological	Survival
2	Safety	Stability
3	Love	Sociability
4	Esteem	Expertise
5	Self-actualization	Self

I consider Maslow's work not only to have inspired (or instigated) mine, but also to be a particular instance of my general social science systems theory. Rather than constantly cite him in this and the next chapter, I thank him here and refer you to "A Theory of Human Motivation" (1954, pp. 80-106).

This approach has also been developed independently, concurrently, and with some overlap and variation at the Educational Policy Research Center of Stanford Research Institute in Menlo Park, California. See A Needs-Concerns View of Society by John J. Bosley (1967) and Alternative Futures: An Exploration of a Humanistic Approach to Social Forecasting by Arnold Mitchell (1967). The Needs-Concerns paper takes a socialization approach in arriving at estimates of the composition, or profile, of American society. Bosley develops a socialization model for linking personality with the social system, and he bases this on his own and on Mitchell's adaptations of Maslow. While I disagree with many of the details in these papers (especially Mitchell's adaptation of

Maslow's theory of motivation), the Educational Policy Research Center is making the same sort of "moves" that I have made and will develop later in this paper.

Willis Harman (Alternative Futures and Educational Policy, 1970) extends Mitchell's approach to the educational components of tasks for our society. He spots 6 major tasks that confront us: (1) make direct attack on aspects of the world macroproblem, (2) control technological development and application, (3) alter values, perceptions, and premises, (4) establish a new sense of national purpose, (5) meet the educational demands of varied groups, (6) educate for coping with an uncertain future. Harman then lists a series of 6 steps toward reaching these goals. The first step for each task is "new conceptualization" of mankind, our history, our situation, and our possibilities. I hope and expect that this theory will contribute to this revised view, the "philosophical revolution" mentioned in Chapter 1 (Maslow, "Further Reaches of Human Nature," 1967b, p. 1).

THE 5 HUMANISTIC SUBSYSTEMS

The following 5 categories of dominant subsystems are the types in this humanistic theory. Their descriptions here are general and abstract. They will become clearer and more fully explicated as they are applied in the rest of this paper.

Survival

This category emphasizes remaining alive and free from physical discomfort. This is predominantly somatic and can be summarized as the 3 P's, protection of the person, production of food, and procreation in its physiological aspects. Survival is the counterpart of Maslow's "physiological needs." On a cultural level we see a subsistence society. In the ideal type of survival subsystem all the components will show the survival characteristic. We would expect, on this theoretical basis, to find education, religion, government, etc. subservient to the organization that meets the survival needs, whether family, tribe, or village.

When other categories of behavior are dominant, Maslow's theory leads us to assume the physiological activities are still functioning, but they are not the primary concern of a person or group. That is, even non-survival societies and people must eat, but it isn't their primary concern.

In the United States, a small percentage of people operate at this level, and until recently there was little attention to them. Michael Harrington's The Other America (1964) helped bring this group to the public eye, but because they have little power and spend much of their time just trying to get along, they are not politically powerful.

A person of this type thinks of himself, the world, and others in terms of survival and the objects necessary for survival. Because of this single-minded concern with survival the whole survival subsystem is likely to be less differentiated than the later subsystems, in which there is time and effort to spare for building separate social institutions.

Stability

Stability shows itself in a notably strong desire for orderliness, set structures and relationships, a place for everything and everything in its place, rules, regulations, formulas, etc. Organizations which have a strong emphasis on structure may emphasize ritual, routine, doing things by established procedures (the stereotype of a bureaucracy). Another aspect of stability is a desire for the familiar, predictable, and certain. A traditional society, i.e., valuing tradition, results. Things which are new or different are seen as dangerous, alien, and hostile. There is a great desire to categorize everything, and simpler schemes of categorization are preferred to complex ones. Hayakawa describes this as a semanticist in his chapter "The Two-Valued Orientation,"(Language in Thought and Action, 1964, p. 320):

> This proneness to divide the world into two opposing forces - "right" versus "wrong," "good" versus "evil" - and to ignore or deny the existence of any middle ground, may be termed the two-valued orientation.

A favorite way of increasing stability is to adopt and tenaciously hold a worldview, belief system, philosophy, faith, ideology, or religion which systematizes all things and states the relationships among them. A person sees himself and other people and things in terms of this set, rigid belief system.

Stability subsystem conceptualization of social problems is also based on this stability method of conceptualization. It is often strongly ideological, political, and/or partisan in nature. Polarization of attitudes and concepts, thinking in dualistic opposites, and labeling result. Politically, stability is manifested in totalitarianism, absolutism, and authoritarianism. These emphasize complete orderliness and the attributes noted by Levinson below.

In economics this shows up as trying to provide for every possible contingency. Tawney describes the excesses that this hyper self-reliance and economic independence can go to (The Acquisitive Society, 1948, p. 29),"...their whole tendency and interest and preoccupation is to promote the acquisition of wealth." And this preoccupation is based on an assumed escape from a survival subsystem (p. 158):

> The assumption that the stimulus of imminent personal want is either the only spur, or a sufficient spur, to productive effort is a relic of a crude psychology which has little warrant either in past history or in present experience.

To people with this orientation the right of private property is one of their most emphasized values because personal security, safety, and stability are thought to increase as one's property increases.

In an individual we see this exaggerated in the authoritarian personality syndrome (Adorno _et_ _al_, _The Authoritarian Personality_, 1950; Jones and Gerard, _Foundations of Social Psychology_, 1967, pp. 173-174, 707). Daniel J. Levinson summarizes much of the research on this well-examined category and the personality and social components of the stability subsystem ("Conservatism and Radicalism," 1968, pp. 24-27):

> There is massive evidence that authoritarianism is significantly associated with the following: emphasis on rigid hierarchy and stratification in political and other structures; rejection of democratic processes; reliance upon the "great leader" in solving social problems and upon coercive social controls in maintaining social order; chauvinistic nationalism as a stance toward one's own nation and toward international affairs; an ethnocentric view of relationships among various groups within the nation; readiness to place severe restrictions upon civil rights and civil liberties; religious fundamentalism and its extension into political and other spheres; punitiveness as a basic emotional-moral response to deviance (expressed idealogically, for example, in the emphasis upon military solutions to international problems, or upon the use of punishment in the deterrence of legal crime and nonconformity); rejection of innovation, experimentation, and openness in political and other systems.

Jones and Gerard report that this set of stability attitudes and personality characteristics is likely to be formed by harsh and threatening home discipline and by parents who adopt highly conventional goals for their children and who view the child's behavior in terms of their own, rather than the children's needs (1967, p. 173). Highly authoritarian people are less likely to accept their own impulses and feelings and are prone to repress and displace them by attributing them to others, especially to social minorities and people otherwise different from themselves.

The economic, social, political, and cognitive styles of the stability personality, society, and culture combine to form an interlocking subsystem permeated by the value of stability. Unfortunately, the amount of information available on the other subsystems is less than that on the stability subsystem. Here is another field for investigation, collecting and combining the information now available and doing original research to fill in the holes for the other subsystems.

Sociability

The third category focuses on warm interpersonal relations. While people and groups in the other categories also interact with others, here the emphasis and value is on such relationships. The interaction is not a side issue to other problems and interests. For example, in the stability orientation people may form groups, but these are spin-offs of the stability orientation such as groups forming around the belief systems, etc. Under the survival subsystem groups form, but primarily to meet the survival needs. Under the sociability orientation, however, group membership itself is desired.

One aspect of the sociability subsystem is the other-directedness described by David Reisman in The Lonely Crowd (1961, pp. 21-22):

> What is common to all the other-directed people is that their contemporaries are the source of direction for the individual - either those known to him or those with whom he is indirectly acquainted, through friends and through the mass media. This source is of course "internalized" in the sense that dependence on it for guidance in life is implanted early. The goals toward which the other-directed person strives shift with that guidance; it is only the process of striving itself and the process of paying close attention to the signals from others that remain unaltered throughout life....
>
> While all people want and need to be liked by some of the people some of the time, it is only the modern other-directed types who make this their chief source of direction and chief area of sensitivity.

While I agree that the other-directedness is characteristically modern, i.e., that there is more of it now than in many previous times, I disagree that other-directedness, or excesses of the sociability subsystem exist in modern times only. The humanistic theory leads us to expect sociability types to exist throughout time, where there is a middle class, for example.

William H. Whyte, Jr. calls one of the components of the sociability subsystem the "social ethic" in The Organization

Man (1957, p. 7):

> By social ethic I mean that contemporary body of thought which makes morally legitimate the pressures of society against the individual. Its major propositions are three: a belief in the group as the source of creativity; a belief in "belongingness" as the ultimate need of the individual; and a belief in the application of science to achieve the belongingness.

The emphases on groupiness and belongingness are definitely sociability traits, while the citation of science indicates some influence of the expertise subsystem, but it is still subservient to the sociability subsystem, i.e., used to further sociability.

Although some views of the "mass society" can stress the stability aspects of totalitarianism stemming from tyranny of the masses, the overriding characteristic is group solidarity, based on a democratic value. "Pervading all kinds of mass relations is a common normative orientation of equalitarianism. All members of mass society are equally valued as voters, buyers, and spectators." And, "...similarities between the attitudes and behavior of individuals tend to be viewed as more important than differences." This contributes to the breakdown of the stability subsystem's hierarchical social and political structure as local, class, ethnic, and religious groups lose identity in a large whole, (Kornhauser, "Mass Society" 1968, p. 58-59). This might best be seen as the egalitarian, or sociability, society.

Not only is the emphasis on group-legitimized norms in the sociability subsystem more pervasive than the emphasis in other subsystems, but conformity and exaggerated equality are seen as good themselves, not primarily as instrumental to some other goal. The norms of sociability oriented people differ from the norms of stability types. The former adopt what they think their groups approve of: What the group thinks is right is right. The stability oriented, however, conform to what they think is a true, secure, certain ideology. The groups they belong to are likely to be based on this shared ideology rather than the ideology growing from the group. To stability types belief is the unifying element rather than sociability.

An individual who is socially motivated thinks of himself primarily in terms of his relations with others. He wants warm, human relations with people as one of his primary goals. Maslow calls this "love," and it refers to both affection and affiliation. Popularity is highly prized. Much of America is sociability oriented. This is phrased in word, song, and legend. "Hail! Hail! The gang's all here," celebrates the sociability orientation. Will Rogers phrased one statement of this ideal, "I never met a man I didn't like," (1930). The converse of this would make people in the sociability category even happier: I never met a man who didn't like me. This sociability desire shows up in wanting to be "one of the boys," or "just folks." In the next subsystem, the expertise subsystem, people pay attention to social relations, too, but the emphasis switches from an orientation of being liked to being respected and esteemed, from popularity to status.

Egalitarianism, democracy, togetherness, belongingness, affiliation; groupiness, unusually strong emphasis on norms, tolerance and similarities, sociability, pleasant social relations, peer-pressure, conformity, other-directedness, the social ethic, and mass society are all typical traits of the sociability syndrome.

Expertise

This category is similar to the social orientation because it is partially based on esteem, respect, or prestige from others. But an important difference is that being well-thought of to an expertise type connotes status and is often based in a specialized ability or skill, not just the being liked of popularity. Esteem connotes recognition, attention, importance, and appreciation, but this may come not only from one's immediate contacts alone, but also from people who have more universal standards. Professional colleagues are an example. In this sense the local or rational political group is transcended by the standards of a profession and an interest in mankind. The feelings of achievement, adequacy, and confidence in the face of the world are important in the expertise subsystem. Being of service and value to the world differentiates this orientation from the sociability orientation, which may include recognition for popularity, but not so much from service to mankind, expertise, specialized skills or knowledge. Professionalism gets at this dimension. Expanded frame of reference is one hallmark of the expertise person. He includes people with his specialty as the major reference group wherever they are in the world; for example, to expertise people the professions, the arts, and the sciences are often characterized as transcending nationalism, as world-communities. On a cultural level expertise is a technocratic, or expert, society. In The Making of a Counter-Culture Theodore Roszak catches the expertise essence of specialization, science, and technology: (1969, pp. 7-8, 142):

> ...It will be enough to define the technocracy as that society in which those who govern justify themselves by appeal to technical experts who, in turn, justify themselves by appeal to scientific forms of knowledge. And beyond the authority of science, these is no appeal.
>
> Expertise - technical, scientific, managerial, military, educational, financial, medical - has become the prestigious mystogogy (sic) of the technocratic society.

From Roszak's mentioning of specialization as the justification of those who govern in the technocratic society we begin to see one way the humanistic social science theory can be used. In the expertise subsystem expertise is seen as legitimatizing, and experts make decisions. In the sociability subsystem, by contrast, there is a "popular legitimation of authority" (Kornhauser, "Mass Society," 1968, p. 60) and large-scale democratic processes are appealed to as a basis of leadership and a justification for group action. The pressures of society, as society, are felt as morally legitimate (Whyte, The Organization Man, 1957, p. 7). In the stability subsystem legitimatization comes from a "true" belief, a great leader, and/or a political hierarchy. This theory sensitizes us to these differences in style from subsystem to subsystem and helps us conceptualize these differences and link them to other similar variations in other components. We can also use the theory as a basis for hypothesizing about components. For example, we can expect that legitimatization of group pressure in the survival subsystem will be on the basis that individual cooperation is needed for the survival of the group, for protection and food production. On the same basis we would expect the social imperative of the self subsystem to stress cooperation for mutual self-growth.

In one sense the expertise subsystem resembles the sociability orientation to the degree that a person defines his worth in terms of other people, esteem from his colleagues or from the people he helps; however, this type of recognition differs from the emphasis on being liked in the sociability subsystem. In another sense the expertise subsystem blends into the self subsystem. In the self values, individual development is highly desired. Professionalism or specialized expertise is one step toward this; one develops a special ability and receives some notoriety from it. This often leads to a subspecialty and so forth until one becomes the expert in a subfield. Increasingly such a person relies more on himself and less on his colleagues to determine what he should do or wants to do. The scope of those whose opinions are most important narrows from the general population in the sociability subsystem, to colleagues in the expertise subsystem, to himself in the self system. While the others exist to a lesser extent, the dominant reference group narrows and changes relative to the subsystem.

In "Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles" Alvin Gouldner describes some differences between sociability types and expertise types (1957-1958). He bases this distinction on Robert Merton's previous distinction between "locals" and "cosmopolitans," ("Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," 1957). Merton notes that locals (sociability types) join organizations to make contacts and to meet as many people as they can, while cosmopolitans (expertise types) join organizations in which they can exercise their special skills and knowledge. Gouldner uses the same dichotomy, but includes stability types in his locals: "Locals tend to be tighter in rule tropism (tighter rules) than cosmos," (1957). Both Gouldner and Merton identify the expertise type as oriented toward a wider community than the sociability type, and both see personal skill, knowledge, and expertise leading to this wider reference group. These studies will be examined through the glasses of this humanistic theory in more detail later, Chapter 7.

Self

The values of the self subsystem are the ultimate or highest good within the framework of this humanistic view of man. The self ideal type is both a constructed ideal type and a desired ideal type. The type is arrived at from 2 sources, (1) studies of the psychologically healthiest people and their characteristics, the psychological strain of information (Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 1962), and (2) studies of philosophies and religions in a search for common values and insights that they share and have shown throughout time and around the world, the metaphysical strain. The components of the self subsystem are examined as manifestations of these shared values and insights. In this work I am using the psychological strain of information from Maslow rather than the metaphysical strain from sources such as Aldous Huxley's The Perennial Philosophy, (1968). I believe, however, that they are complementary.

The personal characteristics of the self subsystem have been one of Maslow's major areas of study. He lists the personal characteristics of the self types and says that they are more likely to value and to experience feelings of the following: wholeness, perfection, justice, aliveness, richness, playfulness, truth, and self-sufficiency (1962). Of course most people value and experience these things, but the self types apparently do so more than others, who see these as instrumental to some other goal, not so much as goals themselves. Again it is a matter of degree, not of the presence or absence of the trait.

Another aspect of the self subsystem is the acceptance and increased intensity of the transpersonal, religious, mystic, and occult. Anthony J. Sutich ("Transpersonal Psychology: An Emerging Force," 1968, p. 77) describes the psychology which specializes in these human interests:

> The emerging "Fourth Force" (Transpersonal psychology) is concerned specifically with the scientific study and responsible implementation of becoming, individual and species-wide, meta-needs, ultimate values, unitive consciousness, peak experiences, B values (intrinsically valued for themselves), ecstasy, mystical experience, awe, being, self-actualization, essence, bliss, wonder, ultimate meaning, transcendence of the self, spirit, oneness, cosmic awareness, individual and species-wide synergy, maximal interpersonal encounter, sacralization of everyday life, transcendental phenomena, cosmic self-humor and playfulness; maximal sensory awareness, responsiveness and expression, and related concepts, experiences, and activities.

Maslow says that the latter stages of the self system are increasingly centered around such interests. In "Theory Z" (1970) he reports that the self-actualizers (self types) are of 2 kinds, "those who were clearly healthy, but with little or no experience of transcendence, and those in whom transcendent experiencing was important and even central." The first type is characteristically free from the survival, stability, sociability, and expertise subsystems. The latter have this freedom, too, but also show more of the characteristics Sutich describes and show them to a greater degree. Such people are more likely to have mystic, sacral, aesthetic, and ecstatic peak-experiences "with illuminations or insights or cognitions which changed their view of the world and of themselves," (Maslow, 1970).

Typical behavior for people with a self orientation is not instrumental (i.e., to obtain something else). They feel their actions are enjoyable for themselves. Maslow calls some of these experiences "peak experiences;" they, themselves, are pleasurable, ends, not means to other ends.

As I look out my window I see a San Francisco cable car. Some people ride the cable cars to get somewhere, such as to work. These people have an instrumental reason for riding. Other people, especially tourists, ride them because it's fun to ride them. They have self-validating experiences. The reasons of most riders are mixed, of course; it is the predominance of one or the other that would classify them.

A person who is concerned with developing his idiosyncratic uniqueness or his own personal style may or may not be creative, as is his character. He may want to develop one or a few of his talents, or he may want to develop as many of them as he can in different roles, for each of his multiple potentialities, situations, interests, values, abilities, and/or curiosities. On an individual level, but with some applications to interpersonal relations, Maslow describes this type of person in Toward A Psychology of Being (1962). He uses the word "being" to emphasize the fact that the actions themselves are enjoyable, i.e., it is *being* that is enjoyable, rather than trying to be something one currently is not, *becoming*.

In this category people are primarily interested in self-growth. Each person becomes the measure of his own development. This stage is not anti-social, however, as a person's own development may be linked with social, family, or group activity. For example, one person may want to assume public office, another may want to be the best parent he can, and another teach. These activities, however, are primarily an expression of himself to a self type, not a desire for popularity or status.

Self oriented people may operate in various types of groups. Maslow shows how this can be done in corporate enterprises in Eupsychian Management (1965), but self-actualizing people may be found in a variety of situations. He uses the idea of societal-individual synergy to describe the mutually benefiting relationship between a person and a society in which the society provides the person with a role or roles to enhance his self-growth, and the society benefits from his labors (1964). It is important to note that this conception of "self" is not one of self versus society (although there may be some individual-group conflict), but it is primarily self in society, using, contributing to, and benefiting society, "...the object is not to have one's way," the Port Huron Statement says, "so much as it is to have a way that is one's own," (Students for a Democratic Society, 1962, p. 13).

Personal and social goals are seen as ultimately complementary but with possible conflict arising from either an undeveloped society or an undeveloped person (undeveloped in the sense of being at one of the earlier subsystems). For example, certain social structures and norms or other components may block or be conducive to self-growth. For example, our cultural expectation that most people will choose only one occupation and work at it or in related fields restricts people who have varied interests and abilities. Our occupational roles seldom allow someone to develop several types of work simultaneously or to switch from one to another in sequence. Other organizations, such as artists' guilds, can be arranged to allow each person to have more leeway than he would have in many organizational roles.

Because the self types have been exceptions throughout most of history, it is difficult to describe their organizational characteristics. The type does seem to be becoming more numerous; however, and if we look at those groups that do have a large number of self types in them, we see some common characteristics emerging. Openness, change, fluidness, turmoil, direct participation, temporariness, and switching leadership seem to be some traits of self organizations. There is little permanence of any kind in structure, goals, methods, leaders, etc. In many senses the self style is the opposite of the stability style. The stability style values (among other things) structure, certainty, orderliness, and permanence. The self style is characteristically unstructured, spontaneous, diffuse, and ad hoc. In Chapter 12 I discuss this style in more detail, especially as it appears in colleges and the youth culture.

Another series of self characteristics related to the trait of change has to do with diversity. Self persons, groups, institutions, and other components of the self subsystem are likely to display a multi-faceted appearance. The world in the chaotic fullness of its booming, buzzing confusion is enjoyed with its contradictions, dilemmas, complexities, and multiple relationships. Opposites are often recognized and enjoyed, so that their differences are still perceived, but transcended and enjoyed.

We would expect self types to show high interest in institutions and activities which foster self-growth and the values and goals of the self subsystem. In The Unfolding of Man Claudio Naranjo (1969) writes that there are 3 institutions in Western society that have self-growth as their goal. These are psychiatry, religion, and education. In keeping with this triumvirate, he uses an expanded name for self-growth "growth-healing-enlightenment" and says that they result in 7 kinds of experiences that contribute to personal growth:

- Shift in identity
- Increased contact with reality
- Increase in detachment and responsibility
- Increased unity
- Increase in freedom and the ability to surrender
- Increased self-awareness
- Increased self acceptance

Self types, then, are likely to feel that institutions and activities that result in these 7 kinds of growth-healing-enlightenment are most worthwhile for them. And we can expect them to favor these goals for themselves and for social institutions over goals appropriate in the other subsystems. In short, they desire personal growth and a society that spurs personal growth.

The Multipotentialed Mind

There is a special sense of personal growth, however, and this is hardest for most people to understand. The phrase "multiple-mental-potentiality" gets at the meaning, but is not exact. The self-growth that is uppermost is an increase in all of the many possibilities of the mind. If we can use an analogy to the muscular system, we can think of developing various muscles or sets of muscles. We can also conceive of someone who develops many of his muscles. Likewise, the mind is felt to have many possibilities, but most people use only one or two of them. In the self subsystem the mind appears as a vast undeveloped region capable of many things. Explorations into this are felt as pleasurable and potentially greatly rewarding. The self interest in awareness, expanded consciousness, and transcendent experiences is an example of this as are the items mentioned by Sutich (1968). Chapter 12 discusses some aspects of this subsystem in greater detail.

RESEARCHABLE QUESTIONS

A typology does not a theory make. Hypothesizing relationships among the types is the business of the next chapter. But this typology, by itself, does raise some questions that can be investigated. In this work I concentrate on numbers 1 and 2 within a limited number of studies of American higher education.

(1) When we consider a particular component of society (X), we can ask: Which subsystem is X most associated with? For example, if we are interested in studying joining organizations, we would expect this to be strongest in the sociability subsystem and among the individuals and groups that are some of its components. Another approach to this question is: What is the distribution of X? In Chapters 3 and 4 I present some reasons and evidence to expect that there is a symmetrical distribution of X through the subsystems, peaking at one subsystem and sloping away as one moves from the contiguous subsystem to those further away.

(2) This chapter already pointed out that the justification or legitimatization of group pressure on individuals varies from subsystem to subsystem. This gives rise to the general question: How does X vary from subsystem to subsystem? This points to the rearrangement of some of our knowledge to portray these changes, if any. It may also point to "holes" in our knowledge, e.g., has anyone researched expertise cognitive styles? The self subsystem is especially lacking in research.

(3) Since the subsystems are seen as clusters of components with the same general factor running through them, we can ask: How is X component in a subsystem related to the other components of that subsystem? For example: How are ideology and political structure related to each other in the stability

subsystem? What about their relations to the other components? What changes in X cause what changes in the other components?

It may be that not only the values of the components change, taking on the dominant characteristic of the subsystem, but the relationships among the components may change too. We would expect that ideology would be a relatively important component in the stability subsystem but much less so in the other subsystems.

(4) One of the assumptions of this theory is that individual, group, and cultural levels are isomorphic. That is, what holds on one level has a counterpart on the other levels. If we find X on one level of analysis, do we find an isomorphism on other levels? For example, one of the goals of the self subsystem is self-growth. Do we find self groups and self institutions that have this as a norm and/or goal? This brings up the associated question: If we change X on one level, say organizational structure, what changes do we find on the individual and cultural levels?

(5) Since one of the goals of this theory is to present a conceptual scheme that can be used on various-sized human groups, from one person to a civilization, we need some sort of program to conceive of the relationships among these different size units. A general question is: How is X related

to larger and smaller units in its environment? If we are studying a political party, for example, we may want to know the environment it finds itself in. Or we may want to know about its relationships with individual persons in its membership or in its environment. For investigations into the transactions among groups and individuals a schematic diagram such as the following may help portray situations:



To take this illustration, we might assume a hypothetical situation of a self individual. For whatever our purposes we may want to consider him as a member of an expertise group, say a profession. He will, of course, have other memberships too. We may also want to consider his relations to the general nation of which he is a citizen; in this case it is a nation characterized by sociability. The civilization of which this nation partakes may also be characterized by sociability, but the world as a whole might be in the survival subsystem. Of course these 5 levels of analysis, self, group, nation, civilization, and world can theoretically take any of the 5 subsystems. And in some cases we would not want to consider all levels at once, perhaps, for example, just a self person existing in an expertise group, or the relations between an expertise group and a sociability nation. On the other hand, sometimes we may want to consider more levels and more groups.

By characterizing the various environments we can learn where to expect conflict or concordance. For example, in this illustration we would expect some conflict between the self person and his expertise group and between the expertise group and the sociability nation because of differences in subsystems. On the other hand we would expect basic agreement between the nation and the civilization of which it is part.

I certainly don't mean to imply that conflict comes only from differences in worldviews; 2 survival people fighting over food would show conflict. They would show agreement, the theory implies, on most items in their subsystems; however, for example, the high value placed on the food they are fighting over. Conflict between people or groups in different subsystems, however, is likely to have the added differences in the components of the subsystems. They are likely to differ on their values, social goals and structure, and on the other components.

Another possibility for investigation is that the people or groups vary according to whether they share the same subsystem with their environment. A self person in a stability culture may differ from a self person in a self, expertise, sociability, or survival culture. Minority or majority status may affect other things besides the assumed differences in alienation mentioned above.

This sort of analysis can be used to depict conflict in one person or a group too. For example, suppose a person has a stability social class origin, a sociability occupation, an expertise church affiliation, a sociability wife, and so forth. We can picture some of the conflicts this person has:



Given a particular issue, such as attitude toward a particular political issue or goals of education, we may someday be able to understand the conflicts a person has by seeing them as conflicts among subsystems.

(6) Since constructed types focus on uniformity, variation

from the ideal type raises questions. How and why does a particular instance vary from the ideal? Simplification and reduction of diversity are part of the process of building types, but the uniqueness of individual events and instances forces us to examine and explain, if possible, the deviations from the ideal type. This also opens up the possibilities of comparing specific instances with each other as well as with the ideal type. In explaining the uniqueness we must look at the history of each individual, group, society, civilization, etc. What this typology and theory do, then, is give us a new set of types from which variations may be explained, thus opening a new realm for historical questions and comparisons.

(7) Finally, How do people, groups, and cultures move from one subsystem to another? Can and should we encourage this? If so, how?

Summary

The usual approach in the social sciences is to look at a class of things, for example, social structure, attitudes, language, politics, etc. Instead of that, I am proposing looking at 5 properties of the whole social system and its parts and that we arrange these components by these 5 properties. These are the 5 characteristics of the subsystems and their components - survival, stability, sociability, expertise, and self.

Can we find some reason for this new grouping other than the fact that these come from a theory of human motivation? Do they, in fact, hang together and influence each other toward one or another of the 5 general characteristics? Are there isomorphic relationships among and between the subsystems? In this chapter I presented the 5 types of dominant subsystems and started sketches of them.

The next move consists of following Hempel's second step for turning a typology into a theory, "...formulating a set of hypotheses in terms of the characteristics," ("Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," 1963, p. 230). Chapter 3 presents hypothetical relationships among the types, and these relationships give rise to another set of questions that the humanistic general social science systems theory helps us ask.

Chapter 3

DYNAMICS - GENERAL PROPOSITIONS OF A HUMANISTIC GENERAL SOCIAL SCIENCE SYSTEMS THEORY

The last chapter presented a typology of subsystems, which included beliefs, values, and cognitions. This chapter turns the typology into a theory by hypothesizing relationships among the types.

As explained in the last chapter and as will be discussed below, the scope of this theory is very broad. Because of this breadth it would be, in my opinion, impossible for one work to investigate it thoroughly. In this work, then, I present the theory in its breadth but limit my investigation 2 ways. First, I am limiting it to American higher education. Second, I am focusing it mainly on only the first proposition below; however, as information on the other propositions turns up or as they seem particularly relevant to topics under discussion, I will so note. Chapter 5, for example, contains a discussion of proposition 5.

Before doing that, however, it will be helpful to take a glimpse at the meaning of "a general social science systems theory." This quick, incomplete view is merely to set the stage for the particular hypotheses and applications that follow, to make them more understandable.

Theory By "theory" I mean a body of interconnected statements which give a concise systematic view of a subject. The statements are the 5 propositions in this chapter.

System A systems view emphasizes a complex of mutual interrelationships among the parts and also characteristics of the system as a unified whole. As Anatol Rapoport says, "A system, roughly speaking, is a bundle of relations,"(1968, p. 454). The 5 types of the previous chapter are posited as characteristics of the whole social system, of its subsystems, and their components.

General "General" is opposed to "specific." A general theory refers to a wide variety of phenomena, not to just one type. For example, I see this theory as potentially applicable to individual motivation, group formation and interaction, the development of society through centuries, and to other phenomena; although, as stated above I present a limited application here.

Studies of human activity frequently distinguish between the size of the group being studied. In this humanistic approach, however, it is assumed that the magnitude of a unit of study is not a dominant or important characteristic for the purposes and extent of this theory. That is, in keeping with humanistic holism, this theory applies equally to an individual person, groups of various sizes, and civilizations without regard to the number of people comprising them. Size is important, however, in the operations and measurements taken. Just as one uses an appropriate set of instruments and operations to measure gravity in a swirling solar system and another set to measure gravity in a falling apple, so one uses different instruments, measurements, and indicators to measure the stability subsystem as manifested in one person, in a group, or in a culture.

This is not meant to deny the differences between human conglomerations of various sizes, but this theory is about their similarities. The differences among objects studied are sacrificed in the isolation and exaggeration of the typology of subsystem characteristics. These differences, while important for some considerations, are not so for this theory.

Social Science This delineates the boundaries of the general systems theory to social behavior, still a very wide scope, but more narrow than some systems theories (Miller, 1955). The content of this theory intersects with various theories, typologies, and descriptions from anthropology, communications, economics, history, linguistics, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology. It even touches on the domains of the arts. Here again a general systems approach is helpful because of its emphasis on relationships among parts, of parts to the whole, of the whole to parts, and because, "...all the variants and interpretations (of general systems theory) have a common aim: the integration of diverse content areas by means of a unified methodology of conceptualization or of research." (Rapoport, 1968, p. 452).

Needless to say, each of the fields mentioned in the last paragraph has its own theories which handle its own concepts and observations. This theory is by no means an attempt to supersede them. But I hope it will (1) suggest particular theories, theorems, and hypotheses for use in these specialized fields, and (2) suggest some ways these various disciplinary fields may be related to each other in an overall social system.

PROPOSITIONS

General Proposition 1

The types exist. That is, the characteristics of the components that are posited as being correlated with each other in the last chapter are, in fact, correlated. They do "hang together." Chapter 4 is predominantly a partial examination of this proposition using approximately 13,000 college freshmen as a sample. This reinterpretation of the findings shows, for example, that sociability freshmen are very aware of and active in the teenage culture, joined many clubs in high school (especially those requiring extroversion), and showed heavy interests in social studies, indicating the characteristic sociability interest in interpersonal, human relations.

Other investigations, using other groups, present a field for further work: Do the subsystems "hang together" in other people and groups? If our unit of investigation is a culture, do we find that institutions, organizations, and personality types can be classified by the subsystem typology? Once we have done so, do the expected relationships among them appear?

Here again are several types of work to be done in the further development and articulation of this theory: (1) conceptually developing the indicators and measurements of the subsystems for various size groups, (2) making and refining the instruments, (3) seeing whether the expected relationships among the types exist and to what degree.

In one sense the rest of this dissertation is an exemplification of this process limited to higher education. In Chapter 4 I try to show that a study of college freshmen (Peterson, On a Typology of College Students, 1965), was, unwittingly, an investigation into the question of whether the types exist on a college campus. I also make a few suggestions for refinement of the instruments used. Then, in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, I show that some of the relationships that appear in various other investigations of higher education can be explained on the basis of the theory. These same moves might be adopted for other studies in various disciplines.

General Proposition 2

In his major presentation of his theory of motivation, Maslow (Motivation and Personality, 1954) says that a "chain of prepotency" exists in human motivation. By that he means that human motivation consists of a series of stages or steps such that when the goals of one stage are met, then the next stage or step then becomes dominant. As each succeeding stage is satisfied, then the stage immediately beyond it emerges. The reverse process also can change a person from one type of motivation to another. If the goals of a stage which had been met no longer are met, then that more basic motivation will be stronger, more potent, than the later stages. General proposition 2 is primarily based on this assumed chain of prepotency from Maslow's work; i.e., that a person's or group's location in a subsystem, with its values, components, etc., depends on the degree of satisfaction of the goals in the chain of prepotency. Occasionally in the second and third sections of this work I will point out places where this theoretical assumption helps explain some observations.

The sequence of subsystems is:

survival -- stability -- sociability -- expertise -- self

I call this the humanistic continuum of subsystems. It seems to be more a continuous line with each subsystem blending into those on its sides than a chain of discrete boxes with sharp demarcations between subsystems. This, however, is an assumption that remains to be verified in other studies.

"Stages"

Until now I've referred to "types," "categories," and "subsystems." Because of the sequential nature of their relationships, I'll often call them "stages" from here on. A system, subsystem, or component might be in the "sociability stage" if it fits the description of that category, other-directed, thinking primarily in terms of interpersonal relationships, etc.

Proposition 2, the sequence of humanistic subsystems, and propositions 3 and 4, are consistent with, suggested by, but not dependent on Maslow's theory of motivation (1954). He reports that when a person is successful at meeting the goals of one stage, the succeeding stage emerges. In his chain of prepotency the strongest motivation is survival, then stability, and so forth.

For example, when a person meets his survival needs, Maslow reports, he then becomes interested in stability. Once a very poor person is able to meet his day-to-day needs for food, shelter, etc., he then wants to make sure that the world will not change, so that his daily existence won't be threatened and he can continue to meet his survival needs.

Success consists of a feeling on the part of the group (or individual) that its (his) goals have been met. In some cases it might appear to an outsider that the group has every reason to think it has reached its goals, but if the members of the group do not think or feel so, then they will strive to attain the goal in the ways they see fit.

Another way to conceive of the sequence is as a chain of those types of experiences which are rewarding or of goals. In the survival stage an activity such as eating may be most rewarding and make life meaningful. In the stability stage it may be seeing one's larder full, or counting money, or being able to rest easily. In the sociability stage popularity may be most reinforcing, while in the expertise stage recognition or feeling of value to the world may make life worthwhile. In the self stage meaningfulness may come from any of the number of experiences that make a person feel, "Ah, this is really _me_." These stages form a nexus of prepotency so that the emergence of later stages and their strength depends on the degree of success at all previous stages.

This proposition and the assumptions it is based on include a sort of attention-to-the-weakest-link also derived from Maslow's chain of prepotency. If a previous link becomes weak, a system will attend to it, leaving, for the time being, the more advanced goal or state. For example, during times of threat to a nation, the country may leave its development of culture (expertise or self) and pay attention to its national defense (stability). A person in the expertise stage who has moved to a new city to take a job, may find that he has to reestablish social contacts before he can really concentrate on his work. He may find himself temporarily put back in a social orientation. As Rowland Howard said, "For you never miss the water till the well runs dry."

Hypotheses 2 and 3 state that individual, social, and cultural change may come 2 ways, (1) success in one stage leading to the emergence of a new stage, or (2) failure with a previously established stage leading to the eruption of previously quiescent goals, now freshly unobtained. Change from one subsystem to another is seen as an expected consequence of the theory, and non-change is seen as a person's or group's holding its own, i.e., remaining in the same subsystem. A whole theory of change remains to be explicated using this approach.

General Proposition 3

A person or group may not successfully go through all stages of the sequence. He or it may become blocked at a stage. In fact, this is usually the case and points to further goals for our society and ourselves. There may be several reasons for this arrested development.

First, the society may not provide socially accepted roles for people who are on the growing edge of the society. Those who are in advance of the society and have different goals from those of the society may have to devise their own institutions with roles that fit their goals.

Second, there may not be enough roles even when the person is at the mode for his society. The unemployed, for example, may see the types of roles they would like, but be unable to obtain them. A society which has a history of high employment may neglect the needs of the unemployed through ignorance.

Third, on an individual level, a person may have an experience (or experiences) in his own background so that he does not develop fully. Considering that we do not have a perfectly functioning society which provides for all the stages, everyone will deviate from the ideal in some ways. Using Hypothesis 3, we can see that someone who has had a deprived childhood may be arrested at a stage and never feel adequately satisfied there, even though an outside observer thinks that he should be.

In a society or group that is composed of such individuals social institutions will show this bias too. For example, in societies where most individuals do not have a feeling of security, the whole society may expend an abnormally large part of its efforts on security, trying to cover every possible eventuality, no matter how slight. War, depression, disease, and other disasters and threats may so influence a society that it overcompensates and overprotects itself. If one generation has experienced a war, for example, it may strongly emphasize foreign threat and national defense. If their children have never experienced this threat, they may not understand their parents' concern, and the parents may not understand their children's lack of concern. This is the opposite of "increased frustration-tolerance through early gratification" (See Hypothesis 4) and might be called "decreased frustration-tolerance through previous deprivation." For a discussion of some of the reasons that people get stopped in this normal sequence see Maslow "A Theory of Human Motivation" (in 1954).

John Bosley ("A Needs-Concerns View of Society," 1967, pp. 23-27) considers these "hang-ups" from the perspective of socialization. He notes four sources of failure of growth due to the social milieu:

1. Actual lack of resources, e.g., society cannot provide enough food, education, protection, etc.
2. Lack due to conscious or unconscious choice, e.g., an affluent society not providing food for the poor.
3. Structural and organizational problems which do not use resources efficiently or keep an individual from pursuing his development.
4. Negative sanctions and norms which are built to fit the predominant current pattern, not allowing for the values of other worldviews.

Under number 4 Bosley notes that negative sanctioning of erotic, or pleasurable feelings may be one cause of slowing down development. If what feels good at each stage is obtaining the goals and solving the needs of that stage, then a negative valuation of pleasure will lead to the slowing of progress. It is a matter of what is of most benefit to oneself and society in the long run, however, not what is immediately gratifying only.

General Proposition 4

The influence of a stage on social behavior is a function of the effort the person or group expended to achieve the stage.

Thus, a person who has always been secure, or a group which has never had to worry about security, is likely to pay little attention to stability. In terms of subsystems, if a person has never looked at the world through the glasses of the stability orientation, he is unlikely to see the world that way in the future.

Maslow calls this "increased frustration-tolerance through early gratification." Applying this to an individual subsystem he says, "It is just the ones who have loved and been well loved who have had many deep friendships who can hold out against hatred, rejection, or persecution." (Motivation and Personality, 1954, pp. 20-21).

Bell and Stub's comments about middle-class values of teachers from lower classes use the same principle (The Sociology of Education, 1968, p. 270). They note that many people of upper-lower-class and lower-middle-class origins (stability origins) enter teaching, a middle-class occupation, as a means of social mobility. One might expect them to show the usual middle-class emphasis on middle-class values. But this is not the case, "...often middle-class values acquired through occupational mobility may be more rigid and binding than when the same values are of an ascribed nature." That is, if these values were ascribed (if they were assumed as part of the social and psychological heritage, if they were "naturally" there), these teachers would take them for granted and pay less attention to them. Although the subsystems (teachers of upper-lower and lower-middle-class origins) are in a social stage occupation, they show more concern with this achieved stage (middle-class subsystem) than do teachers whose origins are in the middle class or upper-middle class (to whom this subsystem and its values are "natural," or effortless).

This is especially important when we consider differences between generations or "age cohorts," groups that have grown up in one set of conditions, e.g., subsystem (Ryder, "The Cohort in the Study of Social Change," 1965). If the efforts of one generation make it successful at the goals of a stage, then it is likely to move toward the subsequent stage, but at the same time to value the achieved stage and those goals' however, its children will accept the stage and its goals as ascribed, and value other things.

General Proposition 5

The further away a person or group is from a subsystem, the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. "Distance," of course, is distance along the humanistic continuum. For example, survival and sociability are next to stability on the continuum; therefore, they are expected to show characteristics more like the stability subsystem than is the expertise subsystem, which has sociability intervening between it and stability. Self, which is furthest away from stability, will be even less like stability. We would expect survival and self to be most unlike each other.

General proposition 5 elaborates on how components are distributed through the subsystems. General proposition 1 The types exist leads us to expect that a component will be most associated with one or another subsystem. For example, we would expect concern with personal, self-directed, idiosyncratic development to be most associated with the self subsystem. But this says nothing about how it will be distributed throughout the rest of the humanistic continuum. If it were highest in the self subsystem, it might be second most high in any of the 4 other subsystems. But general proposition 5 predicts that self characteristics will be second most frequent in the expertise subsystem, third most frequent in the sociability subsystem, fourth most frequent in the stability subsystem, and least frequent in survival.

Once the peak is located in 1 of the subsystems, there are 24 logically possible permutations for the remaining 4 rank orders (not counting the possibilities of ties). When the peak is in survival or self, general proposition 5 predicts 1 of these possible permutations. When the peak is in stability or expertise, proposition 5 predicts that the distribution of the component will be 1 of 2 possibilities. The peak, of course, is predicted to be in the subsystem that is most characteristic of the component. The second highest frequency can be in either of the 2 subsystems next to the peak one. For example, we might take authoritarianism, which is predicted to be most frequent in stability. Stability is next to both survival and sociability. Either of these is predicted as being second, and whichever is second, the other is predicted to be third. Expertise is predicted to be fourth, and self fifth.

When sociability is the most frequent subsystem, either stability or expertise will be second, and the other will be third. Self and stability will share the fourth and fifth spots.

When fewer than 5 subsystems are used, the principle still is the same. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 I reanalyze Richard Peterson's On a Typology of College Students (1965). In that study, as I reinterpret it, he used 4 types of students. The survival subsystem is missing, so we would predict that distributions peaking in the stability subsystem would slope downwards towards the self subsystem. And when sociability is highest, self would be lowest. If all 5 subsystems were used, either self or survival would be lowest in sociability traits. By eliminating survival from the study, we expect self to be lowest in sociability traits as well as in stability traits. Chapter 5 elaborates on this proposition, and Chapters 6-10 illustrate further uses.

This proposition makes a prediction about one of the questions asked at the end of Chapter 2: What is the distribution of X component among the types? Once we have found the subsystem it is most concentrated in, we can predict decreasing frequency or strength in subsystems further away. This proposition is more fully discussed in Chapter 5.

* * *

My use of these propositions varies. At times I'll use them hypothetically. I'll examine data to see whether there is reason to believe that they are correct. As pointed out earlier, Chapter 4 is primarily an investigation of the truthfulness of proposition 1: The types exist. Chapter 4 uses a sample of college freshmen to see whether the expected clusters of characteristics do, indeed, appear together.

At other times, I'll assume that the propositions are true and test their usefulness as general statements to explain particular observations. In Chapter 12, for example, I assume that the humanistic sequence, proposition 2, is true, and I use this assumption to explain the emergence of a self culture from our current expertise culture.

I think it will be clear from the contexts when I am directly investigating the truth of the propositions and when I am assuming their truth and using that assumption as a basis for discussion based on this theory. In instances where this is not clear without stating, I'll explicitly state which use I am then attempting. Generally, I will be directly investigating the theory, especially general proposition 1, in Section 2 (Chapters 4-10). In Section 3

(Chapters 11-14) I'll use the theory as if it were already established, as a basis for discussing applications to American higher education and some social problems (Chapters 11 and 12 and as a conceptual basis for further developments in a humanistic social science (Chapters 13 and 14). I hope to show it can serve as basis for both empirical investigation and for social commentary and policy formulation.

Summary

This chapter developed the typology of Chapter 2 into a theory by hypothesizing relationships among the types. The categories of the typology are broad enough to cover much social behavior, and the relationships posited here form a general social systems theory. I hope this theory will facilitate the work of social scientists who want to transcend disciplinary sects.

A disciplinary approach to knowledge takes a concept or type of object, or a few related concepts and objects, and investigates them and their empirical referents thoroughly. For example, it may investigate small groups in formal and in informal organizations, in collectivities, under various conditions, and with various compositions, etc. This approach adds more facts to our warehouses of information, and those who practice this approach become, within their academic specialty, erudite.

The stubborn world and social problems, however, do not present themselves as a series of isolated disciplinary experiences, a series of small group experiences, let us say. Knowledge which does not take into account the interrelatedness of the world, by "disciplinary purity" or by building a fictional world of "all other things constant," may be worthwhile to men as academicians, who collect this sort of knowledge, but not to men as aware humans, who exist in an interrelated world. The former is "academic knowledge." The latter is "intellectual knowledge;" when it is combined with insight into oneself, it is wisdom.

This is often confused by academicians who misinterpret the anti-academicism of their non-expertise students and fellow men as anti-intellectualism. They cannot see a difference. Furthermore, wisdom has such a hallowed mien that its name is seldom even invoked.

I hope this theory will be helpful to intellectuals and to academicians. To academicians by suggesting hypotheses within and among their disciplines. To intellectuals by providing some understanding and insight into the interrelatedness of the world and into themselves - to assist a few steps on the way to wisdom.

The theory developed in this and the previous chapters is one motif that appears and disappears and reappears through social behavior. The next 7 chapters (Section 2) transpose 7 studies into this humanistic framework. Then, Chapters 11 and 12 (Section 3) apply the theory, first to groups active in campus conflict, second to a closer examination of self types on campuses. Finally, Chapters 13 and 14 examine the scope of this theory. Chapter 13 draws the materials from the previous 9 chapters into one place, displaying the breadth of material on higher education that the theory was useful for, in this work. Chapter 14 extends, speculates, and extrapolates this humanistic theory to other parts of the social sciences.

SECTION 2

THE THEORY AS A SET OF CONCEPTS FOR REANALYZING SOME STUDIES OF HIGHER EDUCATION

SECTION 2

STUDIES, RESTUDIED -
A HUMANISTIC REINTERPRETATION OF OTHERS' STUDIES

This section uses the concepts and dynamics sketched in the previous section as tools to analyze some others' studies of higher education. I try to show that their descriptions of the events related to higher education are specific instances of this more general humanistic theory. As such, they tend to confirm the theory, and the theory can provide the covering laws and the descriptive categories necessary for an explanation of some of the findings reported by these authors.

Chapter 4 reinterprets Martin Trow's "Student Cultures and Administrative Action" (1962), his article with Burton Clark, "The Organizational Context" (1966), and part of Richard Peterson's On a Typology of College Students (1965). Chapter 5 examines general hypothesis 5 by using it to explain some of Peterson's findings on the extracurricular activities chosen by his sample of freshmen. Chapter 6 is also based on Peterson's study; it extends the construct validity investigation into more topics covered by the humanistic typology of subsystems.

Chapter 7 looks at Robert Merton's "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials" (1957) and Alvin Gouldner's "Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles" (1957 and 1958). Chapter 8 examines Theodore Newcomb and Richard Flacks' Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus (1963-66?). Chapter 9 focuses on Newcomb's "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups" (1958), and Chapter 10 studies Newcomb's Personality and Social Change: Attitude Formation in a Student Community (1943).

In addition to using the humanistic social systems theory for reinterpreting parts of these studies, I'll use it to conceptualize questions, to generate hypotheses, to refine instruments, and to suggest further research in the parts of these studies that are unclear or thought provoking.

Chapter 4

SUBCULTURES, STUDENTS, AND INSTITUTIONS - AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSTRUCT VALIDITY

Introduction

Chapters 2 and 3 developed a theory of broad scope, applying to many sorts of social phenomena. In an effort to see whether that theory is useful, this chapter uses it to make some predictions, then to see whether the predictions are confirmed or disconfirmed by observations. To do this it is necessary to narrow the broad scope of the theory down to manageable size. While the theory remains broad, we can work with only one part of it at a time.

For example, major proposition 1 "The types exist" is too general to confirm or disconfirm as it is. The proposition doesn't tell us what to look for to gain evidence one way or the other. In the first part of this chapter, I use a typology of college students by Burton Clark and Martin Trow ("The Organizational Context," 1966) to narrow the scope of the theory down from the wide and vague "social sciences" to predictions about college students. As an investigation of the major proposition "The types exist," the Clark and Trow typology helps us to narrow the statement to "Types of college students exist." And, just as proposition 1 was narrowed, the characteristics of the typology in Chapter 2 were narrowed, or particularized, so that we limited the characteristics to be appropriate to the more limited derived proposition. We now have "social types of college students" as an instance of the "sociability subsystem." And these students are hypothetically "joiners of many organizations" as an instance of the sociability subsystem characteristic of "congeniality."

The second part of this chapter tests the narrowed scope developed in the first part. It takes Peterson's study (On a Typology of College Students, 1965) of 12,949 college freshmen from 23 colleges and universities as a specific example of one place where the general theory and its narrowed subtheory might apply. Likewise, proposition 1 is narrowed to specific, observable relationships among characteristics, and the characteristics are narrowed to objects and actions we can actually see, in this case the college students' answers on a questionnaire. For example: A student who chooses the sociability type philosophy of education as most like his own will, we predict, also show other sociability traits (e.g., he will report that he likes to join many organizations).

Of course, if the theory does apply here, we might then assume it applies elsewhere as well, but we won't know this until somebody has looked elsewhere. And if it doesn't apply here, we might assume that it doesn't apply elsewhere, but we won't know. Thus, this chapter is 1 test of the general theory, and the findings will partially confirm or disconfirm the general theory. This chapter also demonstrates an approach that I hope other people may use elsewhere.

Part 1

TYPES OF STUDENT SUBCULTURES - CLARK AND TROW*

Clark and Trow start by considering "some of the orientations toward a college education which are represented on American campuses and which may be in competition on any one campus." Their orientations are part of what I call a "subsystem" or "orientation." To Clark and Trow they are "shared notions of what constitutes right attitude and action toward the range of issues and experiences confronted in college."

Before we examine their subcultures through humanistic glasses, let's ask what we can expect to find. If this humanistic theory is useful, then we would expect to find that their groupings and the humanistic categories are similar. That is, the characteristics they ascribe to their subcultures are likely to be those that I've ascribed to the various subsystems. An exception might be noted here. It is unlikely that there would be any, or very many, representatives of the survival subsystem. They are likely to be too busy trying to stay alive to go to college; they are not likely to have done well in school previously; and they are not likely to have the money or time resources to afford college.

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*The linkage between Clark and Trow's typology and my humanistic theory was originally suggested to me by John A. Richardson. I am greatly indebted to him for sharing his insight with me.

Here then, are the 5 subsystems and Clark and Trow's subcultures. I've arranged them in the pairings I think go together:

Humanistic Subsystems	Subcultures
survival	(missing)
stability	vocational
sociability	collegiate
expertise	academic
self	nonconformist

Stability Orientation - Vocational Subculture

According to Clark and Trow, this subculture is composed of "ambitious, mobility-oriented sons and daughters of working and lower middle-class homes." As an ideal type they lack the money and time for social life. They see college as preparation for jobs, usually nonprofessional, and do only enough work to get by and obtain the diploma. The symbol of the vocational culture is the student placement office.

Here we see the traits of the stability orientation. Lower middle-class, interest in a dependable, secure job (p. 20), such as engineering (Trow, 1958) or teaching (Rosenberg, 1957; Bell and Stub, 1968), a view of academic work as occupational work, something that has to be done for the boss, but one does as little as he can get away with. And academic work is merely instrumental, to get a diploma and better job. There is little or no idea that the work itself might be interesting, i.e., that it can contribute to one's personal growth and actually be enjoyable.

Sociability Orientation - Collegiate Subculture

This is the middle- and upper-middle class world of "football, fraternities and sororities, dates, cars, drinking, and campus fun." Like the vocational subculture, the collegiate subculture is not primarily interested in ideas and intellectual issues but is willing to put up with them as a justification for college. However, while the stability (vocational) subculture puts up with them to get a diploma and better job, the sociability (collegiate) subculture puts up with them to enjoy the social life which goes with the social round. The symbols of the sociability subculture are the football and fraternity weekend.

Here, too, we see the dominant quality of the sociability orientation, pleasure of getting together with others and defining oneself in social terms.

Expertise Orientation - Academic Subculture

Clark and Trow don't make any comment on the social class origins of people in the academic subculture. (We will see some evidence on this when I discuss Peterson's findings on social class in Chapter 6.). They do note, however, that these students are often preprofessionals and identify with their future professions and professors as symbols of these professions. This would influence them toward upper-middle-class values. These students think of themselves in terms of their fields of specialized knowledge and future professions. The members of the stability (vocational) subculture think of themselves in terms of future jobs and seek skills and a diploma. Members of the sociability (collegiate) subculture think of themselves in terms of their social relations and seek fun. Members of the expertise (academic) subculture think of themselves in terms of professionally specialized vocations and seekers of knowledge for its own sake. Their symbols are the library, laboratory, and seminar.

Here, too, we see the expected expertise subsystem characteristics of achievement, adequacy, feelings of self-confidence, strength, colleague-orientation, etc. Professions provide the roles for achieving these, and the official role of expertise student in college is a sort of "entry role."

Self Orientation - Nonconformist Subculture

Here again, Clark and Trow do not specify a dominant socio-economic status for the group; although, we might expect them to show an unusual concentration of upper-middle-class and upper-class students (see Chapter 6). Throughout their description of the nonconformist subculture the theme of self-growth, self-knowledge, self-ness shows through.

Clark and Trow identify this contingent as "...'nonconformist,' 'intellectual,' ' radical,' 'alienated,' 'bohemian'...." By "intellectual" they mean seeking wisdom as opposed to "academic," which they use to mean pursuing knowledge within a scholarly or professional field.

These students are "*self-conscious* nonconformists"; they seek *distinctive identity* in keeping with their "*own* temperament and experience." They "pursue an *identity*, not as a by-product, but as the primary and often *self-conscious* aim of their education." (Italics mine.)

Clark and Trow note that not much is known about these people and it may be, in fact, a residual category. The way they have described it, it is by no means a residual category, but in a society that does not yet recognize the self subsystem as an important category or motivation, it is not surprising that it often goes unnoticed, misunderstood, or is seen as an aberration.

Another trait that the authors spot is that these people have transcended their institutions. They are interested in the larger world, in adult art, literature, and politics of the wider world. (This is worth keeping in mind for the Newcomb-Bennington chapters, 9 and 10. These students often use off-campus groups as points of reference. They may become deeply involved with ideas they meet in the classroom, but this is because they have some personal relevance to them and their interests. This points to at least 1 meaning of "relevance in education." They use their institutions rather than being a part of them. In this sort of activity, they sound like Maslow's self-actualizing people (Toward a Psychology of Being, 1962; Motivation and Personality, 1954; Eupsychian Management, 1965).

In the rest of their chapter Clark and Trow apply their concepts of subcultures and use them as jumping off points for excursions into related topics. I suggest that when people read this chapter and use their subculture typology they use this humanistic framework to tie together various observations and citations and to explain and understand the findings. For example, the claims in the following passage are explainable by citing and elaborating on the stability orientation and on the expertise orientation and their manifestations (pp. 28-29).

> Lower-middle-class origins and modest aspirations for security (stability) in a job predispose students to taking a vocational (stability) stance toward their college; in the upper-middle class, aspirations for the intellectual occupations and professions (expertise) that involve postgraduate study predispose students toward the academic (expertise) cultures and the disciplines of learning.

I hope I've shown that Clark and Trow's typology can be embedded in a more general theory, which, as Hempel says, is a long-range objective of typology building ("Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," 1963). I think this gives added credence to their typology and adds confirmation to my theory.

Part 2

CONSTRUCT VALIDITY:
TYPES OF STUDENTS, STUDENT SUBCULTURES, AND INSTITUTIONS

Introduction and Methodology

The subcultures described by Trow (1962) and Clark and Trow (1966) and investigated by Richard E. Peterson (*On a Typology of College Students*, 1965) are used by these authors primarily as classificatory typologies. That is, they pigeonhole data, whether as subcultures to Clark and Trow or as types of students, institutions, and subcultures to Peterson. They were built as constructive, ideal types, but are used primarily for classification, not for theory building.

In keeping with Hempel's suggestion for moving from a typology to a theory, I intend to show that their types of students, subcultures, and institutions are not just handy, random categories but have regular relationships to each other. I think they are arrangeable along the humanistic sequence and that they have regular relationships to each other and to the larger society. These relationships are the dynamics of the humanistic model developed in Chapter 3. In other words, when the categories are properly arranged, I think they and the relations among them can be shown to be specific instances of the subsystems and dynamics of more general humanistic social theory.

Before asking questions about the relations among the constructed categories, however, we must first ask, "Are the categories themselves useful?" Until we can establish some grounds for this typology, investigating the hypothesized relationships within it will be premature. This chapter offers some beginning evidence of construct validity. Chapter 5 then investigates one set of relationships among the types. Chapter 6 extends the investigations in Chapters 4 and 5 to additional characteristics.

Construct Validity

In this humanistic theory the "constructs" are the constructed types in Chapter 2 - survival, stability, sociability, expertise, and self. When a person measures construct validity, he wants to know whether a test, or some particular item(s) on it, actually measures the theoretical concepts, the "constructs," in his theory. To put it another way: How can scores on this test be explained (in a theory)? (Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological Testing, 1960, pp. 104-106).

In 1 item on a questionnaire Peterson asked students to choose 1 of 4 "philosophies of education" as most like their own. Putting this discussion in terms of the humanistic theory, which, of course, Peterson didn't do, we can say these 4 statements were based on the typology of the humanistic theory. In other words, we interpret him as wanting to know whether that item actually selected holders of the various subsystems.

The way he found out was to go back to the descriptions of the typical students in the Clark and Trow typology to see what other characteristics, besides choosing a particular kind of statement, the typology predicted. In our terms, he went back to the descriptions of humanistic subsystems to see what characteristics occur together. For example, according to the Clark and Trow typology, students who chose the "philosophy" of the stability subsystem were expected to be of lower social class than the students who chose other "philosophies." This humanistic theory predicts that they will show other characteristics of the stability subsystem as described in Chapter 2 too, such as being dependent on their families and disliking ambiguity. In my interpretation, Peterson asked whether students who chose a particular "philosophy" also showed the characteristics expected by someone using the humanistic theory as a basis for his predictions.

If the chosen "philosophies" and the students' personal characteristics both fit expectations based on the theory, then the item has construct validity; it measures what it is thought to measure. And this is evidence that the theory is useful. If the expectations are not fulfilled, then the item may not be a good measure, the theory may be useless, or both.

Peterson says that the purposes of his monograph were to test the construct validity of a questionnaire item based on the typology and to extend it to matters beyond higher education. He extended it to some demographic characteristics, secondary school achievements and perceptions, and 5 personality dimensions. These extensions are discussed in Chapter 6.

The *College Student Questionnaires* asked the freshmen to choose 1 of the following 4 philosophies as most like their own (Appendix, p. 10); I've added the humanistic reinterpretation of these philosophies in (brackets).

> On every college or university campus students hold a variety of attitudes about their own purposes and goals while at college. Such an attitude might be thought of as a personal philosophy of higher education. Below are descriptive statements of four such "personal philosophies" which there is reason to believe are quite prevalent on American college campuses. As you read the four statements, attempt to determine how close each comes to *your own* philosophy of higher education.
>
> (Stability) *PHILOSOPHY A*: This philosophy emphasizes education essentially as preparation for an occupational future. Social or purely intellectual phases of campus life are relatively less important, although certainly not ignored. Concern with extracurricular activities and college traditions is relatively small. Persons holding this philosophy are usually quite committed to particular fields of study and are in college primarily to obtain training for careers in their chosen fields.
>
> (Expertise) *PHILOSOPHY B*: This philosophy, while it does not ignore career preparation, assigns greatest importance to scholarly pursuit of knowledge and understanding wherever the pursuit may lead. This philosophy entails serious involvement in course work or independent study *beyond* the minimum required. Social life and organized extracurricular activities are relatively unimportant. Thus, while other aspects of college life are not to be forsaken, this philosophy attaches greatest importance to interest in ideas, pursuit of knowledge, and cultivation of the intellect.
>
> (Sociability) *PHILOSOPHY C*: This philosophy holds that besides occupational training and/or scholarly endeavor an important part of college life exists outside the classroom, laboratory, and library. Extracurricular activities, living-group functions, athletics, social life, rewarding friendships, and loyalty to college traditions are

> important elements in one's college experience and necessary to the cultivation of the well-rounded person. Thus, while not excluding academic activities, this philosophy emphasizes the importance of the extracurricular side of college life.
>
> ($\overline{\text{Self}}$) PHILOSOPHY D: This is a philosophy held by the student who either consiciously rejects commonly held value orientations in favor of his own, or who has not really decided what is to be valued and is in a sense searching for meaning in life. There is often deep involvement with ideas and art forms both in the classroom and in sources (often highly original and individualistic) in the wider society. There is little interest in business or professional careers; in fact, there may be a definite rejection of this kind of aspiration. Many facets of the college - organized extracurricular activities, athletics, traditions, the college administration - are ignored or viewed with disdain. In short, this philosophy may emphasize individualistic interests and styles, concern for personal identity and, often, contempt for many aspects of organized society.

On the basis of only this 1 item Peterson classified the students into the 4 types. Then he looked at the responses on the other items to see whether the 4 groups showed the other traits the typology predicts.

In terms of the humanistic theory, we would say he went back to the characteristics of the subsystems to see whether they did, in fact, hang together as general proposition 1 predicts. Do the students originally classified as "self" by their choice of "philosophy" also show the expected interest in the mind and their own multipotentiality? These hypotheses, derived from the humanistic theory, are the content of this and the succeeding chapter.

Statistical Treatment

He conducted the study with a sample of 12,949 freshmen at 23 colleges. The colleges were "broadly representative" of American four-year institutions of higher education. The students were given College Student Questionnaires Part 1, "CSQ" (Educational Testing Service) during freshman orientation periods. Thus, the investigators examined the views of relatively naive freshmen rather than experienced college students. Part of the procedure called on the freshmen to rank order 4 "personal philosophies of higher education" as they stated their own views. The philosophies were condensed statements from the Clark and Trow orientations. Thus, the students classified themselves (in humanistic terminology) as oriented toward stability (vocational), sociability (collegiate), expertise (academic), and self (nonconformist) subsystems. Since the goods in the conceptual bag I'm peddling are the humanistic ones, I'll refer to the subculture types in humanistic terms and sometimes refer to the others' terminology in parentheses; e.g., sociability (collegiate) or self (nonconformist).

The standard deviations that are given (Chapters 5 and 6) indicate that, although the expected results appear for the means, the groups of humanistic types show a wide spread. This may be due to the way the questions were asked. For example, only 1 item, the selection of a "personal philosophy of higher education" was used to classify into humanistic types. A scale of several items might have distinguished between groups better or might have spotted those individuals who were between groups, in the sociability-expertise range, for example. More work on this area will help determine whether the groups show as much overlap as indicated here or whether they are more or less bunched.

"Results of tests of statistical significance are not included in the body of the report," Peterson explains, "Because of the large numbers (12,949) a difference between proportions could easily reach statistical significance at a magnitude so small as to have no practical or 'administrative' significance. Generally speaking, questions were included for which there was at least a 10% difference between two of the student types on one of the alternative answers." (p. 12).* That is, the significance is due to small differences among large groups rather than large differences among small groups.

Beyond Classification to Theory

What does my reinterpretation and secondary analysis of Peterson's findings do that his report doesn't do? A few pages back when I discussed construct validity, I mentioned

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*If, gentle reader, one of your things is statistics, you may want to refer to Peterson's footnote on page 12.

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that an investigation into construct validity tries to explain results on a test or other instrument in terms of a theory. Peterson investigated the Clark-Trow typology of college subcultures. In his report he examines data on 12,949 college freshmen to see whether the traits of the Clark-Trow typology do, as they predict, hang together. He would thus explain his results in terms of the Clark-Trow typology. He also extends their typology by investigating some particulars they don't mention, 5 personality dimensions and types of institutions, for example. Peterson both tests Clark and Trow's constructs (Chapter 4 of this dissertation) and extends them to cover additional traits of individuals and institutions of higher education (Chapter 6).

Part of my investigation is also a look at construct validity. But I am looking at the construct validity of the humanistic types. I reinterpret what Peterson does for Clark and Trow to show that his report does the same for the humanistic types of the humanistic theory. More important than this, however, is the fact that Clark and Trow present their types as descriptive, ad hoc, types. Apparently they looked at college subcultures and described what they saw in these general types. My typology, on the other hand, is derived from and embedded in a larger theoretical framework. Thus my reinterpretation of Peterson's findings is the beginning of an investigation into a theory, not simply a check of ad hoc, observed types. I try to show that Peterson's findings are more than a useful classification scheme; they have theoretical import. Also, Peterson presents some of his data as additional information about the types that is not covered by the Clark-Trow formulation. I try to show that these characteristics, which Peterson reports as a nontheoretical empirical discovery, are to be expected within the humanistic theory. This gives his findings support by embedding both the old traits and the new ones in a larger conceptual framework, and the findings add confirmation to the humanistic theory.

While the Peterson report remains an investigation into a typology as such, my embedding it in a larger typology which is part of a larger theoretical framework makes their typology potentially more useful in later explanations based on the overall theory. For example, later in this work, notably in Chapters 11 and 12. I use the theory to start understanding some forms of campus and social unrest, conflict, and change. As part of a theoretical system, the Clark-Trow typology becomes part of a systematic examination and explanation of these events, not just a classification scheme unconnected by hypotheses which relate the categories to each other or to other larger categories.

My interpretation of Peterson's data also allows me to explain some things he could not. He was unable to account for the results on a social conscience scale, for example. He found that the nonconformist types did not show so much concern with social problems as he expected. By showing that the nonconformists were actually a subgroup of the self type and by referring to the self characteristics, I show that the results are to be expected, Chapter 6.

There are regularities in his data that he doesn't notice but that the humanistic theory leads us to look for. Chapter 5 investigates one of these. For example, 2 items showing the percent of the types who think they may be active in various extracurricular activities show:

ACTIVITY	Voc.	Acad.	Colleg.	Nonconf.
Art	22.3	29.6	24.1	47.8
School spirit activities	64.1	63.5	81.2	42.2

By both the Clark and Trow typology and the humanistic typology we would expect that art would be most chosen by the nonconformists (self) types. And we would expect that school spirit activities would be chosen by collegiate (sociability) types.

But when we redisplay and reinterpret his data within the theoretical framework of the humanistic theory, additional regularities emerge that he doesn't spot, but which the humanistic theory both points to and explains. Here is the same information redisplayed in a humanistic theory table. This is the table we get when we use general proposition 2 to display the data: The usual sequence of subsystems is survival, stability, sociability, expertise, self.

ACTIVITY	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Art	22.3	24.1	29.6	47.8
School spirit activities	64.1	81.2	63.5	42.2

When we skim the row for art, we notice that there is a steady increase in interest from stability to self. This makes us wonder whether we aren't on to some sort of orderly trait that is measured by this item. The other activity most chosen by the self students shows the same internal relationships:

ACTIVITY	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Literary, oratorical, dramatic	31.5	38.9	47.7	50.6

When we look at school spirit activities, we see that sociability is high, and that the immediately contiguous categories (stability and expertise) are lower, with the furthest (self) category even lower. General proposition 2 aligned the data so that these regularities appeared, and general proposition 5 directs our attention to and explains these distributions: The further away a person or group is from a subsystem, the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. When we use propositions 2 and 5 to display our data, these regularities emerge. In Chapter 5 I discuss proposition 5 and joining organizations in more detail. The object here is to point out that treating Peterson's data through the conceptual glasses of the humanistic theory allows us to see some things that a mere typology without an embedding theory does not point out.

Finally, Clark and Trow's typology is limited only to types of student subcultures. Peterson investigates this and expands the typology to include types of students and institutions too. This is an example of the disciplinary approach to broadening scope by increments. When we start with this holistic theory, however, we start with the assumption that people and institutions are part of a unified whole and that this whole field of social activity is mutually dependent. An investigation into one part of it, subculture, students, or institutions then becomes merely a partial view of the unified whole. What we find out about these particulars is assumed to be true of the whole. This leads us (1) to interpret our findings as indicative of the whole and of other components and (2) to investigate the whole in the same terms or in similar isomorphic ones. This is not seen as an isolated investigation into students or into higher education but an investigation into manifestations of the whole social system and its 5 subsystems. Humanistic interpretation broadens the theoretical significance from students or higher education to the whole social system.

Generally the advantages of this humanistic reinterpretation of Peterson's findings are the advantages that come from a theoretical approach as opposed to a descriptive approach to social sciences. (1) The constructs whose validities are investigated are tied to other constructs in the theoretical system. The constructs being investigated and the other constructs and the system gain or lose as a result. (2) A broader theoretical scheme points to additional traits, helps direct research toward them, and helps explain them when they appear. (3) Findings receive additional strength if they can be embedded in a theory, or the findings and/or theory may be weakened when they conflict. (4) Explanations of later findings benefit from a more fully developed conceptual scheme. These events can be seen as instances of more generally operating laws. (5) A theoretical system allows some apparent anomolies to be explained by seeing that they are instances of some other part of the overall system; a typology without theoretical embedding cannot resort back to a theory for conceptual backing up. (6) A theory points to other relationships which may go unnoticed when there is only an ad hoc, or nontheoretical, way to display and interpret data. (7) Finally, a typology which is embedded as part of a large-scale theoretical system, such as the holistic humanistic approach, tends to support or weaken the whole system. Its theoretical import is broader, the broader the theory the broader the import.

Ordinal Nature of This Theory

Before examining the data 2 additional methodological points about the discussions of Peterson's data will help. First, the propositions (Chapter 3) and measurements used to investigate them concern relative relationships among the subsystems and their components. For example, a component of the sociability subsystem is expected to have relatively more of each of the sociability traits than are the components of the other subsystems. A sociability-type person, for example, is expected to show a greater desire for congeniality, joining groups, etc. than are survival, stability, expertise, or self people. These others will show this to some degree, but not to the extent of a sociability person. Thus, it is not the absolute numbers in the data that are important, but their sizes relative to each other. In the example of anticipated extracurricular activities (above) when we look at the school spirit row, the thing to notice is that the sociability students show more interest in this activity than do the other types. The particular numbers, 64.1, 81.2, etc., are not of major importance.

The type of scale that puts emphasis on the relative position of objects is an ordinal scale. "With ordinal scales we are limited to statements of greater, equal, or less; we cannot undertake to state how much greater or how much less...the scale reflects only the order of positions and not the distances between them." (Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations, 1959, p. 192). Thus, the predictions based on this humanistic theory so far are limited to comparisons among individuals and groups. Perhaps someday more advanced research will lead to more exact scales and statistical methodology.

Another limitation in these 3 chapters on the Peterson study is the fact that I am not approaching my interpretation completely unseen. While I will speak of expectations derived from the humanistic theory, I had skimmed Peterson's report during the formative stages of the theory, so I am not acting completely without advance information. Although I can think of no specific instances, it is likely that my knowledge of Peterson's research has influenced me in the original formulation and frequent revisions of the theory. This seems to me to be an example of how the "steps" in building a typology, which McKinney talks of (Constructive Typology and Social Theory, 1966) are actually not sequential but mutually dependent.

(The usual ruse of pretending to be seeing the data for the first time seems to me a bit fatuous as I've already looked at it, although not studied it closely, but it plays the soothsayer role that academicians and others love so well. Actually, at one time this and similar investigations were predictions, but you will have to entertain a certain willing suspension of disbelief to travel back with me to ante-looking-at-the-data times.)

In Chapter 2 I wrote 7 "researchable questions" and said that this dissertation is primarily an investigation into the first 2. This investigation starts in the discussion of Peterson's data, which immediately follows. The 2 questions are: Which subsystem is X component most associated with? And, How does X component vary from subsystem to subsystem? These questions are primarily useful for examining the first of the 5 general propositions described in Chapter 3: The types exist.

When investigating a theory, an appropriate place to start is with the constructs of that theory. In this case, is there evidence that the constructs (types) have empirical referents? Do survival, stability, sociability, expertise, and self people (and other components) exist? The first 2 researchable questions and general proposition 1 are ways of asking these questions.

Although this dissertation is primarily an investigation of these questions, I noted in Chapter 3 that I would occasionally refer to other questions and propositions. The data in Peterson's report is well-suited to examine proposition 5 too: The further away a person or group is from a subsystem the less it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. As I mentioned a few pages above, there are regularities in Peterson's data that he doesn't discuss. These have to do with general proposition 5, and I discuss this proposition and some evidence that examines it in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 1 I wrote of this theory as a possible paradigm. At that time I suggested that an important criterion for theories, one that has often been underemphasized from the humanistic point of view, is the theory's scope: How many different sorts of things can be explained? The lack of attention to this criterion, I suppose, is due to the overwhelming disciplinary nature of our educational and intellectual system. Because our knowledge system is organized into specialties, it is natural for people working within those specialties to think, perceive, and judge primarily within their specialized limits. I suggest the criterion of scope be constantly kept in mind when evaluating this examination of construct validity. This may require stepping back from one's intellectual specialty to a more holistic perspective.

Individual Expectations of College Life

Peterson examined 5 specific expectations of college life: (1) educational plans, (2) plans for graduate study, (3) greatest satisfaction, (4) extracurricular involvement, and (5) curricular and instructional preferences (p. 14).

1. Educational Plans (pp. 14-20) - On the College Student Questionnaires the freshmen were able to select 40 different fields as intended majors. 16 of these choices had differences large enough to yield meaningful data. In terms of our researchable questions this item asks: Which subsystems are the various majors most associated with? According to the humanistic theory we would expect an intended major field, a component, to be most associated with the subsystem that has the same dominant value that the major does. That is, a stability major is expected to have most appeal to a stability student, etc.

As I pointed out in Chapter 2 some characteristics of the stability subsystem are a desire for a secure, safe place or institutional role, lack of tolerance for ambiguity, for indecision, and for vacillation, and a desire for sureness, planning, accounting for eventualities, certainty. These were strongly evidenced by the stability freshmen. The majors that they anticipated lead to secure jobs, often in large organizations; business administration, engineering, and technical specialties.

They were also heavily committed to the biological sciences. Peterson speculates, "It is likely that many of the vocationally oriented students choosing biology see this as a step toward medical school...," (p. 17), also a stereotypically secure occupation. The stability students also were high in choosing education as a major, although not so high as the sociability types. This too can easily lead to security, in likelihood of finding a job, in finding a bureaucratic niche, and in job security. Gerald Moeller ("Bureaucracy and Teachers' Sense of Power," 1968), for example, reports that teachers like bureaucratic organizations because they allow the teacher to predict the results of his actions; that is, a bureaucracy makes a job more predictable.

As for the expected low tolerance for indecision and uncertainty, the stability types showed the highest percentage already decided on a major field for the 4 types, had the longest standing commitment, had less difficulty in deciding, and had the highest proportion indicating theirs was the only field they were really interested in. They also felt the most certain of graduation.

Part of the stability subsystem is the authoritarian deference to superiors. While I hesitate to say that this was strongly confirmed, the stability students reported that their parents strongly approved of the major field decision;

they were the highest scoring of the four types in this category, too.

This brings up the interesting question of whether their reporting is accurate and whether they were strongly influenced by their parents or whether their desire to see an orderly world biased them to reduce dissonance between them and people in authority (parents). Research design and interpretation based on this theory should take into account these response biases of various types.

A hallmark of the sociability (collegiate) orientation to the world is an interest with establishing and developing as many social contacts as possible. Peterson notes this in both the choices of the sociability types and in his explanations of their choices. These students frequently chose business administration (as did the stability types, but to a lesser degree than they). They were highest in choosing physical education, education, and home economics. Peterson says that the selection of education and teaching does not follow from the Clark-Trow theory; however, he accounts for this and for the other selections by citing peer and family influences, and the fact that education attracts many women who may be strongly influenced by their associates in sororities, etc. "Of equal significance all these curricula," he says, "are probably seen as making fewer intellectual demands, thereby leaving more time for extra-curricular activities, living-group functions, athletics, social life, (and) rewarding friendships," (p. 18). Thus, he cites the lack of interference with social life as the criterion for the sociability (collegiate) types, and he spots their susceptibility to interpersonal pressure.

The expertise orientation (academic) is the category least confirmed by this section of the Peterson report, although the evidence presented in the section on major field is as expected.. The expertise orientation stresses, among other things, competence in a specialized field. A professional orientation to oneself and one's work is one manifestation of this. The 5 fields for potential major most selected by the expertise-centered students demanded "intellectual power and habit (e.g., the sciences)" (p. 20). They were biological sciences, chemistry, physics, mathematics, and history. The dedication to one's field that characterizes many professionals and is a trait of the expertise orientation was stated in the personal philosophies as "scholarly pursuit of knowledge and ideas wherever the pursuit may lead."

The fact that both the expertise types and the stability types were high in choosing the biological sciences demonstrates a point in the potential uses of this theory. If we assume that these choices are consistent with the subsystems of these types, then these choices are made for different reasons. As Peterson pointed out, stability types may have been primarily interested in biological sciences as a door to the security of a medical profession. The expertise types, on the other hand, may have been more interested in medicine as an interesting specialization or for a developed field of knowledge, technique, or expertise. An investigation into the reasons for choosing biology might be based on the second researchable question in Chapter 2: How does X component (here choosing biological sciences as a major) differ from subsystem to subsystem? Ways to study this question and similar ones can also be based on the humanistic theory. For example, we would suppose that stability students who were trying to decide between a biological sciences major and another major would be more likely to be thinking of a stability alternative (business administration, engineering, or technical specialty) than they were likely to be considering another expertise alternative (chemistry, physics, mathematics, or history).

The problem here is getting at the motivations of the various types. What do the various choices mean to individuals of the different types? The 5-valued humanistic system proposes 5 reasons for human choices, and this leaves much room for future research. Do stability people make decisions for stability reasons, and so forth?

In many ways the self students (nonconformists) are the opposite of the stability students. Considering the fact that these groups are the furthest apart on the humanistic sequence in this sample (Survival is missing), this is to be expected; general proposition 5 - The further away a person or group is from a subsystem, the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. While the stability students exhibited their low tolerance for indecision and uncertainty in their having reported the greatest percentage of decisions made for major field, the longest standing commitment, the least difficulty deciding, the highest proportion claiming this was the only field for them, the most parental satisfaction, and the most certainty of graduating, the nonconformists demonstrated their tolerance for ambiguity, indecision, and uncertainty by being at the opposite poles from the stability students on these items.

Peterson (correctly) notes that they lived up to the expression from the personal philosophy statements "concern for personal identity." He refers to their identity experimentation and their "search for the activities of greatest personal meaning" (p. 20). They were characteristically high in majors that have to do with self-expression and self-exploration: art, drama, English, humanities combination major, and psychology.

As indicators of dominant subsystems the measurement of educational plans showed the expected orientations of the 4 types of students by the certainty and uncertainty of their choices and by the majors characteristic of the various subsystems.

Some expectations based on the humanistic theory, however, were not confirmed. For example, with the strong emphasis on law and order that is characteristic of the stability subsystem, there weren't significant differences for the choice of an intended major in criminology, law enforcement, etc. Theology and religion are often thought of as placing order in the universe, as specifying relationships among things, as stressing hierarchical structure in both dogma and institutional forms, and as providing a set of rules for proper relationships in society and nature. Peterson, however, does not report significant differences among the 4 student groups.

Here again is a matter for investigation based on the supposition that components vary from one subsystem to another. We would expect to find that stability people interpret and favor religion as an order-giving system. Sociability people are most likely to value their churches as providing social contacts. Expertise people may find a chance to exercise their fields of knowledge through their religious organizations, possibly through social benefit programs in which they are the experts helping less expert others. And self types may be interested in religion as a personal search for individual meaning and life. In the section on background characteristics of the freshmen religion is discussed in more detail. Chapter 12 also presents a description of religion in a discussion of the self subsystem.

Another expectation based on the humanistic theory but not found by Peterson is an expected interest among the sociability types in studies that have to do with social relations, such as sociology. In the discussion of the Bennington College studies, Chapters 8, 9, and 10, I point out that sociability students were often social science majors. Later in this chapter I point out that sociability students characteristically enjoyed social studies in their high schools. If studying human interaction is thought to be characteristic of sociability students, then we would expect them to show intended majors in sociology, anthropology, history, or psychology. While they were second to the self types in psychology and second to the expertise types in history they didn't show the expected strength in the social sciences as intended majors.

2. Plans for Graduate Study (pp. 20-23) - The findings in this section closely parallel those for selection of the major field; however, this required anticipation of where the college freshman would be 4, 5 or more years in advance, and the proportion of omitted answers was high. From the

data that was "sufficient," Peterson says that the stability students prefer the professional schools of business, dentistry, engineering, and nursing as well as the academic discipline of chemistry. These choices are in keeping with fitting oneself into a prepared, secure, specific slot in society.

The sociability-oriented generally showed the least interest in continuing their formal education beyond 4 years of college. Using the theory as a basis for speculation, we can interpret this tentatively: (1) they are in college for a good time; "i.e., social activity" and expect to continue this after graduation but in other institutions, such as country clubs, civic organizations, etc.; (2) many of them are women and may be looking forward to early marriage; (3) they see college as a deferral of taking a serious job and as a sort of last fling before the obligations of a job and a family. Number 3 is supported by the sociability-oriented's choosing engineering and education as the most likely intended professional schools. These selections may indicate that underneath the collegiate veneer they are thinking of their future vocations and resemble the stability students in these choices.

The college-age holders of the expertise orientation are most inclined toward postgraduate education. They exhibit their interest in specialized knowledge by their greater expectancy for a doctorate and by a greater certainty of achieving it. These show the high value of specialization appropriate to the expertise subsystem. They were most likely to choose law, medicine, and social work as professional schools. These remind us that Maslow called this group "esteem" and noted their desire to be useful and necessary to the world (Motivation and Personality, 1954, p. 91). Their medical, legal, and helping specialties may be the expertise components that aid the social-esteem component of the expertise subsystem.

True to their interest in self-development and personal expression, the self students (nonconformists) chose art and English as the most likely graduate schools, and they chose architecture and the performing arts as the most likely selections among professional schools.

Thus, plans for graduate study also indicated the validity of the humanistic paradigm, as exemplified unknowingly by Clark and Trow.

3. Greatest Satisfaction (pp. 26-28) - We would predict that the greatest source of expected freshman year satisfaction would be influenced by students' orientations, and in general they are. This is based on College Student Questionnaire item 52 alone which asked about 15 kinds of greatest anticipated personal satisfactions during the

coming freshman year.

The 15 selections which the students could choose as the one they most hoped to receive their greatest feelings of satisfaction and the percentages of the 4 subsystems choosing them follow (p. 27):

Selections most chosen by	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
STABILITY				
Course work in general	36.8	30.1	35.8	24.1
Course work in major field	35.0	23.3	28.7	19.3
SOCIABILITY				
Student government	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.0
Athletics	2.3	4.6	1.6	2.9
"Bull-sessions" with fellow students	0.7	1.2	0.8	0.6
Parties and social life	0.8	2.4	0.8	2.1
Close friendships with students	3.6	6.6	3.3	3.6
Getting acquainted with a wide variety of students	2.6	6.1	2.1	1.5
The life of the dorms or houses	0.8	1.1	0.4	0.4
EXPERTISE				
none				
SELF				
Individual study or research	3.1	2.5	6.2	6.7
Getting acquainted with faculty	0.4	0.2	0.4	1.0
Dating	1.2	1.5	0.5	2.3
Artistic or literary work	0.5	0.4	1.0	4.4
Self-discovery, self-insight	9.9	16.8	15.7	26.8
OTHER	1.5	1.8	1.3	3.1

The stability students selected "course work in general" and "course work in major field." Given the 15 selections they could choose, these are the ones nearest to preparation for occupations, but the selections are not specifically well-stated for stability studnets. Since many of the stability-oriented vocationalists see their higher education as preparation for jobs, it would be interesting to see revisions of this item to include a future-occupation orientation. One problem with the two selections chosen by the vocationalists is that these two were also heavily selected by the expertise-oriented academics, slightly less by the sociability students, and somewhat lower by the self types. It might be helpful to try to separate these overlapping interests by finding out just what it is that these various groups expect to enjoy about their course work. I hypothesize that the self students see their courses as a way of self-development and insight, that the expertise-academics see them as entry into occupations. One can imagine stability-vocationalists selecting an alternative such as: Course work which will develop my abilities for my future occupation, or Preparation for future job, or Future job security.

The sociability types, true to their gregarious natures, were the highest choosers of student government, athletics, "bull sessions" with fellow students, parties, social life, close friendships with students, getting acquainted with a wide variety of students, and the life of the dorms or houses. These 7 items were well chosen to pick out the gregarious natures of the sociability types. Using high interest in interpersonal relations as an indicator of sociability, however, makes us expect that dating would be indicative of sociability types. However, this is not confirmed. Dating was most characteristic of the self students; this is definitely a bit of disconfirming evidence.

In order to try to figure out why this result appeared, a future study may want to investigate how the various types see dating. The theory leads us to expect to try to solve this disconfirmation puzzle by finding that dating is interpreted as self-growth, insight, or personal expression (self traits) more than it is as social interaction (a sociability trait). This is an example of how the humanistic theory can be used to hypothesize.

The expertise students weren't the highest in any of the 15 choices. They were high in those that had to do with course work, however, and if there had been some choices that were written with the stability group in mind, the stability group, we may hypothesize, would be enough lower in the course-work choices to give the lead in these categories to the expertise group. Choices such as expertise, specialized knowledge, and search for truth might also have appealed to the expertise students by appealing to the truth, knowledge, and intellect biases of the expertise subsystem.

The expertise-oriented academics were high in both selections having to do with course work; this may indicate their interest in a particular field as such, contrasted with the stability-oriented vocationalists' interest due to anticipated jobs. This is a speculative interpretation, however, and is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by the data. The expertise students were also interested in individual study or research and somewhat interested in self-discovery and self-insight (although less than the self group). These, especially the former, may be a recognition that professional recognition often comes through specialized individual effort, research, etc. The latter may be an influence from self interests. The expertise orientation is next to the self orientation. As general proposition 5 says: The further away a person or group is from a subsystem the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. One would expect some similarity between these two contiguous categories.

The self students showed greatest expectations for "self-discovery, self-insight." Their secondary anticipation of satisfaction came from course work, but they were the lowest of the types in anticipating satisfaction from course work. This may indicate potential dissatisfaction with institutions of higher education and faculties which think of education in terms of courses, credits, specialized knowledge, and curriculum; that is, an expertise view of education. As would be expected, they showed the greatest interest of the 4 groups in individual study or research, and artistic or literary work. They also were highest in selecting "getting acquainted with faculty." (I don't know how to interpret this within the humanistic theory.) And, as pointed out earlier, they were the highest in dating anticipations. This last is also puzzling. As mentioned above, they may be interested in dating as a means of personal development and expression, rather than as social gregariousness, à la socially-oriented.

In summary, the general factors of stability, sociability, expertise, and self are evident in the greatest anticipated source of freshman-year satisfaction.

In this discussion of greatest anticipated satisfaction some of the value of using a humanistic theoretical approach as opposed to Peterson's _ad hoc_ typology shows. Both approaches find that the items generally fall into the expected categories, but this humanistic theoretical approach makes more precise predictions based on the larger scale of the humanistic theory. The value of self-development, for example, accounts for the high reading in the self type for self-discovery and artistic work. In its failure to account for the high self response to dating as a probable source of greatest satisfaction, the results can disconfirm expectations too. But this theoretical approach opens the door for further investigation by suggesting how dating may be seen from within the different subsystems, as self-expression by self types, for example. Thus, a theoretical approach suggests more research and a possible future reconciliation of disconfirming evidence.

This theory also gives us a basis for criticism of the original questionnaire. For example, I suggested several additional items to try to give the stability types choices more in line with their interests. When we assume that the stability types are more than just vocationally oriented, we can then write items for future revisions of the test to stress security, stability, etc.

This humanistic theory lets us hypothesize what it is about the various selections that makes them most attractive to their respective groups, the 5 major values of the 5 subsystems. This is a variant of the question: How does X component change from subsystem to subsystem? Course work may be a social meeting ground and place for interpersonal action for sociability types. The expertise students may use course work to develop and satisfy their intellectual techniques, curiosity, and their specializations. And the self types may find that course work leads them to insight and/or means of personal expression. The humanistic theory is fertile ground for generating hypotheses, interpreting results, constructing, criticizing, and revising tests. It does these by providing a wider conceptual framework than a mere classificatory typology.

4. Expected Extracurricular Involvement (pp. 24-26) - Peterson's study of how much and which extracurricular activities the college freshmen expected to participate in provides us with a good example for investigating the 2 principle researchable questions of this dissertation: Which subsystem is X component (joining extracurricular activities) most associated with? And, How does X component (joining extracurricular activities) vary from subsystem to subsystem?. At the same time, this topic can provide us with some additional information about the first general proposition The types exist and also about the 5th general proposition, which states that subsystems and components resemble the subsystems and components nearest them on the humanistic continuum. Proposition 5 and the researchable question about how a component varies from subsystem to subsystem are taken up in detail in the next chapter.

Which system is joining extracurricular activities most associated with? This question seems readymade to pick out the sociability types. And it does. The College Student Questionnaire listed 13 kinds of activities that the freshman might participate in. The averages across the 13 activities for the different students were:

Stability	Sociability	Expertise	Self
49.6	56.1	52.0	45.4

And a 14th indicator of social propensities, which was not included under "activities," picked out the sociability subsystem too:

> Do you hope to join (pledge) a social fraternity or sorority (or other equivalent house or club) sometime during the coming year?

Stability	Sociability	Expertise	Self
40.5	55.9	36.3	32.7

Thus when we consider joining activities as a whole, the sociability students show the most likelihood of this. When it comes to joining fraternities or sororities, they stand out even more. If we assume that fraternities and sororities are sociability-type organizations (if they stress gregariousness, congeniality, togetherness, etc.) then we would predict that the sociability traits would appear even stronger on this item, as they do. This brings us to the second researchable question, which considers how components vary from subsystem to subsystem and to general proposition 5. These are the subject of the next chapter. Before that we have more information on the construct validity related to American higher education.

5. Curricular and Instructional Preferences (pp. 28-31) - The stability desire for sureness and structure shows itself in the stability group. More than any of the other groups, they preferred unambiguous problems, assigned work, objective examinations, and assigned readings.

Their opposites, the self group, preferred mostly independent work, essay examinations, and suggested readings. And they were second to the expertise group in selecting original research and tied with the sociability group in their desire to have classes conducted as mostly discussion. The self traits of self-direction and self-expression are evident in these high choices.

The sociability group had only one question framed so that it would show their orientation. For the preferred way of conducting class they were tied with the self group in favor of mostly discussion. Here too we can use this humanistic theory to hypothesize about the values that the different groups put on something, discussion method. Perhaps liking class discussion is an instance of sociability's gregariousness, while class discussion might be valued for its self-expressiveness to the self types. Before we can accept this, further research would have to bear it out.

The expertise students were highest in preferring original research and in preferring ambiguous problems. In this they were similar to the self group. Peterson calls these (p. 30) "willingness to deal with uncertainties, presumably in a personal, subjective manner, ...the subjective, idiosyncratic ...academics (expertise) and nonconformists (self) (are) oriented toward individualistic exploration of ideas." The expertise group, according to the humanistic model, is oriented toward developing expertise in a field of knowledge, discipline, skill, or ability. Their willingness for independent work may reflect these values as well as anticipatory socialization to their hoped-for worlds of achievement. The independence orientation of the self students, however, may be a reflection of their highly personalized orientation to the world.

These findings on 4 different orientations to classwork and studying suggest that the humanistic theory may provide one source for applications to education. Grouping might be done so that students who have similar preferences of learning styles are together. Or, they could be matched with teachers who have compatible styles. If a teacher wants to individualize instruction, he may have to switch from one humanistic mode to another as he changes from one student to another or as his students each change. In a humanistically heterogeneous class he may want to provide 4 types of activities, curricula, course requirements, etc.

Refining Conceptualization and Instrumentation

Item 200 of the College Student Questionnaire gives us an instance of how this theory helps us interpret the constructs that are being scrutinized and helps us suggest refinements of testing instruments (Appendix, p. 29):

> Which of the following statements comes closer to your views?
>
> 1. College students should be given great freedom in choosing their subjects of study and in

choosing their own areas of interest within their subjects.

2. There are bodies of knowledge to be learned, and the faculty is more competent than the student to direct the student's course of study through required courses, prerequisites, etc.

The first alternative, with its self-directedness, seems designed to pick out the self types, and, as noted below, it did:

Stability	Sociability	Expertise	Self
41.5	39.9	43.9	59.5

In the text of his monograph Peterson reports that the stability, sociability, and expertise students prefer that the institution prescribe the curricula rather than that the student be free to devise his own curriculum. But the second alternative is not, as Peterson misinterpreted, a selection that gives the right to the institution, but to the expertise of the faculty. In the second alternative we see the emphasis on authority based on intellectual, specialized knowledge, not on the legitimacy of the institution or of society.

The construct being tested by the second alternative is not institution-based authority, but expertise-based authority. This humanistic theory alerts us to these distinctions.

This awareness, of course, suggests refinements of testing instruments. Item 200 forces a choice between a self orientation and an expertise orientation toward authority over curricula. If there were selections written for the stability and sociability types, then we would expect these groups to choose their respective categories and expertise to be highest on alternative 2. As item 200 is written now, sociability is highest in choosing alternative 2, with expertise and stability close behind. A stability selection might stress legality and hierarchical structure:

> 3. When a student enters a college, he agrees to abide by the regulations, and the administration and faculty have the legal right to decide on requirements.

A sociability selection would stress smooth social relations:

> 4. Living harmoniously with others is an important social and educational goal. Because extracurricular and social activities stress equality, democracy, and friendship, they are an important part of an educational plan.

If these additional selections were added, the humanistic theory would lead us to predict that the self types would be most likely to choose the 1st choice, expertise types the 2nd, stability types the 3rd, and sociability types the 4th. The refined conceptualization that the humanistic theory leads us to makes it possible to redesign instruments to be sensitive to these finer conceptual differentiations.

In summary, the 5 indicators of construct validity for individuals (educational plans, major field, expected satisfactions, expected extracurricular involvement, and curricular preferences) all showed that the Clark and Trow categories (as instances of the humanistic theory) were useful for typing college freshmen.

CONSTRUCT VALIDITY - INSTITUTIONAL TYPES

Peterson does not let his investigation drop here, however; now that he has tried the typology on individuals, he tries it on institutions (pp. 31-41). He asks whether the typology can predict the make-up of freshman classes at various types of institutions. We generalize his interest with the Clark-Trow typology to the humanistic one, to paraphrase his question: Does the humanistic theory produce descriptions of freshman student bodies at various institutions which correspond to some kind of reasonably informed judgments about the nature of those institutions and the kinds of students likely to attend them (pp. 31-21)?

Peterson selects 4 types of colleges that he thinks will have large concentrations of the various types of students, (a) technical institutions (stability), (b) public institutions (sociability), (c) coeducational liberal arts colleges (expertise), (d) 2 selective women's colleges emphasizing student independence (self).

In the table below we see the figures for these colleges. The first 2 rows are for the whole sample. Individual norms are for the whole sample combined without differentiation by colleges. For example, 26.5% of the 12,949 students chose the personal philosophy for stability. Institutional norms are the means of the proportions at the 23 separate schools. For example, college 1 might have reported 25% expertise; college 2, 30% expertise; college 3, 35% expertise; and so forth. These percentages were averaged for the 23 colleges and the average reading was 21.8% expertise.

The next 8 rows represent the distributions in 8 colleges which Peterson expected to show biased distributions toward one or another type of student. Colleges A and B are private technical institutions. The expectation here was for a strong stability bias. Colleges E and F are predicted to have large proportions of their freshman classes depicting themselves as sociability oriented. E and F are both public universities. (Note: I have put institutions E and F before C and D in order to rearrange them in the sequence of humanistic types.) Academics are expected to predominate at independent liberal arts college C and at Jewish university D. C is coed, middle and upper-middle class, and moderately selective. D is all men, middle and upper-middle class, and requires a minimum of B average in secondary school. Colleges G and H are women's colleges for upper-middle class students. They stress student independence. On this basis we would expect them to attract self students. In every case the deviations away from the norms for the whole sample, Row 1, are in the direction expected. See boxed data.

Table 4-1

Type Composition:

Whole Sample, 8 Colleges, 3 Kinds of Colleges

Sample/College/Kind Row	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Whole Sample				
1. individual norms	26.5	50.8	18.5	3.3
2. institutional norms	25.2	46.6	21.8	5.6
8 Colleges				
Stability (Tech.)				
3. College A	47.9	33.5	14.0	2.1
4. College B	42.2	41.5	14.1	2.4
Sociability (Public U.)				
5. College E	22.4	58.6	16.1	3.0
6. College F	17.0	63.7	15.9	3.2
Expertise (lib. arts & Jewish U.)				
7. College C	21.4	40.6	33.0	4.3
8. College D	33.3	28.6	32.7	2.3
Self (independent women)				
9. College G	7.0	14.7	48.9	23.3
10. College H	7.3	14.5	47.3	30.9
3 Average Types				
11. 4 lib. arts colleges	18.1	50.6	26.7	4.1
12. 3 R. C. colleges	29.7	45.2	19.6	4.5
13. 9 public institutions	26.4	53.6	16.6	3.1

The stability colleges, Rows 3 and 4, have almost half their students in the expected category compared with 26.5% in the whole sample. The sociability type accentuate the dominant collegiate "Joe-College" subculture, Rows 5 and 6. The expertise type, Rows 7 and 8, show a movement along the humanistic continuum from the domination of a sociability orientation toward the expansion of an expertise orientation. The predicted self colleges turn out to be dominated by the expertise orientation; however, their strong self orientation, 27.1%, is over 7 times the whole-sample concentration of 3.8%, which included colleges C and D. In summary, the pattern of distributions moves in the expected direction.

Rows 11, 12, and 13 are averages for 3 types of similar institutions. Row 11 gives the averages for 4 relatively small independent liberal arts colleges. Row 12 is for 3 Roman Catholic colleges, and Row 13 shows the figures for 9 public institutions. Grouping the colleges by these 3 (pp. 38-39), Peterson found that the 4 liberal arts colleges resemble the expertise examples, C and D. The 9 public institutions deviated from the whole sample norm similarly to the 2 examples of sociability public universities, E and F. And the 3 Roman Catholic colleges deviated away from the sociability norm toward the 2 ends of the humanistic continuum. This split is unaccounted for by this theory.

We should remember, of course, that these data were taken before the students had been on campus long and before they had had time to be greatly influenced by the colleges. To a large extent these figures may represent a combination of self-selection, selective recruitment, anticipatory socialization, and demographic factors such as family-income/institution-tuition interaction. These readings come from a period before the institutions have had much effect on their entering freshmen. It would be interesting to know the different effects of the types of institutions on different types of students. In Chapters 8, 9, and 10 I demonstrate one way this analysis might be done by interpreting 3 studies of Bennington College. In Chapter 8 I portray Bennington of 1959-1962 as a self institution with a sociability minority. In Chapters 9 and 10 I examine and interpret Bennington of the late 1930's as a sociability institution with some expertise influences.

SUMMARY

In the first part of this chapter the Clark and Trow typology of student subcultures was shown to be conceptually a specific instance of the larger humanistic typology. In the second part of the chapter the humanistic types were empirically examined. This was done by investigating the construct validity of a "personal philosophy of higher education" item from the College Student Questionnaire. Students were placed in 1 of 4 of the humanistic categories by their response on that item, and their responses on other items were anticipated by that placement. With some exceptions the predictions were confirmed for (1) educational plans,

(2) plans for graduate study, (3) greatest anticipated satisfaction, (4) expected extracurricular involvement, and (5) curricular and instructional preferences. The humanistic typology also accounted for differences in institutional types for 8 institutions of higher education and for 2 groups of similar colleges.

The exceptions to the expectations were pointed out, and I demonstrated how this humanistic theory can be used to generate hypotheses to account for these apparent exceptions. This, of course, led to suggestions for further research. It is at this point that the advantage of a theoretically derived typology becomes apparent. Instead of just accepting disconfirming evidence, a theory can suggest speculations to account for them. Refinements in conceptualization lead to refinements in instrumentation, and some suggestions and demonstrations of how this humanistic theory can alert us to these possibilities were also pointed out.

The focus of this chapter was on the first of the general propositions of this humanistic theory: The types exist. This proposition was tested by the researchable question: What subsystem is X component most associated with? Because the Clark and Trow typology was limited by its authors to student subcultures on college campuses, Peterson limited his investigation of construct validity to higher-education-oriented phenomena. The broader humanistic typology, however, includes components beyond college education. Chapter 6 goes beyond higher education to look at background characteristics, personality, and secondary schooling. While Peterson saw his investigation of these topics as exploring characteristics which have no necessary relationship to the student subculture types, the humanistic theory interprets them as having expected and predictable relations to the 5 wider-ranged humanistic subsystems. Thus, exploring background, personality, and secondary schooling takes us past the Clark and Trow predictions but still within the humanistic predictions.

Before doing that, however, it will help clarify both Chapter 6 and this chapter to differentiate between 2 closely related, but quite different, researchable questions. The question that this chapter concentrated on was: What subsystem is X component most associated with? Joining organizations, for example, is most associated with the sociability subsystem. This is a way of investigating The types exist.

This question is often confused with: How does X component change from subsystem to subsystem? That is, how does joining organizations differ from subsystem to subsystem? This question brings us back to the data on expected extracurricular involvement and takes us forward to Chapter 5 and general proposition 5.

Chapter 5

GENERAL PROPOSITION 5:

CHANGES IN COMPONENTS ACROSS SUBSYSTEMS - JOINING ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

General proposition 1 The types exist leads us to expect that people operating in a particular subsystem will show the group of characteristics that are expected to hang together. When we consider anticipated extracurricular involvement, for example, we expect the gregariousness of the sociability subsystem to be evident in a high degree of joining. We would expect the sociability types to be more socially active (choose more organizations) than the other types.

As pointed out in Chapter 4 under Expected Extracurricular Involvement, this expectation was confirmed. The sociability students far outstripped the others as potential joiners. Of the 13 kinds of organizations they could choose from, they were most likely of the 4 groups to join 7, compared with stability's 1, expertise's 3, and self's 2. Peterson summarizes (On a Typology of College Students, 1965, p. 26):

> ...compared with the other types, students classified as collegiate were easily the most oriented toward extracurricular activities. In those activities which give rise to the "Joe-College" stereotype, differences between collegiates (sociability orientation) and the other types were particularly large.

We can switch our researchable question from *What subsystem is X component (e.g., joining organizations) most associated with?* to *How does X component (e.g., joining different organizations) vary from subsystem to subsystem?* Not only is the total amount of joining organizations an indication of subsystem, but the type of organizations joined is too. We expect the self types, for example, to choose activities that stress self-expression, self-development, etc.

Proposition 5 - Ordinal Distribution

With either researchable question, general proposition 1 leads us to expect that a peak will be in one category. General proposition 5 leads us to expect the contiguous categories to show less of the trait, and the furthest categories to show least: The further away a person or group is from a subsystem, the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. Using proposition 1 we expect one highest correlation between a component and a subsystem. Using proposition 5 we expect this association to be a peak with frequency decreasing on each side. For example, if we think of joining organizations as a trait of the sociability type, then a curve of this may look like:


survival
stability
sociability
expertise
self

I have no idea whether this should be a "normal" curve or an abnormal one. More investigation into this might be valuable. Likewise, a schematic curve for interest in self-expression, or self-development may look like:


survival
stability
sociability
expertise
self

For example, let's take organizations and activities which sociability-oriented people would select. The groups lying next to the sociability group are the stability and expertise groups; we would expect them to choose these sociability activities less frequently than the social group, but more frequently than the self group. Also, in this study, we would predict that an organization chosen by the stability group would have the second highest frequency of choice from the sociability group, the third highest from the expertise group, and the lowest from the self group.

In a study that included survival types, we would expect them to show approximately the same frequency as the sociability types because they are both next to the stability group. If all 5 types were present, we would expect an indicator of a stability trait to be most frequent in the stability types, about equally less frequent in the two contiguous types (survival and sociability), still less frequent in the expertise type, and least frequent in the self type. This assumes a symmetrical distribution of the indicator, although the curve may or may not be the symmetrical "normal" curve of statistics. Likewise, activities chosen for their individual expression and self-development by the self group should be next most appealing to the expertise group, less attractive to the sociability group, and least appealing to the stability group. (See diagram above). Here too, if the survival types were present in this study, we would assume that they would be least attracted to the activities that appealed most to the self types.

Do organizations which are most frequently chosen by a humanistic type of student show characteristics of that subsystem - supporting proposition 1? Are these organizations also less frequently chosen as distance along the humanistic continuum increases from these systems - supporting general proposition 5? Part 1 of this chapter, immediately below, goes into a more detailed analysis of the type of activities chosen by the humanistic types and then checks to see what the distribution of choices tells us about proposition 5. Part 2 of this chapter exemplifies how this sort of detailed analysis can be used to generate analysis, discussion, conceptualization, hypothesizing, instrumentation, and research. Both these demonstrate how proposition 5 can be used to reanalyze data. This technique of investigation might be used on the rest of Peterson's data; I do this to some extent in the next chapter. Or, it might be used in other studies; see Chapters 7-10, for example. I hope this illustration will encourage you to try humanistic analysis of those studies and topics which interest you.

Part 1

DISTRIBUTION OF COMPONENTS IN EXPECTED EXTRACURRICULAR INVOLVEMENT

Each of the four sections below, 1 for each humanistic type, presents 3 kinds of information. First is a table of activities which that type was highest in choosing. The 4 tables are a redisplay of the data presented in Table 4, page 25 of Peterson's On a Typology of College Students. Following that is a discussion of the type of activity, to see whether it is the type of activity we would expect of the humanistic type of student. Last is a discussion of the distributions, a check into general proposition 5.

The numbers in the tables refer to percentages of students of the type who chose that answer. For example, of all the students who labeled themselves stability 52.4% said that they "Would like to participate, either very actively, or not very actively in preprofessional clubs." 47.5% of the expertise students answered they would. The third possible answer was, "Would not be interested in participating." Again, what is important here is not the actual numbers, but their relative sizes, greater or less, compared with each other, their ordinal relations.

Stability Joining

▭ = high ◯ = low

Table 5-1

High Extracurricular Choice for Stability Students

Activity	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
preprofessional club	52.4	48.2	47.5	27.5

Type - Peterson interprets this lone high choice of preprofessional clubs consistently with the humanistic interpretation that stability types look forward to fitting into ready-made societal roles (p. 24):

> ...it is difficult to think of these clubs as

> extracurricular. While they no doubt afford a Certain amount of social exchange, the exchange is with persons (students and faculty) having very similar educational-vocational interests. Perhaps more important, these clubs serve to keep members appraised of events (and opportunities) in their chosen career fields.

Distribution - As predicted by the humanistic sequence the percentages are in the indicated ordinal direction in spite of the fact that preprofessional clubs were not divided into subsections that would make the appeal to the various groups stronger, e.g., clubs that focus on job opportunities and job related problems for the vocationally oriented. Stability is highest, sociability lower, expertise even lower, and self lowest.

Sociability Joining

Table 5-2

High Extracurricular Choices for Sociability Students

Activity	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Living Group Activities	75.7	88.5	76.3	68.2
School Spirit Activities	64.1	81.2	63.5	42.2
Student Government	63.0	76.6	67.1	48.4
Athletics	71.3	74.5	65.7	60.6
Hobby Groups	67.5	70.4	63.4	60.8
Religious Organizations	61.1	67.0	62.0	39.9
Service Organizations	35.8	43.7	39.2	29.9

Type - These activities, especially the top 3, are likely to have a strong element of social interaction. One of the sociability traits mentioned in the description of this subsystem in Chapter 2 is an egalitarian and democratic view of mankind. This may help account for the interest in student government, which, of course is highly sociability oriented with its politicking, meeting people, social exposure, etc. Religious organizations and service organizations are not obviously sociability-centered. We can conjecture that these are seen as sources of social interaction by the sociability types. As noted in the last chapter the sociability students also were most likely to join a fraternity or sorority:

Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
40.5	55.9	36.3	32.7

Distribution - In every case when the sociability group was high, the stability and expertise groups were second or third, and the self students were lowest. This distribution is exactly the prediction by proposition 5. The slight bit of data available for these seven cases suggest that the slope away from the peak of sociability may be symmetrical or nearly so. For the 7 cases the mean difference between stability and expertise is only 2.8%.

Expertise Joining

Table 5-3

High Extracurricular Choices for Expertise Students

Activity	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Journalism, publications	33.8	43.8	45.0	44.4
Music Performer	29.6	32.4	34.1	32.3
Political Organizations	36.4	40.5	44.5	38.2

Type - Journalism, music performance, and political organizations were the top choices of the expertise group. Publication and political work (not campus politics) are ways one can influence large numbers of people (consistent with the expertise orientation desire to be of value and service to the world). These, as does performance of music, bring recognition, prestige, and reputation, another expertise trait.

Distribution - Here again, we see the predicted falling off of interest as we go to the immediately contiguous categories and a still greater drop to the stability category, furthest away. Also, the differences between the average percentages of the 2 categories bordering on expertise is relatively small, 1%.

Self Joining

Table 5-4

High Extracurricular Choices for Self Students

Activity	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Literary, oratorical, dramatic	31.5	38.9	47.7	50.6
Art	22.3	24.1	29.6	47.8

Type - As to be expected, the self students opted for literary and art activities, self-expressive, self-directed, etc. It would be interesting to know whether they might also choose sensitivity training, as it is supposed to lead to greater self-awareness, etc. Also see the discussion of psychedelic drugs in Chapter 12.

Distribution - The prediction of a slope from a high in self to a low in stability is confirmed again. The confirmation of the predicted slope is not limited to extracurricular expectations. The same general results, although not always so strong, come from reinterpreting the data on intended major field, intended graduate school, intended professional school, and expected greatest freshman-year satisfaction (pp. 14-23). Rather than present all the data here, I refer you to Peterson's study and suggest you watch the data in the rest of this chapter and the succeeding ones to see where general proposition 5 can be used to explain the data distribution, where it is confirmed and where disconfirmed.

Part 2

USING PROPOSITION 5 AS A CONCEPTUAL PROBE FOR RESEARCH

In addition to directing our attention to the regularities in the distribution of data, general proposition 5 draws our attention to irregularities and helps us speculate about what causes them, and it helps us to analyze components in terms of this humanistic theory. As part of a theory it gives us a technique of thinking.

Increased Sensitivity to Data

As an example of the type of analysis proposition 5 generates, we can look at Table 4, immediately above. In both activities we see the predicted slope upward from stability to self. But in the case of literary, oratorical, and dramatic activity the slope is gentler, from 31.5 to 50.6, compared with the slope for art, 22.3 to 47.8. Also we notice that most of the rise in art comes between expertise and self, while the rise for literary-oratorical-dramatic has very little rise between expertise and self.

When we compare these 2 items, art seems to be more characteristic of the self subsystem than do literary, oratorical, and dramatic activities. Interest in art is relatively low until we go from expertise to self, where it takes a big jump. Literary, oratorical, and dramatic activities, however, seem to appeal more equally across the types, although there is some increase as one approaches self. These data-based differences brought to our attention by general proposition 5 lead us to speculate about differences between the 2 types of activities.

Analysis of Components of Social System

What is the reason art is more characteristically a self activity? For one thing, an artist is likely to work alone and to show his work without necessarily interacting with his viewers. Dramatic and oratorical works, however, are by nature interaction with an audience. Writing, of course, is more like painting in this respect.

Basing our thoughts on these data and on proposition 5, we would expect that painters are more interested in personal expression than an average of literary, oratorical and dramatic artists. The latter, we judge from their relatively higher sociability and expertise scores, are more interested in social recognition, status, or esteem (characteristics of the sociability and expertise subsystems). Literary, oratorical, and dramatic works (especially the latter 2) are more oriented toward interpersonal communication (sociability) and the verbal aspects of specialized knowledge (expertise) than is artistic work as a whole. This may be because words are used for communication more than shapes, sizes, colors, and textures are. (Not that this is necessarily so, but that it happens to be so in our culture now). Compared with painting and sculpture - drama, oratory, and writing are more expertise and sociability activities because their medium (words) is more open to interpersonal communication, because oratory and drama are performed in front of an audience which gives immediate interpersonal response which may, in fact affect the performer and performance, because their performance, as in a debate or play, often requires interaction with others. Above all the technique, expertise, or skill that they require are more based on influencing others than expressing oneself. Here again, literary expression is often more like art than like the performing arts.

Comparison of Components

If we tentatively accept the idea that literary, oratorical, and dramatic activities are more expertise activities than is art, we can look at other typically expertise choices to see whether they and literary, oratorical, and dramatic activities resemble each other more than they resemble art. The expertise students were highest in 3 activities, journalism, political organizations, and music. Do these 3 more closely resemble art or literary, oratorical, and dramatic activities?

Journalistic, Literary, and Artistic Work - Journalistic and literary activity both are writing; however, if we speculate about how writing varies from subsystem to subsystem, we can infer that writing in the self subsystem is likely to be highly self-expressive. In the expertise subsystem it may have a dominant cast of expert authority, influence, or source of information and knowledge. Writing which is oriented toward communication with mass readership, as is journalism, shows shades of sociability and expertise, while writing that is oriented toward self-expression is more literary. (I discuss this in Part 2 of Chapter 12; see "The Self Style in Literature.") Although journalism is less a component of the self system than is literature and although the journalistic use of words is more sociability and expertise oriented than is the literary use of words, the expertise activity of journalism resembles writing literature more than it resembles painting or sculpting. This resemblance to journalism may account for some of the attraction that literary, dramatic, and oratory actitivies have for sociability and expertise students. Art is not usually seen as having such a wide communicative streak and is less attractive for this reason.

Political, Oratorical, and Artistic Work - The same expertise trait of influence through knowledge that appeared in journalism appears when we compare political activity (an expertise activity) with oratory and compare them both with art. Politics and oratory both seem more group oriented than art. We can think of this groupiness as moving politics and oratory down the humanistic continuum away from self and toward sociability and expertise. Compared with political activity, oratory is more an individual effort to influence people, i.e., one speaker in front of a group, than is work in political organizations. In the latter a student worker is less likely to stand out and to express himself and more likely to be an equal worker among equals, sociability. In political organizational work the type of influence a person has is more as part of a larger influential group than as being the source of influence himself. It is more a democratic-sociability type of influence than it is an expertise or self type of influence. With its emphasis on influence and communication rather than on expression, oratory, a self activity, and political organizational work, an expertise activity, resemble each other. These attributes may account for some more of the interest that expertise and sociability types show in the self activity of oratory.

Musical, Dramatic, and Artistic Work - When we compare music and drama with each other and both with art, a different basis of comparison shows up. Drama and music, as a whole, are performing arts, while painting, which is more individually creative, is not. This is not to say that every instance of music and drama is less creative than every instance of painting, but that this general difference holds between art and the other 2 forms. Being a performance, music, like drama and oratory, is usually more calculated to move an audience than is art. Music and drama are characteristically following a score or script of a composer or playwright under the guidance of a conductor or director. Painting characteristically is more decided by the artist himself. Painting is thus more self-determined than playing music and acting usually are. Also, while painters may communicate and critique each other's work, their creations are characteristically the work of one man working alone. Except for soloists and monologists, musicians and players usually perform in groups. They show several more tinges of sociability and less of self than do painters and sculptors. These differences may account for additional interest in drama and lack of interest in art from expertise and sociability students.

Thus, in the whole Peterson sample the relatively stronger appeal of literary, dramatic, and oratorical activities compared with the lesser appeal of art may have been due to the hypothesized fact that these 3 have some expertise and sociability characteristics which appeal to the sociability and expertise types. Art, on the other hand, has fewer of these characteristics. The purpose of this comparison of the arts was not to investigate them, per se, but to illustrate how proposition 5 can lead us to notice these differences and to illustrate how the humanistic theory can be useful in generating hypotheses, observations, and analyses, even about the distribution and characteristics of art, drama, oratory, journalism, music and literary writing.

Spotting Irregular Distributions and Analyzing Them

Of course not all data shows the expected distributions. By giving us expectations, proposition 5 makes irregularities, data that does not fall as expected, pop off the page into our theoretical eye. For example, Peterson reports on 16 intended major fields (pp. 14-20). These were partially discussed in the last chapter under "Educational Plans." In 11 of these 16 the data falls as predicted by general proposition 5 (see Table 5). That is, when stability is highest, sociability is second, expertise third, and self last. This order is reversed when self is highest. When expertise is highest, self and sociability are lower, with stability lowest. When sociability is highest, stability and expertise are lower with self lowest.

Of the remaining 5 cases that don't fit the expected distributions 2 show unpredicted differences of only 1/10th of 1%. In biological sciences, chemistry, and physics, however, expertise is highest, and sociability and self are lower, as expected. But there is an unpredicted rise in stability.

Table 5-5

Intended Major Field

Percent of Humanistic Types Making Choices

Intended Major Field	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
STABILITY STUDENTS				
Business administration	9.5	8.4	5.0	5.1
* Engineering	18.2	12.7	10.3	7.2
* Technical specialty	1.7	1.1	0.7	0.4
SOCIABILITY STUDENTS				
* Education	13.1	16.4	11.3	7.2
* Physical education	1.7	2.7	1.5	1.3
* Home economics	1.5	2.4	1.2	0.8
EXPERTISE STUDENTS				
Biological sciences	8.5	5.8	8.7	5.1
Chemistry	4.4	3.0	5.3	4.0
Physics	2.6	1.7	4.5	3.2
* Mathematics	4.2	4.6	5.1	3.6
* History	2.7	2.8	3.7	2.7
SELF STUDENTS				
Art	1.4	1.3	1.7	4.2
* Drama	0.3	0.5	1.0	2.3
* English	2.2	3.5	5.3	7.2
* Humanities combination	0.1	0.2	0.7	1.5
* Psychology	2.3	3.0	3.5	5.1

* Indicates distribution is in the pattern predicted by general proposition 5.

Proposition 5 draws our attention to these irregularities, and the humanistic theory provides some techniques for examining them.

Is there something about these fields that can be explained within the humanistic theory? The theory does not answer this, but it suggests interpretations for further thought and investigation. Majors in these fields were in demand in the employment market when this survey was taken (1965). This would appear to someone looking for job security. Second, Peterson points out that many of the vocationally oriented students see biology as a step toward medical school. This may account for some of the interest in it as a major. This is consistent with the finding for intended professional school, which also shows that the expertise-type slope for medical school has an unexpected bump for the stability group (p. 21):

	stab.	soc.	exp.	self
Intended Medical School	6.4	4.3	7.3	4.0

A third reason that these fields may appear as majors and as attractive graduate school fields for stability students is that they are studies in which there are comparatively often right answers, structured knowledge, exact procedures, and the security of knowing one is right or wrong. As we saw in "Curricular and Instructional Preferences" in Chapter 4, these attributes appeal to stability people. Part of the stability subsystem is an especially strong desire to know where one stands and low tolerance for ambiguity and indecision. If these speculations are true, then we would expect that the same would hold true for mathematics. Contrary to this supposition, mathematics as a major field does not show an unexpected rise for the stability types. They are lower than the sociability students (p. 15):

	stab.	soc.	exp.	self
Intended math majors	4.2	4.6	5.1	3.6

In this section on spotting and analyzing irregularities the question of whether these particular irregularities in major fields can be explained is not of primary importance. The main points to notice are that proposition 5 spotlights these unexpected distributions and the methods of bringing the theory to bear on them. The data on intentions to go to medical school helps substantiate the claim that the unexpected rise in stability students who wanted to major in bilogical sciences was due to the fact that they hoped to attend medical school. The information on intended math majors distribution across the types did not substantiate the hypothesis that the irregularity in biological sciences, chemistry, and physics was due to curricular and instructional preferences.

SUMMARY

Before returning to our examination of the constructed typology, it will be helpful to summarize this section on proposition 5: The further away a person or group is from a subsystem the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. This makes predictions about the distribution of components. As we saw in the data on joining organizations and on major fields, the predicted distributions showed up. Proposition 5 draws our attention to differences in the distributions of data. When we compared the slopes for activities in art with literary, oratorical, and dramatic activities, we saw that the latter was more strongly favored by stability, sociability, and expertise types. This observation leads us to hypothesize that the latter 3 have traits of these subsystems in them. Proposition 5 helps us generate hypotheses about components, how and why they appeal across subsystems. Proposition 5 draws our attention to those instances that do not fit our predictions. These irregularities can stimulate further speculation and instigate further analysis and research.

Although general proposition 5 makes ordinal predictions (predictions of "more" or "less"), it does so across 5 categories and specifies a series of ordinal relations among them. This allows us to make more complex predictions and analyses of data than would predicting ordinal relations between just 2 categories. Proposition 5 allows us to go beyond investigation into construct validity and into investigations of relationships among the constructed types.

In Part 1 of this chapter and in "Extracurricular Activities" in the previous chapter we saw that joining organizations was excellent at picking out sociability types. This provided an investigation of general proposition 1: The types exist by using 2 of the researchable questions in Chapter 2: Which subsystem is X component most associated with? and How does X component vary from subsystem to subsystem? This second question in conjunction with general proposition 5 allowed us to proceed on a more detailed examination of joining organizations than the first question alone.

In Chapter 4 we investigated 5 topics as indicators of construct validity, intended major, intended graduate or professional school, greatest expected satisfaction, anticipated extracurricular activities, and curricular and instructional preferences. Branching off to study extracurricular activities in some detail, this chapter illustrated how proposition 5 can lead to more detailed analysis of these various topics. Now that the possibilities and techniques of using proposition 5 have been partially demonstrated, we can use it on the rest of Peterson's data, Chapter 6.

Chapter 6

BEYOND ACADEMIA: OR THROUGH SOCIETY WEARING HUMANISTIC GLASSES

Introduction

Because Burton Clark's and Martin Trow's typology was limited to American institutions of higher education ("The Organizational Context," 1966), Peterson limited his inquiry into the construct validity of their typology to considerations of higher education (On a Typology of College Students, 1965). Chapter 4 reviewed his findings as well as Clark and Trow's typology and showed that the typology was composed of subtypes of the humanistic subsystem typology. It also showed that Peterson's results were to be expected by one using the humanistic theory.

In the second part of his work (pp. 42-88) he examined "characteristics which have no necessary relationship to students' attitudes about their college education" but which he felt it was reasonable to expect them to differ in (p. 42). His 3 general groups of characteristics were background characteristics, secondary schooling, and personality and attitude dimensions. My reinterpretations of Peterson's findings in these 3 topics form the 3 parts of this chapter. While his investigation was an exploratory description into non-higher-education ways the types differed, this chapter remains predominantly an inquiry into construct validity of the broader humanistic typology. Most of the topics he investigated would be the subject of predictions based on general proposition 1: The types exist. The breadth of the humanistic typology leads us to expect that background characteristics, secondary schooling, and personality differences will be manifestations of the humanistic types described in Chapter 2, survival (omitted here), stability, sociability, expertise, and self.

Chapter 5 gave us experience with using general proposition 5: The further away a person or group is from a subsystem the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. In addition to directing our attention to regularities and irregularities in the distribution of data, it sensitizes us to differences among components and provides us with a way to analyze them by bringing other humanistically derived observations and data to bear. We will use these techniques further in the following discussions of the college freshmen's backgrounds, their secondary schooling, and some of their attitudes and personality traits.

Part 1

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

In the students' backgrounds Peterson examined (1) 5 demographic characteristics, (2) socio-economic status, (3) religion, (4) family cultural level, and (5) child-rearing practices (pp. 42-56).

1. Demographic characteristics (pp. 42-56) - The 5 demographic characteristics that Peterson obtained information on are sex, race, nearness of home to college, type of college residence, and main source of financial support. Of the 5 sorts of background characteristics these demographic characteristics are least relevant to examining the construct validity of the humanistic types. Other things being equal, distribution by sex, race and other strictly demographic factors are expected to be unaffected by the various subsystems. But other things aren't always equal. And one way of observing the amount of inequality is to look at the differences that do appear. We can use the humanistic theory to spot these differences and to speculate about them.

Sex (pp. 42-44) - The stability (vocational) group shows a heavy concentration of men. This may be due to the fact that people in this category see themselves as future wage-earners, which is predominantly a male role in our society. Also, women who are interested in obtaining secure positions in society may do so by leaving school and getting married or by going to school with the purpose of getting married. If the latter is the case, they may show up in the sociability category, being interested in joining organizations, partying, and having a good time while husband hunting. Peterson cites Douvan and Kaye ("Motivational Factors in College Entrance," 1962) as calling this a "social-sexual" motivation. When we divide the sample into humanistic types, we see that the sociability subsystem has a higher percentage of women than the other subsystems (p. 43):

	% male	% female
stability	69.3	30.7
sociability	56.0	44.0
expertise	60.5	39.4
self	57.0	43.0

If we divide the male and female populations to see how they are distributed, we again note the stronger percentage concentration of women in the sociability subsystem (p. 44):

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
males	31	47	19	3
females	21	57	9	4

Discussion: Women's Rights and Women's Roles - If the highest concentration of women is expected to be in the sociability category, as it is, general proposition 5 draws our attention to the unexpectedly high reading in the self subsystem. Of the 205 women in the whole sample who listed themselves as self types by choosing philosophy D, 73 (35.5%) were at 2 women's colleges. These were college's G and H, which I discussed in Chapter 4 under "CONSTRUCT VALIDITY -

INSTITUTIONAL TYPES." These colleges are definitely exceptions to the usual pattern. On most coeducational campuses there are about twice as many men who see themselves as self oriented as women. Here again, this may be due to the fact that a woman's role is still seen very much as one of self-effacing, search for security (stability) and as a social companion for a man rather than as an expertise or self role. It is not considered so "safe" (socially acceptable) for a woman to be a nonconformist as for a man. Perhaps women's colleges free women from the "social-sexual" cultural roles or attract women with these qualities.

Studies of social and self expectations in terms of this theory may give us more information on these topics and on social change groups such as the Women's Liberation Front. One way of interpreting the goals of this organization is to see them as expanding the socially accepted possibilities of womanhood beyond stability and sociability to expertise and self.

Race (pp. 43-44) - The racial mix of the students compared with the national population showed an imbalance of Caucasions, 93.4%. The 640 Negro freshmen (90% of whom were at Morgan State) showed the following distribution of types compared with the whole sample, which included these 640 (p. 44):

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
whole sample	26.5	▭ 50.8	18.5	◯ 3.8
Negroes	▭ 38	35	25	◯ 2

▭ = high ◯ = low

The vocational concentration may represent their desire for the security of a good job based on one's abilities rather than insecurity based on race. (Note high score in expertise too.) It may be due partially to lower socio-economic status, but Peterson does not give the information to indicate this.

A fascinating study might be done to see what changes, if any, in humanistic types correlate with black power sentiments. Can black pride be seen as wholly or partially a change in subsystems or in various components of subsystems, such as self-image and awareness of social processes? In what respects have prejudice and injustice kept minorities from pursuing the usual line of human development? Are these being made up for now?

It's difficult to separate demographic and economic factors. In addition to having race confounded with economics, nearness of home to college, type of residence, and source of financial support are also partially economic and partially demographic indicators. As will be discussed under "Socio-economic Status," following this section on demographic factors, the humanistic types are hypothesized as correlated with SES.

Nearness of home to college (pp. 43-44) - More than the other types, stability students were likely to attend a college or university in the same county in which they lived. As we will see under "Socio-economic Status," they are from poorer homes than the other students, and the type of support possible for many low-income families is limited to living at home.

Over half the collegiate students went to college within the state of their residence, but not in the county. Perhaps this is partially due to feelings of affiliation with state or regional colleges and universities, perhaps to a middle-income position of being able to afford some distance, but not too much, perhaps to feelings of dependence on their families. The students most likely to go out of state are the self types. This may have to do with higher income or with their strong feelings of independence (See Part 3 of this chapter).

College residence (pp. 43-44) - Only 2 categories of 10 alternatives gave significant results for this item (p. 43):

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
College dormitory or apartment	67.9	74.3	71.1	$\boxed{75.7}$
At home with parents	$\boxed{19.6}$	13.7	15.7	11.9

As mentioned above, lower income families may be best able to help by having their sons and daughters live at home. We might further speculate that sociability students are high in living in a college residence because they look forward to living-group activities, as noted in Chapter 5. And perhaps the self students expect to find independence in living away from home. Both these are just conjectures; however, they offer hypotheses for further research.

Because the respondents were college freshmen in their first weeks of higher education, some possibilities might not be open to them due to housing policies, living in a fraternity or sorority, or living off-campus, for example. On the basis of this humanistic theory, we would expect that sociability types would migrate toward fraternity and sorority life (See Chapter 5) and that self types would move toward independence (See Part 3 of this chapter) and the freedom of living off-campus on their own.

Financial support (pp. 43-44) - The stability students were most likely to depend on jobs, previous personal earnings, or their own savings. This is consistent with their stability subsystem's concern with securing an economic post. They and the expertise students were high in support from scholarships. In the case of the stability types, this may be due to awards based on need, which is increasingly a criterion for financial aid. Since the expertise types are the "academics" of higher education, we would expect them to show a high degree of awards based on academic excellence.

In higher education, with its specialized fields of knowledge and theory as technique, they can thrive in their expertise sort of world. In keeping with the supposition that socio-economic status correlates with the humanistic continuum, the self types were most likely to be mainly supported by family trust funds, insurance plans, or similar arrangements.

While these 5 demographic factors and the humanistic theory shed some light on each other, much of this seems to be due to the economic status of the students rather than to non-economic demographic factors. The next section brings up the question of income more exactly.

2. Socio-economic Status (pp. 45-47)- Peterson assigned socio-economic status (SES) by an index of father's occupation (given a triple weight), father's education, mother's education, family income, and father's ethnicity. The standard deviations show a wide spread within each type; I discussed this in more detail in the introduction to Part 2 of Chapter 4.

Table 6-1

Socio-economic Status

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
SES	40.2	42.9	42.4	44.5
Standard Deviation	8.89	8.58	9.68	8.33

Based on the humanistic assumption that a person's or a group's goals emerge and subsystems change as previous goals are met, and combining this with an assumption that higher SES people have more of their more basic goals met, one would hypothesize that SES would be congruent with humanistic types. This is confirmed overall by the table above, but the small reversal between sociability and expertise is not accounted for. Only ½ of 1% separates them, but it is in the unexpected direction.

General proposition 2 in the humanistic theory (See Chapter 3) assumes that individual and social goals change when there is either a success at attaining a goal (A new one emerges) or a lack of success where previously a goal had been achieved (A previously met goal is no longer met). This point of view combined with information from two SES topics, income and education, gives rise to interesting speculation concerning some of the unrest on campuses. Do wealth and education cause unrest? See the discussion that completes this topic.

<ins>Family income</ins> (p. 46) - Children from families with income under $8000 are most likely to be in the stability subsystem. Those from homes with incomes between $8000 and $14,000 are most likely to be sociability, and those from families with income over $14,000 are most likely to be self types (p. 46). Thus, as income rises, we would expect an increasing number

of students to be self types.

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Parental family income:				
Less than $8,000	$\boxed{41.5}$	33.5	37.1	31.4
$8,000 to $14,000	36.2	$\boxed{38.0}$	35.8	33.1
More than $14,000	18.1	23.5	22.0	$\boxed{30.4}$

We find this generally to be so in the data above; higher income leads to a position further along the humanistic continuum. From a knowledge of the highs, we can predict the subsystem of the lows, but in the "less than $8,000" and the "more than $14,000" rows sociability and expertise show the opposite relations to each other as predicted by general proposition 5. This irregularity in these distributions is unaccounted for.

Occupational Level (p. 46) - As would be expected from the information on income, father's occupational status also correlated with humanistic subsystem of the children (p. 46):

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Father's occupation:				
Blue collar	$\boxed{39.8}$	31.5	32.5	26.9
Lower white collar	35.0	$\boxed{38.5}$	35.4	33.6
Professional	23.6	28.7	30.6	$\boxed{37.5}$

In this case the ordinal reversal between sociability and expertise persists for blue collar children but disappears for the children of professional people. Family income is, of course, a measurement of only money. Occupational status combines income with education, and one of the distribution irregularities disappears. Perhaps this indicates that amount of formal education is more closely associated with the humanistic continuum than is amount of income.

Education (p. 46) - Peterson gives 2 kinds of information on education, the level of formal education and the highest degree. He gives these separately for mother and father in the family. The ordinal relations are almost identical:

Table 6-2

Fathers' and Mothers' Level of Formal Education

		Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Some high school or less	Father	28.2	22.5	24.7	21.3
	Mother	24.3	18.5	20.5	20.4
Secondary School	Father	23.6	22.2	20.1	19.7
	Mother	35.0	34.2	32.9	29.8
Some college	Father	15.3	17.0	14.4	14.7
	Mother	13.1	15.8	14.9	15.1
Finished college, 4 years	Father	13.6	16.0	16.3	19.7
	Mother	11.3	13.7	14.3	18.0
Graduate or professional degree	Father	11.7	14.6	16.3	19.3
	Mother	5.1	5.4	6.6	8.1

The more highly educated the parents are, the more likely it is that the children will be self types. When the parents have completed secondary school or less, the children are likely to be stability types. When they have had some college, their sons and daughters are likely to be sociability types. But when they have finished college or attained a graduate or professional degree, their children are likely to be self oriented. The difference between college degree and no college degree emerges as the biggest educational difference between self students' families and other students' families. Parents' education beyond a bachelor's degree increases the relative differences between the self types and the others (p. 46):

Table 6-3

Highest Degree Held by Fathers and Mothers

		Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
No college degree	Father	69.0	65.0	62.1	56.8
	Mother	75.8	73.8	71.4	66.9
Bachelor	Father	14.2	16.8	17.1	19.9
	Mother	12.3	14.8	15.6	18.4
Master	Father	3.9	4.9	5.3	5.5
	Mother	2.1	2.6	3.7	4.2
Law or Medicine	Father	3.4	4.2	5.1	6.3
	Mother	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.8
Doctorate	Father	1.3	1.7	2.3	3.6
	Mother	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.8

When we compare the parents' educational background of one type of student with the background of another, we find that increased parental education contributes to greater percentage differences between the types. For example, when we compare the self type with the stability type, we find that 14.2% of the stability students have fathers with bachelor's degrees, and 19.9% of the self types have fathers with bachelor's degrees. 19.9 is 40% larger than 14.2. When we compare doctorates, however, we see that 1.3% of the stability students have fathers with doctorates, while 3.6% of the self students have fathers with doctorates. 3.6 is 167% greater than 1.3.

Discussion: Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise and Radical - This section on socio-economic status showed that increased wealth and increased education are associated with later stages of the humanistic continuum. If education and wealth increase and spread throughout our society, we can expect more students of these better-educated parents and wealthier homes to be self oriented. Some people are surprised that student unrest often comes from the higher SES students and is prevalent in the "best" colleges. These puzzled people are using the type of psychology described in Chapter 1 as "satiation psychology." They expect that when a person has obtained certain goals, he will rest satisfied. Such people cannot understand why these students, who they assume have most of their desires met, are not satisfied with the society that meets them. If these people would switch to humanistic psychology, which assumes that when one set of goals is met then another emerges, they would understand that new goals account for the activity of these students.

Kenneth Keniston ("Notes on Young Radicals," 1969) points out that a consistent finding is that these students are the "elite" in almost all ways. And the best colleges have an abnormally high concentration of children of well-educated parents with high incomes. I'll go into this in some detail in Chapters 11 and 12. In the meantime it is worth noting here that many of the themes running through student uprisings have to do with self-determination (student power) and with restrictive policies which are said to interfere with personal development, doing one's own thing. The growth in drug use is often said to be for self-discovery, and the upsurge in sensitivity training (which is supposed to lead to a better awareness of oneself) may also be a manifestation of this. Institutions of higher education often have legitimate roles for stability, sociability, and expertise types, but there is a lack of roles for self types. It is difficult for professors, administrators, trustees, legislators, and others who come from relatively impoverished backgrounds and times compared with their young students and whose occupational roles are governed by institutional stability and professional expertise to understand the self subsystem. In Chapters 11 and 12 of this paper I'll go into this in some detail, but it is worth pointing out here, since some of the data is here.

3. Religion (pp. 47-52) - Before trying to determine whether Peterson's findings about the religious preferences and views of the entering freshmen are explainable by using the humanistic paradigm, it is necessary to examine the assumptions this interpretation is based on.

Some Assumptions - I see religion generally as an attempt to explain the unexplained. Religion posits beings, some as common as our everyday selves, and some as unique as a god. It establishes relationships among these beings and often does so with extreme thoroughness. The completeness of the medieval church's view of the world and its complexities is an ideal example; everything has its place, and there is a place for everything, real or imagined. Thus, a religion makes a chaotic world orderly. One aspect of this is a set of rules for relating to other things. In extreme cases everything is prescribed. By reducing uncertainty, by ordering the world, by making laws, by explaining the previously unexplainable, by building systems within systems, religions, in this basic sense, appeal most to individuals and groups that are stability oriented. In terms of the researchable questions in Chapter 2, religion is most associated with the stability subsystem.

Beyond this basic function, however, religions may vary from subsystem to subsystem. For example, to sociability-oriented people the church may be a sort of umbrella organization, sponsoring social clubs, hobby clubs, age assocations, etc. Churches are often criticized for ministering to these needs by those who are stability oriented and by those who are expertise oriented. Social action may arise from the desire to be of value to the world, which is characteristic of the expertise stage.

We can think of an array of churches from those that (classically) are institutions of order and stability to those that are centers for self and personal development. In the stability churches ritual and procedure are usually prescribed, but as we move up the humanistic continuum, they become freer and more open to personal interpretation and activity. As the expertise churches blend into the self churches, we can hypothesize an increase in the rights and responsibilities of the individual to determine his own beliefs and the nature of his own religious practices. In the extreme self end we see such collectivities as the "hippy churches" which are more gathering places for people to do their own things in the presence of others than they are organizations which organize concerted action or shared belief.

Hypotheses - Coming to the Peterson report, we would expect to find this general humanistic view exemplified by this data. I expect on the basis of the humanistic theory (1) that church attendance is likely to be greatest among the stability group, (2) based on the idea that success achieved by oneself or by one's parents leads to the emergence of new goals, that there will be a shift of students along the humanistic continuum compared with their parents, and (3) that the types of churches attended and belief systems will be consistent with the humanistic sequence (stability to self). The first of these assumes that religion is predominantly a stability activity. The second hypothesis is an analogue in religion to the campus unrest argument in the immediately previous pages of this part, i.e., higher educational and income level moves a person and group along the humanistic continuum toward self. The third hypothesis is a test of the researchable question: How does X component (here religion) vary from subsystem to subsystem?

Findings - Below, displayed along the humanistic continuum, is what Peterson found (pp. 47-52):

Table 6-4

Religion and Humanistic Type

	Stability	Sociability	Expertise	Self
PARENTS				
1 Back-ground	Catholic background	Protestant background	Jewish background	(esp. reform) No formal rel.
2 Protestant sects	Methodists Baptists	Presbyterians	mixed Episcopal, Unt.Ch.Chr.,	Friends, Unitarian
3 Atten-dance	most frequent	less frequent	still less frequent	very little attendance
STUDENTS				
4 Back-ground	Active Catholicism Active Protestantism	Jewish conservative	Rejection of Protestantism (noticeable)	(strong) Rejection of Jew. (esp. conserv.)
5 Protestant sects	Baptist Methodist	Episcopal Presbyterian	varied mixture	
6 Atten-dance	Active goers		less active	much less attendance
7 Certainty of belief	most certain			least certain
8 Satisfaction with beliefs	most satisfied			least satisfied

The first hypothesis was that the stability group would be most frequent in attendance; this was confirmed for both parents and for the freshmen (p. 49):

Table 6-5

Frequency of Church Attendance: Student, Mother and Father

Frequency		Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
More than once a week	Student	16.1	15.5	16.3	9.0
	Mother	14.8	13.3	13.6	11.3
	Father	10.5	9.4	9.7	6.5
About once a week	Student	42.7	44.8	39.3	33.8
	Mother	36.7	38.4	34.3	29.6
	Father	28.7	30.7	29.0	25.2
Not at all	Student	8.3	6.1	9.8	24.3
	Mother	12.2	10.3	13.9	20.3
	Father	20.9	18.2	21.5	31.4

The exception to the expectation is that the expertise students are highest in going to church more than once a week. Peterson didn't give the data for intermittent periods between "not at all" and "about once a week." The humanistic theory leads us to expect that the expertise group would be highest in these categories on the basis that expertise frequency will be between that of sociability and self. This remains unaccounted for.

Distribution - Other than the expertise student exception, the data falls as general proposition 5 predicts except for a repeating irregularity for the stability types under "not at all." We would expect stability people to be lowest in "not at all," but they are between sociability and expertise in this. This is also unexplained by the theory.

The second hypothesis was that there would be a shift of students compared to parents along the normal direction of the continuum, from institutions that help one reach the more basic goals to those that help one meet the subsequent ones. The apparent rejections of the faiths of their fathers by the students suggests that this may be the case (See Table 6-4). Contrary to this, however, in all humanistic categories the students attended church on a once a week basis more than their parents did. (See first 3 rows of Table 6-5.)

Type - The third hypothesis was that the type of church attended would be consistent with the humanistic sequence. This, too, was somewhat confirmed. (See Table 6-4.) Stability-oriented people went to the churches most emphasizing structure, ritual, rules, and order. The self people chose churches that give the greatest latitude to the individual. The degree to which churches can be humanistically classified and research can be based on this classification remains to be seen. This discussion is just a start.

Discussion: Religion - A Chacun, Son Goût - The two questions about the certainty and satisfaction with one's belief system show that those most oriented toward the stability subsystem reported they are more satisfied and certain of their worldviews than those oriented toward the self subsystem (p. 49).

How certain are you that your religious preference will continue indefinitely?

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
very certain or quite certain	78.6	78.5	73.9	64.2
somewhat or quite uncertain	18.1	18.5	22.2	29.4

Do you feel that you now have an adequate personal philosophy or religious faith which serves as a guide for your personal conduct?

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Yes	77.4	76.8	74.0	58.1
No	8.2	8.9	10.6	19.1
Undecided and don't know	13.8	13.9	14.5	22.2

A humanistic interpretation of this is that the stability people are less tolerant of uncertainty so will be less likely to change and/or to entertain the possibility of changing in the future. Reinforcing their apparent certainty and satisfaction is the assumption that religion is important to them as a bringer of stability, and they value stability. The groups further away from this subsystem, however, are least satisfied and least certain, but perhaps they can psychologically afford to be. Stability is not a big thing with them. Their value system can let them play around with belief systems. It needn't even be Christianity or Judaism, but may come from the East or from a "cult." Or they might manifest their enjoyment of diversity by switching from one to another or selecting elements of several religions or beliefs.

To someone with a strong stability view a person who is uncertain and/or not fully satisfied with his worldview may seem to be in a chaotic and pitiful state, but to someone in the self stage, a person in the stability stage may seem "hung up" and to be pitied because he lacks the freedom to choose his beliefs and to consider alternatives. This is a good case of how different subsystems construe the same object or event.

In summary, the information about the religious attitudes and activities of the 4 groups can be subsumed under the humanistic theory proposed in this writing. Clark and Trow's typology of college students not only fits them, but also embeds their religious characteristics into the humanistic framework. The questions on religious organizations and activity (essentially a stability concern) were most fruitful in describing the stability and the self types, but were somewhat helpful in characterizing the sociability and expertise types too.

The prediction that attendance is likely to be greatest among the stability group was confirmed. The expectation that there would be a shift along the humanistic continuum was undecided. The students often showed rejection of their parents' beliefs, but they attended church more frequently on a weekly or more-than-once-a-week basis. The investigation into the types of religious-philosophical beliefs showed that the stability and self types were attracted to activities that were characteristic of their subsystems. More work will be needed to categorize religions into humanistic types.

4. Cultural Level (pp. 52-55) - By "culture" Peterson meant the sort of activities grouped together as "cultural" - attending a concert, poetry reading, serious lecture, play, opera, art exhibit, museum, or a ballet. These are often closely correlated with socio-economic status, education, and income, and Peterson's data presents no surprises. These usual studies do not offer any reason or explanation for the usual association, however.

From a humanistic point of view the increased interest in culture as one goes along the humanistic sequence is at least partially explained by the increased interest in self-development and self-expression. The arts and cultural activities are to a great extent based on self-expression, although usually of the artist. We would expect questions of participation and/or production of culture to show an increase in the self subsystem too, as was evident in the extracurricular selections (See Chapters 4 and 5).

The College Student Questionnaire asked about attendance at cultural events for the freshmen's parents, but did not ask about attendance by the freshmen themselves (p. 53):

Table 6-6

Attendance at Cultural Events: Freshmen's Fathers and Mothers

Number of cultural events attended in the past year:		Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
None	Father	33.1	28.6	26.8	28.5
	Mother	25.2	21.2	20.3	22.0
One or two	Father	35.0	37.3	34.2	29.7
	Mother	36.7	37.1	31.8	28.7
Three or four	Father	15.1	16.6	17.0	16.2
	Mother	20.1	23.0	23.1	22.9
Five to eight	Father	14.2	15.9	20.9	22.3
	Mother	8.5	10.3	13.9	17.4

Except in the "none" category, where the self parents were higher than the expertise parents, the data fell in the distributions predicted by general proposition 5.

5. Child-rearing Practices (pp. 54-55) - The final topic in background characteristics asked the freshmen to answer 5 items about the ways they perceived their parents'

child-rearing styles. These were child-training philosophy, independence, concern about social relations, importance of grades, importance of graduating from college.

Child Training - The freshmen were asked to select 1 of 3 statements that epitomized the approach to child training that most closely matched their parents' philosophy. The unilateral-authoritarian style seems made to pick out the stability backgrounds. The mutuality-interdependent style seems to stress the social interaction characteristic of sociability. The autonomy-permissive style suggests the self-direction characteristic of the self subsystem (p. 54):

Child-rearing style	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Unilateral-authoritarian	24.1	17.6	19.9	22.6
Mutuality-interdependence	65.8	73.5	69.2	60.2
Autonomy-permissive	8.2	7.7	9.2	15.5

The main expectations are fulfilled, but the distribution of data for unilateral-authoritarian is irregular as the sociability low for the third category. The high number of self students who reported this form of child-rearing remains unexplained, although we may speculate that their sensitivity and dislike of controls made the self types more likely to interpret restrictions by their parents as authoritarianism. Another possibility is that a highly authoritarian parent has had the effect of producing a rebellious child, who reacts against the authoritarianism of his parent by becoming a self type. These speculations remain to be checked. An item of this topic which offers a selection for each of the types might clarify the topic and the resultant data.

Independence - The descriptions of the humanistic subsystems lead us to infer that self students are likely to have greatest freedom, and stability students, least (p. 54):

Independence during high school:	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Not much or very little	12.4	10.7	11.9	15.7
Quite a bit	62.9	65.2	59.3	52.2
Almost complete freedom	23.0	22.9	27.0	30.8

Once again the response of the self students is puzzling. As expected they were highest in assessing "almost complete freedom" as would be expected, but they were also highest in reporting "not very much freedom." The sociability, not the stability, reported little independence.

Parental Concern With Social Relations - Since one of the marks of the sociability subsystem is concern with social relations, we would expect that sociability freshmen would report that their parents were most concerned with whom their associates in college would be. This was borne out by Peterson's data (p. 54):

Parental concern with college associates:	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Quite concerned	38.9	41.3	37.0	34.2
Somewhat concerned	42.0	41.5	42.7	40.0
No concern	17.0	15.4	18.6	24.3

The low concern by parents of self students can be seen as either distance from sociability or as closeness to the independence of self. The high readings in stability for the second and third choices are unexplained.

Educational Importance - Using this humanistic theory, it is difficult to determine which group of parents would place greatest emphasis on the importance of either high school grades or graduating from college. These items seem capable of being highly evaluated by parents in the various groups for reasons that make sense within their respective subsystems. For example, stability parents might like their sons and daughters to make high grades because the children show that they accept the standards of society and will be able to secure a stable job. Perhaps sociability parents would see high grades as indicators of getting along with teachers and as a sign of social acceptance. Academic parents would be likely to assess grades highly because they indicate an ability to excel in academic work, which is broken down into expert fields. It is harder to envisage parents in the self subsystem valuing grades highly, although they could do so as an indication that their students were capable of achieving what they set out to do, but the idea of grading is itself a non-self activity. It is a process of someone else assigning a mark of goodness, rightness, or appropriateness to one's work. Grades are seldom assigned by the students themselves. Thus, self parents may be lower than the other types in seeing the importance of grading. The reasoning for importance of graduating from college is almost identical.

We can look at this topic in a negative way too. Grades and finishing college can be seen as accepting the status system of society. In this too we expect self types to be lowest. In both cases the stability and sociability parents evaluate these goals noticeably higher than the expertise parents, and the self parents are lowest (p. 54):

Extremely or quite important:	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
High school grades	$\boxed{80.\text{[illegible]}}$	80.2	74.6	⑦71.0
College graduation	$\boxed{85.9}$	84.2	80.9	75.7

Discussion: Questionnaire Response and Socialization Patterns - The authoritarian style with its emphasis on order, obeying rules, regulations, hierarchial associations, deference to superiors, and contempt for inferiors is part of stability. (See also Chapter 2 "stability.")

We would expect that the sociability oriented would emphasize congeniality. The sociability types reported the most parental concern with whom their associates in college would be, more "socially desirable" alternatives "mutuality" (in Peterson's words), and "quite a bit" of perceived independence during high school.

Peterson calls the sociability types' responses "idealized." While it is expected that the sociability types would come from families that tried to develop good interpersonal relations and would be likely to practice this among themselves, Peterson raises an important question about interpreting the responses of the sociability college freshmen. Socialization pattern may bias response to questionnaire items. With their desire to smooth over interpersonal differences and to make everything appear compatible, they may want to give the impression of congeniality where there is less or none. We may also suppose that they also may want to give socially acceptable answers. Reporting conflict may be socially unacceptable to them more than to the other types. (This is taken up again in this chapter, "Evaluation of School and Teachers," in Part 2 and "Liberalism," Part 3.) Also, reporting conflict may be more of an admission of lower personal worth to them than to other types.

To stability types control of children by parents may be the "best" or "most natural" way of viewing what are to them naturally hierarchical parent-child relationships. These stability types may perceive the "democratic" sociability homes to be unrealistically lax and overly permissive, without respect for the parents. I am writing about child-rearing practices in Chapter 14, but it is of interest to note that Hess ("Social Class and Ethnic Influences Upon Socialization," 1970, pp. 29-42) repeatedly notes this authoritarian (stability) approach in lower-class families. Hess and Shipman ("Cognitive Elements in Maternal Behavior," 1967) report that lower-class mothers use "imperative-normative" (stability) controls more than do middle-class mothers. They also report that upper-middle-class mothers are more likely to use methods of control that emphasize (1) interpersonal relations, a "subjective-personal" (sociability) style and (2) task-logical principles, "cognitive-rational" style. While it is difficult to tell from their description, this approach with its emphasis on logical principles may be a determinant and forerunner of the theoretical-deductive or systematic approach toward investigation in a particular field and emphasis on knowledge and reason so characteristic of the expertise orientation. When these children go to college, they may have already been cognitively socialized to the "academic" subculture, with a cognitive-rational style.

Family Background Summary

The following summary of family background characteristics is from Peterson. I have inserted [in brackets] the humanistic terminology to replace the Clark-Trow types in order to make more apparent the general factors of stability and structure, sociability and congeniality, expertise and prestige, and self and self-expression (pp. 55-56):

> [Stability] oriented entering freshmen tended to be of lower socio-economic origin (in the sense of occupational prestige, income and education level of parents), to have Catholic and "lower class" Protestant denominational attachments, to have parents with relatively few "cultural" interests, and they most often reported parental authoritarianism and education pressures.
>
> Differential descriptions of the social background of the [expertise types] and [sociability types] were difficult to draw. Both had characteristically "middle-class" origins. Parents of the [expertise types] were relatively well educated; [the expertise types] were somewhat more often affiliated with "upper-middle-class" Protestant denominations. [Sociability types] more often had "middle-class" denomination ties (e.g., Methodist and Presbyterian); to a greater extent than other types, [sociability types] reported agreeable (or desirable) interrelations between self and parents.
>
> [Self types] more often came from upper-middle socio-economic strata and had Jewish and Protestant (characteristically "upper-middle-class" denominations - e.g., Congregational, Unitarian) religious traditions from which they had "defected" in large numbers. They had parents with relatively broad cultural interests, saw their parents as both authoritarian (some) and permissive (others) and less often reported parental pressure to excel scholastically.

While the family background characteristics were especially fruitful in describing the stability and self types, a description of secondary schooling was more helpful in describing the sociability and expertise types.

Part 2

SECONDARY SCHOOLING

I think this part may be as interesting to those whose interests are centered in secondary education as to those who are primarily interested in higher education and the social sciences. This discussion extracts topics from Peterson's data (pp. 56-68): (1) type of secondary school, (2) academic achievement, (3) academic preferences, (4) non-academic activities and (5) teenage culture. Here again we will expect to find stability, sociability, expertise, and self to be more general factors in the particular findings of this data.

1. Type of Secondary School (p. 56) - In the discussion of religion in Part 1 of this chapter, I explained why religion as a whole is classified as a stability concern. This is especially true of religions, such as Roman Catholicism, which place heavy emphasis on hierarchical relationships, set ritual, centralized authority, and organizational structure. On this basis we would expect Catholic schools and their graduates to show a concentration of stability traits too. Military schools, like Catholic schools, with their assumed stability attributes of hierarchical organization, rules and regulations, chain of command, emphasis on order, etc. are expected to be stability oriented.

Sociability and the public schools are linked by emphases on democracy, egalitarianism, getting along with one's fellow citizens, and so forth. On this basis we would expect public school graduates, as a group, to exhibit sociability traits.

In our findings on the distribution of Jewish students in the section in religion we found that the branches of Judaism were spread across the humanistic continuum. If the data were available, we would expect to find schools associated with various branches to show the characteristics of their respective branches. This data is not available, however, so we would expect one emphasis on stability, due to the religious nature of the schools. If the stereotype of Jewish-scholar or professional man is accurate, we would expect high interest in expertise too.

The same reasoning holds for the Protestant denominational schools. We would expect a spread just as the sects are spread. For many of these schools the religious tie is more one of historical oddity than daily practice. In those schools which are associated with religions by more than historical accident, we would expect a stability orientation. Unfortunately, this information is not available either. If we assume that these schools are upper-middle-class and upper-class oriented, then we can predict high concentrations of expertise and self types compared with stability and sociability types.

The private, nonreligious, nonmilitary schools are the ones we would most expect to show strong self orientations. Their independence from ties with stability organizations, church and military, would lessen the effects of stability. They also portray, on an organizational level, the characteristic independence and self-determination of the self system.

Here's what Peterson found (p. 56):

Table 6-7

Type of School

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Catholic	16.1	15.7	15.6	13.0
Military	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8
Public	78.1	78.9	75.1	71.7
Jewish	1.5	0.7	1.6	1.3
Protestant denominational	0.5	0.6	1.4	1.9
Private, nonreligious, nonmilitary	2.3	3.0	4.7	8.8

The data on the military schools is the opposite of what was predicted. Instead of being most characteristic of stability, they were most characteristic of self. And the distribution of data from self toward stability supports the high in self. I know of no explanation for this.

The Catholic schools and the public schools showed their respective associations with stability and sociability. Graduates of Jewish high schools showed both an expertise subsystem, perhaps picking up the scholar-professional man stereotype, and a stability subsystem, perhaps picking up a religious-stability trait. The Protestant denominational and private schools were strongly associated with the self subsystem.

The distributions of the data for these 6 types of schools was in the patterns expected by general proposition 5, with the exception of the double high for Jewish schools. This was speculated about above, and further research will have to establish whether there were actually 2 humanistic types of schools picked up under "Jewish."

2. Academic Achievement - This subject is naturally one to pick out the expertise subsystem, the humanistic theory predicts. "Academic" is the name Clark and Trow ("The Organizational Context," 1966) used for one of their student subcultures and the name Peterson used for his types of students and institutions of higher education. While the expertise subsystem is most associated with high grades, our expectations point to the self subsystem as least associated with high grades and most associated with low grades. People in

the self subsystem are likely to judge by their own criteria.

Our prognostication for the sociability and stability groups is based not on the meaning or importance of grades to them as these particular groups, but on their positions in the assumed distribution of traits based on general proposition 5. We expect the middle grades to be most characteristic of them, just as we expect high grades to be characteristic of expertise and low grades to be most characteristic of self.

A reminder - this is not a prediction that expertise students are more likely to have A's than they are to have B's, C's, or D's. It is a prediction that getting A's is more typical of the expertise students than it is of the stability, sociability, and self students. What is being predicted here and in most of the rest of the data in these discussions of Peterson, is that a particular characteristic is more associated with one or another subsystem than it is with the others.

What do we find when we look at the data? (p. 57):

Approximate overall grade average:	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
A	16.5	17.0	21.8	18.9
B	59.1	62.6	58.7	56.8
C	23.8	19.9	18.9	22.2
D or lower	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.2

The data confirms the predictions, and the distributions appear in the expected patterns in 3 of the 4 rows. The rise from expertise to self in the C row is not explained, although it may be due to the same sort of anti-grade feeling that makes row D heaviest in the self column.

Items about approximate grade average for senior year and estimated class standing were almost identical in ordinal relations to approximate overall grade average.

The information on overall grades and the predictions about them were based on the assumption that grades were highly important in the expertise subsystem and not very important in the self subsystem. Peterson gives some evidence on these assumptions (p. 60):

In terms of your own personal satisfaction, how much importance do you attach to getting good grades?

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
None or not much	2.4	2.1	3.5	12.6
A moderate amount	14.4	17.1	17.0	31.9
Quite a bit	43.4	46.8	41.4	32.1
A great deal	39.5	33.8	37.7	22.9

As forecast, the self students attached the least importance to grades. Contrary to expectations, the stability and sociability students showed the greatest interest in grades. At the present this is unexplained; although, in principle it may be explainable by investigating the question: How does the importance of getting good grades vary from subsystem to subsystem? Hypothesizing from the humanistic theory, we can suppose that high grades promise security to stability people and social acceptance to sociability people. In the first instance they indicate a solid position in the social hierarchy, in the second, a position of acceptance by one's social peers.

3. Academic Preferences - The first topic explored in Chapter 4, Part 2, which was the beginning of this reinterpretation of Peterson's data, was intended major field. The results in that section indicated that the various majors were typical of their respective subsystems because they shared dominant traits with each other. These findings were discussed in more depth in Part 2 of Chapter 5, which used general proposition 5 to discuss the distributions of data among the subsystems. The information here very much corroborates these earlier findings and discussions.

Peterson asked the freshmen both which subjects they enjoyed most and which subjects they enjoyed least. He then presented and discussed their likes and dislikes as if they were 2 different sorts of unconnected, nonsystematic, empirical discoveries. And for him they were, as far as we know. But they are not for us.

By using the humanistic theory to alert us to the humanistic characteristics of the subjects and by attributing likes and dislikes on the basis of these characteristics, we should be able to anticipate which subjects are most liked and disliked by the various types of students. This is a use of proposition 1, The types exist. It leads us to see the 5 main humanistic values as threads which tie together components sharing values. We expect the self students to evince their self subsystem by liking self subjects, etc.

General proposition 2 gives us the humanistic continuum, the order of subsystems. By knowing it we know where the subsystems are located on the 5-part continuum. We know that self is next to expertise, and so forth.

General proposition 5 predicts distributions of properties along that continuum. Using it we know what ordinal distribution of data to expect once we know its peak.

Table 6-8 redisplays data from Peterson's Table 18 (p. 59). I have rearranged the table to group the liked subjects by humanistic classification. The percentages most disliking the subjects are given underneath the percentage that liked them.

Table 6-8

Subjects Most Liked and Most Disliked

SUBJECT		Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
STABILITY					
Mathematics	liked	$\boxed{20.5}$	19.2	16.7	14.5
	disliked	18.8	23.2	21.1	⬭ 26.2
Shop or commercial	liked	$\boxed{3.2}$	2.4	1.6	1.5
	disliked	3.9	4.3	6.5	⬭ 7.1
SOCIABILITY					
Social sciences	liked	15.3	$\boxed{16.5}$	14.7	15.7
	disliked	⬭ 12.1	11.8	11.0	10.9
Physical education	liked	7.7	$\boxed{9.1}$	4.0	5.7
	disliked	6.4	4.7	⬭ 10.0	8.4
Music	liked	5.4	$\boxed{5.6}$	5.2	4.8
	disliked	⬭ 3.6	2.8	3.2	1.7
Home economics Agriculture	liked	1.5	$\boxed{1.8}$	1.1	1.0
	disliked	1.5	2.2	2.5	⬭ 3.1
EXPERTISE					
Natural sciences	liked	24.1	18.1	$\boxed{24.3}$	14.3
	disliked	9.0	⬭ 13.1	10.8	11.7
Foreign languages	liked	5.4	7.0	$\boxed{7.4}$	6.9
	disliked	⬭ 23.6	21.8	19.0	17.4
SELF					
English	liked	13.4	17.5	22.1	$\boxed{26.6}$
	disliked	⬭ 15.9	11.4	10.8	10.5
Art	liked	2.9	2.5	2.7	$\boxed{8.2}$
	disliked	⬭ 4.4	3.9	4.0	2.1

▭ = most liked ⬭ = most disliked

Types - Are mathematics and shop or commercial courses related to the stability subsystem? Compared with the other subjects high school mathematics offers greater sureness of right/wrong answers, structured knowledge, and emphasis on orderliness. There is less ambiguity in questions, techniques, and methods, which also appeal to stability people. Shop or commercial courses may interest the stability types more than the other types because they are stepping stones to niches in society. In this the Clark-Trow terminology "vocationalists" fits especially well.

Do social sciences, physical education, music, and home economics have the theme of sociability running through them? Social studies, of course, is the study of how people relate to each other and the study of how this has been done in the past. Physical education and music, especially in high schools, are group activities. More than the other 10 possible selections, these 2 are consistently interactions with others, either in team sports, or in orchestra, choir, band, etc. If they were more solo music activities and individual sports, this appeal would probably lessen, but appeal to self types might increase.

Home economics seems definitely oriented toward future-family and the social-sexual role of women. I can see no reason for finding that agriculture goes in this slot. I would expect it to be more a vocational course, hence, strongly appreciated by stability students.

One of the indicators of expertise is a theoretical orientation. Theories, as an intellectual technique, are often introduced in the natural sciences for the first time in education. Principles are taught, and used for organizing perceptions and observations. This use of technique appeals to expertise types. Foreign languages are more difficult to speculate about. From my own experience it seems that many students who take them do so because the languages are required for college entrance or because they are needed for college graduation. This future-college orientation is one we would expect from the expertise types.

Also, foreign languages are in competition with the other selections, trying to beat them at their primary appeal. Learning a new language is learning a new way to look at things, and could actually be disquieting to a strong stability type. While a new language definitely has social possibilities when visiting a country, these applications are not very likely to apply to most high school students. And compared with art or English (composition?) a person just learning a foreign language is not able to express himself and develop his own ideas. Later, of course, this may be possible, but not for most novices.

Art, as discussed in Chapter 4, is most open to self development. If drama or oratory were listed, perhaps these would be high too. English on a high school level can be self-expressive with much effort spent on increasing one's ability to write his ideas.

Discussion: Varieties of Curricula - In this respect, the theory would predict that humanistic varieties of English teaching would appeal to different humanistic sorts of students. Creative composition would probably attract self types. The study of English literature as a specialized field of knowledge might attract expertise people, and the study of rules of grammar, might attract the stability types. These preliminary speculations apply equally to other subjects too. The field of humanistically based curriculum planning has, as far as I know, been merely grazed.

Compared with the other subjects as usually presented, however, English may rank high with the self types because it is one of the few subjects that offers any means of self-expression.

If we know which subsystem is highest in a subject, do we then know which is lowest? In the 10 subjects this prediction works 6 times. For example, when mathematics appears as most liked by the stability types, we predict, and find, that it is most disliked by the self types. The 6 out of 10 rate is twice the expectation at random.

Distribution - Of the 20 rows 11 have exactly the predicted distributions. The random expectation would be slightly above 3.

Amount of Studying - In addition to asking about the type of academic activity preferred, the College Student Questionnaires ask about the total amount done. This too was good at picking out the self and expertise students (p. 59):

Average time devoted to homework:	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
About an hour a day or less	31.0	29.4	25.9	41.7
1½-2 hours a day	37.4	39.4	35.1	32.9
3 hours or more a day	31.4	31.1	39.0	25.1

While effort spent on studying was a good indication of the expertise subsystem, effort spent on socializing was a good indicator of sociability.

4. Nonacademics: Activities and Values - As with expected extracurricular activities (See Chapters 4 and 5) this field was especially good at picking out sociability students. These students were seekers of elective offices (or at least achieved them) and were most active in 8 of the 18 activities listed. They refrained from criticizing others and wanted to be known as popular, leaders, and athletes.

Office Holding (p. 61) - Popularity is one of the sociability traits, and high school office-holding in student government is interpreted as an indicator of this. The democratic, egalitarian, popular leadership thread is one of the political themes that runs through sociability. In the next chapter we will see this trait manifested in "local" influentials. In high schools this is shown by election to student government:

Number of important high school government offices:	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
None	67.3	63.3	67.3	71.9
1	15.1	18.2	16.0	13.2
More than 1	16.9	18.3	16.1	14.4

The sociability students were most likely to hold 1 or more important offices and the self students least likely to do so.

Types of Activities (pp. 61-64) - What subsystem is activity in organizations most characteristic of? Here, as elsewhere in this discussion of Peterson, the sociability subsystem is more characteristic of group activity than are the other subsystems. Of the 18 activities listed here (See Table 6-9) 8 are most associated with sociability.

How does nonacademic activity vary from subsystem to subsystem? Is there something about scouts that would appeal more to stability types than to sociability, expertise, and self types? It seems to me that the paramilitary

Table 6-9

Nonacademic Activities

	Stat.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
STABILITY				
Scouts	27.1	24.8	26.4	21.8
SOCIABILITY				
School spirit activities	53.8	69.5	54.5	39.4
Student government	47.0	57.5	49.4	43.2
Interscholastic athletics	52.5	56.9	47.9	45.7
Church youth group	50.4	55.8	51.5	34.6
Public affairs groups	24.3	31.0	29.0	24.1
Future teachers, future nurses, etc.	26.1	30.2	23.4	13.0
YMCA, YWCA, YMHA, YWHA	17.8	20.6	16.1	12.3
Social fraternity or sorority	11.9	16.5	11.8	11.5
EXPERTISE				
Literary, debate, speech, drama, etc.	42.9	49.1	53.7	53.6
Science	47.1	41.7	48.9	37.6
Music	42.5	44.8	46.2	41.5
Honor society	37.9	40.6	42.9	32.5
Hobby groups	23.7	22.9	24.9	20.1
SELF				
Nonschool writing, poetry, articles, etc.	24.7	28.4	41.2	50.3
Journalism and publications	36.9	42.4	43.8	46.1
Nonschool arts and crafts	30.7	32.1	35.3	45.9
Art	15.1	15.9	18.0	29.8

style, ranks, badges, organizational structure, and military style would appeal to the stability types and not to the others. In my opinion, however, this conjecture may be a partial explanation, but is by no means complete. Scouting also provides group cooperation and activity, encourages expertise and special skills, and could be used for self types for their own personal development. Liking the military style and decication to the organization may be a start toward understanding the strongest appeal to stability types, but they are merely suggested hypotheses.

In the sociability activities social interaction, group effort, and being in the public eye, predominate. The fact that Future Teachers, Future Nurses, etc. are included here is somewhat puzzling. It may be that these are characteristically sociability occupations rather than stability occupations as perceived by the students. Or it may be that sociability students who look forward to these careers are more likely to join these groups than are stability students who are oriented toward the same careers. From Peterson's study of anticipated joining of preprofessional groups in college freshmen, we would expect this activity to appeal to stability people (See Chapters 4 and 5). They are a much nearer second in this component than the expertise third and self fourth. Peterson did not give the data for participation in "4-H clubs and/or Future Farmers." Presumably this was not significant. The humanistic theory predicts that stability students will choose these vocationally-oriented activities.

Do the expertise activities evince specialization, esteem, and technique? Music and the literary-debate-speech-drama group were discussed at some length in Part 2 of Chapter 5. There I suggested that although they had strong elements of self, they were mostly a mixture of sociability, expertise, and self. They consisted of such things as public recognition and performance, activity in concert with other people, performance techniques, and so forth. Science, as mentioned in this chapter under "Academic Preferences," is often the broad field in which intellectual technique is first emphasized in secondary education. Theory-building and use is a general intellectual technique, and specialized studies develop their own specific theories. Honor society, of course, hits Maslow's "esteem" nail right on the head. "Esteem" was his name for "expertise." A hobby suggests a field of special interest and/or ability, and this may account for its appeal.

As with other self components, personal creativity runs through art, writing, and crafts. "Journalism and publications" also carries some self-expression, but this category appeals to expertise too with its attribute of being a person "in the know." This was mentioned in Chapter 5, as was journalism's appeal to the mass-orientation of sociability.

Distributions - Of the 18 activities the sociability students were highest in 8. At 5 highest, the expertise were next to them, and the self types, at 4, were below the expertise. The stability students were the lowest, being most dominant only in scouting. Their low position may be due to the fact that they spend much of their "free time" in activities characteristic of the "teenage" culture, TV and cars (See the next section of this chapter).

When we know the subsystem that is highest in a component, can we infer that the lowest is that subsystem furthest away? In 14 of the 18 cases this technique works. The 4 cases that don't follow this pattern are all in the expertise group of activities. Neither this concentration of exceptions nor the individual exceptions themselves are explained within the humanistic theory.

Evaluation of School and Teachers - 2 College Student Questionnaires questions asked the freshmen to evaluate their secondary education. In the first they were asked about general satisfaction with secondary school, not just academic preparation. The self types showed most dissatisfaction, and the sociability types showed most satisfaction (p. 60):

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Very satisfied	40.1	47.3	39.6	26.0
Fairly satisfied	43.3	39.0	40.5	34.4
Somewhat dissatisfied	13.2	11.0	15.1	24.7
Very dissatisfied	3.3	2.5	4.6	14.5

The poles of expressing satisfaction/dissatisfaction run from sociability to self. We might speculate that expressing dissatisfaction is socially awkward to sociability types, while this concern for others' feelings isn't a major worry to self types. The latter may also feel that the institutions of society are blocking their own personal growth.

This general criticism of school extends to criticism of teachers (p. 60):

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Very or fairly satisfied	80.2	82.5	77.2	66.4
Somewhat or very dissatisfied	19.6	17.5	22.6	33.3

Here too expressing satisfaction peaks at sociability, and expressing dissatisfaction peaks at self. If the percentage of self types is increasing in our society as education and affluence spread, we would expect students to become increasingly dissatisfied with secondary education unless it too can become more of a self education. This dissatisfaction and the "new education" are topics of Chapter 12.

Desired Self-Image (pp. 63-64) - If students see their schools and teachers critically, how do they see themselves? While the College Student Questionnaires didn't ask about self satisfaction, they did ask about desired self image. This question forms a bridge between a view of secondary school and the so-called teenage subculture. It is adapted from James Coleman's The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenager and Its Impact on Education (1961):

Table 6-10

If you could be remembered at your secondary school for one of the three things below, which one would you want it to be?

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
1. Brilliant student academically	50.7	33.8	$\boxed{62.0}$	52.4
2. Outstanding athlete (boys) or leader in activities (girls)	24.9	$\boxed{36.7}$	20.2	23.5
3. Most popular	22.6	$\boxed{28.0}$	15.6	19.9
4. 2 + 3	46.5	$\boxed{64.7}$	35.8	43.4
Omits	1.8	1.5	2.2	$\boxed{4.2}$

This question, Peterson points out, divides the expertise types from the sociability types. Interpreting this question through humanistic glasses, we note that the "brilliant student" selection is the one which we would expect to attract the expertise type. Likewise, the sociability types are likely to be split between the second and third choices. They should probably be added to get one sociability reading instead of splitting the indicator; therefore I've added them, Row 4.

Discussion: Revised Self-image Item - The fact that the stability types chose the academic alternative may indicate their desire for good grades and/or for success in a vocation, both previously noted. The selection of the academic choice by the self students may be the result of a hard choice on their part: Which of two disliked traits are they to be known for? Their dislike of mass culture makes "athlete and leader" unsavory; the possibility of using an academic field for self-growth makes "brilliant student" preferable. Perhaps a selection written for their interests would lower the amount of omits.

A better selection of alternatives would give each major type a statement that we would predict he will select. For example:

If you could be remembered at your secondary school for one of the four things below, which one would you want it to be?

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
1. Most likely to succeed, best job prospects	X	x	o	0
2. Most popular - athlete and/or leader	x	X	x	o
3. Brilliant student, academically	o	x	X	x
4. Most creative, self-developed individual	0	o	x	X

The prediction according to the humanistic theory is that the major choices will fall on the diagonal indicated by the capital X's and that adjacent types will be second most attracted, the small x's. The relatively unattracted are indicated by small o's, and the very least attracted by the large O's. The most likely exception to this prediction is that the stability types may want to be brilliant students as already indicated by their interest in grades and parental pressure.

Discussion: Adolescence for Adolescents - Before I return to Peterson's findings on the teenage subculture, it is appropriate here to demonstrate how the humanistic theory raises questions of values and policies. In his book Coleman seems to imply that the sociability orientation of the teenage culture is detrimental to education because it presents alternative social values and activities (sociability) to the educational system's values and activities (expertise).

If we look at the teenage peer-culture as a sociability stage in development, then our theory raises questions about the interference between the 2 stages. The theory implies that a fully developed and encouraged sociability stage will lead to a naturally developing expertise stage, i.e., that intellectual-academic goals should wait for sociability goals to be met. When intellectual-academic goals are emphasized too early, then they will interfere with sociability development. And this interference, in turn, will later stymie intellectual-expertise growth.

A humanistic educational and developmental theory would allow the adolescent subculture to reach its full growth. Force-feeding secondary education or blocking sociability's natural development will only result in unfulfilled and persisting sociability later on as unattained sociability goals continue to clash with further educational development.

Stunting the social life of the teenager will have its impact on education. Shocking as it seems, probably the best thing for an adolescent to be is an adolescent.

5. Teenage Culture (pp. 65-66) - Aside from the nonschool activities mentioned in the last section, Peterson's description of the teenage culture included dating, cars, television, popular music, and movies. The College Student Questionnaires asked how much volume of alcoholic beverages the freshmen had consumed. Since Peterson didn't include this item, apparently there weren't any significant differences. In Table 6-11 I have condensed his presentation of these items to include only the extreme choices.

From these data we see that the teenage culture is most participated in by the sociability students and secondly by the stability students. The self students are non- or anti-teenage culture. Although I've included only the extremes in selections, the data from the middle selections usually falls between the extremes.

Table 6-11

Participation in Teenage Culture

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Dating frequency:				
Not at all	11.2	5.7	12.8	12.6
Once a week or more often	50.8	59.0	45.4	43.4
Car-centered activity:				
None weekly	57.7	61.6	65.9	71.7
5 or more hours	8.6	7.5	7.4	8.1
Watching TV:				
None or almost none daily	22.9	23.6	29.0	35.6
2 hours or more	25.9	22.1	20.4	15.8
Listening to popular music:				
None or almost none daily	14.6	9.7	19.2	30.0
2 hours or more	25.9	28.9	20.6	20.1
Movie attendance:				
Never, almost never	16.4	12.1	20.0	17.8
Once a week or more often	18.0	19.9	13.7	17.4

Secondary Schooling Summary - The idea of 1 teenage society or teenage subculture is rooted in the comparison between that segment of society and the rest of society. To characterize the whole mixture as "adolescent," "teenage," "hedonistic," "young adult," and so forth may be useful for comparison with other parts of society. Looking at the youth segment, however, we find that it is composed of 4 mingled, but differentiated, subcultures of its own. Part 1 of this chapter summarized some background differences among the subcultures. This part summarizes some differences in their lives in school and outside of school.

Stability types constituted the largest proportion of Catholic secondary graduates, and they were the smallest proportion of private, independent and Protestant school graduates. Stability types did least well academically for a whole group, but part of the self group did even worse. This, combined with the parental pressure they felt exerted, may explain why they valued grades the most of the 4 groups. They could have been trying hard to achieve the social acceptance and intellectual style that the sociability and expertise types learned at home. Bell and Stub note that achieved goals may be valued more than ascribed goals ("The Teacher," 1968, p. 270). Perhaps this is one reason the stability group values grades so much. This, of course, is a reformulation of the humanistic principle that people who have had the least satisfaction of one of their goals show the most interest in it, the more basic ones first. It is also significant that they do accept grades as a goal. With their desire to find a secure place in society, it is natural for them to accept the reward systems of the established institutions. They preferred studying the natural sciences and mathematics (fact-oriented, right/wrong answers, relatively secure bodies of knowledge), and as one would predict, they disliked the humanities, arts, and social sciences (the least fixed studies). As expected, the stability students were "middling" in their interest in extracurricular activities, being next to sociability in the humanistic sequence. They generally spurned "humanistic" activities such as journalism, literary, and art activities, but enjoyed automobiles and TV. I wonder whether machinery is enjoyable because mechanical behavior is relatively more predictable than human behavior. It may also help one overcome feelings of powerlessness. TV programs are also often highly familiar and predictable.

The sociability types are quite the opposites in relation to joining organizations. They were the most active. As Peterson sketches them (p. 62):

> They participated in all the activity categories listed in the questionnaire - registering, relative to other types, the greatest degree of involvement in public affairs groups, preprofessional clubs, and school spirit activities, in addition to athletics and student government. These students relished multiple memberships. Differences between collegiates (sociability) and other types were largest in activities for

> which aggressive extroversion is indispensable. They were socially adept, highly visible, and loved by all - fellow students, school administrators, board members, coaches, college admissions officers, etc.

Even the courses they most liked had to do with personal interaction, physical education and social science. They disliked math and natural sciences. Their style of reporting on their schools was similar to the no-complaint style they also used for reporting on their parents. Their outlook "was the most 'socially desirable', i.e., the least critical of the four types, perhaps another example of relative 'idealization' (or idolization) of authority figures on the part of the collegiates" (p. 55). The humanistic theory leads us to think of their non-criticism as an example of the sociability desire for smooth social relations rather than authoritarian identification. Of course, they were very much a part of the system and would be likely to be less critical. And just as they were immersed in the high school organization they were immersed in the general teenage culture too.

The expertise type was most often recognized for their grades. They enjoyed English and the natural sciences and disliked physical education. They spent the most time on homework, and were "middling" about extracurricular activities, but especially enjoyed music, science, literary, and honor society activities. They showed relatively stronger interest in intellectual and curriculum-linked activities.

The self students were heavily represented among private, non-religious, nonmilitary school graduates. They liked art and English more than the other types, and they disliked mathematics and vocational courses most. They studied least and were the least concerned with grades. They were the least involved in 9 of the 12 types of activities, but were extensively involved in those in which they were active - journalism, literary-speech-drama, art. They liked the activities that were least organized and the most open to individual expression. (This may be a characteristic self organizational style; see Chapter 12.) Outside of school, "They were distinguished by their reported literary and artistic production, their relatively infrequent dating, and their unmistakable disinterest in or antipathy toward the teenage culture of cars, TV, popular music, and movies" (p. 66). They were antagonistic toward institutionalized authority. I think that they felt that organizations interfered with their individual expression, and that this was the basis of their antagonism; they seem to be prototype student-power advocates. Their value system stressing self versus society will come up again in the next section on the attitude "social conscience."

The 4 of the 5 humanistic subsystems studied here by translating Clark and Trow and Peterson into humanistic terminology did manifest themselves in the college students' views of themselves as high school students. In most cases these results paralleled the findings on expectations about college life as portrayed in Chapters 4 and 5. Most of the information here, instead of being just additional empirical findings about the subsystems as manifested in college freshmen, was explainable by referring to the characteristics of the subsystems, stability, sociability, expertise, and self. In addition to extending this investigation of construct validity to secondary schooling, this section used an item based on Coleman's The Adolescent Society to exemplify how the humanistic theory suggests revised instrumentation based on refined conceptualization and how it raises educational policy questions.

So far in this exegesis of Peterson's section on non-higher education traits we have found that many background characteristics and profiles of secondary school traits are what would be predicted by the humanistic school. The last part of Peterson's investigation moves from sociological data to more psychological data.

Part 3

5 PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS

The 5 dimensions that Peterson explores are (1) family independence, (2) peer independence, (3) liberalism, (4) social conscience, and (5) cultural sophistication. He measured each dimension by a 12-item scale. Due to weighting the scores could range between 12 and 48. Here too, the relationships among the scores is most important, not the scores themselves.

1. Independence from Family (pp. 69-72) - The Family Independence Scale measures freedom from family authority. A student with a low score is judged to be psychologically dependent on his parents and family; for example, he will consult them about important matters and is concerned with his relationships with them.

From the humanistic model we would expect that the hierarchial orientation and deference to those in power would make the stability students feel dependent. The desire to be part of groups and the high value of congenialty are likely to influence the sociability groups toward dependence on family. The self students may feel that the family, like the other organizations or institutions of society, is a block to their development, so they are likely to be most independent. The expertise group, due to its position between self and sociability, is likely to be between them. Family independence might best be seen as an inversion of sociability. We would expect scores here to be the opposite of sociability scores.

Table 6-12

Family Independence Scale

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Mean	24.2	24.0	25.1	28.5
Standard deviation	5.65	5.82	5.32	5.55

The results were generally those predicted, with the self students highest in independence and the sociability lowest.

One of the individual items is characteristic of the overall results. Item 209 (p. 70) asked whether it would be possible for the student "to become so absorbed in some kind of activity that (he) would lose interest in (his) family." The stability and sociability groups were lowest on this (13.6% and 11.7% respectively). The expertise students were slightly higher, 16.9%, and the self types, with their high value on individual life, were high on independence at 36.1%.

This ordinal pattern remained exact through 10 of the 12 scale items: Self was most independent, sociability was least, and expertise and stability were between them. On 11 of the 12 items self was most independent. On 10 out of 12 sociability was least; on the other 2 stability was least independent. In 3 out of 4 cases expertise was more independent than stability. 1 distribution had a high in self sloping to a low in stability; combined with the 10 sociability patterns, this gave 11 out of 12 predicted distributions once the peak was known.

2. Peer Independence (pp. 73-75) - The second personality dimension seems naturally built to find low independence in the sociability subsystem. In Peterson's words this type is "sociable, extroverted, or other-directed." The responses here were much like those for family independence. For 11 out of 12 items, sociability showed the least independence from peers. On the other item stability was high. Here again, the self students showed the most independnece (on 11 out of 12 items). On the other item expertise was high. In 11 cases knowledge of the high allows us to predict the ordinal distribution.

Table 6-13

Peer Independence Scale

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Mean	27.6	26.4	28.7	31.0
Standard deviation	5.43	3.98	4.62	5.41

3. Liberalism (pp. 76-79) - Peterson calls liberalism a political-economic-social value stressing change as opposed to an ideology of preservation. The liberal stereotype sees a liberal as sympathetic with welfare statism, organized labor, abolishment of capital punishment, academic freedom for teachers, etc. (p. 76).

Here again we would expect stability oriented people to want to maintain the system as it is. The sociability group is likely to idealize current groups, institutions, and group behavior so that conflict will be minimized. They too are likely to want to leave things unchanged.

Table 6-14

Liberalism Scale

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Mean	27.4	27.3	28.8	30.7
Standard deviation	4.50	4.41	5.32	6.52

As expected, the stability types and the sociability types are most conservative, the expertise types more liberal, and the self types most liberal. The self students were most liberal in 11 of the 12 items. The stability group was most conservative on 5 issues, and the sociability on 7.

Discussion: A Sociability Scale? - The fact that sociability was lowest on 7 items suggests that this "liberalism" scale is actually an inverse sociability scale, as was family independence. This suggestion is contrasted with the assumption that liberalism is high in self and slopes lower through expertise and sociability to stability. If we work on the inverse-sociability assumption, 9 of the 12 patterns of distribution appear as expected. If we work with the liberal-self assumption only 5 of the patterns appear as expected.

Additional evidence comes from Peterson's definition of conservatism. He says a conservative is opposed to "persons who disagree with our form of government" (p. 76). As we saw in the subsection "Evaluation of Schools and Teachers" (in Section 4 of Part 2), sociability students do not like criticism; it grates against smooth social relations, we presume. This may dispose them to support the status quo and statements that support it in order to increase the amount of smooth social relations.

To someone expecting to see political questions, the items in the liberalism scale measure political liberalism, but to someone who is especially sensitive to social relationships, to someone in the sociability subsystem, these items may be reinterpreted humanistically. To a sociability person instead of asking about political rights they ask about popularity and social acceptance of views. A question such question.

On this question the sociability students are exceedingly low:

stability	sociability	expertise	self
23.2	19.4	31.4	$\boxed{53.7}$

The very low reading suggests that they interpreted the question consistently with their sociability style. When asked to explain their answer, they might say something like, "In an interracial marriage, you're asking for problems." Presumably the "problems" are unpleasant interpersonal problems, e.g., within the marriage, among family, or with outsiders.

The difference in percentages between the sociability low and the self high (53.7 minus 19.4) is the biggest difference in the scale. It is also the biggest percentage difference. Thus this item, which we surmise is the most sociability-laden, is the item that picks up the biggest apparent difference in whatever the scale measures.

If we assume that the scale is an inverse sociability scale, the 7 lows in sociability are explainable; otherwise only 5 are. As a sociability scale 9 of the 12 data distribution patterns are predictable; otherwise only 5 are. Finally, the item that measures the biggest difference is the item most easily construed in sociability terms.

as, "Do you agree or disagree with the belief that democracy depends fundamentally on the existence of free business enterprise?" looks like a question of political economics to most people. But to a sociability person it may ask, "Most people in this country say that democracy depends on free enterprise. Do you agree or disagree with most people?" When we realize that a sociability person is likely to go along with the majority, we can predict that he will not criticize the statement, people who support it, or the government. He will be for those things he thinks most people are for and against those that he thinks most people are against. He is interested in the social acceptance of an idea more than the political or economic issues it raises. If these surmises are correct, then the more sociability-loaded a question is, the more sociability types should stand out on it.

In the 12-item scale 1 question stands out as very different from the rest in this way, "How do you feel about the idea of interracial marriage?" While the other questions emphasize legal rights and other political concepts, this one is especially ambiguous. Does it mean, "Do you think interracial marriages ought to be legally allowed?" or does it mean, "Do you think interracial marriages contribute to smooth social relations?" The phrase "feel about the idea" easily allows respondents to make the question a sociability

The purpose of this discussion is 2-fold. First, it demonstrates how the humanistic theory sharpens our awareness of certain problems, and it illustrates how the different parts of the theory and information collected by the theory can be brought to bear on these problems. Second, Chapters 9 and 10 take up the question of liberal political attitudes. I offer a sociability reinterpretation of them. This discussion is a forerunner of that argument.

Discussion 2 - Analyzing an Exception - Peterson points out a reversal of the dominant pattern, Table 6-14) for one item (p. 77):

Would you agree or disagree that the government should do more than it is presently doing to see that everyone gets adequate medical care?

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Agree, but not strongly, or strongly agree	65.8	68.3	62.7	63.1

The self group may be antagonistic to organized authority, as we surmise from the questions about the acceptability of their secondary schools (See Part 2, Section 4, under "Evaluation of School and Teachers"). They may be reacting to the fact that the government is postulated as the agent of better medical care. Just as they mistrust educational organizations and participate in the least organized activities, they may not want the government to "interfere" any more than it has to. (Also see Chapter 12.)

The opposite feelings, unwillingness to criticize others, may make the sociability group's attitude toward the government one of acceptance. The high reading for the stability group can be attributed somewhat to this shared feeling and also to the fact that they are also next to the survival group in which personal health is of great concern. Partially sharing the feelings of these two groups and feeling that possible astronomic medical bills are a threat to their own economic safety, the stability group could well be in favor of reducing this uncertainty. The data in the report is insufficient to check these speculations, but this shows some more suggestions for further roads of investigation generated by this theory.

The preceding discussion of liberalism and the following discussion of social conscience are important not only for what they tell us about these topics and about the subsystems, but also because they set the stage for Chapters 9 and 10, which reanalyze the adoption of political and economic progressivism in a college community.

Social Conscience (pp. 79-81) - Peterson does not give a table for all the items in the Social Conscience Scale because it "did not yield noteworthy differences among the four student types." I disagree with Peterson's conclusion, but first here is his data:

Table 6-15

Social Conscience Scale

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Mean	32.6	33.0	34.0	32.4
Standard deviation	5.63	5.61	5.86	6.25

One of the characteristics of the expertise group is wanting to be "useful and necessary in the world" (Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 1954, pp. 90-91) often through public service. And we do see a slight rise in concern with social problems, although a small one.

Discussion, Self Social Conscience - What is most significant, and disconcerting to Peterson is the "diversity" of the self types. They seem to answer inconsistently from item to item. Here again, we use previous findings and the humanistic theory as a basis for developing hypotheses.

We will go into these soon, but before that let's look at Peterson's definition of "social conscience." It is important to try to feel about it the way a self person would. Individual expression and self-development are two of his most highly prized values. Here is Peterson's definition (p. 79):

> Social conscience is defined as moral concern about perceived social injustice and what may be called "institutional wrongdoing" (i.e., as in government, business, unions, etc.). Social conscience has a strong emotional component. High scorers express "concern" about poverty, illegitimacy, juvenile crime, materialism, unethical business and labor union practices, graft in government, and the like. Low scores represent reported lack of concern, detachment, or apathy about these matters.

If we look through humanistic glasses at the content of the items Peterson suggests, it is obvious that some have content that refers to individuals as the aggrieved party; others refer to groups or society as the aggrieved party.

How does the perception of "social problems" vary from subsystem to subsystem? For example, on what grounds is illegitimacy a "problem"? Since so many other items in a person's background and attitudes are relative to his dominant subsystem, we would expect that his definition of a "problem" is likely to be relative too. A stability type with his strong emphasis on rules, regulations, etc. is likely to see any breach of formalized codes as a problem. For such a person illegitimacy is a problem because it breaks these moral, religious, and/or legal codes. A sociability type may be most worried about the social acceptability/unacceptability of an action. If it is not condoned by his group or by his idea of "society" and especially if the act is likely to make one a pariah, then he may see the act as a "problem." To an expertise type an act may be a personal "problem" if it is likely to be one that lowers him in standing with those members of his specialty or special field. He may be most sensitive to a mistake that makes him less of an expert and will lower his reputation, especially among his colleagues rather than the whole community. However, it is the former that is his peculiar type of problem. He is likely to interpret social problems as he does everything else - in the light of his specialty.

A self person will feel that something is a problem, naturally enough, if it impinges on his ability to grow, act, express himself, etc. His main criterion is: Does it limit my own (or others') self development? Illegitimacy, to continue the example, may be socially awkward because Mrs. Grundy sees it as immoral or socially unacceptable, but the problem, to self types, rests with her opinions, not the fact itself. Thus, the questions on the Social Conscience Scale probably had very different content for the various humanistic types.

Now we come back to Peterson's concern with the "diversity" of the self (nonconformist) types. He reported 5 questions as evidence of this diversity:

government official takes a bribe
illegitimate births
children reading obscene magazines etc.

less opportunity for minorities
A-bomb dropped on Hiroshima

In the first 3 self types show evidence of nonconcern; in the last 2 great concern. It is not clear that illegitimate births and obscene magazines present problems in the self subsystem. To a self person, as already demonstrated just above for illegitimate births, obscene magazines may be a problem in society's eye. Regulations limiting interest in prurient topics may be seen as an instance of society putting a straight jacket on individual behavior.

The question about the government official taking a bribe seems tangential to self interests too. While a tenuous case can be made that the official's action harms each person in society, it is not explicit that many individuals will be greatly hurt by the act or that they will be severely limited in their self-development.

4 of the other items in the social conscience scale are also broad, societal, large-scale problems: the extent of poverty, low welfare payments to elderly, corporate price rigging, and embezzlement of union dues. It is not surprising that a self group, which is antagonistic to organizations, is not particularly upset about their breakdowns or malfunctions.

Another item asked about the growing preoccupation with money and material goods and the corresponding decline of interest in "national aims, spiritual values and their moral considerations." These latter preoccupations, as usually stated and interpreted, are primarily those of the stability and sociability types, so it is not surprising that the self types pay little attention to this preoccupation.

If lack of concern for these items in the Social Conscience Scale is because they are not slanted toward the self subsystem interests, then those items which do express self concerns are likely to be the ones that champion individual rights. Of the 2 items that did evidence concern above "less opportunity for minorities" definitely has an appeal to individual development. "Dropping bomb on Hiroshima" can be interpreted in individualistic terms: Killing people can be interpreted by people with strong views on individual rights as the ultimate infringement on their personal rights.

We find additional confirmation that this view is pervasive in the self subsystem from the Liberalism Scale (previous to this). The self people were distinctively on the liberal side of issues that had to do with self-determination, etc. Compared with the other groups, they were strongly against the death penalty, government limit of the right to peaceful assembly for dissenters, and legislative investigation of faculty views. They were relatively in favor of the wartime rights of conscientious objectors and the right of individual choice in marriage (interracial marriage).

Peterson attributes the apparent lack of social concern to what Riesman (The Lonely Crowd, 1961) and Keniston ("American Students and the 'Political Revival,'" 1963) call "Privatism." While I don't wish to get into a full-blown discussion of privatism now, I partially agree and partially disagree with their observation (as reported by Peterson, pp. 80-81):

> In the absence of commitment to parental and adult values (stability, sociability, and expertise values) and coincidental with feelings of helplessness and alienation in relation to "the system" (organizations of the stability, sociability, and expertise types) there occurs an affirmation of "precisely those areas (of one's life) (self-development) which are least involved in the wider society, and which therefore seem most manageable and controllable."

While this withdrawal and concentration on oneself may be accurate to some extent for some people, I doubt that it applies across the board to the self types. Riesman and Keniston imply, according to Peterson, that privatism is a sort of reaction or compensation for one's alienation and powerlessness. This might be correct for part of the group. The negative values placed on alienation and unmanageableness by Riesman and Keniston, however, sound like judgments from sociability and/or expertise value patterns, rather than a positive valuation of self from a self-growth value pattern and self subsystem.

More than this, I think Peterson (and perhaps Riesman and Keniston) entirely miss the possibility of seeing the self types as a group with values of its own. These authors seem limited to thinking of it in terms of a reaction to the groups they are more familiar with. Perhaps this is another instance of people interpreting the world through their own glasses and with their own feelings and concepts.

5. Cultural Sophistication (pp. 81-85) - Peterson bases this personality dimension on Trow's notion of knowledge "about men and institutions and ideas and works of art... about the Great Society, its history and culture" and authentic sensibility to ideas and art ("Cultural Sophistication and Higher Education," 1959). "Students with high scores report interest in, or enjoyment or pleasure from, such things as wide reading, modern art, classical music, discussions of 'philosophies of history,' and so forth."

The expertise theme of interest in ideas and the self theme of personal involvement especially with art and other means of personal expression point to high scores in cultural sophistication for expertise types and especially for self types. Here is Peterson's tally (p. 85):

Table 6-16

Cultural Sophistication

	Stab.	Soc.	Exp.	Self
Mean	23.8	24.4	27.0	29.0
Standard deviation	5.40	6.38	5.44	7.41

Nothing unexpected here. In fact, in 7 of the 12 items the rank distribution of the components was the same as the above distribution of means. In those 5 cases where self wasn't high expertise was. In 10 of the 12 cases stability was low; in the other 2 sociability was low. In 10 of 12 cases knowledge of the high told us, via general proposition 5, the subsystem which contained the low.

Personality Summary

The 5 personality measures Peterson used on the humanistic types (considering the Clark-Trow typology as a specific instance of the humanistic typology) all resulted in differential descriptions of the students according to the expectations of the humanistic theory. Peterson reported success with only 4 of the 5, family independence, peer independence, liberalism, and cultural sophistication. But when the so-called failure of the Social Conscience Scale is analyzed in humanistic terms, it does give the expected results.

The self group showed the greatest independence from family and peers, the greatest liberalism, and the most cultural sophistication. The expertise students were ranked immediately under the self students in these attributes. The sociability students were both least independent and least liberal. They were next to the stability low in cultural sophistication. Stability was low in independence and liberalism, but not as low as sociability. The self students are seen as sensitive to social problems that are clearly self-oriented, but not to other problems.

The concentrations of these components in the various subsystems and their distributions across subsystems are seen as explainable within the conceptual framework of the humanistic theory. The lack of family and peer independence of the sociability students is attributed to their other-directedness, for example. The issues that the self types perceived as socially important and their high independence are interpreted as manifestations of the self subsystem's high valuation on self-direction and self-determination.

This third part of Chapter 6 also made use of general proposition 5 by using it to explain the most frequent patterns of distribution of the components being examined. In the 4 12-item personality scales the data usually fell in the expected pattern. Given the peak the rest of the ordinal pattern could be predicted in 41 out of 48 cases.

The discussions in this part exemplified how this humanistic theory can be used to open doors to further investigation. In section 3 I hypothesized that the Liberalism Scale was actually a reverse measure of sociability. I then brought in more information on this hypothesis such as the patterns of distribution, a characteristic item, and earlier findings on the noncritical nature of sociability types. In addition to illustrating how to use humanistically organized information, that discussion prepared the way for Chapters 9 and 10, which discuss liberalism, not as a political and economic issue, but as a social issue. The second discussion under liberalism started a continuing discussion of the self types. Here they were seen as typically anti-organizational. This and other traits are brought up from time to time in this dissertation, for example, under their apparent diversity in social conscience. Chapter 12 is devoted almost entirely to a description and analysis of the self students and the self subculture in higher education and society.

SUMMARY

This chapter is the third and final one that reinterprets Richard Peterson's On a Typology of College Students (1965). This chapter and Chapter 4 tested the first general proposition of this humanistic theory: The types exist. They examined 4 of the 5 constructs that compose the humanistic typology of subsystems, stability, sociability, expertise, and self. To examine them various components of the social system were predicted to be most associated with various subsystems on the assumption that a component which is characterized by 1 of the 4 humanistic values will be most associated with the subsystem that is also dominated by that value. For example, joining organizations is interpreted as a sociability characteristic and therefore most associated with the students of the sociability subsystem. The researchable question that tested this is: What subsystem is X component most associated with?

In Chapter 4 I showed that 5 components of higher education can be classified by the humanistic typology, and the prediction of association with the appropriate subsystems is confirmed. These components are (1) educational plans, (2) plans for graduate study, (3) greatest anticipated satisfaction, (4) expected extracurricular involvement, and (5) curricular and instructional preferences.

The second part of Chapter 4 used the typology to classify institutions. Humanistic criteria were able to account for differences in 8 institutions chosen separately by reputations and descriptions. 3 groups of institutions were also types; liberal arts colleges, Roman Catholic colleges, and public institutions. The constructs of the typology were thus widened to include institutions as well as people.

Chapter 5 moved from this investigation of broad-range components to analyses of the extracurricular involvement components item by item. This was done by asking a different researchable question, but one that still tested the construct validity of the humanistic differences in activities that accounted for differing appeals to various humanistic groups.

Chapter 5 also developed general proposition 5: The further away a person or group is from a subsystem, the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. This proposition allows us to predict the ordinal distributions of components once we know the subsystem a component is most associated with. For example, when a component is most associated with self or expertise, we predict that it will be least associated with stability (or with survival if data for this type is included). Because stability is furthest from both self and expertise (Survival is missing), we cannot reverse the process to go from least association to most. In Chapters 5 and 6 predictions derived from general proposition 6 were usually confirmed.

Chapter 5 closed with a demonstration of how the techniques of using propositions 1 and 5 can combine to analyze and compare components, in this case artistic, literary, dramatic, oratorical, musical, journalistic, and political activities.

Chapter 6, this chapter, resembles Chapter 4 by being a return to investigation of construct validity: Do the items measure the construct they purport to measure? Instead of being limited only to questions of greatest association between a subsystem and the component being studied, we drew on the techniques developed in Chapter 5. The analyses in this chapter were more detailed and were comprised of items of background characteristics, secondary schooling, and personality. The humanistic theory could usually explain these too, so the area of construct validity and applications of the typology was enlarged again to include these non-higher-education topics.

In these chapters, especially the latter 2, I used the theory to comment on and discuss various topics related to the data. These discussions illustrate how the theory can be applied to social problems and topics. They also set the groundwork for areas that will be developed more in the later sections of this dissertation. Some of them exemplified how the theory opens doors to further research and suggests refinements of instruments for these and other investigations.

Humanistic Theory - A Technique of Thinking

In addition to making hypotheses that are confirmed by the Peterson study, the humanistic social science theory can be a source of speculations on unclear data and interpretations of them, a source for criticism of current studies and suggestions for refinements, a basis on which to question some educational policies, practices, and the values and assumptions on which they are based, and a conceptual framework for developing further research. The following chapters show continued use of the theory to provide general laws for explanations of particular findings and to provide a conceptual background for more explanations, speculations, interpretations, criticisms, suggestions, and challenges.

Chapter 7

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FACULTY TYPES: MERTON'S AND GOULDNER'S EXPERTISE "COSMOPOLITANS" AND SOCIABILITY "LOCALS"

In this chapter we leave the study of college students for a view of administrators and faculty. The main study to be reinterpreted here is Alvin W. Gouldner's study of the attitudes among these people in a small liberal arts college ("Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," 1957-58). His main analytic categories are "locals" and "cosmopolitans." This distinction is based on Robert K. Merton's types of influentials in a community ("Patterns of Influence, Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," 1957). We will start, therefore, with the Merton study in hopes of showing that it can be seen as a partial instance of the humanistic general social systems theory.

Merton's Joiners and Specialists

In his study of influential people in a community Merton found that there were two types, one who was influential because of the things he knew, and one who was influential because he shared the feelings of those he influenced. Studying these types more closely, Merton came up with ideal types which resemble two of the humanistic categories.

The "locals" were concerned with knowing other people and being known by them. They were the "joiners" who were attracted to organizations to "make contacts." They were likely to hold political elective positions and to have many broad spheres of influence.

The "cosmopolitans," on the other hand, were more interested in making a few friends with whom they could exchange ideas; they were interested in the kind of people they knew rather than the number. When they joined organizations, it was usually to exercise their special skills and/or knowledge. The positions they held were those in which they could apply their specialty. Their influence was largely from outside attainments, such as education. The cosmopolitans read more nationally and internationally oriented magazines and acted as mediators between the outside world of ideas and the local community.

From these descriptions it should be clear that the locals are a specific case of the sociability types with their interest in joining, camaraderie, etc. The cosmopolitans are an instance of expertise types, with their emphases on specialized knowledge, colleague reference group, and desire for reputation and prestige.

Discussion: Problems with Dichotomies

Although Merton's dichotomy is adequate for his purposes, I'd like to comment here about concept formation in the social sciences. Dichotomies are certainly useful, and they are the simplest step in categorization and concept formation. Either object or event A is an instance of the category under consideration, or it isn't. As may be apparent from the earlier discussion of college types and from this beginning, I think a 5-unit system of categorization would be more useful than a 2-unit one. For example, Merton, by dividing his population of influentials into only two sections, runs the risk of making strange concept-fellows. Splitting the population between locals (sociability) and cosmopolitans (expertise) types probably is most efficient for the community he studied and for the news magazine readership problem he was working with, but a study of influence would benefit from broader conceptions of influence. The dichotomous split puts self types in with cosmopolitans and puts sociability, stability, and survival types together. In the next chapter we will see that Theodore Newcomb and Richard Flacks join pairs of humanistic groups because they too use a dichotomy.

When others try to use previously established dichotomous classification schemes, they are likely to have to build subcategories to handle their cases. Gouldner does this, in fact. I expect that one outgrowth of the humanistic theory will be more typologies that have 3 or more types. 5 types won't always be appropriate, as in the Peterson study, because few, if any, survival types get to college, but it would help other investigators to know whether their 2, 3, or 4 types are restricted samples of a larger number.

I hope a sort of conceptual sophistication of using more than 2 types will result from a humanistic social theory. If three types are used, one must at least answer the question whether they are on the same continuum:

type A type B type C

Whether they are independent:

type A

type B type C

whether they represent a major category with subcategories:

type A
(type A1)
(type A2)

or whether they might represent a matrix of two properties with a missing type:

	Property 2	
Property 1	Type A	Type B
	Type C	

As noted earlier, Hempel ("Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," 1963) says that a typology can become a theory when (among other things) hypotheses are suggested about the relationships among categories. It is easy to let a dichotomy by as finished, but 3, 4, 5 or more categories beg to be put in some sort of order. Theory building and the systematization of the social sciences could be aided by using dichotomization only as a rough tool or when, after investigation, it is found that there are only 2 types. In the next chapter I enlarge on this. Now, back to cosmopolitans and locals.

ADMINISTRATORS AND FACULTY - GOULDNER'S SMALL LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGE

Gouldner applies Merton's categories to a study of a small college faculty and administration. Here we predict that his findings can also be subsumed under the humanistic theory. That is, we expect to be able to predict what the sociability types (locals) and expertise types (cosmopolitans) will be like by knowing their characteristics under the humanistic framework.

Compared with the world at large, we would expect that Gouldner's restricted population would be relatively homogeneous so that any differentiation he is able to come up with would be more difficult to achieve than a differentiation based on a more diverse population.

The following diagram places Merton's and Gouldner's categories in the humanistic framework:

Type System	Humanistic Continuum	
Humanistic Categories	survival-stability-sociability-expertise-self	
Merton's and Gouldner's Major Types	LOCALS	COSMOPOLITANS
Gouldner's Subtypes	true burcrts dedicated elders homeguard	outsiders empire builders

Stability and Sociability - Locals

From Gouldner's descriptions of the subtypes (p. 446) it is obvious that they belong in the appropriate local-cosmopolitan categories and that they represent humanistic categories as well. The dedicated show a strong stability orientation in their adherence to a set belief and judge the world in its terms, "These are the 'true believers' who are identified with and affirm the distinctive ideology of their organization." To them the organization is important because it embodies unique values. Community loyalty is more important than acceptance of individual differences, and they insist that their colleagues have certain value orientations (stability) rather than technical competencies (expertise). They are, of course, low on professional orientation. Gouldner sees them as, "loyal and reliable members of the group, as pillars of its ideological purity."

The true bureaucrats seem to straddle the line between stability and sociability. They are aware of the college as part of the town and try to make the college policies reflect the socially acceptable tastes of its community. Their desire for smooth interpersonal and intergroup relations is evident here.

The homeguard is composed of second rung administrators, many of whom are female and who studied at the college, or whose husbands studied there. There is not much evidence to indicate where in the humanistic sequence they would fit; however, they and the elders may be threatened by changes in the college because they are dependent on the organization and somewhat powerless (lower rung administrators and imminent retirees). I speculate that they may be unsure of how any changes would affect them. For them it is safer to have things continue as they've been going.

Expertise-Cosmopolitans

Of the 2 cosmopolitan subgroups the "outsiders" seem furthest along the humanistic continuum, although they look like predominantly expertise types rather than self types. (At least this is as much as can be drawn from the report.) "Highly committed to specific skills," they are disciplinary, not interdisciplinary. In this they show the expertise quality of achievement and reputation through specialized knowledge. They show little loyalty, participation, or integration in either the informal structure of the college (as opposed to the sociability types) or the formal structure (such as the bureaucrats and the empire builders).

The empire builders are classified as cosmopolitans, but their orientation to a particular field is mixed with a commitment to their specific academic departments as well. They are, thus, integrated into the formal structure via their departments, but not into the informal structure.

Loyalty

In the Peterson study we found that loyalty to the organizations one is associated with generally decreases as one moves up the humanistic sequence. The self types were definitely the most critical of the organizations they had come in contact with. We find the same trend in the Gouldner study. Loyalty among the locals (especially the dedicated) is to the values and ideology exemplified by the college. The "true bureaucrats" are sensitive to the social standards of the community and would like the college to conform. (I prefer another name for this group to emphasize their sociability orientation and leave "true bureaucrat" to apply to people who were primarily aware of their structural position, official duties, and established procedures, most likely a stability type. However, the positions occupied by these people in the college were the "bureaucratic" ones.) Their loyalty might be said to be to the community social standards and smooth intergroup relations between the college and its locale. They are like Peterson's sociability types (collegiates) who idealized relations with their schools and parents and reported the least friction between themselves and these groups. This social grease is a goal of Gouldner's sociability types (bureaucrats), too.

The loyalty of the "empire builders" indicates a further move along the humanistic sequence with their dependence on their departments but also on their disciplines. While bureaucrats can be characterized by college + community concerns, empire builders can be characterized by college + discipline. They seem to be trying to gain esteem through (1) heading an empire (their departments) and (2) being part of an academic field beyond their bailiwicks. One can easily imagine that among their most difficult problems are those that put their departmental esteem in opposition to professional esteem, i.e., those instances of what will be good for the local department but which might not contribute to its professional prestige, e.g., keeping a good but non-publishing professor. They share departmental loyalty and professional field loyalty. A department is their specialized part of the organizational structure. The professional field is their specialized part of the intellectual domain.

Like those who were furthest toward the self category in the Peterson study, those who seem furthest out in the Gouldner study, the expertise (outsiders), have the least institutional loyalty. They are loyal to their discipline. Either there were no self types at Gouldner's college or he didn't ask questions that would bring them into view, e.g., primary loyalty to one's own ideas. While the "outsiders" may be self types, Gouldner reports on them as discipline-centered, not as personal-growth-centered people who happen to use a discipline as part of their growth.

Reference Groups: Hypotheses and Findings

Hypotheses - Gouldner makes a particular point of discussing reference groups. In a way, I have already covered this in the loyalty discussion, but I think it is important to note that reference group theory can become more sophisticated by considering humanistic concerns. A humanistic reference group theory is based on the idea that reference group formation (like most other human social activity) varies from subsystem to subsystem by being strongly influenced by the person's dominant subsystem. In other words reference grouping shows one way a person thinks and relates to the world. Thinking and acting are influenced by his subsystem, so we would expect his reference grouping to reflect this dominant subsystem.

Gouldner asks the question, "...do cosmopolitans and locals utilize discernibly different principles of sociometric rating?" Judging by the humanistic standard, they probably do. In fact, there might be considered 5 sort of standards for forming reference groups, one appropriate for each of the 5 humanistic stages, or types. People in the survival stage are likely to associate with groups that help them obtain the necessities of life. In the stability group, individuals are likely to associate with others who contribute to their desire for certainty, such as an ideological association, or the accumulation and protection of their goods or property, such as mutual protection associations. They are likely to try to influence organizations such as the government to protect property rights, etc.

People in the sociability stage are looking for congeniality and social contact; they are likely to join with others for this purpose. In the expertise stage, people are apt to join groups where they can practice their specialty (Merton, 1957) such as professional organizations and to think of themselves in terms of their specialty. In the self stage, people are likely to select organizations that aid them in their own development. This might be one or several of many types of of organizations depending on the unique make-up of the person. (A humanistic approach to reference groups is developed in the next 2 chapters.)

Types

We can see how this helps account for Gouldner's findings about the reference groups in the small college. The cosmopolitans, as expertise oriented people, evidence their bias in reference groups based on their specialized fields. These are their professional colleagues. The "outsiders," according to Gouldner, have as their reference group only people outside the college, while the "empire builders" use an academic department as well as a professional reference group. Locals think of themselves as members of (or influenced by) groups which are specific to their sociability needs, too. The "dedicated" use the college as a symbol of the values they adhere to. The "true bureaucrats" seem more influenced by social norms; they think of "the college-in-a-town" as their reference group. The elders and the homeguard stick to their own kinds, an elder, informal peer group and fellow middle-level administrators, respectively.

Law and Order: "Rule Tropism"

In addition to being evidenced in the patterns of loyalty and association in Gouldner's study, the humanistic types show themselves in something that (in the escalation of sociological terminology) Gouldner calls "rule tropism." This attraction, which sounds like some sort of botanical authoritarianism, is actually a stability desire for more and stricter rules. As we would certainly expect from the authoritarian bias of the combined stability and sociability group, the "locals", they favored "rule tropism" more than "cosmopolitans" did. Even after holding steady the amount of influence that they had, the stability and sociability types favored stronger rules more than did the expertise type.

Bureaucracy and the Stability Desire for Certainty - Discussion - Within Gouldner's combined stability-social group those with less influence on the organization were most strongly rule tropic. This is similar to the findings of Gerald H. Moeller. In "Bureaucracy and Teachers' Sense of Power" (1968) he found (among other things) that a highly bureacratized system with many rules explicitly stated gave teachers a greater sense of power than an unorganized system. Rules and firm policy as opposed to capricious, idiosyncratic, and *ad hoc* decisions gave teachers the ability "to predict events accurately, providing an effective basis for action and thereby enhancing sense of power" (p. 249). Moeller also found that the teachers' sense of power was in inverse proportion to their socio-economic status. If we can think of the stability-sociability types (bureaucrats) in the college status hierarchy as occupying a relatively powerless position similar to the teachers in schools and also as sharing middle-class socio-economic status, and concern with socially acceptable behavior (See Bell and Stub, "The Teacher," 1958), then it is not surprising that they also share rule tropism to promulgate order and social acceptability. A well-defined policy structure reduces the uncertainty so disliked by stability types, and it decreases their feelings of powerlessness. To a self type or expertise type who already feels secure, however, the same system of rules may seem constricting and arbitrary because they value variety, independence, and colleague reference rather than certainty.

Summary

In loyalty, associational patterns, reference groups, and "rule tropism" as well as in the typification of the groups, Gouldner's study receives strength by being embedded in the humanistic theory and offers additional confirmation of the theory.

Stability, sociability, and expertise traits are general characteristics around which the specific characteristics of the locals and cosmopolitans and their subgroups center. Merton's and Gouldner's studies give additional evidence that the expected traits do "hang together" into humanistic types: The types exist. Chapters 11 and 12 discuss some of the conflict among humanistic groups in higher education today. It will be helpful to remember the stability, sociability, and expertise groupings of administrators, faculty, and staff in those chapters and to consider how they are likely to interact with each other and with a self group.

This chapter has taken us away from direct concern with students. Chapter 8 returns us to them again with a discussion of Theodore Newcomb's famous studies of Bennington College.

Chapter 8

THERE'RE SOCIABILITY GIRLS IN THEM THAR SELF SUBSYSTEM HILLS

Of hindsight the benefits are glorious.

--Last line from limerick
etched on interior of jade
vase of Hsu Dynasty

Introduction

Following the Wisdom of the Orient, I have decided to treat 3 studies conducted at Bennington College in reverse order. One of the advantages of looking backwards is that we can use the conceptual tools developed in the interval between the original reports and the present. Considering the humanistic theory as one set of new tools, this is what I plan to do with the 3 Newcomb writings. This chapter reinterprets *Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus*, which Newcomb wrote with Richard Flacks (1963-66?). Chapter 9 reinterprets "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups" (Newcomb, 1959). Chapter 10 is a reinterpretation of Newcomb's original work at Bennington College, *Personality and Social Change: Attitude ormation in a Student Community* (1943).

In his article on reference groups Newcomb discusses how attitudes change according to the group one associates himself with. In the best-known and the original study, Personality and Social Change, he tries to determine what kind of personal characteristics determine the social relationships which, in turn, influence attitudes to proposed social changes, specifically social-political changes.

The first part of this chapter outlines a humanistic approach to reference groups. The second part applies it to Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus. The next chapter carries on this approach and the findings accumulated in this chapter and uses them to reinterpret "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups." The data on this chapter comes from a study done in the early 1960's. The next chapter is based on information from Newcomb's landmark 1930's study. Chapter 9, then, prepares the way for Chapter 10, which is my major reinterpretation of Newcomb's original study.

Part 1

A HUMANISTIC APPROACH TO REFERENCE GROUPS

In brief, the humanistic theory of reference groups states that reference groups, like so much else, are based on one's humanistic subsystem. In the previous chapter I briefly outlined and applied this to Gouldner's study, "Toward an

Analysis of Latent Social Roles," (1957-58).

A person in the survival orientation will use groups that help him meet his physiological needs as his reference group. In primitive societies this is likely to be the family, tribe, or village as the social units necessary for his survival. Among the poor we see a kin-neighbor network of association based on mutual aid with survival problems and low participation in other voluntary organizations (Cohen and Hodges, "Characteristics of the Lower-Blue-Collar Class," 1963).

In the stability stage a person will think of himself in terms of those organizations that help him conserve the gains of the survival stage. In addition to the production organizations (above) that may expand to take on stability functions, he may think of himself in terms of a religious or political ideology that organizes his world and of the group that espouses those beliefs. When we use the humanistic sequence to examine types of group membership, we see membership in labor organizations. The lower-lower class often is decidedly non-union, while the upper-lower class is union-oriented (Cohen and Hodges, p. 307). We might say that the worst off are too busy trying to make a living to organize and to try to consolidate their almost nonexistent gains. The working blue-collar man is extremely interested in seeing that he will be able to hold his job; job security, a stability goal, emerges as a survival person or group starts to become successful with the most basic human needs.

In the sociability stage, where camaraderie itself is important, people join organizations for the joy of belonging and of being together. As opposed to the lower-middle-class hostility and suspicion toward others, the typically middle-class person is exceedingly democratic and tries to smooth over intergroup friction. One big, happy family is his model. He is likely to think of many of the groups he belongs to as possible reference groups, and he will minimize the discrepancies among them. If there is a humanistic group to which reference group theory applies strongest, it is probably this socially oriented class, which typically thinks in social relations concepts.

As already pointed out, Merton's "cosmopolitans" ("Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," 1957), the expertise types, choose organizations and roles that fit their reputation-prestige orientation to the world. These may be whole organizations that have congruent values with the individual or they may be specialized roles that are prestigeful. They are likely to think of themselves in comparison with their colleagues elsewhere.

In the self stage the concept of reference group may not apply, at least not so much as it does in other groups. For one thing, the self people use themselves and their uniqueness as major points of reference. For another, they have the most distrust of and antagonism toward most groups, institutions, and organizations. While they may use organizations for their own growth, I am not sure that the usual type of judging self by the group is accurate for the self type. This too is a speculation, and I would like to see whether this is accurate. If, indeed, we think of reference group theory as most appropriate for the other-directed social types, as suggested above, then we would expect that it might be somewhat less appropriate for the contiguous stability and expertise types, and much less applicable to the self and survival types.

Reference Group and Membership Group

Some groups may have the same subsystem that an individual has, and he can use the entire group as a reference group; for example, a stability oriented person who holds a secure job in a bureaucracy may find that the bureaucracy and his fellow bureaucrats are one of his major reference groups. His stability subsystem, his secure occupational role, and the largely formal, specified, and regulation-centered organization can all be thought of as showing a high degree of the same general factor of stability. They might be said to be "congruent."

On the other hand, if an expertise person found himself in the same role, he may not use the whole bureaucracy as his reference group, but is likely to use an expertise group as his orientation. For example, he might use an office of the bureaucracy which does similar work he does. Vocationally he might think of himself primarily in terms of his colleagues outside the organization (Gouldner's "outsiders") socially as a member of a status group, e.g., Daughters-of- or Sons-of-Somebodies. Merton suggests this outside reference group (1957). And J. W. Getzels and G. E. Guba describe this in terms of role conflict and show how one group of professionals in a bureaucracy resolve this in favor of an outside group ("Role, Role Conflict, and Effectiveness: An Empirical Study," 1954). Thus, when the subsystem of the membership group, the larger group, is not the same as an individual's subsystem, he may use another group as his reference group although continuing to occupy his organizational role.

The Newcomb-Flacks Bennington study, Part 2 of this chapter, is a study of a subgroup. One of the questions they investigate is whether a deviant subgroup (sociability group in a self institution) helps the deviant individuals (sociability types) adjust to their situation.

Discussion: Dangers of Dichotomies

> Our minds are congenitally lazy, and the
> original sin of intellect is oversimplification.

--Aldous Huxley, "Education on
the Nonverbal Level," 1967.

Newcomb and Flacks' division of their sample into dichotomies is an example of the problems that occur with this binary approach. They start off with major culture and deviant. While this 2-part branching technique is useful in some instances, it has problems immediately viewable with this example. First, it lumps together types that might be more usefully separated. Here, for example, the expertise and the self types are lumped into the "creative individualists." I think that a more accurate picture would result from a 3- or 4-part categorization. I think a 5-part is frequently useful (a "quinchotomy" to polysyllabiphiles). Here, as in the Peterson study, there are probably no (or very few) survival types, so 3 or 4 types should be enough.

I am here amending the methodological principle that there should be no empty boxes in conceptual schemes, or in typification in experimental design. This may be true in planning and analyzing individual studies; there is little use in carrying around a lot of empty boxes. When it comes to embedding an individual study into a theoretical framework, however, the types not considered in the individual study, as well as the types considered, help place the study in a larger conceptual context. For example, in the discussion of Peterson's study I was able to embed his data and subsume his typology because I was aware that the survival type was not to be considered in the data and interpretation. Likewise, the Merton and Gouldner studies concentrated on 2 of the humanistic types, leaving the other 3 types out. Knowing this made their studies more understandable and valuable.

Just as categories are squeezed together, relationships among categories are tangled and confused. In Table 8-1, for example, I arrange Newcomb and Flacks' subgroups into what seems to be a humanistic sequence. But the missing data for the assumed expertise types makes the relationships less obvious. My rearrangement of the Peterson data makes the data generally sequence better, e.g., big numbers to little, and vice versa across rows and down columns. More than that, when a series of types consistently shows similar relationships to each other, one is tempted to hypothesize about these relationships, thus moving a bald classification scheme into a hairy theory. These relationships are much more obvious and intriguing for 3, 4, or 5 categories than they are for a dichotomy.

Damn the dichotomies, full speed ahead!

Part 2

BENNINGTON IN THE 1960's -
SELF DOMINANTS AND SOCIABILITY DEVIANTS

In Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus Newcomb and Flacks first describe the dominant culture at Bennington College, then 2 varieties of a deviant subculture. At most colleges the sociability subculture is dominant, or at least largest (Peterson, On a Typology of College Students, 1965, pp. 31-32), but at Bennington this group was deviant, and the self subsystem was dominant. Studies of self groups may give us a clue about the future direction of society if we continue to develop along the humanistic sequence.

The Self Culture: Creative Individualists

A Self Aphorism - The beat of the different drummer is
the beat of one's own mind.

Newcomb and Flacks named the dominant culture at Bennington "Creative Individualist." They identify this as often called "nonconformist" in other studies. In the categories of the humanistic framework, these are the self types, and I will continue to refer to them this way, sometimes putting Newcomb and Flacks' name "Creative Individualist" in parentheses. Likewise, the investigators identified the deviant subculture as "the Social Group" and noted that other investigators called it "collegiate." I'll call it "sociability." The self types (Creative Individualists) adhered to the normative pattern of "individualism" and "intellectualism," (p. 26), while the sociability types were described in the girls' own terms as "collegiate-social-preppy" (p. 38).

Originally the students labeled 6 types of groups at Bennington: Creative Individualists (which turned out to be the college norm), Scholar (an expertise type), Wild Ones, Social Group, Political Activists, and Leaders. From what we know of the desire for popularity and its manifestation as the desire for leadership among the sociability types (See Chapters 4, 5 and 6, especially Part 3 of Chapter 6), we could expect to collapse "social" and "leaders" into the humanistic "sociability" category. The "Wild Ones" is a vague group in humanistic terminology (although it may not be by other systems of classification) so it is difficult to tell where to place it. Wildness and activism mean different things to people with different subsystems. For example, wildness could mean an extreme social orientation such as attending frequent and vigorous social events, or it could be a form of self-expression, depending on how one is wild. To a sociability type political activism could be a desire for popularity as expressed through election. To an expertise type it could be working in campaigns to bring about social changes to benefit the disadvantaged, being of service to the world, a way of establishing esteem, reputation, and prestige. On these grounds, the political type seems primarily an expertise type.

Considering the fact that Bennington has a self culture and a sociability subculture, one would expect that there would also be an expertise ("scholar" plus "political activist") culture because this category falls between the other two. We would expect, in fact, that the expertise culture would be second in size to the self dominant culture since they are next to each other in the humanistic continuum. How do we account for this lack of mention by the authors?

The Scales

Newcomb and Flacks developed 6 scales to separate the college into deviants and nondeviants (p. 25). These scales and the descriptions of them show that we would expect them to be good at picking out the self types from a general population but that it would be difficult to resolve the "nonself" into their humanistic types on the basis of these scales. The 6 scales were:

> Atheism-Agnosticism...high scorers are skeptical of religious beliefs and practices and tend to reject most of them especially those that are orthodox or fundamentalistic.
>
> Developmental Status...high scorers are more like seniors in their attitudes and thinking..rebelliousness toward authority, especially when it is institutionalized in family, school, church, or state...less authoritarian and freer to express impulses.

Estheticism...high scorers indorse statements indicating diverse interests in artistic matters and activities...painting, sculpture, music, literature, dramatics.

Theoretical Orientation...interest in science and scientific activities, including a preference for using the scientific method in thinking. High scorers are generally logical, rational and critical in their approach to problems.

Originality...an index of independence of thought, freedom of expression, novelty of instruction... reflects a highly original mode of responding to experience.

Liberalism...resistance and favorability to change.

From these descriptions it is apparent that these items, except Theoretical Orientation, cover attitudes that Peterson found strongly differentiated self from other types. The Theoretical Orientation Scale sounds as if it would pick out the expertise types, "academics" in Clark and Trow's typology, "scholars" in Newcomb and Flacks', because of its appeal to knowledge, and theory-building as intellectual technique.

These scales were taken from and slightly adapted from the Omnibus Personality Inventory (OPI) of the Center for the Study of Higher Education. The scores in Table 8-1 are means for 3 Bennington groups. These are the scores for the various groups at the first administration of the test, 1959 or 1960. The group of 548 students who represented the whole college is composed of any student who took the OPI at least once in the 2 administrations. Subsequently some of these left, so that second readings were not possible in every case.

Table 8-1

Bennington's Norms:

The Whole College and 2 Subgroups of Deviants

Group	N	Theo. Orient.	Develop-mental Status	Estheti-cism	Liber-alism	Origi-nality
Deviant 1 - Sociability Participants	16	25.3	22.7	27.4	37.0	48.2
Deviant 2 - Non-participants	21	24.2	26.6	29.6	40.0	47.2
Expertise (?)	----------------no data given---------------					
Whole College	548	30.3	31.1	35.7	47.1	54.8

In drawing their dichotomy between creative individualist and social-deviant Newcomb and Flacks may have lumped the expertise group together with the self group. As I pointed out in Part 1, this would be easy to do. As the Peterson report showed (Chapters 4, 5, and 6), this pair often resemble each other more than they resemble the sociability and stability pair. Also, the scale which stressed theoretical orientation, scientific method, etc. may have pulled the expertise group into the self camp.

Deviants

Girls were selected as deviants if they fell below the mean of the college on all of the last 5 culture-norm scales. (Atheism-Agnosticism was dropped.)

Deviant Participants and Deviant Nonparticipants - When the total deviant group was examined, the authors found that they could be divided into those that participated in the collegiate (sociability) subculture and those that didn't. The former we hypothesize are the sociability types (collegiates); the latter are the non-social deviants. The 2 deviant groups will be compared with each other in the study to see the effects of their social/non-social biases on deviant group behavior. Statistical significance between the 2 deviant groups for each scale (Table 8-1) is greater than .20. Both groups differ significantly from the mean of the total college. In all cases the chance of this occurrence happening at random was less than 1 out of 100, according to the authors (pp. 33-34).

Cherchez L'expertise - Not enough information is available in the Newcomb-Flacks report to identify the non-social deviants in humanistic terms; however, they may turn out to have been part of the expertise group. The numbers in the groups suggest this. There were 37 students classified as deviant, but only 16 of these participated in the collegiate subculture. This leaves 21 non-social deviants. As noted above, we would expect the expertise group to be somewhere in size between the sociability and self sizes. While this is exceedingly weak evidence, it is a clue to further investigation. Stronger evidence comes from the fact that this group usually answers questions and ranks on scales between the 2 groups. These may be sociability deviants who are about to emerge into the expertise group.

Another source of the expertise type may be those students who answered 1, 2, 3, or 4 items below the college norms. In my opinion this is the most likely place to look for them because we would expect their values to fall between those of the sociability and self groups.

One of the values of a theory is that it tells us what to look for. The search for the expertise group will appear from time to time in the rest of this chapter. The group that scored below the mean on 1, 2, 3, or 4 scales has been omitted except in one instance. This is a weakness from the point of view of an interpreter using a humanistic frame of reference and looking for several points along a continuum, but it isn't a weakness in the original report because the intent was to study a deviant group, and the sociability group was just that at Bennington. In the Newcomb-Flacks study, then, we have 3 subsystem groups compared, the major culture group espousing self values, and 2 deviant groups, the sociability participants and the nonparticipants.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVIANT SUBCULTURES

Our humanistic interpretation of the deviant subculture findings will be of 2 types. First: Do the humanistic theory and the findings of the authors corroborate each other? Does the theory provide a conceptual framework that makes the particulars of this study more plausible because they can be embedded in a theory? And do the findings of the study confirm the expectations of the theory? Second, assuming the first goal: What do the findings tell us about the formation of groups along humanistic lines, and what are some of the relationships among the groups?

The authors looked at 5 major topics associated with their sociability subgroup, (1) patterns of association, (2) visibility and awareness, (3) attitude change, (4) status, and (5) drop-out rates.

1. Patterns of Association

The first question under patterns of association was (p. 34):

> Do social (collegiate) deviants tend to have social (collegiate) friends, and non-social (noncollegiate) deviants non-social (noncollegiate) friends?

Working on the assumption that agreement on dominant subsystem is a main principle of association, we would predict "yes." When asked to name 2 to 5 particularly good friends, the members of each group predominantly stuck to their own groups. A point not called to our attention by the authors was that the 16 sociability deviants chose almost as many friends as the 21 non-social deviants. The sociability selected 59 close friends for an average of 3.7 friends, while the nonparticipating chose 62 friends, for a lower average of 2.95 friends, which is as we would expect, greater congeniality among the sociability types.

The second item about the patterns of association was (p. 35):

> Are the friends of social (collegiate) deviants more deviant in their attitudes than the friends of non-social (noncollegiate) deviants?

The authors found that both groups tended to select people like themselves as friends. The nonparticipating groups tended to choose friends that were nearer to the norms of the college than to the norms of the subgroup (p. 37):

> Were social (collegiate) deviants concentrated in particular houses?

If subsystem is a principle for joining groups, then we would expect that those who share an outlook would tend to group themselves together in living units, too, especially the sociability types. There were 37 deviants in the sample. If they were randomly distributed throughout the 12 houses, we would expect about 3 in each house. However, 30 of the 37 lived in 5 houses. The sociability students were even more concentrated, in 4 of the 5 houses.

From these 3 questions about the patterns of association we see that a sociability type subgroup does interact with itself. However, because this is a sociability subtype as opposed to another humanistic subtype, it is difficult to tell whether to attribute this to other types of subgroups or just to the sociability oriented. The fact that the non-social deviants were more randomly distributed than the sociability deviants suggests that the groupiness of the sociability deviants may be due more to their sociability than to their deviant status in this case.

2. Visibility and Awareness

The second field of investigation was about the visibility and awareness of the deviant groups (pp. 39-42):

> Were (sociability) deviants more likely to be seen as deviant *by others* than (nonparticipating) deviants?
>
> Did (sociability) deviants tend to see *themselves* as more deviant than did (nonparticipating) deviants?

In both these indicators the sociability types stood out from the membership of the entire community. If one of the marks of the sociability types is that they try to fit into their communities and are, in effect, chameleons, then we would not expect these outcomes. We would expect to find these sociability types adopting the norms of the college, not maintaining their differences with it. Newcomb and Flacks suggest that women college students (and this would be especially true of sociability types) define their roles in college primarily in social terms and primarily in terms of housewife and mother. The authors say that these deviant students may not be deviant in terms of the larger culture and may see the Bennington culture as itself deviant from the larger society. Thus, their potential reference group at Bennington College may be considered deviant, in their view, by the rest of society which holds their sociability views. It would be interesting to know whether, in fact, they see themselves conforming to the rest of society instead of Bennington College.

3. Attitude Change

The authors' investigation into attitude change (pp. 42-44) substantiates the view of the subculture as being an insulator to change. On the first administration of the scales from the Omnibus Personality Inventory the 2 sets of deviants were matched in amount of deviance (thus, controlling for regression of extreme groups). The first score of each scale was subtracted from the second score (fall 1959, or 1960 for freshmen, from spring, 1962). The differences divided by 5 (the number of scales) gave the mean attitude change score. The mean attitude change for sociability deviants was 1.3, while it was 4.8 for the nonparticipating ones. Thus, the deviant subculture helped maintain the values of the deviants.

This is the only place where Newcomb and Flacks investigated the large group of students who were between the self norms and the deviants, the group that scored below the Bennington medians in from 1 to 4 of the scales. These may be the expertise group. They selected those students who had 3 or 4 instances of being below the medians and divided them into those that participated in a subculture and those who didn't. The mean amount of the change for the 5-scale deviants was 0.8 for the participants and 1.9 for the nonparticipants. The pattern of change (less for participants) was the same.

Thus, one effect of deviant subcultures is to help strengthen the norms of the groups. Reference groups are based on shared subsystems, and they perpetuate their subsystems. This is of particular interest to a humanistic 5-part social system because the "cultures" or "subcultures" are manifestations of these dominant subsystems in many instances, and the dynamics among groups based on these subsystems can be studied by investigators such as Newcomb and Flacks. In many cases the word "subsystem" can be substituted for "culture," or the culture can be seen as part of the subsystem. Thus, Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus might be retitled Deviant Subsystems on a College Campus.

4. Status

When looking into status Newcomb and Flacks asked (pp. 44-52):

> Did social deviants receive lower status from nondeviants than nonsocial deviants?

In other words: How did the main body of the college campus rank the 2 deviant groups? This was measured by asking all the students to name 2 to 5 students they would choose to represent the college. (For the overall college community the most nominated students were the "creative individualists.")

Newcomb and Flacks assumed that deviants who participated in a sociability subsystem (subculture) would show greater loss of status than the nonsocial deviants, who didn't participate in one. Remember, the sociability students were more conspicuous than the nonsocial students. The mean choices as representatives was in the opposite of the expected direction (sociability types 3.3 and nonsocial 2.5), not statistically significant for the small numbers involved, however. When the authors looked at the source of the nominations, the surprise cleared up. The nonsocial students' nominations came almost entirely from their fellow nonsocials, and "a very large proportion" of the sociability deviants' nominations came from other sociability students (p. 46). Thus, the deviant subsystems (subcultures) also provided this type of status among their groups.

Status Characteristics - Gouldner asked whether expertise types (cosmopolitans) and sociability types (locals) used different principles of sociometric rating ("Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," 1957-58, p. 459). The results of the question above are in keeping with the assumption that they do; that is, each subsystem has its own status-characteristic components. This is explicitly asked in the authors' second question about status (p. 47):

> Do the criteria for status in the social (sociability) subculture differ from those of the college as a whole (self)?

What attributes do the students who were highly chosen by the self community have, and how do they compare with the students chosen by various subgroups? The authors give data for 4 groups of popular (highly chosen students) and compare this with their selection as either self types (creative individualists) or sociability types (collegiates). The 4 groups compared (with some overlap among those chosen) are:

5 students chosen by *sociability participants*

10 students chosen by *all deviants* (regardless of participation or nonparticipation in a subculture)

5 students chosen by *nonparticipating deviants*

6 students chosen by *sophomores, juniors, and seniors*, *but not* chosen by deviant students

Then a panel of interviewees classified these students into types. Unfortunately the authors do not give the number of interviewees or the number of types they could use to classify these chosen students. What is important in Table 8-2, however, is not the actual numbers, but the relative sizes. For example, when we look at the 2 kinds of deviant students (sociability deviants in column 1 and nonparticipating deviants in column 2) we note that in both cases the students they chose were classified as sociability types rather than as self types. That is, sociability students attribute status to other sociability students.

When we look at the 2 groups of students chosen by nonsocial groups (nonsocial deviants in column 4, and soph+jr+sr in column 4) we see that the students they attribute status to were overwhelmingly likely to be self types. That is, the nonsocials (presumably mostly expertise and self types) chose self types.

Table 8-2

High Status Characteristics:

Mean Nominations as Sociability or Self for

4 Groups of High-status Students

Source of Status	Number Chosen	Sociability	Self
Sociability (participating) Deviants	5	5.8	0.4
All Deviants	10	3.2	1.1
Nonparticipating Deviants (nonsocial)	5	0	6.2
Soph, Jr., Sr. but *not* Deviants	6	0	9.0

One of the criteria for judging the usefulness of a theory is whether, and to what extent, it can be used to generate researchable hypotheses. Looking at Table 8-2 through the glasses of this humanistic theory provides us with some clues for further investigation. For example, when we look at the sociability column, we notice that the mean nominations are highest in row 1, lower in row 2, and lowest in rows 3 and 4. The self column is the reverse of this, lowest in row 1 and highest in row 4. When we combine this observation with the assumed sequence of subsystems, general proposition 2, and general proposition 5, "The further away a person or group is from a subsystem the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem," we have good reason to hypothesize that the arrangement of groups in Table 8-2 falls along the humanistic sequence. The social deviants may be strong sociability types, and the soph+jr+sr may be strong self types. The "all deviants" group may be a sociability-expertise group, and the "nonparticipating deviants" may be an expertise group. Since we know some of the characteristics of these groups from the Peterson study and from the theoretical formulations of the subsystems, the way is now open to investigate these hypotheses.

Another use of the humanistic theory concerns those students who scored below the mean on 1, 2, 3, or 4 of the Bennington cultural-norm scales. If many of those who were below the norm on all 5 scales were sociability types, and since the general norm of the college was self, we can hypothesize that people with 1, 2, 3, or 4 items below the norm are stretched between the self and sociability subsystems along the humanistic continuum:

	sociability			expertise		self
No. Scales Below College Norm	5	4	3	2	1	0

Table 8-2 also provides some support for the hypothesis that reference to a subculture group helps insulate one from the norms of the overall membership group. To do this we can compare rows 1 and 3, the all deviants with the nonsocial deviants. We see that the participation in the sociability subculture by the sociability deviants helps them maintain their high regard for sociability subsystem status characteristics; i.e., they chose sociability people as high in prestige. The deviants who didn't participate in the sociability subculture were not so insulated and showed the influence of the overall school; i.e., they chose self types as highly prestigeful.

Desired Self-image

The second measure of status characteristics was the rank ordering of 6 Bennington types by the entire student body. The humanistically relevant types are creative individualist (self), scholar (expertise), political activists (expertise), social (sociability), and leader (sociability). The "wild ones" category may have traces of both sociability and self types, but the category seems not to fit on the humanistic continuum. Newcomb and Flacks, unfortunately, do not give the data for the choices of the whole college, but say, "The overwhelming preponderance of students preferred to be known as 'Creative Individualists.'"

While the nonparticipating deviants go along with this trend, the sociability deviants don't (p. 51):

Table 8-3

Deviants' Choice of Self-image

Number giving first choice to...	Self (Creative Individualist)	Sociability (Social or Leader)	Other	Total
Sociability (participating) Deviants	2	9	4	15
Nonparticipating Deviants	12	5	3	20

Here again we see that the sociability deviants, who isolated themselves in a sociability subsystem subculture, were able to maintain their subsystem; they chose to be known as social types or leaders. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 the reinterpretation of the Peterson study (On a Typology of College Students, 1965), we saw that social and leadership orientations were characteristic of the sociability subsystem. The nonparticipating deviants, however, were more influenced by the standards of the overall college and preferred to be known as self types.

More data and more interpretation would be necessary to develop a humanistic interpretation of status characteristics. I have tried to demonstrate here how the humanistic theory can be used to ask questions, formulate hypotheses, and engender research into some unclear or incomplete matters. The humanistic social systems theory also provides some evidence on questions concerning status ascription. The main principle here, as with other components, is that status measures vary and are relative to humanistic subsystems.

In answer to Gouldner's question about cosmopolitans' and locals' (expertise and sociability types) using different sociometric principles and in answer to Newcomb and Flacks' question about whether the criteria for social status differ in the collegiate (sociability) subculture compared with the dominant creative individualist (self) culture, we can answer: There are different status characteristics in various subsystems, but these follow the same general principle; status characteristics are consistent with the subsystem traits and components.

5. Dropout Rate

The last set of data the authors looked at had to do with drop-out rates (pp. 52-54). If group formation is by subsystems, then we would expect that deviants from the dominant subsystem of the total organizational membership will use a different reference group. They may actually form a subculture the way the sociability deviants did in the dominant Bennington self culture, or they can self-select themselves out of the organization and go elsewhere, the dropouts.

On this basis then we would expect that the deviants would drop out more than the nondeviants and that the more deviant a person is the more he is likely either to drop out or to form a subgroup. If the dominant culture is self, for example, we would expect the least dropping out among the self types, the next to the least among expertise types, and so forth.

This anticipated distribution is not available from the data because only those students who were deviant on all 5 norm-scales were considered deviant in this study. There were 109 of these, and 44 dropped out (40.4%). There were 276 nondeviants, and 81 dropped out (29.3%). The authors report that the critical ratio for the difference between these 2 groups is 2.00, which has a probability of less than .05. While this dichotomous reading is consistent with the hypothesis that self-selection, dropping out, is due to distance along humanistic lines (i.e., the more distant a person is from the membership subsystem, the more likely he is to drop out), more data specifically built to test such a hypothesis would be welcome.

The second question the authors asked was whether nonparticipating deviants were more likely to drop out than sociability deviants. Considering that both these groups are equally far from the Bennington self norms, we would expect that they would both have equal self-selection out, except for the fact that the sociability types participated in a sociability subculture that insulated them and gave them status, interaction, etc. Thus, we would expect a lower dropout rate from the deviant participants in the sociability subculture than from the deviant nonparticipants.

Due to the small numbers of dropouts, the investigators did not come up with statistically meaningful data for comparing the 2 deviant groups in this sample. But by using data from an earlier test that classified deviant students as participating or nonparticipating in a subculture, they arrived at a group of 53 nonparticipating deviants and 23 participating deviants. 36 percent of the former dropped out, while 23 percent of the latter dropped out. While this is in the predicted direction, it is not statistically significant.

The deviant subculture, then, does protect people who have subsystems other than the most popular one. This conclusion, of course, is by no means unique to a humanistic theory. It is just what Newcomb and Flacks hypothesized, too. The point is that their findings about college deviants is another instance of mutual confirmation/explanation between this humanistic theory and their observations.

Discussion: Intersubsystem Understanding and Intercomponent Support

I find that when I view the dominant as well as the deviant subcultures as instances of groups that form around their respective subsystems then the invidious distinction of superiority of one and the inferiority of the other disappears. They are both groups formed according to one or another subsystem; both groups have their ways of perceiving, understanding, and acting. Their ways of structuring their worlds and of adjusting to the larger world and to other groups often makes sense within their frame of reference, and even if I don't share their subsystem, it helps to see how the bits of their world fit together into a meaningful whole to them. Antagonism often drops. (Perhaps this is an example of how this theory serves a sociability function for me.)

Flacks and Newcomb note that the sociability deviants were likely to have had a psychological predisposition to see the world in their terms and to join subcultures that supported their values. Thus the interaction of subculture and personality was one of mutual support. I think this view of mutual interaction among groups and individuals gives a better interpretation than does a view saying that either is "primary." If we are going to select one thing as primary, I prefer selecting 1 of the 5 subsystems as primary and interpreting both personality and social organization as supportive of a consistent and coherent subsystem. That is, the reason that group activity and personality are or are not mutually supportive is that they do or do not reflect the same subsystem, are or are not based on a consistent subsystem.

SUMMARY

In this first study of Bennington, we have seen some evidence that reference group formation is a function of dominant subsystem and that personality and social structure interact according to subsystem. The humanistic theory can provide one set of concepts for linking group and individual behavior into an interacting system.

When discussing their findings (pp. 58-63), Newcomb and Flacks speculate about the origins of the sociability subculture and cite Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique (1963). Her hypothesis is that society as a whole defines women's place in social-domestic terms and that college is usually seen through this view as preparation for these social-domestic roles. Bennington, however, has chosen a different norm, and the investigators see the sociability deviants within Bennington as maintaining this larger, extracollegiate cultural norm.

From Newcomb and Flacks' study we see that sociability deviants have more close friends than deviants who do not participate in the sociability subculture. Each group predominantly stuck to its own group for friendship. The sociability subsystem made that group more aware of itself and more visible to members of the Bennington community who were not members of the sociability reference group. Participation in a humanistic subsystem-based subculture also helped maintain attitudes. Nonparticipants had 3½ times as much movement toward the college norms as did participants. If we think of this in terms of components of the systems, we have grounds for hypothesizing that congruence among components (all of the same subsystem value such as all sociability) maintains the subsystem, while incongruence (components of mixed subsystem values) leads to change. Which components are most influential in which subsystem and how they go about influencing each other provide fascinating and important topics for policy-makers and practitioners. Attributing high status to others and desired self-image also were predictable by knowing a group's subsystem.

Information on rates of dropping out indicated that deviants were more likely to drop out than nondeviants and that participants in a subculture were more likely to remain than nonparticipants.

As well as showing that reference group formation and interaction are likely to be centered around humanistic subgroups, this chapter suggested several avenues for further research and some methodological changes. This reinterpretation of Newcomb and Flacks' Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus pointed to reference groups as one of these avenues and to the analysis of data into more groups than a dichotomy as a desirable methodological change. The next chapter follows both these suggestions by reinterpreting Newcomb's "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups" (1959) and by splitting the sample into 7 groups.

Chapter 9

BENNINGTON 25 YEARS EARLIER

Introduction

The Newcomb and Flacks study was based on data collected from the fall of 1959 through the spring of 1962 (Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus, 1963-66?). The article that I describe and reinterpret in this chapter, "Attitude Development As A Function of Reference Groups: The Bennington Study" (1958), is based on Newcomb's widely known earlier study of Bennington, Personality and Social Change: Attitude Formation in a Student Community (1943) done from 1935-1939. In both these studies one of the hypotheses that Newcomb investigated was that group membership involves the taking on of whole patterns of interrelated behavior and attitudes. In the earlier study he used only *membership* in a group as a criterion, but in the later study, he used *reference* group theory to refine the earlier conceptualization. A reference group is a group that the person uses as a standard for judging his own actions and attitudes. He may have a "positive" identification with the group if he adopts the group's norms or a "negative" identification if he uses them as an example of what he does not want to be. One's reference group may or may not be his membership group. Newcomb says that the Bennington study is better understood in terms of reference group theory and that other reference groups beside the whole college membership should be considered. His chapter, then, is his own reinterpretation of the original Bennington study using reference group theory.

Reinterpreter Reinterpreted

But why should a person choose one reference group instead of another? The groups Newcomb mentions as reference groups are home-and-family, college peers, faculty and advanced students, and various groups of "outsiders," such as left-wing writers. In the Newcomb and Flacks study we saw that group membership was at least a partial function of subsystems. I plan to apply this observation to Newcomb's reference group article.

As I mentioned earlier, the ideas of judging oneself in terms of the group one is a member of seems especially characteristic of sociability. In this chapter and the next, one of the hypotheses I make and examine is that the results Newcomb found are due to the fact that most of the girls at Bennington College were sociability types; their adopting what they perceived as the college community norms is an example of their sociability subsystem in operation. Throughout this chapter and the next I will point out evidence that confirms and disconfirms this position, which I call the "sociability hypothesis."

These chapters, then, show how the humanistic theory can be used to reinterpret existing studies. It is as important to notice how the theory can be used in this kind of activity as it is to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis that the shift to liberal values at Bennington was primarily an instance of sociability rather than an example of a move to the liberalism associated with the expertise subsystem.

Table 9-1 gives a summary of Newcomb's article as relevant to the humanistic social systems theory. The table is continued on a second page and is also a tabular outline of the rest of this chapter. This brief introductory description will be more fully developed in the rest of this chapter on the reference group article.

Column 1 of Table 9-1 consists of the headings of the rows. Columns 2-5 are the humanistic categories with the first (survival) left out because there were no (or very few) students at Bennington in this category.

Row 1 gives the names of the 4 humanistic subsystems applicable to the Bennington investigation. Row 2 locates the Bennington norms and major types of students according to Newcomb and according to me. The main difference is that I see the sociability influence as very important, while

Table 9-1 (Columns 1, 2, and 3)

Summary of Newcomb's Findings on Reference Groups

Row	Column 1	Column 2				Column 3	
1	Humanistic subsystem	stability				sociability	
2	Bennington norms					/--my view------------	/-Newcomb's view--
3	Political extreme	/-most conservative-/				/-most nonconservative	
4	Reference to coll.	negative		positive		p-o-s-i-t-i-v-e	
5	Group no. No. in grp	1 5	2 5	3 4	4 5	5 6	6 7
6	Main ref. group	home and family				whole college membership	
7	Relation to parents	overly or extremely dependent		dep. & conflict mixed	very close ties	none overdepend. consrv par. neg ref grp	
8	Prestige	low	very low	low	above ave	very hi & ave	very hi leaders
9	Instructors' evaluations	stubborn resistant		uncritical, conscientious over-docile	--eager-- cooperative	enthusiastic, anxious to please ambitious	indep. in intell acts meticulous over-conscientious
10	Ambitions	social	making friends		to fit in	leadership	(missing)
11	Degree of success	little	successful			very somewhat	
12	Peterson types	vocational				collegiate	
13	Gouldner types			l-o-c-a-l-s dedicated elders homeguard		true bureaucrats	

Columns 4 and 5 are on the next page.

Continuation of Table 9-1 (Columns 1, 4 and 5)

Summary of Newcomb's Findings on Reference Groups

Row	Column 1	Column 4	Column 5
1	Humanistic subsystem	expertise	self
2	Bennington norms	--my view–/	
3	Political extreme	-----most nonconservative--/	
4	Reference to coll.	negative	
5	Group no. No. in grp	/-----7-----/ 6	
6	Main ref. group	at first fac. & adv. stu, later extra coll	
7	Relation to Parents	none, overdependent 3 severe independence battles	
8	Prestige	mixed, above ave. ave., very low	
9	Instructors' evaluations	highly independent critical minded intell. outstanding	
10	Ambitions	intellectual (?)	
11	Degree of success	successful	
12	Peterson types	nonconformist	
13	Gouldner types	cosmopolitan outsiders (?) empire builders	

Newcomb stresses values more appropriate to the expertise orientation.

In this article Newcomb selected for intensive study the most and the least conservative sixths of 3 consecutive graduating classes. This resulted in 24 nonconservatives and 19 conservatives. The main attitude studied in the investigation was called political and economic progressivism, PEP. The lines in Row 3 of the table "most conservative" and "most nonconservative" refer to scores on a PEP scale. The scale dealt with such socially relevant topics of the late Depression years as unemployment, public relief, and the rights of organized labor. This accounted for the conservative/nonconservative readings. Chapter 10 gives a fuller description of the PEP scale.

Newcomb doesn't use the word "liberal" for "nonconservative." This seems to me to have been due to negative political connotations at the time of his writing, while today we often substitute the words for each other. When he uses "liberal" or "liberalize" they often are in quotation marks. He suggests this interpretation when he says that "liberal" or "radical" students are often thought "to be a little 'queer.'" Perhaps not wanting to suggest that Bennington made its students strange or odd in any way, he used "nonconservative" as more socially and/or politically politic.

Newcomb arranged the 24 extreme nonconservatives and the 19 extreme conservatives on 3 dichotomous variables, conservatism/nonconservatism, Row 3; college as positive or negative reference group, Row 4; their awareness/unawareness of their divergence from the college community, not in table. This gave him 8 subgroups. Row 5 places these subgroups on the humanistic continuum. Missing subgroup 8 will be explained later.

Row 5 also gives the number of students in each of the 8 subgroups. Row 6 gives the results of Newcomb's investigation about what main reference group the students chose, and 7 states relationship with parents. Row 8 gives the prestige rating by the other students in the college of the subgroup members. Row 9 gives the faculty's evaluation of the students.

Row 10 gives the expectations or hopes that the members of the subgroups had when they came to college. Row 11 estimates their degree of success with their goals. Row 12 places the Clark & Trow typology ("The Organizational Context," 1966), the one used by Peterson (On a Typology of College Students, 1965), on the humanistic continuum for comparison with Newcomb's findings, and Row 13 locates the Merton-Gouldner dichotomy ("Patterns of Influence, Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," 1956; "Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," 1957-58).

Table 9-1 can be read either by looking down the columns to see what characteristics "hang together" to form a type or by reading across the rows to see topics referred to in Column 1 develop across the humanistic continuum. In Part 1 of this chapter I will briefly look at the types; we have already done this in some detail in the previous chapters. Then I'll pay more attention to reading and interpreting across the rows, how, for example, reference group varies from subsystem to subsystem, Part 2.

Part 1

TYPE DESCRIPTIONS

This part continues the descriptions of the humanistic types theorized in Chapter 2 and empirically investigated in Chapters 4-8. This part is a further investigation of general proposition 1: The types exist. It consists of reading down the columns of Table 9-1 to see whether the characteristics we expect to occur together do occur together.

Stability Types - Column 2

Newcomb says...(Of course, when I say "Newcomb says" I'm referring to my interpretation of Newcomb. He says nothing about the humanistic theory, and I'm putting humanistic terminology into his mouth.)

Newcomb says that the most conservative types are those that are stability oriented. They use their home and family as their major reference group and were classified as dependent, overly dependent, or extremely dependent on their families, stability deference to authority. They had low esteem from their fellow students (assumed sociability) and were seen by the faculty (expertise) as either resistant (for those with strongest dependency) or as submissive (those with the weaker dependency on parents). This submissiveness may mean that the students were dependent on their instructors rather than on their parents. Peterson noted the same characteristic in his stability (vocational) types (1965, p. 30), "Vocationalists generally evidenced the weakest independence orientation (i.e., they indicated the greatest willingness to defer to institutional authority)." When they came to Bennington, they wanted to fit in and become part of the social structure. Those who continued to use their parents as a reference group and who resisted adopting the faculty-college community standards were unsuccessful with their aims. On the other hand those who were uncritical of the official attitude of the college were successful at fitting in. This is not to say that either one caused the other, but that the pattern of association existed. That is, those who were unsuccessful at making friends may have been "forced" to refer to their parents because of their failure. Or, those who referred to their parents didn't make friends because their parents stood in the place of (unneeded) friends.

Sociability Types - Column 3

In my view the sociability types composed the bulk of the Bennington student body (or at least a very large proportion) during the period of study, and this accounts for the results that Newcomb found. Newcomb seems to see the student body as predominantly expertise types, being concerned with social activism and wanting to be of service to mankind by changing society. While I agree with his description of how the community and the reference groups and membership groups influenced the students, I want to take his description one step further and ask: Why? Why should the students at Bennington switch to political and economic progressivism from the political and economic conservatism of their backgrounds? Newcomb points out that it was a policy of the faculty to make their students aware of social problems and that this was accomplished through the community structure. I think he has shown this well, but I want to ask why it was so successful.

The Sociability Hypothesis - The explanation that I see is that the student body was primarily composed of sociability and expertise types, mostly the former. The latter have a desire to be of service to the world (social activists), and the former have an especially strong desire to adopt the values of their membership groups. With the faculty's expertise orientation and their desire to influence people (students) and to be of service to the world (teach their students to be socially aware), with some students who shared their values, with the exceptional opportunity to establish a community and its values (the study included the first years of operation of the college), and especially with a large number of sociability type students who are eager to adopt the apparent standards of their community, it is to be expected that the liberal values of the expertise subsystem would become the official values of the Bennington community. They were the "natural" expertise values of some and the socially accepted values of others. From time to time in the rest of this discussion I'll point out information that confirms and disconfirms this interpretation.

Like Peterson's and Clark and Trow's collegiates, the sociability types wanted to be leaders and were. They considered the whole college community as their reference group and were eager, enthusiastic, and anxious to please. If the faculty would be pleased with students who showed political and economic progressivism, what else would we expect to become the community standards?

Expertise Types - Column 4

This type seems also to have been a large proportion of the student body, but it is hard to be sure of this because of the way the data is presented. Some of the expertise types show up in the adjacent part of the continuum as independent in intellectual acts. They are the highest in prestige, so that the peak Bennington value may have been a combination of sociability and expertise subsystems. They, like the sociability types, used the whole college as a reference group, but their intellectual independence sets them apart from the enthusiasm of the predominantly sociability types.

Self Types - Column 5

Newcomb notes that this group was intellectually outstanding and at first used the faculty and advanced students as their reference group to achieve their intellectual ambitions (expertise). But later in their college careers they switched to outside, extracollegiate reference groups such as left-wing writers. This reminds us of Gouldner's "outsider" cosmopolitans. They resemble the "Creative Individualists" who dominated their alma mater 25 years later with their high independence and critical minds (Newcomb and Flacks, 1963-66?). In the earlier study such words as "alcof" and "haughty" were applied to them. This is how sociability types are likely to interpret the nonsocial individualism of self types. Their transition from an apparently expertise orientation to an apparently self orientation may indicate that their successes in intellectual endeavors led them to leave the expertise subsystem and evolve into the self subsystem.

This brief survey of the humanistic types leads us into looking at the components described by Newcomb one at a time. This is reading across the rows in Table 9-1.

Part 2

COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS

When we read across the rows of Table 9-1, we analyze the Bennington community by 9 components of its social system (1) political extremes, (2) positive or negative reference to the college, (3) subgroups of extreme conservatives and extreme nonconservatives, (4) main reference group, (5) relations with parents, (6) prestige from other students, (7) faculty evaluations, (8) ambitions on coming to college, (9) and degree of success with those ambitions. We are seeing, then, how these components vary from subsystem to subsystem. Is the variation in the direction of the dominant value of the various subsystems?

Row 2 represents the sociability hypothesis, that the effects Newcomb spots are due primarily to the high incidence of sociability students. The other rows present more information on this.

Subgroups of Extreme Types - Rows 3, 4, and 5

Newcomb divided the 24 most nonconservative and 19 most conservative students into 8 subgroups by conservatism/ nonconservatism on the political and economic progressivism scale, awareness/nonawareness of their extreme status, and positive/negative referral to the college community as a reference group. Table 9-2 gives Newcomb's groups by this triple dichotomy classification, the numbers he assigned to these groups in the article, and the numbers I've assigned them after reading his descriptions of the groups and placing them on the humanistic continuum, Row 5, Table 9-1.

Table 9-2

Triple Classification	Newcomb's No. System	Humanistic No. System
Conservatives, aware, negative	1	1
Conservatives, unaware, negative	2	2
Conservatives, aware, positive	3	4
Conservatives, unaware, positive	4	3
Nonconservatives, aware, positive	5	6
Nonconservatives, unaware, positive	6	5
Nonconservatives, aware, negative	7	7

Table 9-2 continued

Triple Classification	Newcomb's No. System	Humanistic No. System
Nonconservatives, unaware, negative	8	omitted

Methodology

I've chosen to omit Newcomb's group 8 because of a contradiction in his article. In Column 1 on page 274 he identifies this group as "NOT REPUTEDLY COMMUNITY-IDENTIFIED" (underlining mine). In the second column, however, he says:

> These five provide the example par excellence of individuals who came to identify themselves with "the community" ... But because of their need to be accepted, it was primarily the membership group as such which served as reference group for these five.

Newcomb's underlining

Other than this contradiction they look like exceedingly strong sociability types. In addition to their use of the whole membership group as a reference group, they are hard-working, eager, enthusiastic, too dependent on instructors, not overly dependent on parents, good citizens, regard themselves as pretty average persons with strong desires to conform, had ambitions in terms of social acceptance, and used home-and-family groups as supplementary reference groups to the college community and college subgroups.

This collection of qualities is definitely that of the sociability subsystem. They seem to fit best between subgroups 4 and 5, or 5 and 6. They share nonconservatism and positive community identification with 5 and 6 according to the quotations from their records, and in spite of the "NOT" in Column 1.

Because Newcomb's purpose in writing his article was not to confirm or disconfirm the humanistic approach to reference groups, and because he did not frame his observations, data, or his discussion of them in humanistic terms, it is difficult to transpose with a high degree of accuracy. Most of the subgroups numbered under the humanistic numbering system (Row 5 in Table 9-1) might be replaced by either of the adjoining subgroups but not by groups further away. The humanistic qualities are not carefully enough delineated by the reference group data to make the boundaries between them sharp. There is a fair amount of overlap and interpenetration among subgroups. In spite of this fuzziness and in spite of the fact that Newcomb did not arrange the groups according to the political economic progresivism scale (other than 1-4 as "conservative" and 4-8 as "nonconservative") there is similarity in ranks between Newcomb's ordering and the humanistic ordering of the first 7 groups. (The missing subgroup 8 is a major exception. What is important is that using the humanistic theory as a working set of assumptions, we find that the data from many of the other rows falls into expected patterns.

Before getting into the other rows, however, let's take a closer look at Newcomb's subgroups. I'll refer to them by my numbering system, though. Groups 1-4 are those that Newcomb measured as most conservative on his scale of political and economic conservatism, and because of this reading, I've placed them in the stability group. Thus, their original placement there is itself of no significance. What is important is seeing whether (1) the other components (Rows 6-13) of these columns also fit the stability pattern and (2) whether the relationships from the stability type characteristics to the sociability and expertise type characteristics are the expected ones. In other words, (1) if we assume that Newcomb's conservative types are stability oriented, do we see their other characteristics (6-13) as part of the stability pattern, too? And (2) when we consider a row, such as relation to parents, Row 7, do the various readings across this row fall into the expected pattern from stability to self patterns?

Discussion: The Sociability Hypothesis

Another beginning point in placing the Newcomb material on the humanistic grid was placing the most nonconservative groups to the later humanistic stages. "But why," one might ask, "isn't there a large gap between the most conservative and the most nonconservative? After all, these were selected to represent the 2 most extreme sixths of the graduating classes. We would expect that the remaining 2/3 of the school would separate them, and the extremes would show up as extremes at the ends of the continuum." This is where my interpretation differs from Newcomb's. I say "differ" not "disagree" because I think that the humanistic interpretation adds plausibility to Newcomb's reference group interpretation but takes his interpretation a step further than he did.

I see the 3 most nonconservative groups 5, 6, and 7 as resulting from 2 sorts of subsystem influences. Group 7 seems to be a liberal subgroup because of its value system and dominant expertise and/or self subsystem. As the Peterson study shows, this group is liberal (1956, p. 76-79). Groups 5, 6, and possibly the missing 8, however, are sociability types. While their subsystem is more liberal than the subsystem of the stability types, they are not especially noted for liberalism. This is where the second sort of subsystem influence enters. I see these 2 (or 3) sociability subgroups as essentially neither conservative nor nonconservative. They are essentially ready to adopt group norms, whatever they might be. When brought into a group where the controllers of sanctions (faculty and other students) could reinforce students for learning the expertise subsystem, they would pick up this norm for themselves, and this, it seems to me, accounts for much of the swing to liberalism in the case of Bennington.

I by no means want to imply that it was the only force; if college teaches people to meet some of their goals, then we would expect them to move along the humanistic continuum toward a new subsystem. This also is a movement (for sociability types) into expertise liberalism. But I think the main mechanism (or possibly _a_ main mechanism) that operated to give the liberal-shift at Bennington was the social acceptability characteristic of the sociability subsystem. In the case of sociability students entering an expertise value system, both their desire for social acceptance and the humanistic dynamic of success leading to the emergence of new goals would work in the same direction along the humanistic continuum.

To me, groups 5 and 6, and possibly 8, are groups composed of "super-social" types, those who most wanted to get along socially in the community. As Newcomb says and as is evident continually in the article, "individual prestige was associated with nonconservatism" (p. 267). When these super social hounds caught a whiff of social recognition by adopting nonconservative values, they chased their goals of popularity and prestige by becoming super-nonconservatives.

One theory of leadership is that leaders are like their constituents "only more so." That is, they are a sort of visible modal man. I think this theory applies predominantly to sociability subsystem groups, hence to Bennington.

When we look at the quotations from girls in groups 5 and 6, we find such characteristic statements as (pp. 272-273):

> I bend in the direction of community expectation--
>
> ...I needed desperately to identify myself with an institution with which I could conform conscientiously. Bennington was perfect. I drank up everything the college had to offer, including social attitudes....
>
> It didn't take long to see that liberal attitudes had prestige value. ...I became liberal at first because of prestige value.
>
> ...my new opinions gave me the reputation here of being open-minded and capable of change. I think I could have got really radical but I found it wasn't the way to get prestige here.
>
> I was so anxious to be accepted that I accepted the political complexion of the community here.
>
> underlining Newcomb's

These statements and others from group 8 (page 274) indicate that social acceptance was a major part of this group's values. In fairness to the students, I should point out that some of them were aware that the social pressure they felt didn't justify accepting an unexamined set of values:

> I constantly have to check myself to be sure it's real self-conviction and not just social respect.

Thus, I hypothesize that the liberal-shift can be attributed to 2 interacting forces. The first is the main principle of movement along the continuum: Success in meeting the goals of one type of subsystem moves people toward the succeeding subsystem. This principle, theoretically, would apply all along the continuum to successful individuals. The second, supplementing this, is Newcomb's reference group theory. Those who positively identified with the college community would adopt the community's values. This would especially apply to the sociability types so that the more "social" a person is, the more he would move toward the community values of political and economic liberalism.

Main Reference Group - Row 6

As we look across Row 6 of Table 9-1 we see the familiar progression (this time of reference groups) from home-and-family to a larger peer orientation (here the whole college) and to reference groups that have to do with developing one's knowledge and professional skill, and finally to groups that are personal growth oriented. The information on reference groups was obtained from the students themselves, other students, and from their teachers.

Stability

The most conservative students are those who use the family-and-home as a reference group. If we assume that these are stability types, we can speculatively account for their home orientation by suggesting that they see the home as a place for establishing security, where they feel they belong and a place where they can count on fitting in. To put it another way, because they are not sure of themselves (secure) they try to establish their security before going on to the next humanistic stage, the sociability stage. Perhaps they either (1) see their home life as not having supplied the needed security and try to take care of this before taking care of sociability and/or (2) they find that being in college with a group they differ from is also a threat to their security, so they revert to the safe position of their homes. Here are more hypotheses generated by this theory.

Sociability

The sociability types (which in my opinion are the modal type in this study) show their characteristic behavior of trying to get along with as many people as they can. They refer to the whole college for their norms.

Expertise to Self

The only place Newcomb mentions a change in reference groups for the 8 subgroups he selects is with the 7th group. They show a transition from an expertise orientation toward a self orientation. He reports that at first they referred to faculty and advanced students in their fields as the group by which they judged themselves. Later they referred to extracollege groups such as "left-wing writers, etc." From this brief mention it is difficult to make even a tentative decision about their movement from expertise to, or toward, self, but if they are interested in writers or other artists (regardless of political affiliation), then this may be an instance of interest in expressing one's individuality and uniqueness rather than a predominantly political attitude. As shown in the Peterson study (1965), the values of self types are more liberal, too. While the Newcomb study was of political values and it appropriately reports the political affiliation of these extracollege reference groups, their self characteristics may be more relevant when considering this 7th group and their use of outsiders as reference groups. While liberalism would be congruent with the Bennington norms, the liberalism of these outsiders may be of secondary importance to the Bennington self types. That is, the use of the outside groups may be a result of a self orientation rather than a political orientation, Newcomb's interest.

Discussion: Reference, Self, and Society

Newcomb gives some additional evidence for thinking that the liberal political attitudes are due to using these outside groups rather than using the college as a reference group (p. 274).

> In a secondary sense, however, the total membership group served as a negative point of reference - i.e., they (subgroup 7) regarded their nonconservatism as a mark of personal superiority.

If the total membership group were a negative reference group and if the total membership espoused political and economic progressivism, then we would expect subgroup 7 to feel dissonance at holding the same political value (although stronger) as the total membership. However, if their relationships to the outside groups were more important to them than their relationships to the total membership group, they would be more likely to adopt the values of the outside groups than to reject the values of the membership group, the college. The liberalism of subgroup 7 may be due to their relatively strong, positive reference to the outside groups and relatively weak negative reference to the total membership. They could maintain their disdain of the majority and still show similar PEP attitudes.

This argument is consistent with the supposition that this group is a self group. The line of reasoning of the previous paragraph can be thought of in primarily cognitive dissonance concepts instead of primarily reference group theory (p. 168). (I don't mean to imply that these 2 interpretations are in conflict; on the contrary, I see them as essentially complementary.) The dissonance between subgroup 7's liberal views and subgroup 7's use of the whole liberal college as a negative reference group can be reduced when we remember that one way to reduce dissonance (by no means the only way) is to play down the importance of the conflicting value. "Sure, we disagree, but it isn't a very important disagreement." If most of the college community (sociability and some expertise types) placed great importance on political attitudes, this is no reason to assume that subgroup 7 (self types) also valued them highly. If we assume that subgroup 7 was primarily interested in self, not in political attitudes, then we can see that they might not be very concerned with the slight amount of dissonance at holding similar views to their negative reference group, the majority of the college membership. Their thoughts might be, "Sure we hold similar political and economic views, but political and economic views aren't very important." The Vernon-Allport Scale of Values indicates that this is so (See Chapter 10). Self types are further from the political-social part of the humanistic continuum than are the sociability and expertise types.

Remember that Peterson found that self types were most antagonistic to institutionalized authority and seem anti-organizational (pp. 63, 68). Economics and politics often have to do with shifting power among various economically and politically partisan organizations; for example, unions versus corporations fighting over control of economic resources, private corporations versus the government fighting over economic resources, political parties fighting over control of governmental organizations, etc. In much, perhaps most, political and economic activity the partisans are organizations. The attitudes of a group which is antagonistic to all organizational or institutional authority might be summed up, "A plague on all your houses!" To complete the "quotation" of the previous paragraph, "Sure we hold similar political and economic views, but political and economic views aren't very important because most of these views just advocate control by one organization or another."

Thus, the self types may feel that most political and economic views are very unimportant because most of them are just interorganizational bickering. When we look at the political and economic progressivism scale (pp. 178-179), we see that almost all of the items do have to do with interorganizational and/or intergroup partisanship, the government, industry, the working class, unions, etc. To people who think in terms of individual development and other self categories, group conflict and scale items written about group conflict may seem relatively unimportant. And to group 7, their holding similar views to those of their negative reference group may be unimportant. (This reconceptualization of political and social consciousness is discussed further in Chapter 12.)

Another point is worth considering. Subgroup 7's negative referral to the whole community is consistent with the hypothesis made earlier that peer orientation, reference group theory, and other conceptualizations of sociability may apply most appropriately to sociability types, less appropriately to furthest away survival and self types. The dissonance of having a positive reference group (the outsiders) and a negative reference group (the whole college community) share a value (liberalism) may be less for someone who does not think of himself primarily as a member of a group (i.e, a self type) than the dissonance would be for someone who is very group oriented (a sociability type). Provided their self is not interefered with, this type of person may be willing to let group differences ride. As the description of the self subsystem in Chapter 2 noted, enjoying diversity and dilemmas is characteristic of self types.

In their references to other groups, in their values, and in the interaction between these, the individuals in subgroup 7 look like self people or expertise people that made a transition from expertise into or toward self.

Summary

In the choice of main reference groups we see that the descriptions given by Newcomb fall within the expectations of the humanistic theory; the reference groups chosen by the 7 subgroups of PEP extremists are congruent with, or contribute to, their subsystems. The most conservative types chose the stability of home and family. The sociability types chose the whole college community, displaying their acceptance of membership group norms. The expertise-self types at first chose the faculty and advanced students as their reference group, then switched to extracollege groups. There is some reason to think of this as a transition into self.

Since 3 of the reference groups are parents, other students, and instructors, the relationships of the 7 subgroups to each of these 3 types of reference groups is the next order of investigation.

As Table 9-1 showed, Newcomb's classifications were of 3 characteristics: extreme conservatism/extreme nonconservatism, reference to the college community - negative/positive, and awareness/unawareness of conservatism/nonconservatism. Awareness/unawareness is not, as far as I can see, especially relevant to the humanistic theory as used here (Although it is important elsewhere in a different context and with different meaning). Therefore, I'll usually combine the two conservative negative subgroups, 1 and 2; the two conservative positive subgroups, 3 and 4; and the two nonconservative positive subgroups, 5 and 6. The one nonconservative negative subgroup 7 is already collapsed. (Subgroup 8 is omitted.)

Relations with Parents - Row 7

Assumptions

A man's house is his castle, not just legally, as Judge Coke said (1644), but psychologically, too. It is his seat of security, or insecurity. If he feels secure, then he can go on to other business, but if not, then he is likely to try to obtain security. A common way to try to obtain security is by having a secure home; this is especially so for children and adolescents. If one is unsure elsewhere, he can retreat to the safety of his home and family. On the other hand, if the home does not supply the needed safety, then an adolescent or young adult may be stuck, or "hung-up," on security. He may try to make his home and his life more psychologically stable.

There is a sort of vicious or beneficent circle operating between a person, his home, and the rest of his environment. If the home is the type that makes him secure, then he can go on to other efforts in the rest of his environment. On the other hand, if his home is not psychologically stable to him, then he will seek this stability, either by making his home the focus of his stability oriented behavior and/or by working for security elsewhere. He is stuck in the stability worldview, and his actions make sense in terms of it.

Hypothesis

Dependence on strong, reliable powers outside oneself and acting in accord with these powers is part of the stability subsystem. Economic and political conservatism also are congruent with and usually part of the subsystem. We would expect, therefore, that the strength of dependence (on parents for college students) and economic and political conservatism would have similar, if not identical ranks, or slopes. That is, we would expect people with high dependence to have correspondingly high conservatism.

Findings

When we compare Rows 6 and 7 in Table 9-1 this is just what we get. This is corroborated by Peterson's Family Independence and Liberalism Scales (1956, pp. 72, 79). (See Chapter 6.) The stability subgroups that have a negative orientation toward the college community (conservative subgroups 1 and 2) are those most dependent on their parents. As we move from these strongest stability types to the types nearer a sociability orientation, the dependence on parents is still strong, but decreases as the subgroups are described as "very close" and "dependent" but not so much as "overly or extremely dependent." Conflict begins to show up in these two subgroups as the individuals start feeling the double pull of parents and peers.

Discussion: Cusp Resolution

Students in the sociability subsystem are not seen as overly dependent on their parents, although they report some conflict with parents. Some have agreed to differ with their parents, and others use their conservative parents as a negative reference group of lesser importance than the positive membership groups. One difference between subgroups 3 and 4 (stability) and subgroups 5 and 6 (sociability) is that the former have resolved their conflicts in favor of their parents (stability) or are still predominantly influenced by them, while the latter have resolved their conflicts in favor of their college peer groups (a sociability type resolution) or are predominantly influenced by them. As we would expect, those students who are in a transitional stage between humanistic stages feel the conflicting influence of two subsystems.

None of the subgroup 7 (expertise-self) is seen as overly dependent on her parents. But there is an interesting oddity here that may be relevant to student activism on campuses. Newcomb notes that 3 of the 6 students in this group had severe independence battles with their parents. It seems more likely, according to our theory, that any "battles" in this subgroup would occur as an expertise person developed away from the peer and faculty orientation and toward self rather than away from parents. What is particularly curious about the fact that 3 had severe battles while an equal number did not is that Peterson reports a suggestively similar finding among his self types (nonconformists) (1965, p. 55):

> As a category, they (self - nonconformists) were also the most diverse in the perception of degree of parental control; in relatively large proportions they reported both control and lack of control (i.e., some reported control, some reported

permissiveness).

When Peterson asked about the degree of independence during high school, the self types were highest of the 4 groups in both extreme answers, "almost complete freedom" and "not very much or very little."

Discussion: Rebellion & Revolt or Regeneration & Renewal?

This raises an interesting speculation that people who score in the self category may be composed of 2 sorts - a group of rebels and a group of self types. The anti-organizational attitudes of the rebels may be part of their general rebelliousness. They are interested in escaping from what they feel are the confines of established authority, parents or others.

The self types, however, are more interested in developing themselves and resent particular intrusions of institutions which, they feel, disrupt this development. They want to use or expand current institutional roles or develop new institutions that offer self positions and activities. This may partially account for the split among activists between those who are primarily interested in tearing down established institutions and those who are primarily interested in building new ones or working within or renovating the established ones for their own self-growth. That is, the rebels are primarily interested in reacting against the current system, while the revolutionaires, self types, are mostly interested in building a new system, using the current one, or adding new roles and institutions to the current civilization.

Although many of the activities of the two groups are complementary, and they can form a coalition for these purposes, their different emphases on rebellion or renewal give different meanings to their actions.

In his discussion of personal and social change John Gardner (Self-Renewal, p. 32-41) suggests that creative innovation comes from a detachment that innovators have, while rebels, who are interested in attacking the status quo as a major goal, are in a sense limited to reacting against whatever is current, and as such are instruments of change but not of creation or innovation. Gardner's analysis of innovators also fits the image of a self person. He cites openness to oneself, other people, and their ideas; flexibility or playfulness with ideas which includes detachment; and capacity to find order out of experience. These characteristics and the way Gardner describes them picture the self type. The rebels, on the other hand, are primarily interested in destroying.

The distinction is important. Often, unfortuantely, writers, politicians, commentators, and others are unwilling or unable to see the differences between destroying the old and constructing the new.

Perhaps Gardner's observations can lead to more refined thinking and testing instruments which will separate the rebels and the revolutionaries. If the rebels are rebelling against domineering parents, once they feel they have achieved their freedom, they may end up back down the humanistic continuum, if, in fact they were ever far up it. The self types continue to use and reorganize society to provide more self roles and experiences for themselves and others.

This mixture of motivations may account for 2 major types of analysis of student activism, the Rebellion School and the It's-the-Beginning-of-a-New-Era School. The former comes through the Sigmund Freud and Erik Erikson lines of thought, for example, Erikson's Childhood and Society (1963). This tradition is continued in Lewis S. Feuer's The Conflict of Generations: The Character and Significance of Student Movements (1969). Feuer sees student rebellion resulting from such things as a recurring combination of a special ethical consciousness and a conflict of generations. The latter, the New-Era School of thought, sees these particular changes as part of larger holistic changes in society. This humanistic theory is one of the latter sort, and directs our attention to a needed reformulation of the

Rebellion and Revolt School into the concepts of the Regeneration and Renewal School. I start this reanalysis in Chapter 12. This beginning suggests another road for further conceptual development.

In summary, the relationship of students to parents in Row 7 of Table 9-1 does show the predicted variation from high dependence among stability types to low dependence among expertise and self types. And it may be that people who score as self types come from two groups, anti-institutional rebels and self types who arrive at their similar positions through the humanistic processes suggested earlier in this work.

Prestige From Other Students - Row 8

Prestige was measured by asking the student body to select 5 students "most worthy to represent the college" at an intercollegiate gathering. While Newcomb tried to get at community-oriented prestige, this is difficult to separate from popularity. In fact, in a sociability community, which I think Bennington was, a prestige value sought for is popularity.

Newcomb says, "...individual prestige was associated with nonconservatism." While this is true for most subgroups he discusses, it is not true for the self types (subgroup 7). Row 8 indicates that the stability types are least prestigeful. As they approach the sociability subsystem, groups become more prestigeful with the sociability types being very high in prestige, often being chosen as leaders. The self group ranged from above average to very low in prestige and in spite of their extreme nonconservatism.

Rather than attribute popularity (and/or prestige) to the holding of nonconservative views, I think a clearer picture emerges if we attribute both popularity and PEP views to a sociability subsystem. This way we can account for the anomaly of subgroup 7. At Bennington the norms were nonconservative, and the sociability types, which were most susceptible to norms, adopted them. The stability types (especially subgroups 1 and 2) with their orientation toward home, were more conservative and less popular. These two groups fit both Newcomb's statement that prestige was a function of nonconservatism and the humanistic interpretation that both prestige and conservatism/nonconservatism were functions of subsystems.

Subgroup 7, however, does not fit the Newcomb mold. Here we see nonconservatives who were above average, average, and very low in prestige-popularity. We can see their nonconservatism as another instance of the liberalism associated with the self point of view. But the Newcomb generalization that prestige was associated with nonconservatism would make us expect to see these people as prestigeful and/or popular.

The humanistic interpretation, however, attributes a desire for popularity to sociability (subgroups 5 and 6) but not to a self subsystem (subgroup 7). The people in subgroups 5 and 6 may have worked for popularity, and one thing they did, among others, was to adopt the conspicuous group norms of nonconservatism. The self types, however, were nonconservative but not especially interested in popularity. In terms of reference groups, we saw that while both sociability and self types were nonconservative, their respective subsystems inclined the sociability group toward the college community membership as a reference group and inclined the expertise-self group toward faculty and advanced students at first then toward outside groups as reference groups.

While the humanistic interpretation provides a more complete explanation of the information on prestige, I think of it as a refinement of Newcomb's reference group interpretation. The humanistic interpretation makes us aware of the values around which some groups form, and with this knowledge we can be more sophisticated in using Newcomb's ideas, in interpreting his observations, and in embedding these in a more comprehensive theory.

Instructors' Evaluations - Row 9

The third reference group that Newcomb found relevant to the Bennington students was the faculty. They were especially noted as a reference group among the expertise-self subgroup

7. The judgments about the students' relations to their parents were made from the comments of the students themselves, from other students, from instructors, and from the school doctor (a psychiatrist). Prestige was rated by other students, hence reflects their sociability values and biases. The instructors' evaluations, likewise, reflect their values and biases. These seem to be predominantly expertise values (Gouldner, 1957-58; also see Chapter 7). Their comments should be reinterpreted as observations made from the expertise sybsystem. Naturally, we would expect that those students who showed the characteristics of the expertise subsystem would be most favorably rated by the instructors, and those who least showed those characteristics would be negatively evaluated. We would expect favorability to be measured by closeness along the humanistic continuum.

In this humanistic theory, the group furthest away from the hypothesized expertise values (other than the survival types) are the stability types. The subgroups furthest away, 1 and 2, are considered stubborn and resistant by the faculty, while the 2 stability subgroups nearer the sociability subsystem are pictured as cooperative, uncritical of authority, conscientious and eager, but overdocile. As expected, the stability type students at some distance from the expertise instructors do not fare well in their instructors' eyes.

The instructors interpret the behavior of the sociability types, the subsystem next to them (subgroups 5 and 6), as enthusiastic, anxious to please, ambitious, and as independent in intellectual activity although meticulous and overconscientious. These latter qualities are particularly attributed to subgroup 6, which is near the border of the expertise category and may overlap into it. I suspect that the instructors would also like to see themselves as independent in intellectual activities and as meticulous, or at least thorough.

The next subgroup is also near the expertise orientation of the faculty but may be beyond them on the humanistic continuum. The instructors see subgroup 7 (expertise-self) as highly independent, critical minded, and intellectually outstanding. It seems reasonable to suppose that the instructors would like to attribute these characteristics to themselves, too. In their early years subgroup 7 used the faculty as a positive reference group and probably tried to be like them. But later they used outside groups. Perhaps this is one reason the professors thought they were intellectually independent. Peterson noted the self types were peer- and faculty-independent, too. In his original study, Newcomb says that by their second or third year every one of these students "had formulated her own goals which were more important to her than praise from instructors" (Personality and Social Change, p. 132). Self-direction is one quality of a self person. When looking for a reference group for subgroup 7, Newcomb noted that they used the student body as a negative reference group and developed reference groups outside the college. If we are going to assign a reference group to all people, then Newcomb's observation may be accurate, but considering the strong self-orientation of this type, relationships to others may have been much less important than each one's relationship to herself.

In brief, when we look at the comments of instructors, a humanistic framework reminds us that their evaluations come from an expertise subsystem. This helps us understand the values they hold and the values they like and dislike in their students. They approve of the characteristics of students whose subsystems are most like their own and disapprove of the characteristics of students whose subsystems are most unlike their own.

Ambitions on Coming to College - Rows 10 and 11

Row 10 of Table 9-1 at first seems to present a problem for humanistic interpretation. The sequence of ambitions as we read across the row is what would be expected, but when we read down the columns the goals match the humanistic types in some cases but don't match in others. Part or all of the mismatch may be due to the fact that the 7 subgroups were groups of seniors, while the ambitions were those they tried to remember when they entered college 4 years earlier.

Stability

As we read across Row 10, we see a progression from sociability to a mixture of sociability-expertise to expertise. The stability groups, 1-4, saw their ambitions in terms of sociability, becoming one of the group, of fitting in with the Bennington campus. Success with this is correlated with a positive use of the college as a reference group, and lack of success is correlated with a negative view of the college community as a reference group. We can't tell from the description of the students and college whether one caused the other or whether the pattern developed through the simultaneous and mutual development of success and positive identification (or lack of success and negative identification).

Discussion: Stability - True Believers and Ideology

When we look at subgroups 1 & 2 and 3 & 4, an interesting parallel develops between them and some of the groups Eric Hoffer describes in The True Believer (pp. 29-56). In this book, which discusses the stability types and their actions in large scale movements, Hoffer notes that it is often the unsuccessful or marginally successful that develop a stability subsystem (as we would call it in humanistic terms) or become "true believers," in Hoffer's apt name. Hoffer says that if they show any success, they use the current society as a positive reference group, "The slightest evidence of progress and success reconciles them with the world and their selves" (p. 49). This is an example of success within a stability subsystem leading to the beginning of a sociability subsystem.

In subgroups 3 and 4 we see a tendency in this direction. They are conservative, but their success with their goals of social acceptance gives them a positive attitude toward the college community.

On the other hand, if these stability types are unsuccessful, they are likely to maintain or intensify their "true believer," or stability, subsystem. Having been unsuccessful at trying something new, they revert to their old behavior, which has been successful and hopefully will be in the future, too. In subgroups 1 and 2 we see a tendency in this direction. Their lack of success and low prestige reinforces their pattern of stability, and they become overly dependent on their families for stability. Eric Hoffer's true believers become overly dependent on their ideologies and mass movements as part of their stability pattern even if it means a social upheaval in order to remake society to fit their stability mold.

Sociability and Expertise

When we consider the fact that the stability types expressed their ambitions in terms of sociability goals, we run into the problem of humanistic interpretation. The sociability goals of the stability group, making friends, fitting into the college community, sound more like those of the sociability group, rather than a stability group. Likewise, the goals of the sociability group, leadership, sound like either the popularity desired by the sociability group or the social status desired by those with an expertise orientation. Newcomb doesn't indicate the ambitions of subgroup 6 in the article, but he does describe the ambitions of a nonconservative, cooperative, aware group (the same characteristics as subgroup 6) in his earlier work (See next chapter). "All of them, in one way or another, state these first ambitions in terms of achieving status and prestige (Personality and Social Change, 1943, p. 136). Here again, the group selected on humanistic criteria for sociability has ambitions appropriate to the group further along than they are on the humanistic continuum.

Interpretation Relative to Subsystems

When we come to interpret Newcomb's views of subgroup 7, the expertise-self type, we may be running into a relativity problem. I mean that his interpretation may have come from his assumed location in the expertise subsystem, or the fact that his theories and concepts were expertise-subsystem-laden. He notes that these girls saw their ambitions "in intellectual rather than in social terms" (p. 273). When we look back over all his statements of ambitions, they all are stated in the social/intellectual dichotomy. It may be that as an expertise person he was highly aware of these 2 types of ambitions. A person looking at the world through the glasses of an expertise orientation could easily misinterpret the intellectual independence of a self person as a desire for status and prestige. The ideas of self would be unlikely to occur to him. Considering the fact that the nation was relatively unaffluent in the late 1930's and early 1940's compared with its current affluence, and considering the fact that we just now in the late 1960's and early 1970's seem to be developing a sizable self population, it is unlikely that the social sciences of the earlier period would have had extensive enough contact with self types to have evolved ways of thinking about and conceptualizing ideas about self. Thus, not only might Newcomb and his colleagues have missed this interpretation, but the larger society including the girls themselves may have been limited by this lack of new concepts.

Expertise-Self

When we forget what is interpreted about the behavior and look instead at the description of their actual behavior, subgroup 7 exhibits the intensive concentration of doing something for its own sake that is characteristic of the self subsystem, and their intellectual orientation suggests expertise (Personality and Social Change, p. 132):

> Everyone, by the time she had reached her second or third year in college, had formulated her own goals which were more important to her than praise from instructors. Every one is occasionally described as the best in her class, and four of them are consistently so described. Two of the six were considered so competent that they were graduated after three years. Not one of them is considered too respectful of authority, and all are praised for their habits of critical-mindedness.

Newcomb's expertise interpretation of the ambitions stated by subgroup 7 may have led him to portray the members of this subgroup in the status and prestige vocabulary of his expertise subsystem. Their obvious academic success makes them "good guys," and the best "good guys" to college faculty are successful intellectuals. Hence subgroup 7's goals are seen as intellectual. An alternative explanation is that these girls felt intellectual activity as a good way to self-development and used the college and their educations as a way to develop themselves. Under this interpretation of the "intellectual" ambitions of subgroup 7, we add self ambition to the social/intellectual (expertise) interpretation.

Row 10, then, shows us the desires of the stability types to achieve the status characteristics of the sociability types (which they see and interpret as making friends and fitting in); it shows us the desire of the sociability types to achieve the characteristics of the expertise subsystem (which they see as being chosen as a leader and interpret as popularity); and it shows us the desires of the expertise type to achieve the characteristics of the self subsystem (which they see as independent, intellectual activity); it shows us the self types doing their own activities, but as being misunderstood by people in the other stages and possibly misconceiving of it themselves because the social sciences and our society were not prepared to think about self when this study was done.

Interstudy Synthesis - Rows 12 and 13

Finally, Row 12 of Table 9-1 shows the placement of the Clark & Trow typology of college subcultures ("The Organizational Context," 1966) and Peterson's investigations of these types among college freshmen. (See Chapters 4, 5, and 6.) Row 13 shows Merton's split between locals and cosmopolitans ("Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," 1957). This was the same one Gouldner used to discuss college faculty and administrators ("Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," 1957-1958). Chapter 7 reanalyzes these 2 studies. The purpose of these 2 rows is to show how their studies and Newcomb's can both be understood by using this humanistic theory as a more general one which synthesizes many, but not all, of the major findings and the details of their specific investigations.

Discussion: Some Speculations, Hypotheses, and Suggestions

Aspirations

In general, the people in each humanistic category aspire to have some of the characteristics of the people in the category beyond them, but their interpretations of their aspirations are in terms congruent with or tinted by their subsystem. Their actions may also be influenced by these overlapping subsystems. For example, part of the stability pattern is to try to obtain a secure place for oneself. In occupations this shows up as a desire for job security such as employment in a large bureaucracy. Among the conservatives who were nearest the sociability orientation (subgroups 3 and 4) we see the emergence of a desire to "fit in" the social structure of the college, finding a social niche like an occupational niche. The stability types may be interpreting sociability as if it were motivated predominantly by security, as a desire to "fit in" socially.

Typical Action Through the Continuum

When it comes to acting in order to achieve the characteristics of the sociability types, the stability students may use the methods they have been successful with in other human relations; this consists of relations they have had when they were more strongly in the stability subsystem where relations are likely to be those of hierarchy, authority, and power. As the stability types make the transition toward sociability, they carry with them the types of relations they learned earlier. When their families, jobs, churches, and other institutions and organizations were hierarchial and authoritarian, they retain some of this method of interacting. This may account for the instructors' evaluations of these students as cooperative, uncritical of authority, and overdocile.

But their history of not challenging authority helps them fit into a sociability pattern, too. When they no longer look toward their old authority but look toward the social norms for criteria to judge themselves and others by, it is merely a matter of accepting socially determined standards instead of authoritarian standards, or as deTocqueville so aptly called it "tyranny of the masses" instead of tyranny of a powerful elite. And, as suggested in the idea of the progression of stages in humanistic growth, the sociability stage can be thought of as developing out of the stability stage. One of the types of security is to have a secure set of relationships with others. It may be that as job security or the necessities of life are increasingly taken care of, a desire for interpersonal security develops, and this, too, leads one toward sociability.

Applied Questions

The study of the ways humanistic stages blend into each other is open for much research - conceptual, descriptive, empirical, testing, experimental. These transition points are especially interesting to people who wish to contribute to or study human growth. Making these transitions may be the most important or critical points in individual and social change.

A stampede of topics to investigate and questions to ask rises when someone adopts this humanistic theory of social and individual growth. How can societies meet the goals of the various stages so that the next ones will and can emerge? In some transitions, such as the compliance to authority becoming adopting social norms (above), can we use behavior that has already developed as a basis for reshaping behavior appropriate in the next stage? Can we build a society with the right number, types and mixture of roles and institutions so that the people and the society can make the transitions from one stage to the next? Can we sharpen our conceptualizations, observations, and testing instruments to distinguish between such similar behaviors as the compliance that comes from acquiescing in stability and acceptance of group norms in sociability? Psychological dependency, for example, may be better understood if it is divided into a survival and stability dependence on the mother and home early in one's life, social peer dependency as an adolescent, and dependency on one's occupational position as an adult.

SUMMARY

Newcomb's Reference Group Reinterpretation of the Bennington Study Through Humanistic Glasses

After reference group theory developed, Newcomb revised his original study of Bennington College by using this more advanced conceptual tool. The main finding that the shift of opinion in the Bennington students from relative conservatism to relative nonconservatism was due to group influences was still upheld, but it could then be thought of in more sophisticated ways. I have tried to show that these earlier interpretations can be further refined and added to when they are seen through humanistic glasses.

I hypothesize that the main change in opinion was due to the fact that most of the girls at Bennington had a sociability subsystem and readily adopted the group norms. The norm of political-economic progressivism came from a liberal faculty (Newcomb, Personality and Social Change, 1943, p. 8) that consciously determined "to acquaint its somewhat oversheltered students with the nature of their contemporary social world" (1958, p. 265). The faculty was aided in this by some students who also shared their expertise views, by the newness and isolation of the college, and especially by the susceptibility to norms by the sociability majority of the students.

Newcomb's reference group study on Bennington, which I described in some detail here, presented data on 8 subgroups in the college by combinations of 3 pairs of criteria: (1) extreme conservative/extreme nonconservative, (2) positive/negative use of the college as a reference group, (3) awareness/unawareness of extremeness in views. This gave 8 subgroups, although I omitted one here. Using the humanistic theory, I tried to show that Newcomb's observations showed the humanistically expected relations to each other two ways: (1) by finding that the individuals, when grouped by humanistic types (columns in Table 9-1) show the characteristics the theory would expect to see grouped together, (2) by showing that when we explored various topics (the rows, e.g., reference groups) the relations and sequences among the types are in the expected patterns.

The first question provided some further confirmation of general proposition 1: The types exist. The second investigated the researchable question: How does component X vary from subsystem to subsystem? The rows of Table 9-1 gave us information on political extremes, reference to college, main reference group, relation to parents, prestige from other students, instructors' evaluations, and student ambitions and degree of success with them.

This chapter also demonstrated the value of this theory as a conceptual basis for additional questions, discussions and analyses, and future research and applications.

The findings in this chapter, however, were for very small samples and were about extremes in political economic progressivism. The main body of the campus was far from represented in this chapter, and one of my main hypotheses is that the liberal shift was due to a predominance of sociability at Bennington. Newcomb's original work covered almost all the student body, and that is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 10

THE HUMANISTIC THEORY AS A CONCEPTUAL TECHNIQUE

Theodore Newcomb's

Personality and Social Change

Introduction

One of the major values of a new conceptual framework is that it gives us a new way to reinterpret old observations and provides us with a view of our previous activities from a different angle. In Chapters 4 through 9 I've demonstrated some ways this humanistic theory does this. Reinterpretation of existing studies is a standard procedure when new conceptual techniques are developed. Just as Theodore Newcomb's "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups" (1958) reinterpreted his earlier Personality and Social Change (1943) by using the more advanced reference group ideas, so my reinterpretation of his chapter uses this humanistic theory to think about his findings.

In the last chapter I hypothesized a humanistic interpretation of his findings: Did the main body of the college community adopt the nonconservative expertise views of the faculty and some older students because the new arrivals had a sociability orientation and were, therefore, especially likely to adopt group norms? Part 1, immediately below, investigates this "sociability hypothesis" and adds to the information from the last chapter. Although this question is interesting because it incidentally sheds some light on reference groups, memberships, and on the workings of the sociability subsystem, the primary purpose of this investigation is to illustrate the usefulness of the humanistic theory in allowing us to reconceptualize findings and in showing us ways to check our hypotheses. As a broad-scale theoretical technique, the humanistic theory helps us critique narrower-gauge concepts. Part 1 closes with a discussion of Newcomb's conceptual methodology. Here too, while the content of that particular discussion has some interest, what is most germane to this overall dissertation is that the humanistic conceptual system gives us ways to stand back from other conceptual tools and ways to critique them. We gain perspective on our previous findings and on our methods of achieving them.

In Part 2 I also show how this theory is a useful technique in reinterpreting some of Newcomb's observations in Personality and Social Change. Here again, evidence for the scope of the humanistic theory and its potential usefulness is more important than the individual findings and discussions of the relative diversity among the nonconservatives, the distribution of majors, results on the "guess-who" rating, or the Allport-Vernon scales of values. Some of the reanalyses in Part 2 shed light on the "sociability hypothesis," and I'll note them in passing.

Because Personality and Social Change was a parent of Newcomb's later chapter on reference groups, "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups," and to my reanalysis of it in the last chapter, I'll omit many of the details that would be redundant here.

PART 1

THE SOCIABILITY HYPOTHESIS

In Chapter 9 I hypothesized that the shift in political views from conservative to nonconservative was due to the fact that most of the Bennington student body was in the sociability subsystem. To them, political and economic conservatism was predominantly a social norm rather than a political ideology or intellectual belief. If this supposition is correct, we would expect most of the student body to show the characteristics of the sociability subsystem.

Sociability Students

In this part I show that the general student body resembled another sociability group and showed sociability traits in its patterns of friendship, prestige, and community activity.

Resemblance to another sociability group - In the last chapter I discussed 7 of Newcomb's 8 groups of extreme political conservatives and nonconservatives. In addition to these groups he had another in the original study which was more representative of the general student body "...a role characteristic of many, but not all, of these intermediate in attitude who were intensively studied" (*Personality and Social Change*, pp. 151-155).

This group was "non-extreme in almost every...respect." Here is the composite image, or ideal type, that Newcomb drew:

> I'm an enthusiastic community member, to whom positions of responsibility are an important mark of recognition. I'm eager to conform to and influence others to conform to community standards. *I'm loyal to everything for which the community stands, including the prevailing liberal attitude.*
>
> Newcomb's italics

In the 3-part classification scheme this group is positive (uses the college as a positive reference group), nonconservative (but not extremely so), and unaware of its central place in the PEP scale. This is almost the classification of subgroup 5, and subgroup 5 is the group most strongly in the column for sociability subsystem, Table 9-1. The difference between Newcomb's new group and subgroup 5 is *extremely* nonconservative. In Chapter 9 I suggested that the people in subgroup 5 were extreme because they were like the rest of the college, only more so. They were, in effect, super-sociability students, and the new group were sociability types. Both groups show the enthusiasm, loyalty, and conformity to the group that is characteristic of a sociability subsystem. It is hard to tell clearly from these sketches, but the desire for leadership in subgroup 5 and the feeling of recognition from positions of responsibility in the new group sound like a desire for social, popular recognition in both cases, too, a sociability interpretation of leadership.

Friendship and Prestige

A second bit of evidence that the majority of Bennington can be placed in a sociability subsystem is the fact that they combined friendship with choice as a community representative (pp. 55-61, 149). Just as this group interpreted leadership from a sociability subsystem, they chose representatives to a supposed meeting of college students on this basis. That is, desirability as a friend and worthiness to be a representative are closely correlated. Here again, we are reminded of Merton's "locals," sociability types who hold elective offices (See Chapter 7). According to the humanistic theory we would expect sociability people to choose on the basis of friendship, stability types to choose on the bases of power, authority, and legitimacy, and expertise types to choose on the basis of specialized skill or knowledge.

Newcomb also noted that friendship and popularity-prestige patterns correlated with the political and economic progressivism scale. By considering them all as part of the more comprehensive sociability subsystem, this correlation is just what we would expect.

Discussion: An Anomaly Explained

One way of evaluating a theory is to see whether it is useful as a source of potential explanations. So far in this first part of Chapter 10 I've presented evidence to believe that the sociability hypothesis is confirmed; i.e., that Bennington College of the 1930's was composed in large measure of sociability women. If we switch from testing that hypothesis to using it as an assumption, we find it helps us explain an anomaly in Newcomb's observations. And this, as Thomas Kuhn points out, is one mark of a paradigm (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1968).

When investigating the students' characteristics and frequencies of being chosen as community representatives Newcomb found a consistent trend (pp. 56-59). The trend was that choice as representative was a function of nonconservative attitudes. These attitudes showed up as early as the second month of a girl's freshman year. Considering the whole college, the more nonconservative a girl was as a freshman, the more likely she would be to be chosen as a representative later on in her college career, when she was still more nonconservative.

To be consistent with this college-wide trend, we would expect that those most often chosen as seniors would have been most nonconservative as freshmen. This, however, is an exception to the general rule. Girls who were most often chosen as representatives when they were seniors were regularly high in conservatism as freshmen. Why would some of those who were highly conservative as freshmen turn out to be chosen as nonconservative representatives in later years, and this against the general trend? Moreover, these are the girls who were exceedingly frequently chosen (40 to 90 times), while the general trend held for those chosen 0 to 39 times.

Newcomb explains this anomaly by saying that these girls were already prestige-endowed individuals when they came to Bennington and that their backgrounds were conservative. As past leaders in their conservative preparatory schools "they took their leadership hard" and showed "institutional loyalty" to their past schools. I think Newcomb's observations are correct, but that we can picture them more clearly in terms of the humanistic theory. These students were some of the super-sociability types. When they were in secondary school, they adopted the conservative standards of the constituencies and held them strongly. When they were new in college they held these views as newly arrived freshmen, but their responsiveness to the new Bennington norms (sociability) soon took over, and they later strongly adopted the norms of their new reference groups. Newcomb interprets this to mean that frequency of being chosen was a function of both nonconservative attitudes for the general trend and amount of change from conservative to nonconservative for these exceptions.

While I think this is an accurate description, I think seeing this in terms of a sociability subsystem on the part of these students accounts for both the general trend and for the extreme changes of these super-sociability students. If we ascribe their change in attitudes to a sociability subsystem, we can also surmise that these students are those who will desire popularity and act so as to obtain positions of popular leadership. They would desire to know and get along with as many friends as possible. They are the sociability "politicians" of their college and not only would adopt the community values but would also do what is necessary to be well-known and chosen as worthy representatives. Because of these sociability traits too they would be disposed to being chosen as representatives.

To someone thinking within nonhumanistic political terms this group's switch from high freshman conservatism to high senior nonconservatism looks like a complete political inconsistency. But from this humanistic theory we can see that these individuals are consistent sociability types. Parsimoniously using only the one principle of sociability, we can account for the college-wide shift toward nonconservatism, for the general finding that prestige was associated with the community norm of nonconservatism, and for what was previously seen as an anomaly: the extreme shift of the most prestigious students from freshman conservatism to senior nonconservatism.

Community Activity

Another characteristic of sociability types is that they are strongly involved with group or community activities. When we combine this with their disposition toward acceptance of community norms, Newcomb's summary statement linking participation with acceptance of nonconservative norms describes these sociability students, "Reputation for active community participation is also closely related to less conservative attitudes, while reputation for critical or negativistic attitudes toward the community is commonly associated with greater conservatism" (p. 149). That is, sociability people adopt group norms and are active community participants.

Faculty

A second part of the sociability hypothesis is that the faculty played a significant part in the liberalization of the students. This is in essential agreement with Newcomb's interpretation (pp. 172-175, 51). The faculty were influential, prestigeful, and seen by their students as liberal. They, in effect, set the tone of the college norm system. A humanistic contribution here is to point out that this interpretation is in keeping with the humanistic interpretation of Gouldner's study, which showed the faculty as predominantly expertise types ("Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," 1957-58). The student swing toward nonconservatism may have been strengthened in keeping with the supposed liberalizing influence of some of the expertise and self oriented people at Bennington and is consistent with the expected movement along the humanistic continuum, which I assume is also a goal of education.

We can see that Newcomb's original study of Bennington gives us some additional evidence that most of the students there were largely of a sociability orientation. The nonextreme subgroup, when added to the 7 original extreme subgroups, shows strong characteristics of a sociability orientation. In characteristic sociability fashion friendship, prestige, leadership, reputation, and popularity were confounded into various measures of sociability. The students chosen most often as community representatives may well have been super-sociability types.

Observations on Conceptual Methodology

One of the problems of reinterpreting the data and discussion, however, is that Newcomb's collection of data, observations, and discussion were sociability subsystem-laden. He studied phenomena (i.e., social norms) that are especially characteristic of sociability types.

The theories of membership, peer influences, and reference groups have to do with relationships especially strong in a sociability subsystem. The concepts of friendship, prestige, leadership, popularity, social attitudes, norms, etc. primarily have to do with and are defined in sociability subsystem language. In the Peterson study (On a Typology of College Students, 1965) we saw that certain items on his questionnaires were especially good at picking out various types; questions about individuality, for example, helped select and describe self types. (See Chapters 4, 5, and 6.) Likewise, certain theories are especially appropriate for studying certain characteristics of groups. Newcomb's selection of reference group and membership group theories may have been especially appropriate for the study of Bennington because many of the students there might have been social types. Humanistically speaking, his sociability concepts fit his population.

On the other hand, the reason the students and interpersonal dynamics of Bennington appear to be especially relevant to the sociability subsystem may be that the reference group and membership group theories are sociability subsystem-laden. Observations using sociability concepts and theories would naturally give rise to sociability subsystem data and interpretations. Here, then, is a problem of subsystem relativity that this humanistic theory asks: Were Newcomb's sociability subsystem concepts, methods, and observations particularly appropriate because the Bennington students actually were sociability types, or do the Bennington students just appear to be sociability types because the measures and observations of them were sociability subsystem measures?

This humanistic theory asks such questions and points out that a thorough study would consider investigations from all subsystems. Less complete investigations would at least point out that they are partial and "loaded" toward one or another subsystem, depending on which subsystem their concepts and measures are especially relevant to. In studying a population made up predominantly of stability types, the ideas of power, authority, and legitimacy might be especially relevant, and in studying expertise populations, various status and hierarchical measures might be most relevant. This remains to be seen; however, a new door for the development of humanistic methodology is open.

Conceptual Artifact

When the type of statistics used in a study influences the results of the study, we sometimes refer to this as a "statistical artifact." Likewise, when the methodology employed influences the results, we speak of a "methodological artifact." I think our understanding of research would improve if we established a phrase to mean "influence of results due to conceptual model used - conceptual artifact." It is by no means a new idea that the categories of thought one uses influence his thoughts, but I would like to see the idea legitimized by giving it recognition with a quasi-professional jargonistic name: conceptual artifact.

One value of a new theory is that it gives us new ways of examining our old concepts and methodology. A benefit of this humanistic theory is that it alerts us to the possibility that our theories will often determine the sorts of results we find. Just as an artist's materials and a builder's tools partially determine their techniques and products, so our concepts are the tools of the social sciences and partially determine what techniques and results we find. The humanistic theory is by no means alone in pointing this out, but it provides one new perspective for reviewing other conceptual methods, and it helps us anticipate how our results might be biased.

A strength of a sociability theoretical orientation toward the Bennington study was one of Newcomb's strong points because this type of concept seems to fit most of his population. However, it is a weak point, too, because concepts of the sociability subsystem do not fit all the Bennington students. The sociability types and the social interactions are well studied, but the other humanistic types of people and other humanistic types of interactions may be most accurately studied with the concepts humanistically appropriate to them. Looking through the glasses of the sociability subsystem, the Newcomb study gives us a good picture of the social spectrum, but other pairs of glasses let us see other things. The next part of this chapter on Personality and Social Change (1943) discusses some of Newcomb's findings through the glasses of this humanistic theory.

PART 2

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE - SOME HUMANISTIC VIEWS

The first part of this chapter was about observations that had to do with my sociability reinterpretation of Newcomb's main findings on membership and reference groups. This part applies the humanistic theory to some other observations Newcomb reports in Personality and Social Change. The 4 sets of observations are: (1) apparent cohesiveness among conservatives and apparent noncohesiveness among nonconservatives, (2) variations in political-economic conservatism by major field, (3) distribution of students on a 28-item guess-who rating, (4) findings on the Allport-Vernon scale of values. Other findings can be reinterpreted using this humanistic theory, too, but these 4 seem most illuminated by the theory and testing its usefulness. This part will also occasionally spin-off observations on the humanistic reinterpretation of the main findings, the "sociability hypothesis" of Chapter 9 and of the first part of this chapter.

1. Cohesiveness, A Shared Subsystem

In humanistic theory the main principle of association into groups is association by shared subsystem. In this writing I have used that principle, and it has received some confirmation and been used as an explanation of various results that the different investigators have observed (For example, Newcomb and Flacks, Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus, 1963-66?). In Personality and Social Change Newcomb says that there is little evidence for cohesiveness among the low scoring groups in political economic progressivism (the nonconservatives), but that there was considerable evidence for cohesiveness among the high scoring (the conservatives) (pp. 64, 149). This seems to be a contradiction to the general humanistic explanation; however, a glance at Table 9-1 provides an explanation. The stability types (the conservatives) are the group that show cohesiveness. They are just one group in the humanistic model, the stability types. The nonconservatives, however, consist of 3 humanistic types, sociability, expertise, and self. We would, therefore, expect some fractionalization and apparent noncohesiveness among the nonconservatives. A more complete study of the nonconservatives would divide them into humanistic types and see whether the expecte cohesiveness would emerge.

2. Academic Majors and Political Economic Progressivism

The general findings of political and economic attitudes in relation to academic major is that majors are of minor importance compared with the effect of community-wide influences (p. 148). This gives some additional evidence for supposing that the majority of students at Bennington were sociability types; responsiveness to the community as a whole is a mark of the sociability subsystem as opposed to thinking of oneself primarily in terms of academic department as expertise types would do. More important than this, however, is that the predicted variations by majors from the Bennington mean are in the expected directions. In the discussion of expected academic majors in the Peterson report, we saw that students with a stability subsystem tended to select those studies which were most structured and had specific, determined answers as opposed to opinion or subjective answers. (See Chapter 4, Part 2, Section 5.) For example, they chose mathematics and the sciences as opposed to the humanities and the arts (1965, pp. 14-20, 28-31). The expertise (academics) and self (nonconformists) students were more willing to work in intellectual areas that didn't have clear-cut answers. In the Bennington study, too, we find that the literature and social studies majors show less conservative scores than science and music majors. The drama-dance students (perhaps self types) are also significantly less conservative than the science students.

These differences show up in selection of majors by freshmen (p. 201-202), and are slightly stronger after 3 or 4 years in college (pp. 38-41). These findings on relative conservatism/nonconservatism are corroborated by Peterson's findings mentioned just above and by his findings about best liked subjects in high school. He found, for example, that the sociability students liked social studies best when in high school (p. 58, 67).

In the Bennington study we find another possible group of sociability types (the sociability types among the nonconservatives) also choosing social studies as a major. We can attribute the fact that they are social studies majors and the fact that they are particularly susceptible to the college norms to the hypothesis that they are sociability types. Both characteristics fit the sociability pattern.

But are these sociability types a large portion of the Bennington student body? The "sociability hypothesis" leads us to expect so. We saw some evidence that the nonextreme PEP students were sociability oriented, but we don't get a reading for the whole college in the study. A bit of further evidence does come from the distribution of majors, however. Table 10-1 presents this information and also scores on the political economic progressivism scale. There are 2 sorts of information to note in the table. First, the distribution of majors suggests a sociability orientation in the entire student body (assuming that social studies majors are an indicator of sociability, a la Peterson). Second, the scores on conservatism/nonconservatism show the expected variation by major field.

Row 1 gives the major subsystems of the humanistic theory, with the survival type missing because it is not appropriate for the Bennington study. Row 2 is my interpretation of where Newcomb's conservative/nonconservative split fits on the humanistic continuum: the conservatives are stability types, while the nonconservatives span sociability, expertise, and self.

Table 10-1

Major Field and Conservatism/Nonconservatism

for 3 Groups of Students

1 Humanistic Subsystem	Stability		Sociability	Expertise		Self
2 Political	Conservative		--------Nonconservative------			
3 Major	Science	Music	Social Studies	Literature	Drama Dance	Art
4a Freshman 1935-1938	77.9	79.1	71.9	73.3	75.7	74.0
4b Number	26	26	75	42	47	54
5a Juniors, Seniors	72.3	67.0	61.5	62.7	64.0	65.2
5b Number	37	38	100	54	48	75
Same Individuals:						
6a Freshmen	79.0	73.5	74.4	66.6	71.0	75.9
6b Jr.-Sr.	74.0	70.8	63.5	58.4	60.4	64.3
6c change	5.0	2.7	10.9	8.2	10.6	11.6
6d number	9	13	27	10	11	14

Row 3 locates the Bennington academic majors along the humanistic continuum. Science, with a body of facts and less subjective intellectual work, falls within stability. Music has a great deal of emphasis on following the instructions (scores) of others. I am least happy about the placement of music because it could be just as much personal expression as the other arts, and today it certainly can be a means of personal, unique expression, but it seems that to the Bennington majors it was predominantly performing by others' directions. As noted earlier Peterson found that sociability types (collegiates) preferred social studies when they were in high school. I have transferred this finding over to college; however, Peterson does not report differences among his freshmen. Literature is one of the normal humanities and falls within the expertise orientation of academic fields. (Remember Peterson's "academics.") Drama-dance combination and art are especially self activities, means of personal expression. Drama-dance is put before art because these activities, like music, often instruct the performers on what they are to do, the movements, lines, etc., but they also leave open large room for personal interpretation and innovation. It could be that music should be listed with or near dance, drama, and art especially now. Art is seen as most open for personal expression, so it is put furthest under self.

Anyone who has any familiarity with these fields recognizes that the way the professors approach their subjects has a much stronger relation to whether a field is structured or self-expressive to his students than does the nature of the field itself. Many professors of science can, no doubt, make their specialties into ways of expressing oneself, and a poor professor of art could probably manage to be rigid and prescriptive. Considering the possible variation, I feel that the results obtained from my stereotyped placement of these majors are that much more significant.

Row 4a is summary information to Newcomb's Table XLIII (p. 201). The data are those for the freshman classes which entered in 1935-38. Row 4b gives the total number of majors for the 4 years. For example, the 26 science majors had an average conservatism score of 77.9, and the 54 freshmen who were art majors obtained a score of 74.0 on the political economic progressivism scale. High scores show high conservatism.

Row 5a gives the same sorts of information for juniors and seniors (p. 38-39). The latest available scores were used, fall scores in 1935 and 1936 and spring scores in 1938 and 1939. The 100 latest available scores for juniors and seniors showed them with an average conservatism scale of 61.5.

Rows 4 and 5 do not give information for the same individuals. However, rows 6 through 6d do give information for the same individuals (p. 202). These are the classes entering in 1935 and 1936. Newcomb is not explicit about whether the classification by major is based on senior year major, freshman year major, or only those whose majors were unchanged. Some students would have changed majors. Others who have left college are not included in the sample. Among the 27 social studies majors we see that as freshmen they scored 74.4 in the conservatism scale; as juniors or seniors they had dropped 10.9 points to 63.5. The 13 music majors, on the other hand, dropped from 73.5 as freshmen only 2.7 points to 70.8 as juniors or seniors.

How numerous were the sociability types? Each of these 3 distributions of student types has the largest number in social studies. Assuming that social studies indicates sociability, this supports the hypothesis that Bennington contained a large number of sociability types susceptible to adopting group norms. However, it suggests that this number may have been the most frequent type, the mode, but not the majority. The liberal values may have been set by the expertise and self students and faculty and adopted by the sociability types.

This brings us to the predicted decrease in conservatism as we go from science majors to art majors. If we neglect the social studies majors, the general decline in conservatism between the first 2 majors, science and music, and the last 3 majors, literature, drama-dance, and art, appears as expected. Considering only the changes along the rows, the decline is small but consistent from the first 2 majors to the last 3 majors. However, when we bring back the social studies majors, we see that in the freshman and junior-senior rows (Rows 4a and 5a) they are the lowest in their rows, lower than the expertise and self types. If we assume, consistent with Newcomb's interpretation and with the humanistic addition that these groups are especially sensitive to group norms, we can explain the strong nonconservatism of the social studies majors by assuming they "went overboard" in adopting group norms. They were like the college "only more so."

Rows 6a and 6b however, present a different problem. As freshmen, social studies majors were the third most conservative of the 6 major divisions. As juniors or seniors they had dropped 10.9 points to 63.5, fourth most conservative. While this drop is in the direction expected, they are far from the 58.4 of the literature students as juniors and seniors. If they were super-susceptible to group pressures, as I suggest above, we would expect them to drop even more. The fact that this is the next to the largest drop for the 6 majors does support the idea of susceptibility, however, but the art majors show an even greater and unaccounted for drop.

Before leaving Table 10-1 two more observations pop up. The literature majors are consistently low scorers on conservatism. If these are the academics of Clark and Trow's typology (1966) and Peterson's investigation (1965), then they may think of themselves as future faculty members. That is, they identify with the faculty, or use them as a reference group. The Bennington faculty were noted as having strongly nonconservative views. This low scoring by the expertise students can be conceived of as their referring to, or identifying with, the faculty. In both descriptions of his Bennington study (1943, 1958) Newcomb cites students who claim that intellectual respectability at the college was associated with nonconservatism. Since the expertise, or academic, students would be very concerned with appearing respectable to the faculty, they may have adopted their strongly nonconservative views for this reason. In terms of the humanistic terminology, they see their professors using an expertise subsystem, which includes political economic progressivism, and they adopt it too.

The second observation is that the self students, especially the art students, often show an increase in conservatism when compared with the sociability and expertise types. At first this is puzzling if we expect a general decline in conservatism from stability to self. The self types are less conservative than the stability types, but why do they show this slight increase from the sociability and expertise types? A clue emerges when we remember that Peterson did not get meaningful results from his Social Conscience Scale (1965, pp. 79-81, Appendix pp. 34039). The reason that I suggested for this apparent lack of results was that the social consicence issues were for a large part "issues" to people in stability, sociability, and expertise subsystems but didn't particularly concern people in self subsystem. The latter are likely to be antagonistic toward organizations because the self types are sensitive to the way organizations limit their freedom of individual expression. Thus, they are not upset when the organizations have problems either internally or among themselves. In terms of current political labels, the expertise people are liberals, and the self people are radicals. In Chapter 9, where I discussed the outside affiliation of the subgroup 7 (self), and in Chapter 12, where I discuss the politics of the self subsystem, I develop this idea more.

Many of the items on the Social Conscience Scale asked about problems to organizations or to organized society, without reference to interference with personal action. When we look at the Political and Economic Progressivism Scale (pp. 178-179), the same sort of item shows up. Most of the questions have to do with interorganizational or intergroup struggles. Very few of the items have to do with individual action. In humanistic terms it is a scale which will be sensitive to the liberalism of sociability, stability, and expertise types, but it seems remarkably inept at getting at self liberalism. The apparent rise in conservatism among the self types may be due to the fact that the Political Economic Progressivism Scale, the items in it, and the assumptions about what liberalism is were all expertise and/or sociability subsystem-laden. As such, they were relevant to those subsystems, but irrelevant to self.

In summary, this humanistic theory puts much of the data about major field into a humanistic conceptual organization and links it to earlier studies reinterpreted into the humanistic framework, too. While the effects of the whole community are less than the effects of academic departments, the expected deviations are in the direction predicted by the humanistic theory. When considering the majors, we have seen some evidence that the humanistic interpretation of a large number of sociability types is sustained, the large number of social studies majors, for example. Newcomb's findings about the relative conservatism and nonconservatism according to academic majors was explained as a specific instance of increased liberalism along the humanistic continuum. And the apparent rise in conservatism among the self types was seen as an example of the inappropriateness of using measures designed for one humanistic group on another. This last, especially, is an example of how the humanistic theory makes us aware that many of our observations must be reinterpreted as based in the concepts and vocabulary of one or another subsystem.

3. Knock! Knock! Who's Square?

Are the students who are extremely high or extremely low in conservatism extreme in other ways compared with the rest of

Bennington? One way Newcomb investigated this was by selecting 22 extremely conservative and 22 extremely nonconservative students on the basis of the political and economic progressivism (pp. 65-73). They came from 3 classes and represented the lowest and highest scoring sixths of their classes. To find out whether extremeness in conservatism/nonconservatism was matched by extremeness in other community-oriented traits, Newcomb asked 23 widely acquainted juniors and seniors to nominate their fellow students on a "Guess Who" questionnaire. Selecting from the whole college, the 23 judges nominated their fellow students for 28 characteristics. This, Newcomb says, would pick out extreme instances in these characteristics. These people could then be compared with the 22 extreme conservatives and 22 extreme nonconservatives.

In terms of the humanistic theory we are checking to see whether the split between stability and sociability + expertise + self (conservative/nonconservative split) allows us to explain the differences in the 28 Guess-Who characteristics. In other words, do the hypothesized sociability, expertise, and self types (nonconservatives) show the traits expected of them? Table 10-2 presents information combined from Newcomb's Table XXV - Per Cent of Students Nominated More Than Once for Each Guess-Who Item: For Individuals Extremely High and Extremely Low in PEP Score as Juniors or

Seniors in 1938 and 1939 (p. 69) - and combined from Appendix A, the Guess-Who Items (pp. 183-185).

Column 1 gives my item number and the item from Newcomb's schedule. The weighted scores are a sum of the percents of the 22 conservatives (Column 2) and 22 nonconservatives (Column 3) who were selected 2 or more times plus the per cent selected 5 or more times. If one of these 44 individuals were selected 5 times or more he would also be selected 2 times or more, i.e., counted twice in the "weighted" sum of the 2 readings. For example, item 2 "least concerned with the basic educational policies of the college" show a weighted score of 64% for the stability types and 0% for the combined sociability + expertise + self types. The individuals who were chosen 5 or more times were counted twice, hence the "weighting."

The item numbers in Column 1 have been changed to fit Table 10-2 rather than Newcomb's numerical order. I have changed the order of the items to group them according to the humanistic types they are likely to select as high scorers. Group 1, for example, consists of 6 items that I expect to select clearly stability types; that is, the stability weighted score is predicted to be higher than the combination of social + expertise + self. Group 2 consists of items that should be especially clear at picking out sociability types; we would expect Column 2, which includes sociability

Table 10-2

A Humanistic Interpretation of Correlation Between Reputation For Community Orientation and Extreme Conservatism/Nonconservatism

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3
	--------weighted scores---------	
item and number	stability (conservative)	sociability + expertise + self (nonconservative)
Group 1 - Stability Items		
1. most absorbed in home and family affairs	27	27
2. least concerned about basic educational policies of the college	64	0
3. least concerned about activities of student committees	64	18
4. least likely to engage actively in pursuits related to college interest after college	59	0
5. most likely to lead a life of sheltered leisure	68	14
6. most likely to be deterred from some interesting pursuit because of family disapproval	27	23

Table 10-2 continued

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3
Group 2 - Sociability Itesm		
7. most absorbed in social life, weekends, etc.	59	0
8. most absorbed in college community affairs	0	36
9. most influenced by community expectations regarding codes, standards, etc.	14	41
10. most influenced by enthusiasm of the crowd	23	50
11. most likely to be enthusiastic supporters of the college	9	50
Group 3 - sociability + expertise items		
12. most absorbed in national and international public affairs	5	82
13. most anxious to hold positions of community responsibility	9	55
Group 4 - expertise items		
14. most absorbed in college studies, academic work	14	32
15. most influenced by faculty authority	23	50

Table 10-2 continued

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3
Group 5 - expertise + self items		
16. most likely to engage actively in pursuits related to college activities	18	45
17. least likely to live a life of sheltered leisure	14	73
Group 6 - self item		
18. least likely to be deterred from some interesting pursuit because of family disapproval	9	32
Group 7 - stability, self items		
19. most critical of college educational policies	27	32
20. most critical of individual members of faculty or administrative staff	55	27
21. most critical of student committees	18	18
22. most anxious to be left alone to follow individual pursuits	32	27
23. most resistant to community expectations regarding codes, standards, etc.	36	5
24. most resistant to faculty authority	32	18

Table 10-2 continued

Group 7 - stability, self items continued

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3
25. least likely to be enthusiastic supporter of college	41	23
26. most resistant to enthusiasms of the crowd	27	18

types, to be higher than Column 1. Group 3 consists of 2 items that indicate both sociability and expertise; likewise we expect Column 2 to have a higher weighted score than Column 1. Group 4 contains 2 items strong in appeal to expertise types. Group 5 contains 2 items that are selected to pick out expertise and self. The 1 item in "Group" 6 is a self item.

Group 7 contains 8 items that are predicted to appeal to both the stability type and the self type. The common factor here is nonparticipation in the community and its values. Both stability and self types are likely to be adverse to participation in the general sociability life of Bennington, the self group because they are generally anti-organizational, or at least nonorganizational in their individualistic subsystem. The stability types are anti-community (as far as Bennington is concerned) because they do not share the dominant sociability-expertise value coalition among students and faculty. Their reference group, as Newcomb points out, is their family and home.

The original Newcomb Guess-Who list contained 28 items. I've included only 26 here because I couldn't use a humanistic interpretation to predict "most resistant to (or most influenced by) appeals regarded as moving or emotional."

The questions we ask about Table 10-2 are: First, can we judge the content of the items to see whether we can arrange scales for the 4 humanistic types considered here? Second, when we have done so, does the data fall as predicted? Unfortunately, the combination of sociability, expertise, and self types together all as nonconservatives makes an interpretation of the results inconclusive. For example, a high score which is attributed to sociability types could have been due to expertise or self types, or any combination of the three. The most that can be inferred from the data is whether the expected trend is present. My division of the table into groups of items classified by the humanistic typology is as much a demonstration and prod for further humanistic based instruments and investigations as it is an analysis of Newcomb's findings.

Using the humanistic theory, I predict that the 6 items in Group 1 have to do with stability. Newcomb reports that the stability group (conservatives) used their family as a reference group. Using his observation as a basis for classifying items 1 and 6 we would expect that the stability readings for these 2 items in Column 2 to be significantly above the sociability + expertise + self readings in Column 3. For item 1 they are tied; for item 6, Column 2 is only slightly higher than Column 3. Why do we get these high readings for the sociability + expertise + self category (the nonconservatives)? When we check back in the Peterson study a possible explanation emerges (1965, p. 72). Peterson found that the stability and the sociability groups (vocational and collegiate in his typology) both showed low independence from their families. He hypothesized that the sociability group (in keeping with their desire for smooth interpersonal relations) idealized their family relations. They try to get along well in all groups. Their absorption in the family and high sensitivity to its possible disapproval may account for the high readings among the sociability + expertise + self. In this potential explanation, as with many others, however, we are using the humanistic theory as a basis for constructing plausible hypotheses. The actual explanations will have to wait further investigations.

The 3 items having to do with low involvement with college life show the expected high in the stability group, which is furthest from the sociability-expertise interests and norms of Bennington. The stability orientation makes them: least concerned about basic educational policies (item 2); least concerned about student committees (item 3); and least likely to engage in college related pursuits after college (item 4). Item 5 "most likely to lead a life of sheltered leisure" is a stability item because the idea of being sheltered suggests a withdrawal from social or political action into a stable, secure, unchanging life. It may connote an interest in one's future family rather than social issues.

In Group 1 we find that 4 of the 6 items of our tentative Stability Scale show a definite trend to selecting the stability types, and the other 2 can be hypothetically explained as picking up the desire of the sociability types for smooth interpersonal relations with all groups, including their families.

Group 2 consists of 5 items judged to be high in sociability content. Items 8 through 11 all feature strong influence by the college community - absorbed in community affairs, influenced by community expectations and enthusiasm, enthusiastic supporters of the college. These 4 all show the expected high readings for the sociability + expertise + self combination, and I attribute the scores in large part to the sociability group, but, as pointed out above, this is not certain.

Something is blatantly wrong with the prediction for item 7:

	stability	sociability + expertise + self
7. most absorbed in social life, weekends, etc.	59	0

The prediction here is that the sociability type would be highest in this characteristic by far. Item 7 seems expressly written to pick out sociability, but here it did just the opposite. Or did it?

According to the humanistic theory sociability people are exceedingly sensitive to the standards, norms and activities of the rest of the community. This is evidenced in items 8-11. What are the norms of Bennington College? At Bennington they are political and economic progressivism. The activities of the college community are centered around these values which include political and social activism, such as participating in running the college community. That is, when someone acts according to the norms at Bennington, she shows the general sociability characteristic of adopting the prevailing social norms, but at Bennington the content of the norms is not weekend, party, and social life, but community affairs life. The Bennington norms are not the usual norms for colleges and universities, but the sociability types adopted the Bennington norms anyway, and the Bennington norms were anti- (or at least non-) social life in its live-it-up, party sense. We saw that the stability types aspired to fit in, get along socially, etc. This may account for their interest in the usual type of social life. In other colleges it might have been effective, but at Bennington it separated them from much of the student body, who may well have looked down on "mere" social life.

If this conjectural interpretation is accurate, it provides strong confirmation for Newcomb's reference group interpretation of his Bennington study and for the humanistic additions to his explanation. One of his main theses is that the community orientation of the Bennington students accounts for their adoption of political and economic progressivism and that it is a community-wide effect. This humanistic interpretation gives evidence for the strength of community-wide norms by pointing out that not only are the community standards strongly adopted by most students, but that (1) these standards differ from the usual social-collegiate standards, and (2) those who keep the usual standards, the stability types, are seen by their fellow students as different from the rest of the community. The party-weekend-social life which one would expect of students on most campuses may even have had a negative value attached to it by the majority of the community: this last, of course, is a conjecture too, but is consistent with the humanistic hypothesis that people in one stage are likely to be especially opposed to the values of the stage they have just left (or may still be striving to rise above).

Group 2, in summary, gives us the expected results for 4 of 5 items selected to pick out sociability. Item 7 gives results in the opposite direction expected when the Bennington social norms are assumed to be those of the usual sociability groups, the mistake I made. When we speculate that the Bennington norms are adopted by the sociability students, although their content differs, the reversal in item 7 not only is consistent with our expectations, it is strongly confirmatory of the effect of the sociability subsystem.

Group 3 consists of 2 items that seem to be borderline between sociability and expertise. Maslow points out that one of the characteristics of expertise is "being useful and necessary in the world." This includes a desire for reputation and prestige (1954, pp. 90-91). Item 12 "most absorbed in national and international public affairs" shows this interest of contributing to the welfare of the larger world. In the case of Bennington, item 12 shows social acceptance because it states one of the norms of the college community. In other communities it is likely to be more of an expertise item only.

Item 12 "most anxious to hold positions of community responsibility" is a combination of social acceptability of sociability and recognition and reputation of expertise. As I suggested earlier, the transition from a sociability to expertise may be facilitated by the social mechanism of being chosen as popular, or leader. In the most characteristic of the sociability types the desire is to be one of the group, "one of the boys" so to speak, without having any particular rank or status. However, when membership is achieved, a person starts to desire recognition from the group and may run for office as a way to achieve this. At this point he is making a transition toward the esteem characteristic of expertise, from membership to prestige. Item 13, then, measures this transitional, or mixed, stage.

The 2 sociability-expertise items show the expected high scores in the sociability + expertise + self column; however, here again we can not place the individuals or groups accurately within the combined nonconservative category.

The 2 expertise items are selected on the basis that this orientation among college students shows itself in what Clark & Trow called the "academic" subculture (1966). Items 14 and 15 ask for students "most absorbed in college studies, academic work" and "most influenced by faculty authority." Here, too, the sociability + expertise + self combined category is higher than the stability category. Newcomb reported that one of his subgroups, number 7, contained outstanding students who did more than required for their classes. Their trait of following their own interest suggests that some of the people in the combined nonconservative category may be self types, too.

One of the traits of the stability types, especially those hypothesized to be nearest to sociability, is that they were overdocile and uncritical of authority (Chapter 9). This may account for the weighted score of 23 in the stability group for item 15; some of the ~~docile~~ ones may have been seen as influenced by faculty authority. In spite of this, however, the heaviest weight was in the third column, as expected.

Another 2-item group tested for transitional items between expertise and self. In group 5 item 16 "most likely to engage actively in pursuits related to college activities" and item 17 "least likely to live a life of sheltered leisure" show the social activism characteristic of expertise types especially at Bennington and show doing what is important to oneself, characteristic of self. In both these there is a connotation of getting out into the world and doing things, a sort of noblesse oblige activism characteristic of professionals and the liberalism of the upper-middle class. The expected heavy weight in the nonconservative grouping appeared.

Item 18 is a self item because it stresses "doing one's own thing" and independence from family. These 2 are both especially characteristic of self types.

The 8 items in group 7 repeat the theme of being negative toward the college community, critical and/or resistant to influences from the college. If the main orientation of the college is sociability-expertise, as I have suggested, then the groups furthest away along the humanistic continuum are stability and self. We would expect these 2 types to be antagonistic to the sociability-expertise norm for different reasons. The stability types have been unsuccessful with their aspirations; they use home-and-family as a reference group; and their conservative values tend to support established order. The sociability-expertise subsystem propagated at Bennington used the college community as a reference group, was successful in controlling the college, and supported much political and economic change. The self people, on the other hand, would see the organizations and institutions of the Bennington majority as impinging on their individual development.

7 of the 8 items in Group 7 show an expected split between the columns. Except for a tie, the stability group was more visible to the student judges in each case. In the Newcomb-Flacks study (Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus, 1963-66?), the investigators found that a sociability deviant

subgroup was seen as obviously deviant by the other students. It may be that the stability deviant subgroup in this earlier study was more identifiable, too, accounting for their consistently higher score, but this is a speculation.

The one exception to the expected heaviness on both sides of the split between stability and sociability + expertise + self is item 24, "most resistant to community expectations regarding codes, standards, etc." The low score for the combined nonconservative group may indicate that instead of being open critics of the standards, the self group merely went along with them and didn't pay much attention to them, i.e., they didn't feel the standards were worth bothering with or wasting their efforts on one way or the other. In Self-Renewal (1964, pp. 32-41), John W. Gardner captures this detachment and distinguishes it from the exhibitionist's nonconformity and the rebels' reaction against the status quo (p. 37):

> One of the interesting findings contained in recent research is that the creative individual as a rule chooses to conform in the routine, everyday matters of life, such as speech, dress and manners. One gets the impression that he simply is not prepared to waste his energy in nonconformity about trifles.

Maslow describes this as a transcendence of petty conformity among self-actualizing people (Motivation and Personality, 1954, pp. 224-225). Their "apparent conventionality," however, seems to be due more to an unwillingness to waste effort on things that are not their primary interest (p. 225):

> The expressed inner attitude is usually that it is ordinarily of no great consequence which folkways are used, that while they make life smoother they do not really matter enough to make a fuss about. Here again we see the general tendency of these people to accept most states of affairs that they consider unimportant or not of primary concern to them as individuals. ...their yielding to convention is apt to be rather casual and perfunctory... when yielding to conventions is too annoying or too expensive, the apparent conventionality reveals itself for the superficial thing it is, and is tossed off as easily as a cloak.

Also, the judges for the guess-who items may have been more aware of differences between themselves and the stability types than between themselves and the self types. This would be consistent with their being aware on the other Group 7 items of the stability types as (1) a deviant subculture which is visible (See Chapter 8) and (2) representing a system of values which they had just left or were trying to leave, hence were sensitive and negative to.

Group 7 picks out people who are in some ways opposed to the community centeredness of Bennington College. The 8 items show an expected balance between the columns that are seen as noncommunity oriented, the stability and the self groups.

Taking Newcomb's study of extreme conservatism/nonconservatism and his investigation to see whether the girls who showed these extreme political economic attitudes were also those who stood out in the college as not having/having strong community-oriented values, we found that his data, when redisplayed and reinterpreted in terms of the humanistic continuum confirmed both his original interpretation and the humanistic additions to it.

The original data, however, was not collected with a humanistic theory in mind, and Newcomb's categories are broader than mine, so the fit between data and theory is general and shows the expected trend, but is not detailed enough for close examination and strong confirmation/disconfirmation. The sorting of the items into scales was rough but indicates that more work of this type may be fruitful.

4. Values (pp. 41-44, 148-149)

Newcomb says that most personality measures available at the time of his study didn't get at the characteristics he wanted to measure, but that the Allport-Vernon values were an exception to this.*

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*Inasmuch as this is an interpretation of Newcomb's findings and his use of the Allport-Vernon scales I'm relying entirely on what Newcomb reports. A more complete investigation and interpretation of these scales as applicable to a humanistic interpretation would include an analysis of them based on a study of the Allport and Vernon book A Study of Values and on an analysis of the items in the scales for content scored on a humanistic continuum. Considering Newcomb's sometimes vague statements and this arm's length interpretation of scales and data into a humanistic framework, the expected results that do emerge are that much more convincing. Kenneth A. Feldman and Theodore M. Newcomb present a survey of research on college students using the revised Vernon-Allport-Lindzey scale (and other research as well) in The Impact of College on Students (1969). A reinterpretation of these value studies and others awaits some energetic person.

Allport and Vernon used 6 major values that pervade our value system. I have fitted them on the humanistic continuum of subsystems to show which ones are likely to be dominant to people in the various subsystems. Apparently, Allport and Vernon do not present the 6 values in this order; Newcomb, at least, does not do so.

HUMANISTIC SUBSYSTEMS: survival stability sociability expertise self

LOCATION OF A-V VALUES: economic political theoretical
religious social aesthetic

The economic value, Newcomb reports, has to do with interest in what is practical and useful. Given only this information it is difficult to determine which subsystem is most appropriate; however, the survival subsystem seems most appropriate at face value in view of the emphasis on meeting daily demands and the possible lack of interest in other things that both the survival subsystem and the economic value may have. I am least happy with the placement of the economic value, and feel that further investigation of the content of the scale used for this value may place it elsewhere or may result in an economic scale more appropriate for survival economic concerns. The reason for this opinion is that "practical" and "useful" have meanings broader than those appropriate for survival. That is, various sorts of things may be "useful" or "practical" to people in different subsystems, and it is likely that in a study of values to be used in a country such as the U. S. and constructed by upper-middle-class college professors that the survival subsystem would be neglected. Their "practical" and "useful" may be practical and useful for other subsystems, especially their own. A scale of values built from humanistic conceptualization may have to substantially change economic interest to make it fit the survival subsystem.

I placed the religious value in the stability orientation because the humanistic theory sees religions, in general, as making the whole world sensible, orderly, coherent, related, etc. It puts order into chaos and as such makes the world predictable. As an ideology a religion gives rules for conduct evaluation.

The political value is the value of power. One of the traits of stability people is a sense of powerlessness (Hess, 1970, pp. 15-21). Putting order in the world whether it is religious order of the universe or the temporal order of a government is a manifestation of the desire for stability.

Political order, however, is somewhat social; it involves cooperation and organizing interpersonal relationships among men. Therefore, the political value is located where stability and sociability blend together.

Sociability emphasizes congeniality. Allport and Vernon define the social value as love of people; therefore, the social value is expected to be associated with sociability.

Theoretical value is not described at all by Newcomb. I have placed it in the expertise category because it may emphasize interest in a specialty or particular field of knowledge. This would make it akin to academic expertise of the Clark & Trow model (1966) and to the specialized field or professional skill that is often a mark of expertise orientations.

The aesthetic value is postulated as characteristic of the self types. They are interested in unique, individual experiences which are themselves valuable; this includes aesthetic experiences. Peterson also found that the self types (nonconformists) showed the highest in artistic activities and sensitivity as well as cultural sophistication (1965, pp. 28, 82-85, 88).

What do we find, allowing for a great deal of imprecision, when we examine the scores on these values? Newcomb's sample consisted of 40 graduating seniors. He looked at the data two ways, first, the whole class. Second, his characteristic way of looking at the extremes. For this he chose the high and low quarters on the Political and Economic Progressivism Scale.

When we look at the values of the 40 graduating seniors it is apparent that they are more interested in the values at the upper end of the humanistic continuum than those at the lower end; they are more interested in the values associated with sociability, expertise, and self. Newcomb says, "...this scale is so constructed that numerical values are equivalent, in percentile terms for all six values. Scores of 28-31 are considered average, and those of 40 or more or 20 or less significantly high and significantly low" (Personality and Social Change, 1943, p. 41). This interest at Bennington in values of the last 3 stages is clear when we add the value scores to the distribution of values along the humanistic continuum.

Table 10-3

HUMANISTIC SUBSYSTEMS:	survival		stability	sociability	expertise	self
LOCATION OF A-V VALUES:	economic	religious	political	social	theoretical	aesthetic
40 SENIORS' SCORES	27.5	22.7	25.1	32.1	35.7	36.7

None of the scores is in the normal 28-31 range. Those which are below the normal range, economic, religious, and political, are the survival and stability values. Those values which are above the average, social, theoretical, and aesthetic, are sociability, expertise, and self values. This is consistent with the humanistic interpretation of Newcomb's findings, that the important differences at Bennington were between the stability subsystem and the sociability, expertise, and self subsystems.

Newcomb's main interest in the Bennington study was centered around the Political and Economic Progressivism Scale. In associating the Allport-Vernon scale of values with the PEP scores, he uses his characteristic method of looking at extreme PEP groups. He asks: How do the most and least conservative students differ on the Allport-Vernon scales of values? This humanistic theory leads us to expect that knowledge of a person's subsystem will allow us to predict his values and attitudes, both political and economic (as shown somewhat earlier) and the Allport-Vernon values (as shown just above). That is, a person with a specific subsystem (e.g., expertise) is expected to show this subsystem in his political and economic views (non-conservatism) and his values (high on theoretical). Diagram 1 portrays these relationships between political and economic values and the Allport-Vernon values.

DIAGRAM 1

Humanistic Subsystems as General Factors Running Through Allport-Vernon Scale of Value and Through Political and Economic Conservatism/Nonconservatism



Along the bottom is the humanistic continuum with the Allport-Vernon values located along it. The scale on the left hand side is the Allport-Vernon Value scale. The purpose of the diagram is to compare 10 seniors highest in conservatism (C's on the diagram) with the 10 lowest on conservatism (L's on the diagram). We hypothesize that the survival and stability values will be chosen more by the high conservatives than by the low conservatives because political and economic conservatism and high value for economic, religious, and political values are components of the survival and stability subsystems, left of the vertical dotted line. Likewise, we would expect that those lowest in conservatism would value the sociability, expertise, and self values more than those highest in conservatism because political and economic nonconservatism and social, theoretical, and aesthetic values are components of the sociability, expertise and self subsystems, right of the vertical dotted line. In spite of the small numbers of students in each quartile, 10 each, the predicted differences do emerge.

Newcomb expressed surprise to find that the conservatives, being higher in political and economic values, were "less concerned about public affairs in the political-economic arena..." (1943, p. 42). Apparently Newcomb thought that high concern with a particular value would lead to nonconservative attitudes on questions associated with the value. Humanistic theory leads us to expect the opposite. It is precisely because one does not value something highly that he can afford to experiment and try new actions related to it. The sociability, expertise, and self types, which have their survival and stability needs (political and economic needs) met can afford to "play loose" with them; their interests are elsewhere; they are not "hung up" at these earlier stages.

Among the explanations for the nonconservative's low scores on economic and political values, Newcomb suggests that their motive for popularity (prestige) was satisfied, and, hence, became less important. This is in keeping with the humanistic principle that satisfaction with a goal leads to abandoning that goal and the emergence of a new one (See General Proposition 2, Chapter 3). Dissatisfaction, or lack of success at reaching a goal, may lead to continued efforts to reach it or to return to earlier actions that were successful at reaching an earlier goal. That is, someone who is not successful with the goals of the sociability stage may react to his rebuff by reverting to the conservative attitudes of a stability stage, where he has been successful before. One of the characteristics of stability is unwavering adherence to an ideology, and Hoffer reminds us that it is the social misfits who are the nascent "true believers"

(1966). As Newcomb suggests, the stability subsystem of the conservatives may be related to their lack of social success at Bennington, but it is not clear whether it is causal or correlative. That is: Does their lack of success make the conservative? and/or does their conservatism make them unsuccessful?

This humanistic theory leads us to expect that the political and economic attitudes and the Allport-Vernon values will be associated as shown on Diagram 1, and (contrary to Newcomb's surprise) that finding the conservatives more interested in political and economic matters is not an anomaly but is to be expected. The opposite would be the surprise.

The sociability explanation of the extreme nonconservatives' views as those of "super-socials" is supported here by the score of the 10 highest nonconservatives. Their score of 35.7 for social value is the highest reported, as of that date, including all groups tested by Allport and Vernon. It is approached only by a group of missionaries and a group of Boy Scout leaders. This scale measures "love of people in terms of prizing persons as ends rather than as means to any other end" (Newcomb, Personality and Social Change, 1943). The humanistic interpretation of Newcomb's findings, the "sociability hypothesis," is that the changes in political and economic attitudes he describes are a combination of many students' sociability subsystem, in which they wholeheartedly accept the norms of the group they belong to, and the expertise subsystem of the faculty and some students, which is politically and economically liberal. The high social value reading for the 10 extreme nonconservatives in the 1939 graduating class confirms this interpretation and suggests that Newcomb's findings at Bennington are a special case of a combination of the sociability desire for congeniality and the expertise social, economic, and political liberalism.

Summary of 4 Topics

This part of Chapter 10 on Newdomb's original work, Personality and Social Change (1943), examined 4 topics in that book and found them to be enlightened by a humanistic interpretation. The apparent cohesiveness among the conservatives (stability types) and noncohesion among the nonconservatives were seen as examples of cohesiveness built on a shared subsystem. Major fields were found to have the expected correlations with subsystems, with the conservative students more heavily in the structured studies and the nonconservative students more heavily in the arts and humanities. Differences among extreme conservatives and extreme nonconservatives in political and economic progresivism were seen as manifestations of the students' subsystems, and these orientations also accounted for nominations on a 28-item "guess-who" questionnaire. Finally, the Allport-Vernon Scale of Values was "rehung" on this humanistic framework. Most of the expectations about the distribution of values and comparisons between conservatives and nonconservatives were fulfilled. This pilot reinterpretation of Newcomb's value study indicates that a humanistic reinterpretation of other value studies may be fruitful. With a few exceptions, Newcomb's findings contributed to the confirmation of this humanistic theory and received support from being embedded in it.

Newcomb's Bennington Through Humanistic Glasses

My humanistic interpretation of the processes Newcomb described at Bennington divides his observations into 2 parts. First, most students did accept the group norms. Second, the content of the norms was determined by the liberal faculty and some of the students who shared the faculty's subsystem. Had the faculty been conservative, the majority of students would still have adopted the college norms, but the content would have been conservative rather than nonconservative. The susceptibility to group norms is attributed to a sociability subsystem. Evidence independent of norm acceptance itself was presented thought the discussion of Newcomb's "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups" in the previous chapter and in this chapter on his main work Personality and Social Change.

In the latter Newcomb discusses the fact that nonconservatives scored the highest of all groups in the Allport-Vernon social value (indicating a sociability subsystem in humanistic terminology). Giving evidence to the sociability hypothesis, Newcomb identifies the dominant Bennington attitude as a social attitude, rather than a political or economic attitude. That is, it is a social attitude with political and economic content, rather than a political or economic attitude with social ramifications (p. 43):

> The writer regards this as convincing testimony to his general thesis that nonconservative *social* attitudes are developed at Bennington primarily by those who are both capable and desirous of cordial relations with their fellow community members.
>
> *italics mine*

In summary, the humanistic reinterpretation of Newcomb's findings is not an attack on them, but an extension of them to a humanistic theory. His reference group analysis is pictured as a specific instance of a sociability analysis; hence, most of his observations and conclusions can be subsumed under a more general humanistic theory. Furthermore, some of the findings that surprised him (such as the high nonconservatives having low political and economic values and the puzzling fact that many of those most often chosen as college representative were among the most conservative as freshmen and among the most nonconservative seniors) can be explained in terms of this humanistic theory.

This makes these previous anomalies consistent with and contributing to this overall revision of Newcomb's studies.

REVIEW OF SECTION 2

The first section of this paper described a humanistic theory. This section applied that theory to 7 studies of higher education and unified them by stretching them all on the same theoretical framework. The Trow (1962) and Clark & Trow typology of student subcultures (1966) is one instance of a typology that can be subsumed under the humanistic theory. Their types, vocational, collegiate, academic, and nonconformist are instances of the stability, sociability, expertise, and self subsystems, respectively.

Peterson extended the Clark & Trow typology into a way of classifying groups of entering college freshmen and types of institutions of higher education (On a Typology of College Students, 1965). Using a brief "personal philosophy of higher education," he had students classify themselves and found that 1 item was sufficient to group the students according to many additional personal and demographic characteristics. The resulting ideal descriptions of the types closely match the types of the humanistic typology. He also applied the typology to institutions and found that they, too, can be classified by the humanistic (Clark & Trow) typology.

A second source of studies came from Merton (1957) and Gouldner (1957-58). The former found that people were influential in 2 ways; they either had a specialized field of knowledge or skill which made them important, or they could sympathize with their fellows. Merton called the specialists "cosmopolitans" and the sympathizers "locals" because their frames of reference were either larger than the immediate community or were limited to the local community. In terms of reference group and in other ways the cosmopolitans are seen as an instance of expertise people, and the locals are sociability people.

Using Merton's dichotomy, Gouldner investigated the faculty and administration of a small college. He found cosmopolitans (expertise types) and locals (sociability types) there too. The humanistic theory was useful in predicting other characteristics of these 2 types, such as "rule-tropism," a desire to have more and tighter rules.

The third source of studies comes from Newcomb's studies of Bennington College. The first reinterpreted here was done with Richard Flacks (Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus, 1963-66?) and finds that a person's social group and his subgroup membership pattern are manifestations of his subsystem, and that people tend to organize themselves in situations that are most coherent with a subsystem. Apparently, subsystem is one principle around which social organizations are extablished and through which people interpret the world.

In Newcomb's article "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups" (1958) and his book Personality and Social Change (1943) the humanistic theory gives basis for embedding his findings in a larger theoretical framework. By doing this, the theory subsumes and explains many of his observations, some that he expected and some that were unexpected. The humanistic theory attributes Newcomb's findings to a combination of a sociability subsystem held by many of the students, and an expertise subsystem held by most of the faculty and some of the students, but it raises the question that the findings may be a "conceptual artifact" of the theories used.

These 7 studies are by no means the only ones that can be unified within the theoretical framework of this humanistic theory. I hope that this demonstration of what can be done will encourage others to reinterpret other studies and especially to hypothesize among the individuals and groups that can now be conceptually related to each other through the humanistic theory.

This section took each of the 7 studies one-at-a-time and showed how they can be embedded in a humanistic theory. The next section uses the theory in a different way. It examines a general problem area, that of youth unrest, and uses the theory as a bag of conceptual tools to examine this problem. I then extend the theory with some speculations about future applications to the social sciences.

SECTION 3

THE THEORY AS A BASE FOR APPLICATIONS AND SPECULATIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION, SOCIETY, AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Section 3

THE HUMANISTIC THEORY AS A SET OF WORKING CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

The first section of this paper presented a humanistic social science theory. The second section partially tested it and used it to reinterpret 6 studies of higher education and 1 of personal influence. This section uses it as a set of conceptual tools to try to understand some of the problems that universities face today. From the closer analysis of data and reinterpretation of empirical studies, Section 3 turns toward more conjectural and broad-scale commentary. While Section 2 tested the theory with a more detached, analytic tone, Section 3 uses the theory as if it were well-established and takes a more applied, speculative tone.

Chapter 11 describes how some of the partisan groups in university conflict can be thought of in terms of this humanistic theory. When this happens, the theory can then be used to think about, explain, understand, and anticipate some of the interactions among these groups. A complete humanistic analysis of university conflict would take each group and discuss its origins, characteristics, development, and interactions with other groups. Chapter 12 demonstrates how this might be done by picking one of the partisan groups mentioned in Chapter 11, the self students, and examining it in some detail.

Chapter 11 summarizes much of the information of the previous 7 chapters. Chapter 12 looks forward to new grounds for applying and testing this theory.

Chapter 11

ALL'S NOISY ON THE ACADEMIC FRONT: INTRODUCTION - DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter and the next is to use the humanistic theory to begin to investigate some of the problems of student activism in universities and colleges. This is by no means a complete description or analysis of the crises or particular events mentioned here, but is a demonstration of how the humanistic theory provdes a valuable set of conceptual tools for understanding some of the crises or common threads running through these problems.

In keeping with the speculative, applied tone of Section 3, this chapter changes from examining the humanistic theory to applying it. Instead of testing the theory, this chapter jumps to the assumption that it is already established and uses it as a source of assumptions for discussing conflict in higher education.

When we remember that a subsystem includes ways of perceiving, conceiving, valuing, and acting in the world, it is understandable that groups with different subsystems are likely to conflict on one or more of these points. What subsystems do various students hold, and where do these conflict with the views of college administrators, faculties, and the society at large? There are 3 interwoven humanistic subsystem changes within society and colleges that are important to keep in mind: (1) social background, (2) types of students, and (3) generation (subsystem) gap.

1. The Social Scene

Wealth - In advanced industrialized society as a whole we have had a period of immense prosperity. From the Depression to the present, American wealth has flooded our economy. There are still groups that haven't participated in this increase, but as a whole the population is much better off in the 1960's than in the 1930's, 1940's, or 1950's. While the affluence has provided an economic base, we have grown in other ways as well. We have had affluence in terms of sociability too. Whyte's The Organization Man (1957) and Riesman's The Lonely Crowd (1961) have given us examples of affluence of sociability and congeniality. Much of the "one-dimensionality" Marcuse laments over seems to be a manifestation of the sociability desire to limit conflict, to get along with others, and to smooth over differences (One-Dimensional Man, 1968), true horrors to a Hegelian. The generations of joiners have had their clubs, societies, groups, etc. to feel the joys of membership and togetherness.

Middle-class mothers rear their children to belong to a myriad of groups, and middle-class schools stress "getting along with others." A large part of our society has been successful with its sociability goals and has moved on toward expertise.

The Expertise (Technocratic) Society - In the expertise subsystem we have had relative affluence, too. There has been a great proliferation of vocational and professional specialties, which a person can use as a basis of his desire to gain prestige, reputation, and a feeling of being necessary and valuable to the world as well as a basis for sustenance. The increased sophistication and specialization of our occupational structure and the movements toward vocational colleague control have aided feelings of expertise.

Jacques Ellul's The Technocratic Society describes our current society as one which is based on "technique." The technocratic approach stresses specialization of method or means of accomplishing a standard goal efficiently. A specialist is one who can use one of these standard techniques, and technique is not limited to mechanization, although that is an instance applied to the production of goods. Ellul cites 3 major subdivisions of modern technique, economic, organization, and human (p. 22).

Using Ellul as one of his starting points, Theodore Roszak calls our current culture the "technocratic society" (The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition (1969). Its most salient characteristic is domination by experts and a scientific or "objective" worldview (pp. 5-22, 203-232):

> ...it will be enough to define the technocracy as that society in which those who govern justify themselves by appeal to technical experts who, in turn, justify themselves by appeal to scientific forms of knowledge. And beyond the authority of science, there is no appeal. (pp. 7-8)
>
> Expertise - technical, scientific, managerial, military, educational, financial, medical - has become the prestigious mystogogy (sic) of the technocratic society. (p. 142)

Interpreted humanistically, Roszak says that a minority of the young and a few adults are building a culture in opposition to the overemphasis on expertise values, the "counter culture." In the next chapter I reinterpret this counter culture as a self subculture.

Discussion: Technique, Past, Present, and Future - If we apply the first and second "researchable questions" of Chapter 2 to technique, some interesting suppositions arise. These, in turn, open the door to humanistically based analyses of the social environment and its effects on higher education. These are merely touched on here. When we ask: "Which subsystem is technique most associated with?" our answer, as above, is expertise. The second question is:

How does technique vary from subsystem to subsystem? If we see the present, at least in advanced industrialized countries, as an expertise-technocratic period, what hypotheses can we make about the past, and what predictions about the future? On an epochical scale we can associate survival with the Stone Age, stability with the development and flourishing of magic and religion through the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance. With the rise of belief that mankind can order the world through our own intelligence and effort, we see a decline in church domination and a rise in social contract and social decisions consciously made among men - the decline of the church and the rise of the nation-state, a Sociability Epoch. With the rise of the scientific worldview and its continuing development, we are entering, or have entered, a Technological Epoch. Does a Self Era lie ahead?

Self Techniques for a Self Society - Our society seems to be just at the beginning of a period that can result in many more self types. Our society has provided institutions, and our institutions have provided roles for the nonself types, but we have not yet developed many institutions or roles for self types. A "normal" role with its constraints and expectations is somewhat constricting. Perhaps some sort of satellite, free floating role is most appropriate for this type. The lack of these roles plus the constraints of being an incumbent in any role may be reasons the self types are presently so anti-organizational and may feel like "dropping out."

Short-term, part-time, and ad-hoc roles and organizations which allow self people to develop many facets of their personalities may provide the mixture of roles such a person wants. In The Temporary Society (1968) Warren Bennis and Philip Slater point out organizational techniques and trends that may help our society evolve into a Self Society (p. 73):

> The key word will be "temporary." There will be adaptive, rapidly changing *temporary* systems. These will be task forces organized around problems to be solved by groups of relative strangers with diverse professional skills. ...Organizational charts will consist of project groups rather than stratified functional groups.

In a series of temporary organizations a person may be able to develop more of his many potentials than he can as a specialist within 1 organization occupying only 1 organizational role. In Chapter 5 I speculated that self types would select sensitivity training as a possible extracurricular activity because it is supposed to lead to more insight, self-understanding, etc. Slater claims that this activity may contribute to the organizational style of the Temporary (self) Society too (p. 86):

> It seems clear that one of the unintended functions of "sensitivity training" or "basic encounter" groups is anticipating a world of temporary systems, since these groups emphasize openness, feedback, immediacy, communication at a feeling level, the

> here-and-now, more awareness of and ability to express deeper feelings, and so on.

Our successes in developing affluence in economic goods and services, a multiplicity of social structures, and the technological society have helped move the population distribution along the humanistic continuum. We now have large segments of the population in the expertise and self subsystems. These broad-scale movements in the social *mise en scene* are the first humanistic changes that contribute to changes in people and situations in higher education.

2. The Actors: New Roles for Old Positions

Student Roles - In large state universities where the students come from predominantly middle-class origins or aspire to middle-class status we see a preponderance of a sociability among students (Peterson, *On a Typology of College Students*, 1965, pp. 31-41). These students are likely to try to fit in with the existing culture and to get along with the on-going system of values and attitudes. They are much like the general society from which they come and carry their sociability subsystem back and forth between college and society with no need for change. These students and their subsystem are not a source of conflict. But an important comparison between these students and the students of the late 1930's emerges.

In that time the overall distribution of humanistic types was centered in the earlier stages of the humanistic continuum. Most people were concerned with meeting their day-to-day needs or keeping their jobs, survival and stability. The upper part of the distribution in those days was in sociability with a very few people in expertise and self. Thus colleges which served the upper parts of society (took their students from the upper end of the humanistic distribution of types) took many sociability, some expertise, and a few self types. For example, the previous discussion of Bennington College showed its distribution to be predominantly sociability and expertise during the period of Newcomb's first study, the late 1930's. Now, however, institutions of higher education which take their students from the upper parts of society can choose from among large numbers of expertise and self types. In the study of Bennington in the 1960's we saw a large number of self types, "creative individualists" (Newcomb and Flacks, Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus, 1963-66). This group of self types is important to understanding conflict in the universities because, it should be remembered, they are often anti-organizational. Also, they are anti- or non-professional, and college professors are strongly professional. This is an important source of conflict, and I'll come back to it later.

The change in the distribution of humanistic types in our population has led to a large proportionate increase in self types in our society. This is part of the second and closely related change which has affected university life, the change in numbers and humanistic distribution of the students.

What does college offer to different humanistic types? For many people college is the gateway to their aspirations. To the middle class, especially secure jobs such as the technological ones (in fairly constant demand) or the bureaucratic jobs of security and relatively good pay. Engineers and teachers, for example, often come from the socially mobile lower-middle class (M. Rosenberg, Occupations and Values, 1957). A college education is a way to provide the stability desired by the lower-middle class and let a stability oriented person emerge into a sociability oriented person, a jump in subsystems.

To a student from a middle-class background, one who is secure in his sociability subsystem, a college education is a way to move up to the expertise subsystem; he can do this by the professions. Here again, college is the gateway and provides a pleasant sociability stmosphere for 4 years.

If college is meant for anyone it is the expertise students. With their departments, fields, specialities, subspecialties, and so forth universities are made for people who want to carve out a niche by becoming an expert in an intellectual field. Using one's expertise as a basis for influencing or helping others is also an expertise trait. An increase in the expertise segment of society is bringing an increase in "social consciousness," the desire to use one's abilities and influence to help the less well off.

Discussion: Universities - Technocratic Targets for Self Attacks, Observation 1 - As part of the technocratic culture, universities epitomize the use of technique in thinking. Theories are examples of technique manifested in thought. They are standardized, efficient approaches or methods of conceptualizing, hypothesizing, understanding, and working with intellectual problems. An individual theory is a technique, and theory building itself is a technique of techniques. Generalizing, abstracting, and theorizing are all intellectual techniques. These are the essence of both intellectual expertise and of the activities universities engage in. This makes the universities one fountainhead of the technocratic society and may partially explain why they are a prime target for attacks on the technocratic society by self people.

When it comes to possible benefits from a college education, the self student is in a difficult position. If he is interested in self-expression, a college may or may not help him. A frequent attitude toward the arts, for example, on college campuses is one of intellectual appreciation or knowing one's cultural heritage, but not of actually participating in the development of the culture. Frequently, the orientation of the faculty stops at expertise, "It's all right to appreciate artists, but not to be one." A self student may find that a college supplies him with an institutional setting to develop himself if he is able to use the courses for his own personal growth, but they may interfere with him, too, since they are planned, run, and organized by, for, and of the expertise subsystem. He is likely to look down on the "professionalism" of the faculty (expertise) just as they look down on the sociability subsystem or the stability subsystem. But this is hard for the faculty to realize for their perceptions are expertise-laden.

Discussion: Universities - Technocratic Targets for Self Attacks, Observation 2 - Possibly even more important than the technocratic organizational style and the technocratic-theoretical thinking style is the type of technocratic activity that universities are the center of - intellectual activity, thought, use of the mind. In the description of the self type in Chapter 2 I pointed out that they are especially sensitive to and interested in the mind and its multipotentialities. Given this high importance to the mind, its effects and uses, and to awareness and consciousness, self types are especially aware of the ways the actions of universities affect the mind and its activities. Specializing in education and thought, universities are in the spotlight of self students' interests.

The self students place a high importance on unity and holism, but they see the universities splintering knowledge into increasingly small segments. Self types value self-determination and freedom to form one's own mind, but they see general studies committees, interdepartmental politicking, and departmental bickering deciding who will study what, and where, and how much, that is, deciding the general university curricula and major requirements. They see professors set course requirements based on their expert knowledge of the field, not on the expert knowledge about or understanding of their students. Self students value emotion and creativity as much as they value cognition, but they see the universities infatuated with knowledge as the proper goal of formal education. Where are the universities that care for the affective potentials of the mind? They hear about freedom that is supposed to come from a liberal education and the humanities, but they see high school and grade school curricula being determined by committees of experts from various fields; expert mathematicians try to teach children to think like mathematicians, and expert historians want to teach children to think like a historian. How does controlling patterns of thought by teams of university experts liberate minds? Self types see high schools judging their faculties, adjusting their curricula, and estimating their success by their ability to place their seniors in the best colleges. And college admissions criteria are set by admissions committees often composed of university professors. How appropriate to individual needs, how helpful to different humanistic groups, how free is education controlled by expertise?

Combined with the assumed shift in society toward the upper end of the humanistic continuum, an increase in number of students going to college is bringing more self types into the campuses. Their self subsystems are radically different from the subsystems of the faculty, administrators, regents, etc. I discuss this more fully in the next chapter. But there is another change at the other end of the humanistic continuum which is at least as important, perhaps more so. This is the increase in the number of students from lower on the humanistic continuum.

Survival and Stability Subsystems - The changes in the economy are making it possible for some families which have survival and stability backgrounds to begin to emerge into higher subsystems. As they do so, their children are beginning to leave behind the worldviews of their parents and are aspiring to higher standings. They are often no longer needed for day-to-day earnings to help support the family, and are entering higher education, often with the help of their own earnings and scholarship aid. The latter is increasingly being given on the basis of financial need rather than scholastic achievement. These students are bringing whole new subsystems to their campuses. And this accounts for some of the conflict - stability subsystems versus the official college sociability and expertise. For some instances of conflict between the stability-sociability subsystem of minorities and the expertise subsystem of college faculty see "Campus Explosion," Roberts, 1970). While many of these students come from minorities, they by no means all do. Thus, we have 2 "new" subsystems, the stability and the self making themselves felt on college campuses.

Minority Sociability - Another aspect of increased enrollment is the fact that many minority students with emerging or fully developed sociability are now able to enter previously overwhelmingly white, middle-class institutions. This is a different group from the stability (lower-middle-class) group. The stability types (by no means limited to minorities) bring their subsystem of stability with them, as mentioned above. But the middle-class minorities and those aspiring to middle-class status are likely to have a sociability subsystem characteristic of the middle class. One of the desires of this subsystem is to be accepted and to be recognized as a person. One way of doing this is to have the values of one's ethnic background accepted by the majority, as a valuable contribution to the larger society for example. This allows one to fit into the society by adjusting the values of the society. Accepting the values and backgrounds of the minorities and appreciating their contributions to the culture has been accomplished somewhat with the contributions of other groups which previously joined the social-oriented middle class. In the United States the middle-class society has acknowledged the contributions of Germans, Italians, Polish, Irish, etc. Now it is being told to accept the contributions of the blacks, American Indians, chicanos, orientals, and other groups as well. Much of the push for the recognition of black culture in our society can be seen as an effort to get the whole society (both minorities and dominant white) to recognize and accept blackness just as it has recognized and accepted Irishness or Polishness.

The absorption which the sociability blacks are pushing is not absorption in the sense of losing identity or becoming lost in a smothering white society. It is acceptance of differences and learning to see differences as a valuable resource of pride in one's culture. Until there were large numbers of organized middle-class blacks, a black man or woman had to adopt the values of the white, middle-class society to become a full member of the larger society. The individual had to adjust to the white society's values. Now the black community is saying that it is time for the socially-oriented middle class to adjust its values, to accept blackness and black culture as a legitimate culture of the United States. In the sense of wanting their ethnicity recognized, the blacks want the same thing that other minorities of the past wanted and achieved.

Thus, in addition to the pressure of 2 "new" subsystems to higher education, stability and self, we are seeing a manifestation of sociability among middle-class minorities in the form of pressure to accept them and their backgrounds, too. Their pressure is a third force in its content (black culture) but is more understandable to the middle class because it is a desire for the social acceptance that the white, sociability types desire for themselves, too.

In terms of student activist groups we have:*

1- a new and growing group of self types, who are likely to be anti- or non-organizational

2- a large number of expertise students who are activists in the sense of wanting to contribute to the good of mankind

3- minority students who want their ethnic cultures recognized as legitimate cultures in the United States

4- a group of students who bring a survival and/or stability subsystem with them. This includes a strong political interpretation of the world, as Newcomb noted in the high political orientation of his conservative students (1943, p. 42).

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*In addition to these groups there is the group of rebels I mentioned in my discussion of Newcomb's chapter "Attitude Formation as a Function of Reference Groups," Chapter 9. I am not including this group, which is seen as rebelling against the status quo and/or against their fathers, in this chapter because their rebellion is interpreted from a developmental psychology and/or Freudian point-of-view, and I have not presented a humanistic interpretation of either of these in this work. I hope to do so in the future and plan to discuss adolescent and post-adolescent rebellion at that time.

As with the subsystems themselves, there isn't a sharp, definite boundary between categories. The self group and the expertise group are contiguous and blend together. So do the survival and stability types.

Nonstudent Roles - The 4 types presented above represent the activists among the students. It is now time to present a humanistic interpretation of the other students, faculty, administration, and people from outside the academic community. Diagram 11-1 presents the student groups and these non-students on the humanistic continuum.

Diagram 11-1

Humanistic Location of Some Partisan Role-Groups in Higher Education

HUMANISTIC CATEGORIES:

	Survival	Stability	Sociability	Expertise	Self
active student types	low income	ethnic recognition		social service	self-development
other college groups		regents administrators	most students	faculty	some "young" faculty & vanguard students
outside interest groups		police legislative bodies general population			

The assignment of location on the diagram has to do with the positions of the ideal-type groups as they participate in conflict around colleges. That position may or may not correspond with the position the same people occupy for other activities. College administrators, for example, are likely to feel that they are in the expertise category, but that their role as administrators requires them to act in a stability-type role. They occupy bureaucratic positions in most cases, and this entails a concern for the security of whole organization and the development and enforcement of rules (Gouldner, "Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," 1957-58, pp. 446, 453). They often feel more responsive toward their colleagues than toward the institution, however, and judge themselves and each other by the standard of what another colleague so situated would do in their positions.

The police, regents, and legislative bodies are stability types like the administrators because the type of action that is appropriate for them, too, is rule and regulation centered. That is, the way for them to act in our society is through the establishment and promulgation of rules or laws. When a legislator or policeman is asked how to deal with problems, it is part of the subsystem forced on him by his position in our society to give a stability-type answer, law and law enforcement. Another part of the stability subsystem is important there; it is the interpretation of the world in political-economic terms. Given the hostility to change, dislike of introspection, and incipient paranoia of stability types (See discussion of this subsystem in Chapter 2), it is understandable how politicians interpret student unrest as a political activity of foreign origin and possibly of collusive nature. Some of it may be political, for example, that caused by the new low-income students who are also politically-oriented and who are a new power group in a university. However, it is inaccurate to see the social service activity of the expertise types as politically motivated (although it may well have political ramifications, which, in fact, may surprise many naive expertise students). And the self students are likely to feel transcendent over institutions and act outside them, but they are not "political" in the usual sense of trying to wrest control of organizations away from those now in control. Their concerns are not political-economic in the usual sense of the term, although they, too, may have political ramifications.

About half of all college students, as the Peterson report noted (On a Typology of College Students, 1965, p. 33), were in the sociability subsystem, but I think that the distribution of students is moving along the humanistic continuum with the distribution of the general population. But the students are in advance of the general population. The "generation gap" mentioned earlier accounts for some of this; the effects of college itself and the anticipated economic and social benefits may also give students a boost. For example, a student is likely to anticipate greater job security, higher social standing, and higher income than his parents because of his education. His needs will be further along the continuum than his parents' on both accounts.

I explained the placement of most of the faculty in the expertise category in the discussion of Gouldner's investigation into cosmopolitans and locals on a small college campus, Chapter 7, and in my interpretation of Newcomb's early studies of Bennington College, Chapters 9 and 10.

3. The Situation

The words "generation gap" are often invoked as an explanation of some differences and origins of conflict between college students and older adults. But the words are a label, or a name, not an explanation. Merely calling the difference a "generation gap" doesn't explain anything; it just names it. And the thing it names is not too clear. What are the characteristics of the "generation gap"? Here I maintain that at least part of it is a difference in subsystems, and I think that a large part of the conflict can be explained by these differences.

Subsystem Gap - The third change in society that is showing itself in college and university strife is the "subsystem gap" between generations. In one sense this is a mechanism of the first force, the shift of our whole society up the humanistic continuum. A person who has not felt secure as a child may be overly zealous in trying to achieve stability as an adult. As Maslow has noted, it is often the ones who have had the least problems with a stage who show the least concern with it (Motivation and Personality, 1954, p. 84). People who have never been worried about where their next meal is coming from have simply never learned to be concerned about it, or overconcerned about it. As General Proposition 4 states: "The influence of a stage on social behavior is a function of the effort the person or group expended to achieve the stage."

When we come to apply this to family structure a picture of the "generation gap" emerges as a subsystem gap. Suppose the parents are from middle-class backgrounds and went to college. If the husband became a professional or moderately successful businessman, then they are likely to have moved into the upper-middle class, at least as far as their income, etc. go. But this status is an achieved one for them, and they are likely to guard it carefully and to follow what they feel are upper-middle-class values stringently. If the man or woman is a professional, he is likely to be strongly pro-professional, active in professional societies, and the family is likely to strive to have the accoutrements of the upper-middle-class life, tastes, goods, etc. This is not to say that a person himself cannot move along the humanistic continuum, but that he carries with him his past and possible hang-ups.

But what about their children? To them these things are the natural things of life. Their status is ascribed to them by their birth, not by their accomplishments. Having never felt a strong threat to survival, stability, sociability, or expertise feelings, goods, and views, the children go on to the next stage and become the self generation. They may or may not be wise in paying little attention to the earlier stages, for they may suddenly find themselves without the goods that can support the self life. The aphoristic "rags to riches to rags in 3 generations" may be the folk expression of this. But these children of expertise parents are born into an expertise subsystem and naturally assume it; they go on from there to self.

Thus emerges the subsystem gap between generations. This gap may, of course, occur between generations other than a parental expertise (with social residue) and a child's self. But the example given here is especially relevant to some of the forces precipitating crises in higher education. First, there are few institutional roles for self people. Second, the self people are causing much of the furor around universities.

The reason that self students are causing such a commotion around universities may be that they see that the university is often a gatekeeper to the roles that they eventually want for their self-development, but that the expertise-oriented, professional activities of the university are not relevant to their self-development. The general university structure limits their freedom. The intellect-laden classes are appropriate for those whose individual self-development is primarily intellectual, but inappropriate for other types of development. Furthermore, the professors' expertise subsystem restricts the students, who have a wider subsystem. These students judge themselves by their own self-development not by the professional colleagues of the professors, which are the professors' reference group.

Another problem is that people, including university professors, often are restricted to seeing or understanding only that which fits their conceptual scheme. This emergent group of self types does not fit into previously established categories of college students except as an odd group such as Clark & Trow's "nonconformists" (1966). It isn't always clear that this group is not merely nonconforming, but really an expected development in our society, conforming to the expectations of this humanistic theory. It may be an unpleasant shock to the professors to think that many of their students have passed them and look back at them as well-meaning, but hung-up, or backwards. Hopefully, this humanistic theory will allow professionals to see beyond their specialties and beyond professionalism.

SUMMARY

To sum up, we have 3 types of major subsystem shifts which affect colleges. The whole population is shifting toward the self end of the humanistic continuum; this is bringing the growing self subsystem into conflict with the expertise and sociability subsystems of the college communities. It also is resulting in growing numbers of students in the expertise orientation's desire to be of service to the world and to work on social problems.

Painting the humanistic history of western man in the broadest strokes, I indicated one way this theory can be used in historical analysis. Humanistic development, it seems to me, is one of the tributaries to the river of history, and the humanistic theory can be one spring of thought to analyze this flow. I feel this is one of the most exciting potentials of the theory.

Second, admissions and financial aid policies are bringing in students from stability and even survival backgrounds; this is also bringing awareness of social problems, among other things, to the college communities. Here we see a mutual area of concern shared with the expertise students. The stability types want to alleviate social problems of the communities they come from, and the expertise types want to be of service. This is both a potential alliance of goals and a potential area of conflict of methods and reasons for the aid.

Third, the generation gap, which comes from the differences in subsystems between generations, aggravates the problem. In fact, the gap can be considered a sort of tribute to the parental generation because it arises from their success at obtaining the goals they set out to obtain and in making their children feel that these goals have been achieved and are natural for them. This allows the children to go on to subsequent humanistic stages, but results in the conflicts due to the different perceptions and conceptual schemes of the different subsystems.

The 4 student activist types and these other actors in college and university fracases are the main groups to consider when examining the friction, rebellion, and revolution centered in institutions of higher education today. Our society is familiar with many of these humanistic types, if not as students, then as others in our society. The self type is relatively new to many people. Treating them as if they were rebels interested in destroying society infuriates and aggravates them. While there have usually been a few self types before, our society is now experiencing many of them, and they are causing much of the concern and commotion. Because of this, I'll write the next chapter on the self students, describing them, giving a partial explanation of their origins, and showing how their characteristics explain part of the student turmoil on campus.

Chapter 12

FREEDOM OF THE MIND:
A VIEW OF THE SELF SUBSYSTEM IN
STUDENT ACTIVISM, POLITICS, EDUCATION, LITERATURE, AND DRUGS

Introduction

The major characteristic of self types is, as their name indicates, primary concern with their own development. Social, political, and artistic judgments are made from their own perspectives. They take Polonius' advice, "To thine own self be true." This above all is the central value of their existence. The slogan, "Do your own thing" is more than a popular catch-phrase with them. It is a choice for a method of existence.

This chapter is divided into 2 parts. Part 1 is a statement of what I think are some of the dangers of overdoing the self subsystem. My general criticism is: If we assume that the emergence into later stages of the humanistic continuum is contingent on the successful achievement of the goals of the earlier stages and on continuing to maintain those goals, then we should be careful that our current interests don't undermine the achievements of the earlier stages. How much of the previous stages need we maintain in order to reach these later stages? What of the previous stages is helpful and what is a hindrance? I ask these questions, but offer no solutions.

The second part of this chapter is a description of the self subsystem as it is appearing in some components of our society, (1) student activism, (2) politics, (3) knowledge and the "new education," (4) literature, and (5) drug use. I end the chapter with a personal note again.

Part 1

VALUE STATEMENT: OVERDOING SELF, A MYOPIC DANGER

I find that when writers describe something, especially current or anticipated social events, their readers often react as if the writers were advocating what they are reporting. Of course, sometimes they do and sometimes don't advocate what they observe or predict, but often readers spend their time and intellectual powers agreeing or disagreeing with what they assume the writer's values are, not with whether his description or prediction is accurate or inaccurate, likely or unlikely. I hope by showing that I am ambivalent about the developments themselves (depending on whether the dangers are avoided or not) that you readers will concern yourselves with my observations separate from my values. I hope that society will develop into the self stage, but not before it can be reasonably sure that it will be able to maintain that stage and not revert to earlier stages.

It is my observation that the self values are as central to self types as are staying alive to the survival types, security to the stability types, congeniality to the sociability types, and specialization to the expertise types. However, I think that each of these types has a danger (perhaps even likelihood) of overdoing its general factor to the detriment of the individual himself and the weakening of the society and individuals around him. In an effort to secure survival the stability stage emerges, and this may be accompanied by an overdevelopment of those qualities that provide security. Economically we may see hoarding and over-accumulation of wealth, such as Tawney describes in The Acquisitive Society (1948). And/or we may see stability overdone with religious and political authoritarianism and the domination of religious and/or political ideology through overbearing church and/or state.

The "other-directed society" and "the lonely crowd" have pointed out the weakness of sociability carried to an extreme. As we have misers of wealth and goods under the high economic value of the survival and stability stage, we have social greed, or tyranny of the majority, when the social stage is overdone.

The types of expertise gluttony are beginning to catch up with us, but I am not sure we have seen them all. One form of gluttony is the knowledge explosion as exemplified by the glut of published material. (I am contributing my bit to that sin now.) When scientific data were scarce, it is understandable how a society might value it highly. Each idea or bit of evidence could greatly aid such a society. But now, the marginal utility of much additional knowledge is low. Some, of course, may be very useful and highly valuable; other knowledge may just flood the journals and take up valuable documentary and computer space and time. As already pointed out Roszak's Counter-culture (1969) and Ellul's Technocratic Society (1964) indicate excesses of this subsystem.

The fractionalization of society and compensating growth in complex organization with the development of overspecialization in knowledge and skills may also be overly expertise oriented. Instead of expecting all people to specialize in one occupation, perhaps we should expand our cultural values to include some people who work at several occupations either part-time, continually or full-time, serially. As previous ages have overdone their production of goods and building of "appropriate" social structures, so we may be repeating their excesses, but from an expertise orientation, rather than from an orientation characteristic of earlier humanistic stages.

Perhaps this over-production is necessary in order for a society (or an individual) to unhang itself (himself) from his earlier lack of satisfaction. But perhaps not. It would be worth knowing for policy makers and intellectual curiosity seekers.

What is the quality of too much of the self subsystem? It will be helpful to speculate on one way self develops from expertise. In the expertise stage specialization leads to fractionalization and the problems of organizing a complex of specialties. Knowledge is produced with the vague hope that some day it may be useful. In the humanistic theory a stage can be thought of as an evolutionary development between the 2 stages it connects. A person's specialization in the expertise stage can be thought of as nascent self; a person chooses (or falls into) a field where he develops his interest and own specialty within that field. But he is still likely to judge himself by others' opinions of himself. The reference group, however, instead of being the larger society or membership group, becomes his professional colleagues. And the more he specializes, the more specialized, and fewer, his colleagues become.

As he moves into the self orientation, the focus of his specialty narrows from one specialized, public field of knowledge and/or skill to himself and his own development. He may use the specialized field as part of his personal development, but the emphasis switches from it to himself. At the same time, he becomes aware of other interests he has and can develop; he is aware of himself as a congerie of possibilities, some of which he may be able to actualize and some of which he will not fully develop. As this awareness grows, he, rather than other people, becomes the best judge of himself. While others may contribute their insights or stimulate his insights into himself, he becomes the most important judge of himself to himself.

What, then, is the danger of overdoing the self state? It is awareness of oneself to the exclusion of seeing oneself as a member of society at large. It is egocentric myopia, concentration on oneself to the exclusion of the world at large. Each stage has its own sort of nonreality. The inability to see all of oneself, interior and exterior relationships, is a potential weakness of the self types.

It is understandable that a nouveau self type is likely to become overly concentrated on this new subjective world. Like any major discovery or revelation, it is fascinating. A whole, new world does open up. Old worlds have been shed, and the excitement of transcending them is exhilarating. Self-development becomes strongly reinforcing. A second source of forgetfulness is the rejection of the previous subsystem. Shakespeare's description of an ambitious man's disdain for the early stages of the path he trod applies to the humanistic trip as well as to Caesar's climb:

> But when he once attains the upmost round,
> He then unto the ladder turns his back,
> Looks in the clouds, scorning the base degrees
> By which he did ascend.

Julius Caesar,
Act II, Sc. 1, line 21

In the beautiful language of the social sciences, we might say that when a person aspires to a status or when he begins to achieve it, he tries to disassociate himself from the status characteristics, including values, of his previous lower status. To cite Maslow's example, "...even sometimes the physiological needs, which being satisfied, are now underestimated..." (Motivation and Personality, 1954, pp. 84-85). Emergence and support of later stages depends on the continued satisfaction of the earlier stages.

This is not to say that the institutions and traditions of the earlier stages must be kept completely intact or that the social structures, norms, and actions of an early stage must be kept unchanged in order to sustain the later stages. It's possible, and I believe has happened, that the new institutions of emerging stages take over the functions of the institutions of earlier stages and provide the new stage with the support that originally came from the old institutions. For example, national (or other political unit) law replaced church law. The nation took over one of the stability functions of the church. Some professions have taken over part or almost all this function by colleague control. What it is important to see is that somehow at least some degree of these past humanistic functions must be maintained. How much, or which ones? These are unanswered questions. As long as they are maintained, then they may be of negligible importance to the emergent or restructured society. Its needs are centered around the general factor of the new subsystem. Maslow says that one characteristic of the fully-developed self type (self-actualizing person) is that he can see that he is often called on to do things that are necessary to the continuation of society even though these tasks may be personally unpleasant and may not contribute directly to his own self-growth (Toward a Psychology of Being, 1962). As a man in society, however, he benefits from building a society that helps him develop his special talent or his unique combination of talents (Motivation and Personality, 1954, pp. 15-16, 105-106, 109-118).

"...total self-awareness, the intention..."

Jerome Ragni and James Rado,
from "Walking in Space," HAIR:
The American Tribal Love-Rock
Musical, 1968.

Total self-awareness is awareness not only of one's personal, inner, and multipotentialed self but also awareness of one's multiple relationships as part of a larger whole. This larger whole includes the rest of society. Either, without the other, is not total and is dangerous to the self and to the whole.

Part 2

SELF IN US AND AROUND US

This part describes some manifestations of the self system as they are developing in our society. The 5 major topics which follow are (1) student activism, (2) politics, (3) knowledge and the "new education," (4) literature, and (5) drug use.

1. The Self Student as an Activist - The self type of student is predominantly interested in his own self-development. Depending on his own nature, this may be a highly personal development, or a highly social development. In this adventure into being himself, however, he runs the risk of too much detachment from his external relationships.

Radical subjectivism - In Students Without Teachers: The Crisis in the University (1969) Harold Taylor describes the backgrounds, personal characteristics and interests and activities of student activists. He calls the central theme of self-growth, "radical subjectivism...the judgments of the private self confronting public truth," (p. 159). This first section of Part 2 examines what he means by "radical subjectivism" and shows how it and the students whom he notes as the radical subjectivists are responsible for self activism. After using Taylor's observations as an introduction to the self activists, I'll give additional evidence that this subsystem is making itself felt in society.

Family Background - If the students Taylor describes are self types, then we would expect them to come from backgrounds that have supplied them with the necessities of the earlier humanistic stages. (See "Demographic Characteristics" in Chapter 6.) He describes them and their demographic etiology just this way. "They were freed from obedience to the norms of the system by their favored economic and social circumstances and by having been part of a society tolerant of its youth" (p. 4). Taylor recognizes that most people consider the dissatisfaction of the privileged youth to be a paradox. Using the humanistic theory, we can see that satisfaction of one set of goals leads to striving for new ones.

Taylor points out that their values come from the middle-class values of participatory democracy which they practiced in their families. This familial glimpse of what society might be has encouraged them to carry participation to the larger community. In their families children are seen as capable of helping to decide matters. They are seen as having insights into themselves, into their desires, and knowledge of themselves that an outside observer cannot have and that should be taken into account in family planning. They carry these attitudes to social institutions outside the family. They are used to choosing for themselves and participating in group decisions that affect themselves. When they come across faculty who prescribe curricula, course content, and institutional relationships, the students are being told what their own experience denies. They are being told that they do not have the capacity to know themselves or make decisions that affect them in spite of their 2 decades of doing just that. They have learned self-determination by practicing it in upper-middle-class families, where they have been the experts on their own feelings and thoughts and have contributed their insights to running the family and their own lives.

The combination of affluence and activism isn't restricted only to colleges and universities. The Wall Street Journal reports that social protest is strong among upper-middle-class high school students too (Pinkerton, "High School Students in Some Rich Towns Begin to Speak Out," 1969). For example, during the October 15, 1969 Moratorium, "the only major absenteeism at a Pittsburgh high school was at Taylor

Allberdice High, one of the city's most prestigious schools" (p. 1).

Much of this protest may be student activism of the expertise and sociability types, a desire to be esteemed through service to mankind, and concern with social equality. Some of it is probably self activism too. This shows up in the desire for student determination of educational content and policy, for sensitivity training and other personal-growth activities, and for strongly individualized education in which a student not only proceeds at his own rate and style, but also chooses his own content. They reject the idea that a certain amount of material must be covered. Curriculum decisions are based on individual choice, not policy set by others.

Peterson (On a Typology of College Students, 1965, pp. 42-57) also noted the higher socio-economic status of his self students. The "nonconformists" (self types) were higher than the voactionalists, collegiates, and academics (stability, sociability, and expertise). They showed almost double the percentage of other types who went to independent secondary schools. In religion they were 3 times as likely to report "no formal religion," and when they did report a background, the Jewish self types reported mostly "reform," and the Protestant self types were often Episcopalian, Friends, United Church of Christ, and Unitarian. The

Protestants showed a noteworthy across-the-board rejection of the faith of their fathers. The fathers were characteristically better educated and had occupations as professionals, owners, or executives with incomes over $14,000. The nonconformists (self) families showed a higher cultural level than the families of the other 3 types, and the self students were especially heavily represented at 2 independent liberal arts colleges. They also strongly preferred arts and the humanities as studies. Presumably these emphasize individual development and choice more than other majors. (See Chapters 4, 5, and 6 for more complete information on this.)

In "Notes on Young Radicals" (1969) Kenneth Keniston summarizes and surveys the research on student activists and reports that they are "an 'elite' group in virtually every respect." Activism is highly correlated with high socioeconomic status, high parental education, and high parental involvement in professional and, in particular, "helping vocations" (p. 30). Here, again, we see the demographic characteristics of the self subsystem that Peterson (1965) found in his nonconformists.

Especially important, says Keniston, are moral issues, "The most impressive differences found between activists and nonactivists have been in the area of moral development." The difference he describes sounds like a description of a moral stance that would come from a self subsystem. Suggesting 3 stages in moral development, he says that the activists are most characterized by the third stage. The first is "pre-conventional" self-gratification. The second is conventional community standards (This sounds like sociability standards). The third is "post-conventional" and is characteristic of student activists; it is a development away from the conventional (sociability) moral standards and is concerned with the long-range good of the community and with abstract personal principles such as the sanctity of life. His description sounds like a self transcendence of sociability values (and possibly expertise?) and suggests the self traits of wholeness, union, and personalism.

The habit of self-determination and the fulfilled needs of the 4 earlier stages on the humanistic continuum have allowed these self types to become one of the major forces for change in the university. Their upper-middle-class status gives them the freedom as well as the desire to practice their radical subjectivism (Taylor, 1969, p. 71):

> In any case, for the foreseeable future on the college campuses, the radicals will be coming from middle-income families with enough money to make possible the freedom of youthful political action which goes with not having to work while in college and not having to withhold opinion or action in order to hold a job.

Considering the costs of a college education, these "middle-income" families sound more like upper-middle-income to me.

Since some schools and governments are likely to withhold financial aid to students "not in good standing," e.g., who are disrupters, financial independence may be an almost necessary condition for self activism, but not a sufficient condition. Here again, we see how the successes of society as well as its failures produce changes.

Advice to Hegelians - If you want to see societies increase tension to bring about change, help them reach their goals and rejoice in their successes as well as in their failures. Success is a seed of discontent as much as failure, perhaps more.

2. The Politics of the Self Subsystem

> "Modernisms" - "Modern" thought characteristically seeks insight into its own roots. The seminar will consider how such increased awareness of subjectivity affects subsequent action or expression.
>
> - Yosal Rogat (1969)

The Growing Tip - Report from the Front - In the discussion of the changes in society that are manifesting themselves in college conflict (Chapter 11), I analyzed the self types as conflicting with the major portion of society and with the college faculty and administrators because these students are from an advanced part of society, from a subsystem that not many people have experienced before. Taylor conceives of the conflict in a similar vein (p. 6):

> To speak of a younger generation and to characterize

> it is to speak of those in it who go against the norms of their own generation and give the information to the society about what exists in the developing consciousness of the next phase of America.

Here we see the idea that the student activists (of this type, at least) somehow are in advance of the general society. Taylor (1969) and Roszak (The Making of a Counter-Culture, 1969) also spot their high value of a personal view of society and their antagonism toward a group view (Taylor, p. 159):

> If civilization is on trial, it is the civilization of those whose values are ultimately social and political, and therefore not only anti-subjective, but anti-human.

Taylor mentions social and political values (sociability and stability subsystem values) in the above quotation as characteristic of our current civilization, and this seems accurate; throughout the book he also describes the rejection of the dominant expertise values found in the universities, but he does so as if these were primarily social and political values.

Roszak, on the other hand, explicitly describes the personalism and subjective political and social values as opposed to the "technocracy" or the scientific-expertise subsystem (The Making of a Counter-Culture, 1969):

> A discerning few...have a shrewd sense of where the technocracy leaves off and the New Jerusalem begins: not at the level of class, party, or institution, but rather at the non-intellective level of the personality from which these political

> and social forms issue. They see, and many who follow them find the vision attractive, that building the good society is not primarily a social, but a psychic task. What makes the youthful disaffiliation of our time a cultural phenomenon, rather than merely a political movement, is the fact that it strikes beyond ideology to the level of consciousness, seeking to transform our deepest sense of the self, the other, the environment. (p. 49)
>
> The underlying unity of these differing styles of dissent (the New Left) is revealed by the extraordinary personalism...the unwillingness...to reify doctrine.... Personal commitments, not abstract ideas, are the stuff of politics.... Truth must have a biographical, not merely an ideological, context. (pp. 56-7)

This biographical context is a characteristic of the literature of our times too, according to Lionel Trilling. (See Section 4, "The Subjective Style in Literature," later in this chapter.)

The Self Political Style - The criticism shows itself in the self, or subjective, political style. This style, as would be expected, emphasizes personal commitment and action, as opposed to action in organized groups. Instead of electing people to do what needs to be done, self types participate in the action themselves. The anti-organizational bias is not a romantic anti-group sentiment. They act in groups, but the groups are collections of like-minded and like-acting individuals, not well-formed organizations. Membership, for example, is open and fluid. In fact, it is questionable whether the concept of "membership" in its usual sense of meeting the requirements of the organization is appropriate. Organizational requirements are a limit on individual development, so "membership," if it can be called that, is determined by presence or absence at a meeting or activity. Membership might be best defined in terms of communications - those who discuss and listen to each other and talk about the topic of the hour. Loosely linked by overlapping interests, the same people may often show up at discussions or joint activities, but the membership is open to individual decision to participate or not. A "member" for one ad hoc topic may be a nonmember for another. Political power is not delegated to someone elected, appointed, or hired to act on behalf of the group. Political power depends on a speaker's ability to get others to act themselves. This, also, is a style that is helped by economic affluence. Participation may take spare time, some money (very possibly forgoing earnings), and effort (not spent on individual economic efforts).

An excellent description and discussion of the self style is Michael Rossman's "Breakthrough at Berkeley: The Anatomy of a New Political Style" (1968). He notes 3 characteristics of this style. (1) Decision-making is deformalized. Each person makes his own decisions and acts accordingly. (2) The style does not relate to the larger society's style of structured systems. The suspicion and disdain for organization shows itself here but makes interaction with society difficult for both sides because society is structured to work with organized groups, not amorphous collections of individuals. Rossman relates a humorous-pathetic scene in which Berkeley students and townspeople try to obtain a parade permit, but don't have a formal organization or officers to sign papers, be responsible, or act in behalf of any organization. Finally, (3) he notes that there is no social or emotional content (individual meaning) in working through organizational methods such as committees or resolutions. With each man his own decision-maker and participant, the group has little use for "leaders" in the usual sense. Feelings of community solidarity are important, but it is the community of like-feeling, like-minded individuals, not a formal, highly structured group. Rossman's description of one mass meeting catches the essence of the self style, "...this assemblage of free actors who vote with their bodies."

It is hard for people used to thinking in terms of organization to appreciate unstructured, free-style politics and the individual power it can release when each person controls and creates his own actions, does his own thing (p. 41):

> Almost all observers, astounded by the movement's power and the efficiency it displayed, assumed that it was highly organized and centralized, led by skilled and experienced individuals. It was,

> in fact, decentralized and disorganized, semi-leaderless and run largely by novices.... People not only chose to work, they chose the work they would do; orders from on high and central discipline were unnatural.

In his study of the Vietnam Summer organization and participants (Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth, 1968) Kenneth Keniston describes this style and many of the problems it generated. Even though the Vietnam Summer was an exception to New Left organizations because it was large, it showed the characteristic self organizational style. These traits included local autonomy and decision-making; uncoordinated, fragmented, disorganized structure; lack of hierarchical control and traditional patterns of leadership; intense and multiple relationships among members (similar to training groups and sensitivity groups); and discomfort with bureaucratic organization and with control over another person (pp. 150-163). These self organizational styles are in keeping with self interpersonal styles and personalities. "In their personal manner and values, these young men and women favor open, equal, and direct relationships with other people; they are psychologically and ideologically hostile to formally defined, inflexible roles and traditional bureaucratic patterns of power. Their organizational ideal is a face-to-face group of equals" (p. 164).

The usual concepts of politics have to do with organizations that act on many people, coordinate activities among them, or do things for them, some sort of group orientation to politics. With the emergence of the self style in politics, the opposite of these concepts is just as important - nonpolitics - lack of formal organization, people who act themselves for themselves in individual and personal styles. This do-it-yourself emphasis leads to do-ing, self active-ism. Politicians, educators, organizers, administrators, and other experts who act on or for others may have their bitterest pill yet to swallow when they ask, "Well, what do you want us to do?" and the answer comes back, "NOTHING! We'll do it ourselves. Just keep out of our way."

William O. Douglas spots several of the self system traits in the protests of the 1960's; although, of course, he doesn't label them in terms of this humanistic theory (Points of Rebellion, 1970). In the first of the 3 points he notes discontent accompanying affluence (p. 9):

> (1) It (the decade of discontent) comes during a time of prolonged affluence, not of depression;

In the second he spots the do-ing emphasis and the self-active style (p. 9):

> (2) It is not ideological in its orientation but is essentially activist;

In the third he recognizes the attempt to transcend expertise and to achieve the desired self goals of human-centeredness, personalism, and the flowering of diverse human potential

(p. 9):

> (3) It is led by the young people who, though not unanimous in tactics or in objectives, have given these protests a revolutionary tone. The goal of their revolution is not to destroy the regime of technology. It is to make the existing system more human, to make the machine subservient to man, to allow for the flowering of a society where all the idiosyncrasies of man can be honored and respected.

Toward Humanistic Political Analyses

Assumptions - As the normal curve of society moves along the humanistic continuum toward the later stages, the trailing slope and tail become alienated from the larger part of the society. These survival and stability people develop their criticism of the society, but from their respective subsystems. They interpret the movement along the continuum as a movement away from old, established values, and therefore, a threat to their view of society. They are correct that it is a movement away from the old values and views. But if the newly developed social structures can continue to satisfy the old goals, or needs, then new structures can substitute for old ones. The previous values are still important, but they are now secondary to the emerging ones. Previously, in the "good old days" they were primary.

The Trailing Tip - To the conservatives, who are in the earlier stages, the new developments seem to be frivolous. The people holding the new values seem to be paying attention to ephemeral things, or at least to unimportant things. In a way, we can see they are right. The development of a new subsystem depends on success in the previous ones. In that sense the old view is more basic, but, apparently, those who hold on to it do not feel sure enough to take it for granted. The holders of the new view may say that the old one was important in its time, but that times have changed. The emergence of conservative criticism of our expertise and self elements in society may in large part be due to our society's success at moving away from a stability orientation through the sociability stage and now entering the expertise stage.*

Higher educational institutions are centers of an expertise subsystem. Mutual antagonism between the expertise subsystem of the faculty and the stability of the conservative section of society is growing. The conservatives look for stability in ideologies, either religious or political; it is part of the business of academicians to question these. Furthermore, the universities are places where young people collect, and we are seeing an increase in the frequency of self types in the young. Although there is some friction between their subsystem and the universities', there is almost complete lack of comprehension between self and stability.

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*Footnote - Using Maslow's categories, Arnold Mitchell estimates society in the U.S.A. is 25% combined survival and safety (stability), 43% belongingness (sociability), 30% esteem (expertise), and 2% growth (self) (Alternative Futures: An Exploration of a Humanistic Approach to Social Forecasting, 1967, pp. 9-10, 81-82).

Hypotheses and Speculations - This might sometimes result in strange alliances. The stability groups want the universities to support the established (religious and political) values of the society, but part of the business of the faculty is critical examination of these beliefs and the institutions which propound them. But when the self types threaten the faculty and administrators, these expertise types sometimes are forced into an uneasy alliance with the stability types. Often the faculty is split between allying with the stability groups in the general society and the self groups in the students.

Another strange possible alliance is between expertise and self students, on the one hand, and survival and survival-stability outside groups on the other. The latter might be local minorities who feel they are being mistreated by the university or whose problems are being neglected by the university. They see public institutions as supposedly serving the people. Their problems are often basic economic and political problems, but they don't see the university paying any attention to them or their problems. Sometimes, in fact, it aggravates them. The expertise types, with a high value on recognition for public service, and the self types, who value individual freedom from institutional control, combine with the politically active community to fight against administrators and trustees, who by the nature of their roles and perhaps personalities, want stability and smooth social relations. Thus, the poor of the community, who see the university as a threat to their economic stability, are often allied with the well-off expertise and self faculty and students against the desire for social and organizational stability from the administrators and trustees.

National politics suggests additional uses of this type of analysis. We see a coalition in terms of similar humanistic groups, the trailing survival and stability groups combining with the leading expertise and self groups. This unstable coalition is called the Democratic Party. The groups that wander in and out of this coalition are the very poor (the survival group), the working classes (labor), and the intellectuals and liberals (expertise and self types). In the 1968 campaign George Wallace managed to split off many of the stability types with his "law and order" banner, and Richard Nixon appealed to other stability and sociability people.

Between Tips - Report from the Middle - The middle gets it from both ends.

The Relative Nature of Conservatism and Liberalism - The labels "conservative" and "liberal" may also be relative to the dominant humanistic stage of society. In this view we call people "conservatives," as The Trailing Tip (above) suggested, if they are in the more basic stages of the humanistic distribution of the group we are talking about. We call people "liberal" if they are further along the humanistic continuum than most of the society, country, or group we are considering. The following discussion treats liberalism in this view.

The Land of Prosperity and Frontiers Beyond: The Old Left and The New Left - Conservatism and liberalism, then, can be seen as political views in relation to the modal political view of the group they are compared with. We can extend this type of analysis to the old left and the new left.

Some inconsistencies in theory and observations arise when we apply humanistic analysis to the new left. In the introduction to their anthology The New Student Left Mitchell Cohen and Dennis Hale (1969) state that an implicit assumption in political and social analysis by the Students for a Democratic Society is an assumption "that the poor, by having 'less stake' in the system, are therefore potentially more radical than anyone else," (p. xxiv). This assumption about the psychological nature of man assumes that the distribution of goods and services is the major determinant of social-political issues.

This assumption is built on the psychological view of man I attacked in Chapter 1: (1) Deprivation leads to activity, and (2) satiation leads to inactivity. Or, in terms of social-political action, (1) poor people are deprived and are likely to be politically active, radicalizable, and (2) rich people are satisfied and are unlikely to be politically active. 2 usually includes, "...and when they are active, they are likely to be conservative."

These unchallenged psychological assumptions are also the psychological basis for both the old left and for conservative social and political theories. Although these groups differ on what they think the steps to providing the goods and services should be, both formulate their social ideologies in terms of how the wealth should be distributed, redistributed, or how people should be able to achieve the goods they want and/or deserve. This "GNP psychology" and GNP social and political ideology based on it claim that it is the degree of satisfaction of goods and services that determines whether men are complacent or active. Other social phenomena are thought to stem from this basic degree of economic satisfaction. In attributing ripeness for political radicalism to the poor the old left, such as communists, socialists, and some liberals join the conservatives in their view of man as essentially determined by economics.

Just as behavioral psychology is basically goods oriented so old left (and old right) political and social theory and ideology are basically goods (in a broad sense) oriented. Both attempt to explain the types of behavior that interest them in terms of goods (and services) and in terms of the satisfaction of basic survival needs. Behavioral psychology attempts to understand individual behavior in terms of when the individual is given the goods, "reinforced." Behavioral political theory attempts to understand group behavior in terms of the relative distribution of goods.

When it comes to influencing human behavior behaviorism tries to change individual behavior by controlling the times the goods are presented, i.e., the schedule of reinforcement or the contingencies of reinforcement. Old left political ideology, correspondingly, tries to change societies by changing the distribution of goods. Humanistic criticism is not that these theories, ideologies, and techniques are in some sense "wrong" but that they are incomplete and of limited usefulness because they are based on a survival-stability view of man.

When psychologists study the survival needs of animals and generalize these findings to mankind, this generalization and methodology may not be wholly appropriate. We can assume that we share these traits with animals. But if we have differences, higher needs, then the scope of generalizations should be limited only to the characteristics we share. To what extent do nonhuman species share characteristics of the other humanistic subsystems? (Here is another field for development - comparative humanistic psychology.)

The new left, according to the quotation in the first paragraph, sees itself as accepting this behavioral model of man too. I doubt it does wholly accept it or the social theories based on it; it may not realize it has another choice. But if it does use GNP theory, it is left with some serious contradictions between its theoretical formulations and empirical observations. For example, in the Port Huron Statement (1962) the SDS members describe themselves, not as poor and therefore radical, "We are the people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed in universities, looking uncomfortably at the world we inherit" (Students for a Democratic Society, "From the Port Huron Statement," 1962). And as Richard Peterson's study showed (1965) the nonconformists characteristically came from higher socio-economic backgrounds. Kenneth Kenniston found that they were the elite in almost every respect, including socio-economic ("Notes on Young Radicals," 1969). The behavioral assumption that satiation leads to satisfied inactivity can hardly be maintained under these circumstances.

Another set of inconsistencies is apparent in the statements of goals that the new left seeks. While the old left conceptualized, analyzed, and prescribed in terms of the distribution of wealth, this is but one plank in the new left platform. The Port Huron Statement, on the other hand, includes the following among its desires for mankind (pp. 12-13):

> The goal of man and society should be human independence: a concern not with image or popularity but with finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic; a quality of mind...which has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences, one which easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly faces problems which are troubling and unresolved - one with an intuitive awareness of possibilities, and active sense of curiosity, and ability and willingness to learn.
>
> This kind of independence does not mean egotistic individualism; the object is not to have one's way as much as it is to have a way that is one's own. Nor do we deify man - we merely have faith in his potential.

This quotation is by no means a complete statement of the SDS view of what man might become (if one can even speak of one representative view). The self values and goals are obvious in this quotation - independence, personal authenticity and meaning, wholeness, and the potentials of the mind. In the rest of The New Student Left, expecially the section "The Campus Revolt," we find other statements of the sensitivity to self goals. How can this sensitivity and these goals be explained by a GNP psychology or sociology?

A New Psychology for New Minds - If we switch our view of human psychology to humanistic psychology, these theoretical problems and empirical findings clear up. The first assumption, that deprivation leads to activity, is consistent with humanistic psychology. People who are hungry, sick, unhealthy, etc. do want the goods and services that will solve these problems. In the survival subsystem behavioral analysis is useful.

But once these goals are reached, people do not become inactive until want or the fear of want is threatening. They move from this concern with immediate survival needs to providing for these needs in the future, a movement toward stability needs. GNP psychology, or behaviorism, then tries to explain this by linking all activity to conditioning based on these basic survival subsystem wants, conditioned reinforcers. Dynamic of Freudian psychology typically does the same; it links most human behavior to the basic pleasures of the survival stage, via such things as symbolic behavior, sublimation, etc.

But human behavior goes on and on long after these desires have been satisfied. Even people who are bred in comfort show dissatisfaction. They are not contented cows grazing in the pastures of consumer plenitude. This is where humanistic psychology criticizes behavioral and dynamic psychology and offers an explanation for the presence of discontent and for the self kind of discontent among the children of affluence. Although their more basic goals are reached, higher goals emerge as the quotation on goals from the Port Huron Statement illustrated. And these goals are the source of new satisfactions and new dissatisfactions. Humanistic psychology then discards the second assumption of behavioral psychology, that satiation leads to inactivity. In terms of the original survival goal there is inactivity, but activity switches to a new subsystem; it leads to a new sort of activity for the new goals.

Humanistic psychology, sociology, and political science offer to reconcile the contradiction that many of the new left are from higher socio-economic classes, and they offer to give a theoretical base for these emergent goals. They also offer partial explanations of such things as the intransigence of many upper-lower and lower-middle class groups to the types of change that many of the new left want. These groups are beginning to "make it" in society, and any possible change is a possible threat to them.

As diverse people as Abraham Maslow (Motivation and Personality, 1954), Eric Hoffer (The True Believer, 1966), and John Gardner (Self-Renewal, 1964) have pointed out that once a man begins to see the social system pay off, he becomes a vigorous supporter of it. GNP psychology applies at this level. A little bit of going along with the system pays off in goods a survival person sorely needs. If he feels he is just holding on to his job, for example, he won't welcome any threat to his employer. Attempts to "radicalize the workers" are likely to be exceedingly difficult unless these stability types can be shown that the proposed changes will result in increased security.

The GNP behavioral psychology, sociology and politics of the old left were adequate when concern with the necessities of life were paramount in our society. But this psychological-social-political view of man was based on a restricted view of 1 or 2 humanistic subsystems. When most of society was centered in the survival-stability section of the humanistic continuum, then the relatively wealthy people (the stability types) would be against change. Today we see a similar reaction among white, blue-collar workers who interpret rising minority expectations and consequent behavior as threats to their economic and social security. Assumption 2, that satiation leads to conservatism, is accurate for those specific situations. But now that large portions of society in the advanced industrial societies are in the sociability and expertise subsystems and have been there for long enough to feel securely so, that assumption no longer holds for the entire society, although it still would be appropriate for the stability types.

In summary, aching stomachs and full stomachs are both sources of change. The former want changes that will fill their stomachs. Those with full stomachs want changes to bring about goals less concerned with stomachs and further along the humanistic continuum.

I suggest that, if the new left wants a social science that can give it a theoretical basis for dissatisfaction among both the very poor and the sons-of-affluence, then it restrict the second assumption of GNP social science and consider humanistic psychology's view of stages of human wants. This will be no way to win friends from the old left, or the right, but self types aren't sociability types anyway. A humanistic social science will not so much attack communists, capitalists, and socialists as it will subsume their particular views within a larger theoretical framework.

Humanistic theory gives us a partial explanation for what was previously a paradox, the well-off showing discontent with the social system. It also opens the door for the reconceptualization of social goals, for a new vision of where mankind has been on the path toward these goals, for a reformulation of individual and social goals, and for ways to reach them.

I hope that someone reading this will be able to analyze social problems humanistically and suggest appropriate programs and policies. Must a society attend to only one sort of goal? Or, can it and its institutions minister to all 5 subsystems? How does one reconcile these conflicting subsystems? These, it seems to me are the questions that the self political style asks.

3. Self Knowledge and the "New Education"

Living as Experienced Education - Taylor's book (Students Without Teachers, 1969) is full of citations of the self characteristics of this portion of today's student-activist minority. Considering students who were active in integration, freedom rides, voter-registration, freedom schools, peace rallies, tutoring, protests, civil disobedience, draft-card burning, teach-ins, organizing, boycotts, and more, Taylor describes how these students learned about society, not through the mediated experiences of "education" but through their own self-directed, self-experienced living (p. 19):

> Before acting, they had to choose to act, and before choosing, they had to know why they were making the choice. The act of choosing set in motion a new kind of self-knowledge and self-education, partly because they had thrown in their lot with others more sophisticated than themselves about the situations in which they acted, but mainly because they had injected themselves into the world, and, having done so, unavoidably learned more about it.

The themes of personal commitment, personal action, and the resulting personal knowledge run through the self subsystem.

Deciding as Education - One must decide for himself what actions to take and why and how to take them, what to learn and why and how to learn it. Socially and educationally legitimate reasons are neither necessary nor sufficient for self legitimation. If ideas and actions are to be judged by their personal relevance (Note self meaning of "relevance"), and if a large part of that relevance is of an inside, personal nature, then the expert decision-maker for each person is himself. Only he has first-hand, privileged knowledge of himself; and every man is an expert in at least one thing - himself. This view smashes bluntly into social institutions which are based on the rights of people to make decisions for others or in behalf of society. (Taylor, p. 25):

> Across the world, the ideas and feelings of youth have gathered around three focal points:
>
> A refusal to accept any longer the social and intellectual control of those in the society who give them no part in making decisions about what that society should do.
>
> A demand that the obsolete university curriculum, controlled by the academic faculty and made in the interests of the faculty, be subject to drastic reform.
>
> An assertion that freedom to think, to speak, to act, to learn, to invest oneself in a new kind of life which opens up the future, is the right of youth and the central value which must animate social and political change.

The business of politicians, legislators, teachers, and administrators is to make decisions and act on behalf of society. Self students, however, place a very high value on individual action and making those decisions which affect oneself. Making decisions is a major way one lives and learns. When other people make decisions for them, students are having their lives and educations impoverished. It is the control of individual choice and destiny by a power outside oneself (by the powerful of the powerless, by the educators of the students, for example) that they object to, "Watts and Saigon are the same city" (Taylor, p. 21). So, we might add, are most educational institutions.

The University as Antieducational - When the right and expertise to make decisions is examined at the university level, we see the expertise orientation of the faculty resulting in their supposition that their business is advancement of their fields of knowledge and of academic professionalism. They are dedicated to their specialties, and they often assume that their students study under them primarily either to become members of professions, their future colleagues, or to learn about their fields. They seldom see students as testing their specialty to see whether it can contribute to their personal development - using it where it does, ignoring it where it doesn't.

But when one's field of "professional" expertise is himself, who then is the expert? A self person is likely to look down on professionalism as a limited view of the world and of oneself. A man who judges himself and others by the standards of a recognized, established, legitimate profession is limiting his judgement and himself to the scope of his profession. Furthermore, his standards of measurement are still outside himself. In this way they are little different from the external ideologies of people in the stability subsystem and the standards of other-directedness of people in the sociability subsystem. To someone in the self subsystem social and educational values are subjective and may or may not coincide with those of established institutionalized worldviews (Taylor, p. 23):

> Their (the French students) conception begins with a radical perception of revolution itself, one which calls for the subjective revaluation of all values. It goes on from there to the affirmation of new values alien to the old regime - the personal exercise of will, the politics of desire, spontaneity, depth in personal relations, participation, personal action, the importance of fantasy, imagination, art, expression.

The radical subjectivism of the self subsystem is an international flower that blooms wherever self types run into established institutions that, in their view, block personal action and self education. Taylor notes this as a hunt for something new as well as an attack on the outmoded (p. 20):

> The platform of radicals in the world's younger

> generation is anti-war, anti-imperialist, anti-authoritarian, anti-institutional...the younger world generation is attacking the inadequacy of the political and social institutions of the older generation in every society. The anti-Americanism of American student radicals is not so much a denial of their country as the rejection of an America which now exists in favor of an America they want.

My humanistic reinterpretation of Peterson's failure to find "noteworthy differences" among the 4 student types on his Social Conscience Scale corroborates Taylor's observation (See Chapter 6). Peterson's self types did consistently show concern where the society was interfering with personal freedom, but not where institutions or society-in-general were the "victims."

The criticism by the increasing number of self types gives established political, social and educational institutions slight cause for equanimity. Educational institutions and educators who like to see themselves as dispassionate critics and benefactors of society are now finding themselves the targets. The scholar-heroes and committees from academe which championed the liberal causes of yesteryear are the establishment villains of today; they are the powerful imposing their will on the powerless. But the students are developing their own powers. Time magazine describes one part of this self-style in education ("Can Hip Harvard Hold That Line?," 1969, p. 57):

> Undergraduates are studying harder than ever; yet

> it is their estrangement from time-honored academic discipline that worries some teachers. Says John Womack, an assistant professor of history whose jeans and leather jacket are indistinguishable from those of his students and who himself graduated from Harvard in 1959: "Students just simply refuse to learn what they don't want to learn. They are less willing to do the necessary groundwork to form their opinions. They rely more on insight and a sort of induction that I haven't figured out. In my day the professor would beg the students, 'Don't just read the material: Think about it.' Today the problem is almost the opposite.
>
> "Increasingly, students at Harvard are displaying an unnerving self-confidence in their own ability to do anything, an attitude that seems alien to the old academic virtue of modest contemplation at the foot of the savants."

Yesterday's Pariah, Today's Prince - Institutions of higher education are no longer seen as unquestioned centers of beneficial activity to humanity. They are powerful institutions whose expertise-technocratic values control large parts of our expertise-technocratic society, such as the educational system. They are increasingly the gate keepers to vocations, and they influence political decisions by providing the "expert" witnesses for legislators as well as powerful lobbies. Universities are no longer outside, free-floating critics of society, according to Taylor; they are powerful, although sometimes unsuspected, partisans. Among students this point of view is combined with the students' desire to make decisions that affect themselves and with a self antagonism toward institutions that interfere with one's personal growth.

Subsystem-Based Social Modes and Social Critics - If, for the moment, we think of the distribution of humanistic types in society as fitting a normal, or near-normal curve, with one part of the humanistic continuum (either one stage or adjacent stages) containing the bulk of the population and with a slope into the adjoining stages, the idea of social criticism and groups that are critics becomes relative to the modal, or most frequent type. For example, in a civilization which is dominated by stability needs, the adjoining people in the survival and sociability stages are likely to feel somewhat alienated from the society. Those further away in expertise are even more alienated, and those in self, most alienated. This interpretation shows us how university faculty, as expertise types, and how artists, as self types, have usually been considered as outside critics of society. Their subsystems have given them a different interpretation and perspective on the usually dominant subsystems.

When mankind was in the survival stage, the stability types were also probably considered critics of the then dominant society. Since one early manifestation of the stability subsystem seems to be the development of religions, the prophets and religious men of old and the early Christians can be thought of as the growing tip and gadflies of their times. When the church gained ascendency during the Middle Ages, however, and the bulk of society was stability oriented, the men of religion, for the most part, were in and of the society not the dominant critics and proposers of large-scale changes. As the Renaissance developed, and as the ideas of nationalism and economic, religious, and political democracy spread, it was the nascent sociability types who became the most forceful critics. They were then in the flourishing part of society, and the slow transition from a church-dominated society to a nation-dominated society is one mark of the transition from a stability cultural subsystem to a sociability cultural subsystem. This movement is still going on today, although the peak of the transition seems to have passed.

During all this time the academic (expertise) and artistic (self) communities, as parts of the growing tip, were critics of the various kinds of status quo (stability and sociability). Now, however, the humanistic movement in the more developed industrial countries of the West is approaching and entering the expertise stage. In some groups it has already arrived and taken up rule. Thus, the academic community (an expertise community) is increasingly becoming a part of the expertise society rather than an outside critic of it. Society's faults are becoming its faults, and its faults are becoming society's faults. In one sense this is a victory for the academic community, now at the flourishing part of society, but a price of success and power is the loss of the objectivity that comes from being an outsider, i.e., from a different subsystem and with different components - values, perspectives, perceptions, conceptualizations, etc. The expertise subsystem has gone from gadfly to government.

Self Knowledge - Not only are the saints of academe and their choirs of committees in disrepute, but their whole system of objective knowledge is being supplemented by a subjective system, too. The expertise preoccupation with specialized scientific methodology is being attacked by subjective insight and induction. The domain of respectable knowledge and methodology is being enlarged to include subjective knowledge and part of this is self-awareness. As Lawrence Kubie points out in "The Forgotten Man of Education" (1967, pp. 61-62):

> Yet there is one instrument which every discipline uses without checking its errors.... This, of course, is the human psychological apparatus...our academic disciplines...re-enforce the tacit, fallacious assumption that man can understand the world that lies outside of himself without concurrently understanding himself.
>
> ...Without self-knowledge in depth, the master of any field will be a child in human wisdom and human culture.

Knowledge about oneself is often knowledge about one's feelings, and this theme runs through much current interest in education. In NOW: the human dimension (1968) George I. Brown claims inner self-knowledge of the affective domain can be combined with "outside" knowledge of the cognitive domain to form what he calls "humanistic education" (NOW, 1968, intro.):

> Affective: refers to the feeling or emotional aspect of experience and learning.
>
> Cognitive: refers to the activity of the mind in knowing an object, to intellectual functioning.
>
> Humanistic Education: when the affective and cognitive domains are integrated in individual and group learning.

As a self point of view makes itself felt in education, the importance of the affective domain grows and starts to take its place alongside the expertise emphasis on cognition. In JOY: Expanding Human Awareness (1967) William Schutz describes methods of affective growth and self-knowledge and recommends them to educators. George Leonard in Education and Ecstasy (1969) follows a similar line of reasoning and recommendations. He also recommends removing the school wall that separates school from society thus making all society, as it goes about its daily activities, a learning laboratory for children. This is much like the learning the higher education self types engage in. They do not learn about political activism, for example, from books; they become political activists. Leonard and the self activists want to end the separation between society and education.

The New Education - Why this sudden increase in interest in these fields - the "new education" or "free schools"? For the same reasons and among the same groups that are the new critics of society. The self subsystem is making itself felt throughout our society, and the origins of these views in education are the same as the new views in politics and social problems: Our success (and perhaps over-success) with the earlier humanistic stages is allowing society to develop an enlarging self subculture.

It is not a mere coincidence that interest in the particularly self types of education are blooming at widely scattered points and among diverse people. It is a characteristic of the stage our society is now in - a transition from a sociability orientation to an expertise orientation with a large growing tip in self.

As evidence of this self subsystem and of students forcing educational institutions to accommodate to it Taylor cites the current rapid increase in student initiated classes, student influence and control of educational policies, working outside of whatever system is in effect, free universities, and the many "activist" activities.

Self, Psyche, and Consciousness - Self-awareness, subjective knowledge, the affective domain, and the freedoms to develop the multiple potentials of one's own mind and actions are characteristic of the new education, but even more central than these is the belief that a new sort of consciousness can be and should be developed. Social, political, and individual problems are seen as resulting, to a great extent, from a miseducated consciousness. Roszak spots this new, self focus of attention. From the quotation earlier in this chapter we note, "...building the good society is not primarily a social, but a psychic task...it strikes beyond ideology to the level of consciousness, seeking to transform our deepest sense of the self, the other, the environment" (The Making of a Counter-Culture, 1969, p. 49).

Roszak's insight into the important, central place given the psyche, the unconscious, and/or the mind is important to anyone who wants to understand the "new" education and its social, psychological, and cultural backgrounds. In the social cosmology and the epistomology of the self subsystem the unconscious and/or psyche is almost all-important. And change other than a change at this most basic level will be fruitless. A lasting change in society or in oneself must be a deep-level change in consciousness-psyche-mind.

In Young Radicals Kenneth Keniston (1968) calls this approach to personal-social-cultural change the "cultural style," and it is seen as opposed to the "political style" (p. 185):

> The "political" tactic lays primary emphasis on

> momentum, political viability, size, and scope. The cultural perspective emphasizes multi-issue organizing, the construction of "alternative networks," caring deeply, and, in the last analysis, helping individuals transform not only the policies of their government, but their lives. ...The "cultural" position is related to the assumption that the only lasting changes are those that occur in men's minds and outlooks; meaningful change, therefore, cannot be achieved via "mere" political manipulations and changes.

In the cultural approach we see the self emphasis on wholeness and the interrelatedness of components forming a complex social totality. The unified whole, not a critical part, is seen as the target of change. The emphases on large constituency and political technique mark the political approach as a mixture of sociability and expertise. The more politically oriented students, Keniston says (pp. 182-190) were more moderate, interested in electoral politics, most organizational in personal style, most analytic in outlook, and least angry and intense in their radicalism. The culturally oriented were most radical, most personalistic and anti-bureaucratic, were likely to have felt great personal transformations in themselves and to have been made culturally oriented by prolonged work in the Movement.

When guru-teacher-lecturer-critic Steve Gaskin talks about social change, he talks about it at this basic, cultural, undergirding level ("Acid Generation Schooling," 1969, p. 33). Note how he displays the view of change as "a psychic task," as Roszak did:

> And that means when there is a mass attack on the sanity of a nation, as that (sadism in advertising) in effect is, then someone has to decide that if you want the masses to make a good choice about something, you have to get them sane first. So rather than plug in at the political level and try to force people to do something as politics, which is based on winners, losers and dichotomies, plug in at the level of trying to get as many people sane and cool and honest as possible, which will then affect the electorate, I think, in a more significant way than gunpoint or threats, or theatre.

Is it any wonder that self people are incomprehensible to stability, sociability, and expertise people, who tend to think of social, political, and personal problems in terms of ideology, politics, group interaction, or techniques? Instead of trying to change these, which are manifestations of a more pervasive, encompassing, and deeper consciousness, the new education says, we should change the underlying consciousness. Ideology, party, class, specialization, etc. are expected to accompany a larger-scale change.

The type of activity and structure appropriate for the new education changes too. This "educational self style" of student activism in universities, it is interesting to note, resembles the "new political style" described by Rossman. (See "The Politics of the Self Subsystem" earlier in this chapter.) Both are anti- or non-organizational, temporary, ad hoc, special-interest, and stress personal involvement and decision-making. Taylor calls this the "strategy of anarchism" but says that those who follow its path can work either inside or outside the established system.

"Outside" activists would often disagree with the possibility of working "inside." Those who work inside may try to make the old structure do new things, a people's parade or a student-initiated course, for example. Taylor describes this non-organizational self style (p. 234):

> The strategy of anarchism lies in deliberately working outside whatever system is in effect, and from there, by demonstraton, criticism, and action to influence the course of what happens inside the system. In another sense it involves living inside the system without accepting it, something which can be done *and* has been done by the new student movement...(*a*) continual demonstration of new styles.

4. The Self Style in Literature - Because the self subsystem is, like the arts, associated with personal expression, one would expect to find that many artists and their works show this trait throughout time, often regardless of whether or not the society in which they live is a self society or not. However, if we look at what is popular in the whole society, or among certain segments of the society, then we may have one more indicator of that society's or subgroup's subsystem. In other words, artists as a group will be strongly self types, but as society as a whole moves along the humanistic continuum, there should be more artists. Popular themes in the arts and criticism should reflect the humanistic movement and underlying change in orientation of the society too.

Do we see growing subjectivism, or self, now? Lionel Trilling says that this is the major characteristic of his literature students at Columbia and of our times. In Beyond Culture: Essays on Literature and Learning (1963) he says that the characteristic question of modern criticism and contemporary students isn't what a work of literature says about our culture or society, but what it asks about the reader himself, or the author himself. It asks a self question: "Is it true? Is it true for me?" (p. xvi).

Although he doesn't identify them as such, we can notice two themes running through his descriptions and analyses of the characteristics of modern literature and modern criticism. The first is an emphasis on self, self-expression, self-understanding, etc., the usual interests of people in the self subsystem. The second theme is what he calls the "adversary program." It has the purpose of "detaching the reader from the habits of thought and feeling that the larger culture imposes, of giving him a ground and a vantage point from which to condemn, and perhaps revise, the culture that produced him. ...a primary function of art and thought is to liberate the individual from the tyranny of his culture..." (pp. xii-xiii). Trilling's apt title Beyond Culture catches the humanistic self essence of this detachment. Culture might be thought of as the accumulation of mores, knowledge, and institutions of the first 4 stages of the humanistic sequence. Getting beyond culture is getting into individualism, or radical subjectivism. Where does one stand intellectually when he is "beyond culture"? On himself - his self. Just as the political radicals are highly subjective in their criticisms (See "The Politics of the Self Subsystem" earlier in this chapter), so are literary radicals. Trilling is writing of literature here, but he could just as well be writing of politics (p. 77):

> The most immediate specious good that a modern writer will seek to destroy is, of course, the habits, manners and "values" of the bourgeois world, and not merely because these associate themselves with much that is bad, such as vulgarity, or the exploitation of the disadvantaged, but for other reasons as well, because they clog and hamper the movement of the individual spirit toward freedom, because they prevent the attainment of "more life."

This is the literary plank in the self platform, and Trilling identifies it as "one of the chief literary enterprises of our age," (p. 76) and as "...the self in its standing quarrel with culture" (p. 118).

The adversary theme, of course, depends on the self theme, and vice versa. Trilling continually underlines the theme of self running through modern literature:

> No literature has ever been so shockingly personal as that of our time. (p. 8)
>
> ...extravagant personal force of modern literature ... (p. 9)
>
> ...the supreme rights of the individual person... (p. 9)

> ...the anti-hero, in whose indifference to or hatred of ethical nobility there is presumed to lie a special authenticity. (p. 24)

Writing of criticism, Trilling cites M. H. Abrams' idea of an "expressive" theory of literature (The Mirror and the Lamp, 1958, pp. 21-26) as characteristic of current culture (Beyond Culture, p. 189):

> ...the work of genius or disinterested talent, refers itself only to the inner life of its creator and is to be judged only by the truth of its representation of that innerness. Our commitment to this criterion constitutes, as M. H. Abrams tells us, the basis of our modern aesthetic ... Is it sincere? 'Is it genuine? Does it match the intention, the feeling, and the actual state of mind of the poet while composing?'

Discussion: Poetry as Self-Expression and Communication - A set of ideas related to the self subsystem appear in the literary criticism of I. A. Richards' Principles of Literary Criticism (1968). In humanistic terms, it seems to me, he describes a typical artist (poet) as a self person who expresses his peak experiences through his art (poetry). And as a consequence of his "normality" he communicates these to others and assists them in experiencing them too.

Richards describes a poet in an esthetic-imaginative-creative moment very much as Maslow describes a person having a peak experience. The peak experience values that Maslow lists include wholeness, perfection, completion, justice, aliveness, richness, simplicity, goodness, uniqueness, effortlessness, playfulness, truth, honesty, self-sufficiency, and beauty (Toward a Psychology of Being, 1962, p. 78). He gives an extended description of each of these, but beauty is especially relevant to poetry and literary criticism. He defines this "rightness; form; aliveness; simplicity; richness; wholeness; perfection; completion; uniqueness; honesty" (p. 78).

When we compare this with Richards' view of an artist, we can surmise that this psychologist and this literary critic were studying the same thing from their respective expertise specialties. Richards (p. 242) quoted Coleridge (Biographia Literaria, II, pp. 12-14) as the original formulator of this literary-based insight into what we think of as peak experiences of self types:

> That synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination... reveals itself in the balance of reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities...the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order; judgment awake and steady self-possession with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement....The sense of musical delight ...with the power of reducing multitude into unity of effect, and modifying a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling.

Richards shows the self subsystem interest in being true to oneself, authenticity, when he discusses the person-centered meaning of truth, "Truth may be equivalent to Sincerity... the absence of any apparent attempt on the part of the artist to work effects on the reader which do not work for himself" (p. 271). Authenticity is measured by "...that personal stamp which is...perhaps the most certain sign that the experience, good or bad, rendered in the poem is authentic" (p. 294).

Maslow describes his self-actualizers as showing openness of perception and receptivity to experience. "One aspect of the peak-experience is a complete, though momentary, loss of fear, anxiety, inhibition, defense and control, a giving up of renunciation, delay and restraint" (p. 89). Richards expresses this openness as a lack of suppression, "Compared with (the artist) the ordinary man suppresses nine-tenths of his impulses, because he is incapable of managing them without confusion.... But the poet through his superior power of ordering experiences is freed from this necessity" (p. 243). "The wholeness of the mind in the creative moment is the essential consideration, the free participation in the evocation of the experience of all the impulses, conscious or unconscious, relevant to it, without suppressions or restrictions" (p. 189). As Richards says, the open mind is not open only to external events, but also to its own internal or unconscious workings. Maslow associates this dropping of defenses with creativity too (Toward a Psychology of Being, 1964, p. 91):

> ,..the analysts agree that inspiration or great (primary) creativeness comes partly out of the unconsciousness, i.e., is a healthy regression, a temporary turning away from the real world.

> Now what I have been describing here may be seen as a fusion of the ego, id, super-ego and ego-ideal, of consciousness and unconsciousness, of primary and secondary processes, a synthesizing of pleasure principle with reality principle, a regression without fear in the service of the greatest maturity, a true integration of the person at all levels.

Both Maslow and Richards concern themselves with a special meaning of a "normal" person. To both men "normal" has connotations of more-than-average, or better-than-average. They are interested in the people they study as ideal types in both senses, "ideal" as desired, and "ideal" having typical or exaggerated qualities. In the first 2 chapters of Toward a Psychology of Being (1962) Maslow states that he wants to try to draw a composite picture of what a psychologically healthy man would look like. Although no one individual is likely to fit this ideal type, he hopes to base his "Third Force" (humanistic) psychology on it. To Richards the artist, as an ideal type, is also a completely healthy specimen of mankind. The artist enjoys "a fuller life than the average, with less unnecessary interference between its component impulses...we should do well to be more like him..." (pp. 194-195). The unusual openness to internal and external life makes artists and self-actualizers sensitive to more things than most people are; because they are aware of more things, they share more of life with others than do most people, who are less widely sensitive. "The degree to which (a work of art) accords with the relevant experience of the artist is a measure of the degree to which it will arouse similar experiences in others" (Richards, p. 27).

Unfortunately, peak experiences are rather rare for most people, Maslow says, although self actualizers have them "far more frequently" (p. 92). Speaking of moments of artistic insight and imagination, Richards concurs, but in his case they are more frequent in artists (pp. 243-244). The value of art, to this literary critic, is that great art has the effect of helping ordinary men have these artistic experiences (pp. 25-29, 186-189).

In terms of our humanistic theory, then, art is one path toward increasing the likelihood of self experiences. The artist, as a self person, expresses himself through his art. These works of art help him recapture and reexperience his highly-valued moments of insight and imagination. These are the "being" values described in Chapter 2 of this work under "_Self_." Because he is like other people except that he is more a self person than they are, his works also help produce these peak experiences in others.

The parallels between the self subsystem and Richards' views are not limited to the ones mentioned above. Both value increased awareness and _coenesthesia_, whole bodily awareness. Both interpret many phenomena in a typically self manner -

largely as states of mind. Both value activity which enlarges the mind and increases human sensibility. Here too, is another land for further cultivation of the humanistic theory - artistic and literary criticism.

Summary - In literary criticism, in personal writing style, in content, and in student desire for literature of personal relevance we see the "biographical context" that we noted earlier in this chapter in Roszak's analysis of New Left politics (The Making of a Counter-Culture, p. 57). It is the self value of personalism that counts. Trilling reports that as a teacher "this extravagant personal force of modern literature" makes him uncomfortable because the personal subjects are those that people usually deal with unconsciously, in the privacy of one's own mind, and occasionally to a particularly close friend or through the abstractness and anonymity of print. Self literature, style and students require a more personal biographical approach, however. A teacher of this literature... (Trilling, 1968, p. 9)

> ...must confront the necessity of bearing personal testimony. He must use whatever authority he may possess to say whether or not a work is true; and if not, why not; and if so, why so. He can do this only at considerable cost to his privacy. How does one say that Lawrence is right in his great rage against the modern emotions, against the modern sense of life and ways of being, unless one speaks from the intimacies of one's own feelings, and one's own sense of life, and one's own wished-for way of being?...

Just as the "new politics" and the "new education" consider the inner, psychic, subjective states of a person to be of utmost importance, the "new literature" concerns itself with the personal and subjective too. As Trilling comments, "...the questions asked by our literature are not about our culture but about ourselves" (p. 8) Likewise, the "new politics" asks questions, "not at the level of class, party, or institution, but rather at the non-intellective level of the personality from which these political and social forms issue" (Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture, 1969, p. 49).

In politics, education, and literature, subjectivism, or the self subsystem, is increasingly showing itself on a scale never, or not often, seen before. But the growth of this tip of society is just part of the overall hypothesized movement of the general population along the humanistic continuum.

5. Mind-manifesting Drugs - A no less important example of the subsystem gap that can be seen as an instance of the difference in subsystems is in the taking of drugs. How does taking drugs differ from subsystem to subsystem? For the older generation drugs are used for physiological reasons or for psychological "reasons," i.e., "sicknesses." Drugs are usually not seen as contributing to good health but as removing bad health. This, of course, tends to make the older generation associate drug usage with sickness.

Even vitamins seem to be frequently taken to deter bad health rather than to promote good health.

The psychological reasons for taking drugs are likewise associated with sickness or unpleasantness. The precipitating incidents for non-somatic drug usage among older adults are often social in nature. They are often either stimulants or tranquilizers, depending on which social crutch is needed. We see tranquilizers used so that people can cope with social situations such as noisy kids, irritated bosses or coworkers. Stimulants are used to improve functioning at parties, love-making, or in other social situations. They are often used to lessen anxiety or a feeling of insecurity. Sociability and stability needs are the general motivations that turn older adults toward drugs. This use of drugs as relief or escape allows them to understand the use of mind calmers, such as the opiates, among the poor and among minorities. Among stability, sociability and expertise adults economic and social problems are understandable in terms of social ills; taking drugs to blot out these social sicknesses fits in with their subsystems. Young, middle-class adults, however, often use drugs for personal development, not to escape from or to alleviate a sickness. This use of drugs is doubly hard to understand for most people. First, it is not associated with a sickness in the usual sense. Second, the motivation comes from the self subsystem, not from the others.

In keeping with their interest in the multipotentialed mind, they take drugs that reputedly help them to do something with their minds, drugs that are mind-showing "psyche-delic." They feel drugs make them more aware of themselves and their environments (consciousness expanding). Feelings of wholeness, unity, increased sensitivity, and total awareness are frequently reported (Masters and Houston, The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience, 1966), and these are especially desired by self people. LSD isn't advocated so much just for fun (for it frequently isn't enjoyable) but for an increased understanding of oneself. While marijuana is frequently smoked in a social setting, its benefits aren't pictured primarily as letting a person relate better to others, but as letting him relate better to himself, to his own feelings and thoughts, to his mind or soul. This is often pictured as having a beneficial social by-product, but it is only a by-product, not the main reason.

It is no surprise that the generations differ as to the advisability of smoking pot or using other psychedelics. The older generation warns of possible physiological damage. They warn of having a police record (threat to job and other security). They warn of being a social outcast; ostracism is sociability's most feared Hell. The fears that the older generation use to try to scare the younger generation are based on their own stability, sociability, and expertise motivational patterns, not on those of the youth they counsel. The youth, on the other hand, try to explain their use of drugs in terms of self-development and self-knowledge (expanded awareness, etc.). These words mean very different things to their non-self-oriented parents. To the parental generation self-development has the connotations of self-development for something, for ability, for production, for position, for recognition, etc. To the young adult generation self-development does not necessarily have these instrumental connotations but is a worthwhile goal itself. It may include, and very well does, the development of one's skills, abilities, or interests, but this fulfillment is an end in itself, not primarily a method of earning a good living or achieving praise from others (Although if it does serve these functions, too, so much the better).

If we look at some of the characteristic interests of the self subsystem as described in Chapter 2 and some of the effects of taking psychedelic (mind-manifesting) drugs, the fact that self types are attracted to these drugs becomes self-evident. In Chapter 2 we saw that self types are interested in self-understanding, insight, the mystical and occult, personal growth-healing-enlightenment, awareness of the mind and its possibilities, among other things. When we turn to information on psychedelic drugs such as Masters and

Houston's The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience (1966) we find psychedelic drugs portrayed as ways to reach self goals. The book is full of examples, but these will suffice, "On this level, ideation, images, body sensation (if any) and emotion are fused in what is felt as an absolutely purposive process culminating in a sense of total self-understanding, self-transformation, religious enlightenment and, possibly, mystical union" (p. 148). Here the authors are speaking of a state that few takers of psychedelics reach, but the tantalizing pot of gold is there to attract self people. And even if few people reach this final stage, more are likely to have less intense experiences of the same kind, "Insight is added to insight..." (p. 185); "...regions where the terrain is unfamiliar but where a much more profound transformation and self-realization is possible...and to venture into these previously inaccessible, or only very rarely accessible, regions of mind where new concepts and methods have to be evolved, learned, and utilized is a challenge..." (p. 186).

Masters and Houston (1966, pp. 57-58) quote Richard Blum's investigation into the motivations of the drug movement (Utopiates: The Use and Users of LSD 25, 1964, pp. 6-7). Blum's statement is an almost perfect statement of this manifestation of the self subsystem:

> The movement is composed of people who have taken LSD and/or other hallucinogens and see in these

> drugs a tool for bringing about changes which they deem desirable. The emphasis is on the enhancement of inner experience and on the development of hidden personal resources. It is an optimistic doctrine, for it holds that there are power and greatness concealed in everyone. It is an intellectual doctrine, for it values experience and understanding more than action and visible change. It concerns itself with areas dear to the thinker: art, philosophy, religion, and the nature and potentials of man. It is a mystical doctrine, for it prizes illumination and a unified worldview with meaning beyond that drawn from empirical reality. It is a realistic doctrine as well, for it counsels compromise and accommodation between the inner and outer worlds. 'Play the game,' it advises, 'don't let the Pied Piper lead you out of town.' And it is, explicitly, a revolutionary doctrine, although the revolution it proposes is internal, psychological, and by no means novel. It calls for freedom from internal constraints, freedom to explore oneself and the cosmos, and freedom to use LSD and other drugs as the means thereto.

In Blum's statement of the drug movement motivation we note the self interest in insight and personal development. In the assumed greatness in everyone we see the democratic basis for participant democracy. (This may be an instance of how later stages in the humanistic continuum reformulate the gains of the earlier stages and build on them. Here we see the self stage building on the egalitarianism of the sociability stage.) In the intellectual-thinking bias and mystical content we see the self interest in ultimate questions of the relations of man to the universe. As noted earlier in this chapter, subjective reality is placed alongside objective reality. And as shown in the discussion of Steve Gaskin and Theodor Roszak, the self subsystem,

"...strikes beyond ideology to the level of consciousness, seeking to transform our deepest sense of the self, the other, the environment" (Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture, 1969, p. 49). It is seen primarily as an inner revolution which may have external manifestations. It counsels an overall "cultural" view of change (Keniston, 1968) rather than following a Pied Piper who promises quick change via political techniques.

Chapter 3 proposed that success at reaching the goals of one stage leads to the emergence of the succeeding stage. The ability to synthesize LSD and other psychedelics chemically and the spread of this knowledge may be one clear instance of how the self stage builds on the techniques of the expertise stage to reach the self goals of mysticism, insight, and transcendence. Instead of reaching these self states by the laborious techniques of religions, our advanced expertise abilities make self goals more easily and more broadly attainable. Previous expertise skills, chemistry in this case, become reemployed for new self goals, self-knowledge and mysticism in this case.

A conjecture of special interest to educators and parents is: Can one technique for reaching the self goals be substituted for another? Can and should something else be substituted for the drug technique? A tantalizing finding along these lines comes from NOW: the human dimension by

George I. Brown (1968). In this study of how cognitive and affective education might be blended, one teacher noticed, "Lessening the desire for drug use on the part of some students, and for 'mind-blowing' on the part of others" (p. 6-4). He attributes this to "affective techniques" which showed them another and better way to "find a more meaningful reality to which they could relate." Here is another area of possible investigation: Can the use of affective techniques, such as T-groups and those described by Brown and his coinvestigators, substitute for some kinds of drug use? Wouldn't it be ironic to discover that the elements in the public which are fighting against sensitivity training, affective techniques, and self-awareness programs in schools were actually contributing to the use of psychedelic drugs by cutting off these means of self-knowledge?

Let that one fester around in your mind for a while.

If the adult generation could start to understand the self reasons for taking drugs, they would begin to understand what they see as a "problem." If the self generation could understand the stability, sociability, and expertise concerns of the adult generation and its consequential worries and values, they could understand the seriousness these earlier humanistic types show for what seems to them to be the unstable, antisocial, and anti-intellectual behavior of their children. It is doubtful that they ever will see or understand each other clearly because it takes the ability to feel a different subsystem, and no one is very good at that.

If it weren't so poignant, the October 6, 1969 National Education Television Network's discussion of drugs would be hilarious. Throughout the panel discussion, composed of (1) professional experts in fields that have to do with social problems and (2) representatives of youth, the cultivated blindness of the professions (professional expertise) was blatant. Depending on their specialties the professionals suggested the following reasons for the sudden use of drugs (National Educational Television, Speak-out on Drugs, 1969):

a drug-ridden society
massive advertising of medical drugs
adult hypocrisy
the Vietnam War
social problems
ethnic hate
avarice

At this point one of the youth representatives gave a self subsystem answer (p. 3):

> SCOT: I don't see any kind of psychedelic - particularly psychedelic drugs - as being an out from the world. What about people who use it to do something with their minds? LSD is, I don't believe it is like a chemical drug. It's like a substance that you can use to turn yourself on to

> yourself. You can't escape from reality by taking LSD. You can't escape from reality by taking mescaline or psylicibin.

And how did the experts of our sociability and technocratic society respond to the truth that looked them in the eye and told them it was the truth? They blindly blundered on with explanations that made sense in their sociability and expertise fields - poverty, peer-pressure, disgust with civilization, to feel good, socializing. Their social expertise showed them drugs as a social response to social problems, not as a self response to self problems.

Reader: Haughty, hortatory tone!
Author: And deservedly so.

FREEDOM OF THE MIND - A POLEMIC SUMMARY

What is our major "self problem"? Through the glasses of humanistic psychology it is a society which has not yet recognized and adjusted to the self subsystem as a legitimate way of looking, feeling, perceiving, and thinking. Where are the social institutions that contribute to self in the consciousness, subjectivism sense? We have a few artists' guilds. The expanding number of growth-centers and over 500 free universities serve some people (Greenway, "Free U's and the Strange Revolution," 1970?). But these are few compared with the self-development needs of our society. They are tolerated but not encouraged. They do have their proponents, however, the self people. In spite of misunderstanding, opposition, and social languor from the rest of society the self students and other self people are influencing education, politics, literature, religion, and personal habits with the dominant values and styles of the self subsystem - subjectivism, personalism, individualism, joy and the being values, multipotentialed self and society.

Our educational, political, and social systems are showing some degrees of the self orientation, but here too these traits are often misunderstood and mistrusted rather than encouraged. Personal choice and responsibility are creeping into and being forced into them. But the major self freedom, freedom to form one's own mind, to learn, to think, and to feel what, how, where, and when one wants to, has not yet taken its place alongside the survival, stability, sociability, and expertise freedoms. These include freedom from want, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly and political belief, freedom of inquiry, and other personal and social freedoms.

Perhaps, someday, mankind will recognize the rights and responsibilities necessary for Freedom of the Mind. Perhaps, someday, people will see that it is for their own benefit and for the good of society that each person controls how he thinks, feels, and perceives - his consciousness. Perhaps, someday, we will try to build a society where everyone can do this for himself.

Perhaps
Someday
But when?

Chapter 13

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Introduction

"Is it necessary," you might ask, "for you to claim so much for your theory?"

"No," I reply, "but I strongly feel and think that the reasons for doing so outweigh the reasons for claiming less."

It seems to me that a person who propounds a theory has several duties to those he offers it to. One of these is honesty. Intellectual scruples require a theory's developer to give as accurate and complete a view of the theory as he can. Suppose he sees the theory as one of large scope, of many possible uses, and of great potential value. Is he presenting what he thinks is a truthful view of the theory if he pretends it is of narrow scope, few applications, or of limited value?

Theories do not exist in isolation. They are related to other theories, bodies of data, conjectures, and so forth. If one is to try to be intellectually scrupulous, shouldn't he try to point out these connections? This duty, of course, is especially evident within a tradition, such as 20th century humanism, which makes a metatheoretical assumption that phenomena are closely related to each other and which stresses a unified point of view. The unusually great scope of this humanistic theory is due, for one reason, to this holistic tradition.

Suppose I am correct in estimating the possible benefits that might accrue from more development of this humanistic theory. If I withhold information or speculations about these possible uses, am I not guilty of retarding the development of the social sciences, at least of humanistic social science, and of policies based on them? Or, to protect himself from charges of extravagant or grandiose claims, should a man withhold what he feels may be helpful to other men?

Suppose I am incorrect in estimating the possible uses of this theory. Suppose this is an example of a well-rationalized personal position statement, and little more. If I expose only part of what I believe about this theory or only the strongest evidence for it, don't I run the risk of not exposing certain weaknesses? Then, not only am I less likely to find myself corrected by my readers, but I am also more likely to lead others astray. One owes honesty to himself as well as to others. To paraphrase Francis Bacon - Falsehood is more easily discovered when exposed than when hidden.

Suppose I am partially correct and partially incorrect, which is most likely. By giving an incomplete view of the way I see and evaluate this theory, I am likely to mislead both potential critics and potential developers of a "normal science" based on this theory. I expect and hope this theory will become a prototype of a humanistic paradigm. But in order to know a theory it is necessary to know how the parts are related to each other. If I limit my presentation to only those parts, speculations, or applications of narrow scope or which are easily defended, then I am limiting others' understanding of the theory too.

Another duty of a propounder of a theory is to present a theory that will lead somewhere, that can form a basis for further investigation. In this sense the theory acts as a stimulus for further behavior. If the developer of a theory limits his presentation of that theory, its concepts, correlates, hypotheses, conjectures, etc., he is restricting the potential behavior of others by restricting the stimuli he presents to them. An idea that seems vague or an application that is merely a suggestion in the mind of the theory's propounder may be an important stimulus to someone who knows more about the tangential field.

Whether one holds back ideas to have a hoard of his own to develop later, whether he retains them because he is not sure of them and doesn't want to risk putting himself in a position of defending what is still vague and not thoroughly thought out, whether he omits ideas that may make him and his theory seem overweening - whatever his reasons, the world of ideas is impoverished.

Section 1, Chapters 1, 2, and 3, presented a theory of wide scope and grand proportions by nonholistic standards. Because of this large scale, a full examination of it would be impossible in one work, so I narrowed this investigation to the theory as applicable to some studies of American higher education, and I focused the study on one of the 5 general propositions of the theory: The types exist. Chapters 4-10 used the theory to explore partially some studies of higher education, and Chapters 11 and 12 demonstrated a use of the theory as a conceptual framework for investigating student activism, especially the self type of activism.

This chapter again widens the focus and partially explores the theory's scope. Before going on to the wider extensions and extrapolations in Part 2, Part 1 of this chapter first summarizes information gleaned from Chapters 4-10.

Part 2 presents some extensions and extrapolations and is meant to provoke future investigation as well as to expand the theory's scope beyond the content and context of American higher education.

Chapter 14 looks back on this chapter and the rest of this work and asks whether this typology of 5 subsystems is an improvement over some other typologies, and it presents some questions about further conceptual refinement of the self subsystem.

Part 1
RETROSPECT

Stability

The "vocationalists" of the Clark and Trow typology saw college as preparation for a nonprofessional occupation and are interpreted as being the stability students because of their desire for fitting in the established social order. Based on their choice of a "personal philosophy of higher education" this group comprising 26.5% of Richard Peterson's sample of 12,949 college freshmen was interpreted as the stability group in his report On a Typology of College Students.

In their individual expectations for college life these students showed the highest percentage committed to business administration, engineering, and technical specialties. Their low tolerance for ambiguity and indecision, theoretically stability traits, was in evidence; of the 4 humanistic types investigated here, stability, sociability, expertise, and self, they showed the highest percentage already committed to a major, the longest standing commitment, the least trouble deciding, the most reporting it was the only field for them, the most parental satisfaction, and the highest certainty of graduation. The possible graduate schools they selected for themselves were business, dentistry, engineering, and nursing. These choices fit a stability pattern if we assume that at the time of Peterson's study, 1965, these occupations were seen by the freshmen as leading to secure employment prospects.

Their greatest anticipated satisfaction in college was "course work in general." Given the possible selections, this one may have been highest due to a lack of selections that stressed security. Most of the selections stressed social interaction and academic activities. Likewise, the stability students chose preprofessional clubs more than did the other groups. In curricular and instructional preferences the stability dislike of ambiguity was evident in their preference for problems with clear-cut answers rather than ambiguous problems, their preference for objective exams rather than essay exams, and their preference for assigned readings rather than suggested readings.

What social and cultural patterns stem from and contribute to the stability subsystem? Compared with the other humanistic groups the stability group had the highest concentration of males and a disproportionately high percentage of Negroes. When grouped on a scale of socio-economic status, the 4 groups each showed wide variation within each group; however, the stability students were lowest. They were the most likely to come from families with income less than $8,000, the most likely to have a father with a blue-collar job, and were the most likely to be dependent on their own earnings and savings and on scholarships for the source of support in college. Also contributing to their insecurity was the fact that they had the highest percentage of fathers with no college education, 69%. Religiously, they were likely to be members of sects or beliefs that stress revealed, eternal truth, e.g. Catholic and Baptist. They were the most active churchgoers and indicated the most certainty and satisfaction with their current beliefs.

Culturally (attending plays, concerts, exhibitions, etc.) they were the highest reporting no attendance during the past year by their parents. Perhaps also showing the origin of their concern with obtaining a secure niche and with their desire to meet the standards of America in order to partake of some of the affluence, this group reported that their parents placed greatest stress on the importance of high school grades and on college graduation. They may have wanted to use their institutions as gateways to social and economic mobility.

Most students in the whole sample came from public secondary schools, but within various kinds of schools, Catholic schools yielded a high percentage of stability students. Although they placed greatest emphasis on grades, these students were the group which reported the most C's. Their preferences in the curriculum were for math and shop or commercial courses. Of the 10 types of courses reported on by Peterson, these students expressed the most dislike for half the number. They were the most active in only 1 school or nonschool activity, scouting, and their participation in the teenage culture was characterized by car-centered activity and watching television. With heavy pressure from their parents for high grades, with their own concurrence in this, but with C grades and the most dislike of half the studies, these students endure school for the benefits a diploma can bring rather than for pleasant social contact, the intrigues of learning, or their own growth and development.

In the 5 personality dimensions, the stability students were middling on the scales of independence from family and independence from peers. On the Liberalism Scale (a scale which stressed change as opposed to the ideology of preservation) they were not lowest, as the humanistic theory would predict, but were second lowest, almost tied with sociability for least liberal. On a Cultural Sophistication Scale, one which measured knowledge and interest in art, history, ideas, music, etc., the stability students were lowest.

Stability students were especially prevalent at 2 technical institutions which have student bodies of all men, mostly from working class backgrounds and with large fractions of engineering students. These 2 institutions contained 47.9% and 42.2% stability students, while the sample as a whole contained 26.5% stability.

In Alvin Gouldner's study of the faculty of a small college he divided the faculty and staff into "locals" and "cosmopolitans." This was based on Robert Merton's original dichotomy. (See the section on sociability which follows this section on stability.) Within the group of locals a subgroup of "dedicated" showed stability characteristics. They were the "true believers" in the unique ideology of the college, the "pillars of its ideological purity," and they paid primary loyalty to the values the college was founded on rather than to professional abilities (expertise). Together with a sociability subgroup, the "true bureaucrats," they favored more and stricter rules.

In Newcomb's study of reference groups the stability students used their home and family as a positive reference group and had negative feelings toward the whole college. On a scale of political-economic progressivism, they were strongly conservative. The scale dealt with socially relevant topics of the late Depression, unemployment, public relief, and the rights of organized labor.

In their relations to their parents they were seen as overly dependent or extremely dependent but with some conflicts, notably from those nearest the sociability subsystem. Other students rated them as low in prestige, and their instructors saw them as either stubborn and resistant (perhaps a stability reaction against dominance) or uncritical and overdocile (submissive). Their ambitions on coming to college were to fit in and make friends.

In Personality and Social Change Newcomb found more apparent cohesiveness among the conservative students than among the nonconservative students. When the conservatives and nonconservatives are displayed along the humanistic continuum, however, it is apparent that the conservatives are, for the most part, from only the stability subsystem, while the nonconservatives are from sociability, expertise, and self. This combination of subsystems may account for their diversity. The stability conservatives tended to be majors in music and science.

In a "guess-who" rating Newcomb matched a group of extreme conservatives and extreme nonconservatives with 28 extreme characteristics. The students whom we classify as conservative and stability scored highest in 5 items that seem especially likely to pick out stability types: least concerned about basic educational policies of the college, least concerned about activities of student committees, least likely to engage in pursuits related to college interest after college, most likely to lead a life of sheltered leisure, most likely to be deterred from some interesting pursuit because of family disapproval. They were tied with the combined sociability + expertise + self types for "most absorbed in home and family affairs," and they were highest in "most absorbed in social life, weekends, etc." On 8 items chosen to appeal to both stability and self they also ranked high. (See the section "Self" later in this chapter.)

Using the Allport-Vernon scale of 6 values, economic, religious, political, social, theoretical, and aesthetic, Newcomb investigated the values of a senior class of 40 members, and he compared the most conservative and least conservative extremes of that class. All the value scores were outside the normal range. The class was low in economic, religious, and political values. It was high in social, theoretical, and aesthetic values.

The economic value was interpreted as a survival value with its emphasis on practical matters. As reasoned earlier, the religious value is seen as a stability value, and the political value is also seen as stability, but with a taste of sociability. While the seniors as a whole were low in these values, the conservative seniors (stability) were higher than the nonconservative seniors (sociability, expertise, and self) in these values.

Sociability

The Clark and Trow "collegiates" comprised almost exactly half the total Peterson sample, 50.8%. They were in college primarily for the social interaction that the collegiate setting provided. Their educational plans showed them as the most frequent selectors of physical education, home economics, and education as their probable majors. They were least interested in graduate school, another indication that their purpose in attending college was not academic or intellectual. Their greatest anticipated satisfactions were parties and social life, student government, athletics, bull sessions, and residential and friendship activities. All these emphasized popularity and social extroversion. Their expected extracurricular involvement was highest. More than the other types, they reported that they were most likely to join a fraternity or sorority, and of the 13 possibilities for extracurricular activities, they were highest in 7.

These too were activities that were high in sociability, living group activities and school spirit activities, for example. Even their favorite way of instruction showed their desire to interact with their peers; they liked the discussion technique.

The sociability student group was 44% female, the largest concentration of the 4 types. Negroes were relatively low in this group. In socio-economic status the sociability students were between the lower stability and the higher self groups and were almost tied with the expertise. Their family incomes (family of origin, not personal family) were typically in the $8,000-$14,000 range, and their fathers typically held lower white collar positions and most likely had been to college although had not necessarily graduated from college. The middle class Protestants, Methodists and Presbyterians, were strongly sociability types. Their parents attended more "cultural events" than did the stability students' parents, but the sociability parents attended less frequently than the expertise or self parents. According to their children, these parents were highest in a child-rearing style that emphasized mutuality and interdependence between the parents and their children. To the sociability students their parents used suggesting without coercing and understanding as child-rearing styles. This theme of interpersonal sensitivity may also account for the fact that the parents of sociability students showed the most concern with whom their children's college associates would be.

In secondary schooling sociability was especially correlated with attendance at public schools. The parents emphasized grades "quite a bit" but not so much as the stability parents. The sociability students were characterized by grades of B. In high school their favorite courses were the social sciences, physical education, music, and home economics-agriculture. True to their gregarious natures they were most active in extracurricular activities: school spirit, student government, interscholastic athletics, church youth groups, public affairs, future teachers and future nurses, Y's, and social fraternities and sororities. Perhaps showing their dislike of criticizing others, they showed the greatest satisfaction with school in general and with their teachers.

Given a choice of how they would like to be remembered at their schools, they chose being known as outstanding athletes, leaders in activities, and/or most popular. They were most active in the teenage culture, highest in dating, and in listening to popular music.

As would be expected by their other-directed personalities, they were least independent from family and from peers. On the Liberalism Scale, they scored lowest; however, as discussed earlier, this may have been an anti-sociability scale rather than a liberalism scale. Their cultural sophistication was above that of the stability group, but below the other 2.

While the sociability subsystem was the modal subsystem of the whole sample, 50.8%, 2 public universities with students from predominantly middle-class backgrounds and with many majors in mathematics and the sciences, in the social sciences, and in education were especially high in sociability, 58.6% and 63.7%.

In his study of influence in a small town Robert Merton dichotomized his sample into "locals" and "cosmopolitans" ("Patterns of Influence, Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," 1957). The locals express the sociability subsystem, and the cosmopolitans the expertise subsystem. The former were influential because of their social contacts in the community, not that they had powerful or high status contacts, but because of the number of people they knew. They were the joiners of organizations and did so to make as many contacts as possible. Because of this contact they were sympathetic and shared the feelings of the townspeople. They often held political elective positions.

In Gouldner's study the "true bureaucrat" subgroup seems especially sociability oriented. They wanted to make the college practices conform to the community's standards. They were concerned with smooth social relations between the town and the college.

A study of particular interest to the sociability subsystem is Theodore Newcomb's and Richard Flacks' Deviant Subcultures on a College Campus. The Peterson report showed that the sociability students comprised just over half the student population in their sample of 23 American institutions of higher education. In the Newcomb-Flacks study of Bennington College, however, the self types were dominant, and the sociability students were a deviant subculture. The authors were mostly interested in the deviant status of this group, rather than their sociability characteristics.

They found that these "collegiate-social-preppy" girls selected more people as particularly close friends than did a different deviant group. The sociability girls were concentrated in a few living units. They saw themselves as different from most of the college, but their deviant status was mitigated by the fact that their deviant subculture helped them maintain an enclave within the self dominant culture. They selected each other as prestigious members of the community and wanted to be known as social types and leaders (sociability characteristics) rather than as creative individualists, a self characteristic. Although the deviants were more likely to leave Bennington than were the nondeviants, membership in the sociability subculture apparently insulated them somewhat; they were less likely to leave than deviants who did not participate in the subculture.

It's particularly interesting to note that in the Peterson study of 23 colleges only 2 were women's colleges, Bennington and Sarah Lawrence. These are the 2 colleges mentioned in the sections on expertise and self later in this chapter. In those colleges the sociability group comprised 14.7% and 14.5% of their student bodies. Thus, the Newcomb-Flacks and the Peterson reports intersect at Bennington College. Both studies report a strong self subsystem at Bennington. Peterson, however, reports that the most prevalent subsystem in terms of personal philosophy of higher education is expertise, not self.

Most of the students described in Newcomb's chapter were sociability students. Their main reference group was their college peers, and they used the whole college as their positive reference group. One of the values of the college that they adopted was the norm of nonconservatism. None was judged to be overly dependent on her parents, but conservative parents were a negative reference group to these students. They were above average in prestige from other students (presumably sociability too), and their instructors reported they were eager, cooperative, enthusiastic, and anxious to please. Their ambition on coming to college was for leadership, a sociability trait as Peterson noted too.

The liberal shift in Personality and Social Change was due to the dominance of the sociability subsystem at Bennington in the late 1930's, according to my "sociability hypothesis." On Newcomb's Political-Economic Progressivism Scale the most nonconservative group were sociability types, in this interpretation. These students were social studies majors and composed by far the largest number of majors in the college. These students set the tone of the college community and were more responsive to the whole community than to their majors, however.

On the "guess-who" rating the combined sociability + expertise + self group was highest on 4 out of 5 predicted sociability items: most absorbed in college community affairs, most influenced by community expectations regarding codes, standards, etc., most influenced by the enthusiasm of the crowd, most likely to be enthusiastic supporters of the college. As noted above, the stability students were highest in "most absorbed in social life, weekends, etc."

The seniors were exceedingly high in the social value. In fact, to the time of Newcomb's book, his reading was the highest for any group to that date and was approached by only a group of missionaries and a group of Boy Scout leaders. As expected, the 10 least conservative seniors were higher in this value than the 10 most conservative seniors.

Expertise

One of Clark and Trow's groups, the "academics," was primarily interested in higher education for intellectual stimulation and the pursuit of knowledge. These interests, with their area of specialization within academic disciplines, place these students in the expertise humanistic category. Peterson reports that their selection of majors stresses intellectual power and habit; e.g., the sciences. They were the most inclined toward graduate education. While they strongly chose course work as their most anticipated satisfaction, the stability types were higher in selecting this. As noted earlier, this may be due to the fact that the stability students didn't have any alternative written to be especially appealing to them, while the expertise students showed some interest in self activities, lowering their relative standing on course work. Influence over others and public recognition for one's abilities is another trait of expertise. In their choice of journalism, music performance, and work in political organizations as their expected extracurricular activities, the expertise students manifested their subsystem. They were highest in favoring original research as the preferred instructional method, and they were also high in liking discussion and ambiguous problems.

Demographically, equal percentages of men and women were expertise types, although in the whole sample there were more men, hence, more in the expertise group. The expertise students were almost identical with the sociability students in socio-economic status. Both groups were between the low of stability and the high of self. Their parents were more formally educated and were likely to belong to upper-middle class religions or sects. Like the sociability students, their fathers were likely to have attended college, but the expertise students' fathers were more likely to have graduated than the sociability fathers. The cultural level of the parents was below that of the self types, but above that of sociability and stability. In their child-rearing practices these parents were a mixture of the mutuality-interdependence of the sociability parents and the autonomy-permissive style of the self parents.

In secondary schooling the expertise students were the most likely of the 4 groups to receive A's, and they reported that they did the most studying. The graduates of Jewish preparatory schools were especially expertise types, and their preferred majors were the natural sciences and foreign languages. In nonacademic activities public recognition for their special talents and interests was apparent in their choices of literary-debate, speech-drama, science groups, music, hobby groups, and honor societies. They preferred to be known as "brilliant students academically." They had low participation in the teenage culture and were the lowest of the 4 groups in dating and movie attendance.

Being next to the sociability students on the humanistic continuum, they were less dependent than the sociability types on their families and their friends. They were more liberal than the sociability and stability students, but not so liberal as the self group. In the "Social Conscience Scale," which measured "institutional wrongdoing," they were the highest. And in cultural sophistication, they were next to the high.

The expertise group comprised 18.5% of the national sample, but at a coed independent liberal arts college they comprised 33% of the freshmen student body, and at a large Jewish university they accounted for 32.7% of the freshmen. Both these institutions of higher education drew from the middle and upper-middle classes. Mathematics, biological and physical sciences (including medicine) were characteristic majors at these schools. Expertise was also strong at 2 independent liberal arts colleges for upper-middle class women, comprising 48.9% and 47.3% of their freshmen classes. One of these, although we don't know which, was Bennington

College.

Merton's cosmopolitans (expertise) were influential because of the things they knew. When they joined organizations, it was to exchange ideas with others, rather than to meet more people. They cared more about these qualities of the people they met. In the organizations they were members of, their influence came from their specialized knowledge or skills. In the community as a whole they mediated between the outside world of ideas and their localities.

Gouldner's cosmopolitans were composed of 2 subgroups, the "empire builders" and the "outsiders." Both these groups shared loyalty to their disciplines and showed little desire for stricter or more rules. The empire builders, however, shared the dedication to their discipline with dedication to their departments. They may have been straddling the humanistic continuum between expertise and sociability. The outsiders were wholly committed to their disciplines, and were strongly expertise types. (Apparently Gouldner asked no questions that would turn up self answers.)

Gouldner wondered whether locals and cosmopolitans use different standards for forming reference groups. Within these various groups and subgroups the interactions were stronger than they were among groups. Based on the humanistic theory, we can speculate that the different standards are some of the variables, or components, that change from subsystem to subsystem.

Intellectual independence was a characteristic of the expertise students in Theodore Newcomb's study of reference groups. This group held a positive reference to the whole college. They were nonconservative, as was most of the rest of the college, and they were high in prestige from other students. Many were leaders. In Personality and Social Change these students were characteristically literature majors, although they may have shared this major with some sociability students. They were also interested in the combined drama-dance major, which may also have attracted some self students.

In the "guess-who" rating 2 items were predicted to be shared by sociability and expertise: most absorbed in national and international public affairs and most anxious to hold positions of community responsibility. 2 items were predicted to appeal especially to expertise types: most absorbed in college studies and academic work, most influenced by faculty authority. The combined group of the last 3 humanistic stages was highest in these 4, but, of course, we don't know which type within this combination is most responsible. On the 2 items that were estimated to appeal to both expertise and self, the weight was again on the combined side: most likely to engage actively in pursuits related to college activities and least likely to live a life of sheltered leisure.

When investigating values Newcomb found that the seniors of one class were abnormally high in the theoretical values, which, presumably, is an expertise value with its high value on knowledge, the intellect, and theory. The 10 least conservative seniors were higher in this value than the 10 most conservative seniors.

Self

The "nonconformists" in the Clark and Trow typology were primarily concerned with their own identity and with self-insight and self-discovery. They composed only 3.8% of the Peterson sample. They were the highest in choosing art, drama, English, and a humanities combination as their major. Self-expression and creativity showed in their plans for graduate school too; they characteristically planned on continuing their studies in art, English, architecture, and the performing arts. As expected, their greatest anticipated satisfactions in their coming college careers were self-discovery and self-insight. The activities in which they scored highest were literary-oratorical-dramatic, and art. They were the opposites of the stability types in these and in their curricular and instructional preferences, independent work, essay exams, and suggested readings.

3% of the men and 4% of the women were self types. Of the 205 self types, 73 came from 2 small independent liberal arts colleges for women. In socio-economic terms the self students came from the highest ranking backgrounds. More than any other group they came from families with yearly incomes of over $14,000. Their fathers were strongly professionals, owners, or executives. And the self types were those who counted on family trust funds, insurance plans, etc. for their support in college. Their parents were the most educated and were especially high in graduate education. Their religious backgrounds were heavily weighted toward liberal Protestant sects, Unitarian, Friends, Episcopal, and United Church of Christ. Those with Jewish backgrounds were typically Reform. And the self group most frequently reported that they had no formal religion. Again, showing the opposite characteristics of the stability students, the self students reported the least certainty and satisfaction with their current belief system.

They were highest in cultural level of their families, scoring so in 5 of 8 categories. The parents' child-rearing practices were autonomy-permissive, a style which sets relatively few standards or barriers on behavior. Their parents expressed the least concern with their children's associates at college, least concern with high school grades, and least concern with college graduation.

As students in secondary schools, the self types were the highest of the 4 groups in receiving D's or lower. They valued grades least, and they did the least studying, although they, like the other groups, received a B average for their senior year. Self types were especially prevalent among graduates of Protestant denominational schools, private (nonreligious and nonmilitary schools) and military schools. As secondary school students they preferred English and art more than did the other 3 humanistic types.

Journalism and publication activities were the most chosen by self types, and they were most apt to have done some nonschool writing and nonschool arts or crafts. They expressed the least satisfaction with school in general and with their teachers. This was not because they were peer-oriented, however. They were low in participation in the teenage culture, especially in car-centered activity, watching TV, and listening to popular music.

As might be expected, they showed the most independence from their families and friends. They were the highest in liberalism and the lowest in the Social Conscience Scale. As discussed before, they may show low concern with "institutional wrongdoing," because some of the items on the scale pitted an individual against a social institution or norm. In instances where the social system or an organization was the aggrieved party, especially if it were the acts of one individual against a group, the self types sided with the individual person. In cultural sophistication the self students were the highest. While only 3.8% of the whole sample were self types, at 2 independent liberal arts colleges for women, 23.3% and 30.9% were self students.

Newcomb's chapter on reference groups shows a switch along the humanistic continuum for the group we analyze as self types. Earlier in their college lives they used the faculty as a positive reference group (expertise) but later they switched to "outside" writers and artists. Although they were nonconservative, like the rest of the college, they saw the college as a negative reference group. They reported some independence battles with their parents, but none was judged as overly dependent on them. Their prestige from the other students was mixed, and their instructors saw them as highly independent, critical minded, and intellectually outstanding. Their ambitions on coming to college are not clear, but may have been predominantly intellectual.

In Newcomb's original study of Bennington these students were likely to be art majors and may have been drama-dance majors too. They were more conservative than the center of the humanistic continuum, the sociability students. This rise in conservatism may have been due to one or both of the following: a) the scale of political-economic progressivism may have been sociability and/or expertise laden, containing items which, like Peterson's Social Conscience Scale, picked out sociability and expertise liberalism, but not self liberalism; b) if we use the "sociability hypothesis" and maintain that nonconservatism was a social norm, then we would expect self types to show less of this sociability trait than either the expertise or sociability types.

On the "guess-who" rating only 1 item seems specially able to pick out the self types, and it did pick out the combined sociability + expertise + self group: least likely to be deterred from some interesting pursuit because of family disapproval. 8 items were predicted to appeal to both stability and self because they indicate nonparticipation in the community. The stability students and the combined group were generally both high on these items: most critical of college educational policies, most critical of individual members of faculty or administrative staff, most critical of student committees, most anxious to be left alone to follow individual pursuits, most resistant to community expectations regarding codes, standards, etc., most resistant to faculty authority, least likely to be enthusiastic supporter of the college, most resistant to the enthusiasm of the crowd.

The aesthetic value from the Allport-Vernon scale is interpreted as a self value. The senior class was high in this value, and the least conservative seniors were higher in this than the most conservative seniors.

* * *

These 4 summaries of the manifestations of the subsystems combine the information from Part 2, Chapters 4-10. Chapters 11 and 12 used these findings and the humanistic theory as a framework for commenting on and analyzing some changes going on in institutions of higher education and in our society. In keeping with the more speculative tone of Section 3, this chapter now turns its eyes from retrospect to prospect.

Part 2

PROSPECT: EXTENSIONS, EXTRAPOLATIONS, AND SPECULATIONS

Introduction

As William James said, the only adequate test of a theoretical position is to bring it to bear on as many problems as possible, even until the threshold of absurdity. Where is the edge of absurdity for a holistic social theory? Perhaps, like many frontiers, we don't know where it is until we've passed it and can look back on it. Maybe I've already passed it. Perhaps it lies ahead. I'll assume the latter, but your decision is for you to make.

In Chapters 3-10 I demonstrated some uses of the humanistic general systems theory. In these cases I tried to show how the observations usually fell into broad patterns expected by the theory. For example, in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 I showed that many of the results Peterson found in On a Typology of College Students (1965) were to be predicted using the theory. That is, the traits he found for his various types of students would be predicted to hang together by the type descriptions in Chapter 2. This reinterpretation turns his descriptions of characteristics that occur together into a test of the first general proposition of the humanistic theory: The types exist. By embedding his findings in a theoretical framework, his observations move from merely interesting descriptions to theoretically relevant descriptions. Because of the conceptual organization of the theory his findings become relevant to the other findings that are also organized and reorganized by the theory. The first part of this chapter drew together the findings in Chapters 3-10 of this work. One of the main advantages of this humanistic theory, if not the main advance, is that it allows us to draw together many previously disparate observations in a step toward a unified social science and a unified view of man. And we can then use this developing holistic and humanistic social science as a basis for future investigations. The first part of this chapter, by bringing together some separate elements (mostly related to higher education), gives a condensed view of what is, in my opinion, the solution to a major problem of much past conceptualization. This problem is the fractionalization of disciplinary approaches and the resulting inaccurate views of the non-fractionalized world.

This second part of the chapter "Extensions, Extrapolations, and Speculations" shows some directions along which this approach might develop in the future. This part is more speculative and suggestive than the first part and diverges more from the empirical bias of the first part. When you read it, I hope you'll keep my conjectural intent in mind.

Developmental Psychology

The first 5 topics are generally closely associated with child development:

Attachment and dependency
Parental discipline
Socialization
Moral development
Language

For each of these components it is handy to keep in mind 2 orienting questions that a holistic approach asks: How does this component form part of the various subsystems? That is, what is its relationship to the whole? How, for example, does socialization in the upper-lower class contribute to the stability subsystem? The second question is: How do the other components influence the component we are focusing on? For example, how is a stability use of language a reflection of stability attachment and dependency, parental discipline, socialization, and moral development?

Unfortunately, these questions are too big to be fully answered here. The purpose of these explorations is to raise questions, not to answer them. Table 13-1 illustrates a humanistic table that helps generate some questions. When we glance down the sociability column, for example, we notice a warm, love-oriented style of discipline, a middle-class, personal-subjective style of socialization, moral development characterized by autonomous justice, reciprocity, equality, conventionality, and social contract, and a use of pronouns typified by "we." How do these influence each other? How do they fit together to build and maintain the larger sociability subsystem? How do components not listed here interact with these components and with the broader subsystems?

There are gaps in Table 13-1. These raise questions about our conceptual methodology to date. I have placed restrictiveness under stability and permissiveness under self in the first component. This leaves a hole for sociability and expertise.

Table 13-1

Humanistic Social Theory Interpretations of Some Child Development Concepts

Humanistic Subsystems

Components	SURVIVAL	STABILITY	SOCIABILITY	EXPERTISE	SELF
Attachment & Dependency (Maccoby & Masters)		restrictiveness control			permissiveness-----/ autonomy-----/
Parental Discipline (Becker)		hostility power-assertive	warmth love-oriented		
Socialization (Hess)	w-o-r-k-i-n-g low	upper-lower lower-middle status-normative	middle personal-subjective	upper-middle cognitive-rational	
Moral Dvlpt. (Piaget)		adult authority sacred rules punishment	autonomous justice, reciprocity, equality equality	e-q-u-i-t-y	
(Kohlberg)	premoral punishment-obedience instrumental hedonism	c-o-n-v-e-n-t-i-o-n-a-l personal concordance law and order	social contract	p-r-i-n-c-i-p-l-e-d individual principles	
Language (Bernstein) (Mitchell)	r-e-s-t-r-i-c-t-e-d ---------t-h-e-y-----		---------e-l-a-b-o-r-a-t-e-d--------------- we	I	all

A more refined idea of restrictiveness might differentiate between stability and sociability varieties of restrictiveness. If a sociability restrictiveness is conceptualized and found, then we can ask about its contributions to the sociability subsystem and its relationships to the other sociability components.

Do individual development and maturation follow the humanistic sequence of stages? Perhaps this is the major question this humanistic theory asks. From birth through infancy a child's concerns seem primarily centered on his physiological needs and on controlling his body. From early childhood to the onset of adolescence he is concerned to a large extent with learning the rules and mores of society and home. Language is one complex set of rules. It shows the stability characteristics of categorizing things, naming, pidgeon-holing experience, and specifying the relationships among them. Many children, especially in early childhood develop ritualized ways of doing things, and everything must be in its proper place and order, bedtime rituals and security blankets, for example. As Piaget points out (See below) children before the age of 8 are very obedience-punishment oriented (stability).

In late childhood and at the onset of adolescence a child's center of attention switches to his peer group. This may be a sociability stage in development. In later adolescence different effects on the stability stage? Does it help or hinder a child to have parents and society use the same style? If a parent uses a self style of toilet training or feeding schedule, is it easier for a child to maintain this style as he works on his stability developmental tasks? What happens if the parents are either consistent or inconsistent in their child-rearing styles? What if inconsistency occurs during one stage? What if it is consistent within one stage but changes from stage to stage?

These questions, and others, are some of the classic questions of developmental psychology. The humanistic theory doesn't answer them. It asks them again from a different conceptual perspective.

Dimensions of Dependency

What subsystem is dependency most associated with? How does dependency vary from subsystem to subsystem? These questions start a humanistic analysis to dependency. Does this approach contribute to what we know about dependency? In "Attachment and Dependency," Maccoby and Masters (1970) survey and summarize this field, and this discussion is based on their work.

The authors identify 17 dimensions of parental behavior that have been derived by factor analysis. 10 of these appear readily placeable on the humanistic continuum (See Table 13-2).

when he begins to think of himself in terms of his occupation or adult role, he may be switching toward an expertise orientation. Where is the self stage? Is it a shortcoming of our society that we often consider an occupational role as full adulthood? Can we, should we, and are we now developing a new idea of man-beyond-occupation?

If this humanistic view of human development proves useful, old questions are recast in new terms, and some new questions arise. To what extent does one stage always follow another? What personal and social conditions retard or facilitate movement from one stage to another? Will a person at one stage be especially susceptible to influences on that stage? For example, does the development of a person's sense of stability grow primarily from his period of stability development? During the stability period are variations in control-autonomy and restrictiveness-permissiveness most crucial? Is a person's sociability developed primarily during his sociability stage? To what extent does it depend on the preparations of previous stages? If we conceive of each period as having a different major humanistic task, establishing stability, sociability, etc., can we consider different effects from different parental styles or social conditions? For example, during the control of an infant's physiological processes, some parents may use a self-regulated schedule. Does this apparently self style have

Table 13-2

Factors in Parental Behavior and Child Dependence: A Humanistic Interpretation

	HUMANISTIC SUBSYSTEMS				
	SURVIVAL	STABILITY	SOCIABILITY	EXPERTISE	SELF
Dimensions of Parental Behavior		hostility	warmth		
		rejection	democratic attitudes		
		restrictiveness			
		control			permissiveness
		inhibitory demands			autonomy
		discipline			
		physical punishment			
		dependency encouragement			
		authoritarian control			
		punitiveness			
		firm discipline			
				achievement orientation	independence orientation

The remaining 7 and others may be categorizable after further definition and investigation.

The factors that do not seem to scale, at least not obviously so, are: child-rearing anxiety, sex anxiety, responsible child-rearing orientation, general family adjustment, marital conflict, seclusiveness, and involvement versus laissez-faire. Perhaps these concepts and their behavioral indicators will yield to humanistic analysis under closer scrutiny.

A warm parent, according to Maccoby and Masters (p. 139), shows what are sociability traits in humanistic terminology:

> A warm parent is one who is interested in the child, oriented toward him, responsive to him, and whose responses tend to be rewarding and supportive. The warm parent provides a relatively large amount of contact comfort, and praises the child for desired behavior.

The sociability sensitivity to interpersonal relations and warmth is portrayed in the quotation above.

When the authors interpret various studies, they do so from a behavioral approach (p. 139):

> All these parent behaviors should presumably be conditions for the establishment of a strong attachment to the parent on the part of the child.

Apparently the authors think that reward increases the likelihood of behavior being repeated. Within the assumptions of humanistic psychology this is true too, but only to an extent. They fail to take into account the humanistic principle that satiation leads to a new sort of behavior. Those parents who use sociability techniques are likely to reinforce sociability behavior until satiation is reached, but those parents who manage to satisfy the sociability goals of interpersonal warmth will aid their children in going beyond this stage. Thus sociability parental style of socialization (e.g., warmth) is likely to be associated with sociability behavior in children (if satiation has not been reached) or with expertise and self behaviors (if satiation has been reached). A sociability style is not likely to be associated with dependency (stability), however.

The surprise that these authors find is due to their conceptual framework (p. 140):

> It is surprising, at least on first consideration, that this global variable (warmth) has proved to be a poor predictor of dependency. We have seen that in the work on infant attachment, warmth per se was not associated with either the intensity or breadth of attachment.

Dependency, with its overtones of being controlled by another person and of fitting in with established structures and precedures, is predominantly a stability trait, "There is evidence that dependency (stability) is associated not with warmth (sociability) but with its polar opposite, *rejection* or *hostility* (stability)" (p. 140). In answer to the humanistic question of which subsystem dependency is most associated with, this tentative, third-hand investigation indicates stability.

This humanistic theory also helps account for the findings when we look at the restrictiveness-permissiveness (control-autonomy) dimension. Maccoby and Masters hypothesize, "... that restrictiveness (s̲̅tabilityy̲̅) will prevent the child from acquiring autonomous skills (s̲̅elf̲̅) for coping with his needs, and will therefore be associated with continued high dependence (s̲̅tabilityy̲̅) upon parents and other adults (s̲̅tability authority figures̲̅). The development of social skills with age-mates (s̲̅ociabilityy̲̅) should be one of the things interfered with by parental restrictiveness (s̲̅tabilityy̲̅), and therefore such restrictiveness ought to be reflected in low 'dependency' behavior toward peers (s̲̅ociabilityy̲̅)," (p. 143). Table 13-3 summarizes some pertinent information.

As with other studies, dichotomous approaches characterize the field of childhood socialization and dependency. The stability subsystem is rather populated with concepts, while other subsystems share the remaining ones. Table 13-3 is adapted from Maccoby and Masters (pp. 143-144). I have condensed sociability, expertise, and self into one category.

Whether the child-rearing variable is restrictiveness, overprotection, or structure and demand, this stability

Table 13-3

Summary of Studies of Restrictiveness/Permissiveness in Parental Style of Behavior

	STABILITY	SOCIABILITY + EXPERTISE + SELF
dimension of parental behavior	restrictiveness	permissiveness
Watson (1957)	warm restrictive home: less independent	warm permissive home: more independent
Faigin (1958)	structured kibbutz: more seeking attention and help from adults	permissive kibbutz: crying, thumbsucking under 2; peer dependency over 2.
Winder & Rau (1962)	high restrictiveness: dependency and aggression	
McCord et al (1962)	high parental demands strict supervision high restrictions: dependency on adults in middle childhood and adolescence	total lack of parental restrictions: dependence on age-mates
Levy (1943)	boys with overprotective mothers: either passively dependent or demandingly dependent	
Kagan and Moss (1962)	maternal restrictiveness: girls-dependency boys-0-3 independence in adulthood 3-6 dependence in adulthood	
Finney (1963)	maternal overprotectiveness: submissiveness	

Table 13-3 continued

	STABILITY	SOCIABILITY + EXPERTISE + SELF
Murphy (1962)		feeding autonomy: autonomy at preschool age
Smith (1958)	maternal overprotectiveness: dependency toward mother	

style of child-rearing results in dependency. At first some of the findings are puzzling. Levy found that overprotective mothers had either passively or demandingly dependent children. However, when we remember that the dominant-submissive personality is characteristic of stability, then we come up with the speculation that these variations of dependency are also variations of dominance-submission.

The interpretation of dependency and of other topics in developmental psychology is by no means as clear-cut as I simplify it here. The findings in this and in the topics I discuss below are full of conflict and variable interpretation. Apparent contradictions abound. It is my estimation that humanistic theory can provide some organization for parts of this intriguing field, but it is no periodic chart into which studies and findings will automatically or conclusively arrange themselves. As I pointed out in the introduction to this part of this chapter, these observations are more scouting reports than surveyors' measurements.

Restrictiveness was interpreted as one stability trait in this section. It appears again as a major variable in the discussion of parental discipline, which follows.

Parental Discipline

Discussing modes of parental discipline, Wesley Becker uses the restrictiveness-permissiveness continuum too. In addition to this, which he sometimes calls "control-autonomy," he uses a warmth (love)-hostility dimension too ("Consequences of Different Kinds of Parental Discipline," 1964). The love-oriented types of studies have generally used a variable that has to do with sociability, in humanistic terminology, "Love-oriented techniques have generally included positive methods, such as use of praise and reasoning, and negative methods which threaten the love relation to the parent, such as isolating the child from the parent, showing disappointment, and withdrawing love," (pp. 176-177).

For the time being we can let Becker's definition ride, but the use of "reason" could be stability, "Do it because I told you to;" it could be sociability, "Don't do that because Johnny won't like you;" or it could be expertise, "Don't walk on the ice yet, because we haven't had enough cold weather to form a safe thickness." And, as will be discussed below in the section "Reinforcement," praise may vary from subsystem to subsystem too. However, Becker's general description of the love-oriented technique as quoted here and elsewhere in his discussion, does stress the sociability trait of interpersonal relations, love and warmth.

The power-assertive style of discipline shows stability characteristics, "Power-assertive techniques most typically have included physical punishment, but in some cases have been extended to include yelling, shouting, forceful commands, and verbal threats," (p. 177). When we look at the stability and sociability subsystems and their representative types of child control, a picture of how parental discipline forms part of these 2 subsystems and of how styles of parental discipline and their subsystems strengthen each other begins to emerge.

Discipline Style

STABILITY	SOCIABILITY
Power-assertive parents	Love-oriented parents
working class	middle class
physical punishment	praise and reasoning
yelling, shouting, commands, threats	isolation, disappointment, withdrawal of love
hostile parents	warm parents

Results

externalized reaction to transgression	internalized reaction to transgression
fear of punishment	guilt
projected hostility	self-responsibility
aggressiveness	confession

STABILITY	SOCIABILITY
noncooperation	nonaggression
resistance to authority	social cooperation
power assertion over peers	
inhibition of overt aggression	
prosocial aggression	
self-aggression	

In his summary of restrictiveness (stability) and permissiveness (self) Becker examines each of these as it is combined with hostility (stability) and warmth (sociability). Table 13-4 is adapted from Becker's 2 x 2 diagram of 2 dimensions of discipline, restrictiveness-permissiveness and warmth-hostility (p. 198). The double stability style, restrictiveness and hostility, results in neurotic problems, more quarreling and shyness with peers, social withdrawal, low adult role-taking, and maximal self-aggression in boys. Cohen and Hodges remind us that among the lower working class social awkwardness with peers, a lack of breadth in role-taking, and extra punitiveness occur ("Characteristics of the Lower-Blue-Collar Class," 1963).

The combined stability-sociability mode (restrictiveness and warmth) leads to submissive, polite, neat, obedient children. Minimal aggression, maximal rule enforcement in boys, maximal compliance, and dependent, not-friendly, not-creative children. In Theodore Newcomb's report on Bennington College he found that the college instructors called this group spanning stability and sociability "over-docile,"

Table 13-4

Humanistic Interpretation of the Interactions in the Consequence of Warmth Vs. Hostility and Restrictiveness Vs. Permissiveness

SURVIVAL	STABILITY	SOCIABILITY	EXPERTISE	SELF
	hostility-restrictiveness: quarreling, shyness, withdrawal, neurotic problems, low adult role-taking, self aggression	w-a-r-m-t-h - - p-e-r-m-i-s-s-i-v-e-n-e-s-s: active, socially outgoing, creative, successfully aggressive, friendly, independent, easy adult role-taking, minimal self-aggression, minimal rule enforcement		
		warmth-restrictiveness: submissive, dependent, polite, neat, obedient, not friendly, not creative, maximal compliance, maximal rule-enforcement, minimal aggression		
	hostility			permissiveness
		Weathermen? -------------------- / delinquency / / noncompliance / / maximal aggression/ --------------------		

(Personality and Social Change, 1943). These may be Kohlberg's "conventionally" moral people (See "Moral Development" below).

The double stability style, restrictiveness plus hostility, results in people who fit the authoritarian personality, defensive identification or identification with the aggressor. Just before this I pointed out that power-assertive parents, a stability style, are likely to have children who practice prosocial aggression; that is, they show aggression against breakers of society's laws. In Table 13-4 we see that they are also characterized by quarreling, shyness, and withdrawal, quite opposite traits from the sociability types. They also are high in neurotic problems and self-aggression. And they are low in adult role-taking.

When parents combine restrictiveness with warmth a somewhat different set of characteristics develops: submissiveness, dependency, politeness, neatness, obedience, maximal compliance and rule-enforcement, and minimal aggression. This group spans the gap between stability's restrictiveness and sociability's warmth. In my discussion of Bennington College in the 1930's I pointed out that one group of students was also characterized by instructors as overdocile and dependent (See Chapter 10). These students were also placed bridging stability and sociability for reasons other than this compliance itself.

Is there an expertise approach to parental discipline? In most studies the upper middle class is lumped into the broader middle class. Perhaps this lack is due to the fact that college professors have little perspective on themselves. Perhaps it is because the upper middle class prefer to think of themselves as part of the middle class because they share some of the same origins and democratic egalitarianism as the middle class. If this is the case, less humility and more accuracy are called for.

The combination of sociability and self (warmth and permissiveness) resulted in children who were active, socially outgoing, creative, successfully aggressive, independent, friendly, low in projective hostility, and who took adult roles easily. The boys showed minimal rule enforcement and minimal self aggression. These children showed "socially outgoing characteristics and individuality," (p. 198). In Kohlberg's terms, these may develop into individually principled youth (See "Moral Development" below).

The combination of stability and self (permissiveness and hostility) lead to maximal aggression, noncompliance, and delinquency. Perhaps these are Kohlberg's "Roskolnikoffs," who approached individual-principled behavior, but returned to the earlier stages of moral development. In humanistic terms, we can say that they had not achieved the intermediate stages between stability and self, at least not sociability. In Table 13-4 they are placed in a box to indicate that they are a combination of 2 humanistic sorts of influence. Their placement on the continuum should be split between the permissiveness of self and the hostility of stability. They are not, of course, sociability or expertise types although their box is placed under these subsystems.

The frequently heard analysis, "Permissiveness breeds delinquency, disobedience, and disorder," comes especially from the lower-middle class and from people who come from that origin. Their opinion is understandable when we remember that this group is most likely to use a hostility style. Hostility plus permissiveness does lead to antisocial action, but they fail to take into account the fact that adherents of "permissiveness" often advocate love and permissiveness, not hostility and permissiveness. The former combination results in socially outgoing individuality, not antisocial behavior.

Radicalization

I have added "Weathermen?" as a speculation that this is the placement for this group of destructive activists. Since many of them are from upper-middle-class families, we might assume they would be products of a warmth-permissiveness style. In their study of how one wealthy girl became a member of the Weathermen, Franks and Powers describe such an upper-middle-class atmosphere ("Diana - The Making of a Terrorist," 1970). Why did she become a combination of permissiveness and hostility then? If we start with the assumption that she was at one time the sort of person that results from warmth-permissiveness child-rearing (and Franks and Powers indicate this is so), we can trace a series of incidents that replaced warmth with hostility. This gave her the hostility-permissiveness combination that results in delinquency, noncompliance, and maximal aggression.

In Guatemala she saw complicity between the U. S. government and the wealthy families of that country against the peasants she wanted to help. In Ann Arbor, Michigan a free school she was helping to run was closed by lack of cooperation from the local board of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Black community, some of the children's parents, the American Friends Service Committee, and state zoning regulations. Through these incidents and others her attempts to work within our current sociability-expertise social system were thwarted. This series of experiences would contribute to the weakening of sociability and expertise in her. In addition to this she had what might be called desensitization to sociability. For a period she lived in a group which punished social consideration, warmth, and affection, and which practiced aggression and hostility.

While the broad concern for mankind that is typical of self remained, expertise and sociability had been replaced by the hostility of stability. She then was a combination of permissiveness and hostility that leads to delinquency, minimal compliance, and maximal aggression. Instead of coming from her parents, the hostility came from her experience with society and social institutions, but the effect was the same.

This incomplete and tentative interpretation of Franks and Powers' article on Diana is not meant as a full analysis of this case study but as an example which points to what might be done to understand this case and other cases. It shows how individual characteristics and societal effects can be blended when they are both interpreted in terms of this broader humanistic theory.

Moral Development

Piaget believes that moral development in children is predominantly a switch from unquestioned acceptance of adult authority to concern with equality and a sense of autonomous justice (The Moral Judgment of the Child, 1965; Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification," 1963, "Moral Development," 1968). In the early stage of moral development children show what is, in humanistic terminology, a stability orientation to the sense of justice. Piaget calls this a "heteronomous" attitude, and this consists of the following stability attitudes as opposed to the "autonomous" attitudes, which are more characteristic of sociability and the upper end of the humanistic continuum (Kohlberg, 1963, pp. 314-361):

1. conformity to rules rather than to intent
2. unchangeability of rules rather than flexibility
3. absolutism of value rather than relativism
4. moral wrongness defined by sanctions rather than made independently of sanctions
5. duty as obedience to authority rather than conformity to peers
6. ignorance of reciprocal obligations rather than contract and exchange
7. severe, painful punishment rather than restoration to victim
8. culprit injured by natural consequences of misdeed rather than nature and physical laws being morally neutral
9. punishment by authority rather than retaliation by victim
10. favoritism of authority in distributing goods rather than impartiality, equality, and distributive justice.

With increased interaction with other children (sociability) as they grow older, this stability orientation is replaced by one of interpersonal reciprocity, equality, and justice. This transition, Piaget reports, usually occurs from ages 8 to 10.

An example he gives is children's reactions to a story in which a scoutmaster tells a boy who has already done his chore for the day to do an additional one. Do children think that the request was just and that it should be obeyed? These are the results Piaget reports (1965, p. 278):

Age	Obedience (stability)	Equality (sociability)
6	95%	5%
7	55%	45%
8	33.3%	66.6%
9	16.6%	83.4%
10	10%	90%
11	5%	95%
12	0%	100%

In terms of the humanistic theory we see Piaget as documenting the transition from a stability stage to a sociability stage.

Piaget reports that one of his investigators discovered a third step. In this story a mother gives her children a roll to eat. The youngest drops his into a river. What do the children who hear the story think should be done? The investigators interpreted not giving him a roll as punishment. Giving him a roll because everyone should have a roll was interpreted as equality. And giving him a roll because he was small was called equity; it allowed for his special circumstance. This is what the investigator, Mlle. Rambert, found (1965, pp. 268-269):

Age	Punishment (stability)	Equality (sociability)	Equity (self)
6-9	48%	35%	17%
10-12	3%	55%	42%
13-14	0%	5%	95%

Equity is interpreted as associated with self, because it suggests that individual circumstances and differences are important in deciding what should be done rather than strict rule enforcement or equality which is based on blindness to individual differences.

Kohlberg presents 3 major stages of moral development with 2 substages in each ("Moral Development," 1968; Haan, Smith, and Block, "Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social Behavior, Family Background, and Personality Correlates," 1968).

In the premoral or preconventional stage (survival) a person is out to get whatever he can for himself regardless of others. In the conventional stage (stability and sociability) he is very rule conscious and internalizes the rules of his society. In the principled stage (possibly expertise and probably self) he is more interested in the values that the rules are made to promulgate. If the rules do not lead to the achievement of the values, they should be changed and/or not followed.

The first of the premoral substages is an obedience-punishment orientation. "Whatever I can get away with is right." Kohlberg's second premoral stage is naive instrumental hedonism (1968) or instrumental relativism (Haan, Smith, and Block, 1968). In this substage a right action still satisfies one's own needs and occasionally others'. Here one conforms to obtain rewards and to have favors done in return. There still is no idea of rules being right or good themselves.

In the conventional stage the humanistic theory and Kohlberg's observations diverge. This may be due to problems of transposing Kohlberg's descriptions into humanistic terminology. Kohlberg's first stage under conventional morality is "personal concordance." In this stage a person wants to maintain the approval of others by fitting a "good-boy" or "good-girl" image. Conformity to majority stereotypes and judgment by intentions suggests more of a sociability approach than a stability approach. The second premoral stage is the authority maintaining stage, or the "law and order" stage. Here one follows the rules to avoid censure by legitimate authorities. Interest in the earned regard for others' expectations suggests sociability, but "authority and social-order maintaining...doing duty and showing respect for authority" suggest stability. In terms of the humanistic differences between stability authority, which is based on rules, eternal truth, power, compliance, and orderliness, and sociability authority, which is based on democratically derived laws, social concensus, and conformity to the majority, Kohlberg's third and fourth stages are mixtures of stability and sociability. Maintaining the social order, laws, conventions, and the expectations of others are seen as differing from stability to sociability in the humanistic conceptual framework.

The first stage of the principled orientation also shows sociability characteristics, but with some expertise mixed in. This stage is the social contract stage. Here democratically accepted law is the basis for moral judgments. People recognize that many laws are social conventions and can be changed. Moral judgments may be made from the point of view of an impartial judge who has the welfare of the community in mind. This democratic basis of laws certainly indicates sociability, but the fact that there is awareness of this rather than unaware acceptance suggests that such a person may be gaining perspective on a sociability view, rather than uncritically accepting it. The impartial judge may be considered an expert in community welfare and majority rule. The avoidance of interfering with the will or rights of others may mark the beginning of self, seeing importance in individuals and in individuation. This may be a forerunner of the self point of view. The last stage is one of individual principles. This is a self orientation. It is the "morality of individual principles of conscience." Universal values and principles of justice beyond written law, majority will, and social convention indicate one of Maslow's "being values" (1962).

Beyond merely trying to organize concepts and observations that have to do with moral punishment, the humanistic approach sheds some light on student activism. The Haan, Smith, and Block study mentioned earlier, "Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social Behavior, Family Background, and Personality Correlates," investigated the backgrounds of students arrested in the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley in 1964 and at San Francisco State College. They found that 88% of the nonprotestors were premoral or conventional; while among protestors 56% were post-conventional (Keniston, "Moral Development, Youthful Activism and Modern Society," 1969).

In Milgrim's experiments he requested his subjects to shock a confederate for mistakes in learning even when the confederate reported the shocks were painful, that he wanted to leave, that he had a bad heart, and even after he stopped responding (feigning death?), (Milgrim, "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 1965). Kohlberg found that only 13% of the combined conventional and preconventional (survival through expertise?) subjects stopped the administration of shocks. But among the people in the personal principled stage (self) 75% refused to administer the shocks (Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," 1968).

While some people interpret the "new morality" as an attack on middle-class, conventional morals (E. Roberts, 1970), they might more accurately see the "new morality" as post-conventional, or self morality (T. Roberts, 1970). If our society is moving toward the self end of the humanistic continuum, then social planners, parents, educators, and lawmakers might want to take the values and behaviors of the self system into account in their decision-making.

Socialization

In his survey-summary "Social Class and Ethnic Differences Upon Socialization" (1970), Robert Hess recognizes differences that I interpret as differences among subsystems. But here too, as he points out, there is great variability in the method of classifying social class. In our terms, it is usually survival + stability contrasted with sociability + expertise + self. Working within these inexact and shifting classifications, however, we see that the lower, or working, class shows socialization appropriate to the first 2 stages in the humanistic continuum: obedience, authoritarian-control, compliance to authority, discipline, use of power; sensitivity to powerlessness, short-term gain, luck, vulnerability, lack of prestige, hierarchical structure;

preference for the familiar, simple, routine, security, coercive punishment; concern with external standards of conduct, neatness.

Middle-class socialization (usually mixing sociability, expertise, and self subsystems in these studies) stresses social interaction in both content and method. Middle-class and upper-middle-class socialization show traits of the sociability, expertise, and self subsystems: discipline based on social interaction, withdrawal of affection, shame, guilt; reference to how an action will affect others; eagerness to learn cooperation, confiding in parents, happiness, and health; encouraging independence, ambition, curiosity, consideration, and self-control; and a higher level of interaction between mothers and children. A reanalysis of socialization in terms of behavior and social conditions that contribute to the establishment and maintenance of one or another subsystem may lead to a clearer view of how these subsystems perpetuate themselves.

In their investigation "The Cognitive Environments of Urban Preschool Children: Summary of the Complete Project," Hess, Shipmen, Brophy, and Bear describe 3 styles of maternal control (1969, pp. 6-7). The "imperative or status-normative" style stresses "appeals to norms, status, and generally accepted rules and regulations...acceptance of the status quo as appropriate and unquestionable." This stability style was characteristic of the skilled and the unskilled working classes.

The personal-subjective style "appeals to the subjective, internal states of the child, the mother, or other persons with whom he interacts." In this mode of control a mother is likely to ask her child to put himself in the place of someone else, to feel how that person would feel. This sort of control style sensitizes the child to other people and teaches him to cue his activities to those of others, a sociability skill. This kind of control was typical of upper-middle class mothers and was positively correlated with the use of rationales which stress the individual characteristics of persons, rich home resources, and better cognitive development of both mother and child. The investigators didn't examine lower-middle class maternal styles. In their summary report Hess et al didn't report on differences based on the cognitive-rational control style; however, in an earlier report which looked at upper-middle class mothers, they found that the cognitive-rational style was strongest among this higher range of the middle class ("Cognitive Elements in Maternal Behavior," 1967). This style expresses some expertise manifestations in its scientific-intellectual approach, "appeals based on arguments relating to the task and to future consequences of the behavior...a rationale of cause and effect...asks the child to project himself into other times or places and to reflect on long-term effects of his behavior." This may be the cognitive preparation for a scientific-hypothetical mode of thought characteristic of expertise.

In "The Value Systems of Different Classes: A Social Psychological Contribution to the Analysis of Stratification," Herbert H. Hyman (1953, p. 432) reports that lower classes (presumably stability classes) preferred jobs with security and steadiness of employment, while upper and upper-middle classes (presumably expertise and self classes) preferred occupations which matched career pattern to an individual's personality, interests, and individual qualifications. Parents' preference for teaching styles shows this difference among subsystems too. Sieber and Wilder, in "Teaching Styles: Parental Preferences and Professional Role Definitions" (1957), found that working-class mothers (stability subsystem) preferred authoritarian styles of teaching, while middle-class mothers preferred a style that made class interesting and encouraged their children's creativity and self-directed work. From these results it seems the investigators split their sample between working class and higher classes, combining the sociability, expertise, and self classes into "middle class." This, of course, suggests further refinements for further studies; i.e., controlling for and grouping by humanistic types, rather than using a dichotomous split that bunches together several humanistic types.

Melvin Kohn ("Social Class and Parental Values," 1959) divided his sample of parents into 5 classes. He found that as status increases the more likely it is that mothers will choose the following characteristics for their children: consideration, curiosity, self-control, and (for boys) happiness. While consideration shows a sociability orientation, curiosity, self-control, and happiness show the self-growth, personal development, and "being" value of the later stages of the humanistic continuum. While it is difficult to tell from this study what "curiosity" meant to the mothers, it is not unreasonable to expect that they could see it as the key motivation for personal development, individual growth, and these as leading to happiness. If this is so, then it is especially applicable to the self subsystem. This makes Kohn's finding that curiosity is strongly related to the higher status classes a conceptually intriguing finding from the framework of this humanistic theory, "...the proportion of mothers who value curiosity rises very slowly from status level to status level until we reach the wives of professionals and the more highly educated businessmen; then it jumps suddenly," (1959, p. 350). Here is a bit of evidence that the usual dichotomization of studies, such as lower class and upper class may be masking differences that can be clustered around the subsystems.

Kohn's study brings up 3 more points of interest in the design and interpretation of socialization studies. General values, such as "honesty" may have different meanings to people in different subsystems. In this study Kohn found that lower-class mothers associated "honesty" with obedience and deference to parents, stability traits. "Honesty" to middle-class mothers, on the other hand, stresses the sociability value of thinking of others, "Not conformity to authority, but inner control, not because you're told to, but because you take the other person into consideration - these are the middle-class ideals." These differences, which are consistent with subsystem differences, may alert us to other similar variations among subsystems and their components.

Of particular interest to this humanistic theory is Kohn's later discussion of this and other studies, "Social Class and Parent-Child Relationships: An Interpretation" (1963). In this discussion he links social structure (occupations), values, and socialization. This type of linking into clusters by subsystems with mutually interacting components is a type of analysis strongly suggested by the humanistic theory. In the abstract of this article, Kohn links stability socialization style, parental values, and occupational role in the working class. He links sociability + expertise + self socialization styles, parental values, and occupational roles to "the middle class." Unfortunately he slips back to a dichotomous split between the working class and the middle class. The theory would lead us too to expect self-direction to be especially characteristic of the self subsystem (1963, p. 471):

> The argument of this analysis is that class differences in parent-child relationships are a product of differences in parental values (with middle-class parents' values centering on external proscription); these differences in values, in turn, stem from differences in the conditions of life of the various social classes (particularly occupational conditions - middle-class occupations requiring a greater degree of self-direction, working-class occupations, in larger measure, requiring that one follow explicit rules set down by someone in authority). Values, thus, form a bridge between social structure and behavior.

While values, occupations, and socialization are seen here as associated with each other, the humanistic theory tends to interpret them all as parts of larger subsystems, rather than as an isolated chain. The emphasis is, rather, on these as parts of larger wholes, the subsystems, and thus linked with other components too.

The proposition that subsystems emerge as the goals of previous subsystems are achieved, is supported by Kohn too. He says (1963, p. 476) that the reason middle-class parents pay attention to the particular values they do is that they have already achieved "much greater stability of income" and that this allows them "to take for granted the respectability that is still problematic for working-class parents." That is, their previous success at stability goals frees them to become interested in sociability, expertise, and self goals.

This foray into some socialization literature is by no means a complete or even representative sample of how the humanistic theory and research on socialization can contribute to each other. It may be that I have mined most of the ore; however, it seems to me that the main body might not have even been indicated yet. Not only are there studies to be reinterpreted, compared, and synthesized through the glasses of the humanistic theory, but cross-disciplinary and cross-specialty investigations are one of the next steps. Another is the reexamination and rewriting of existing instruments. Dichotomized studies might be replicated using 3, 4, or 5 subsystems in the analyses. I hope new studies based on the humanistic conceptual framework will contribute to a more integrated view of man.

Language

Bernstein claims that a major difficulty that working-class children have in school is that they use what he calls a "restricted" language. This is especially true for the lower working class ("Social Structure, Language, and Learning," 1967). This restricted language "symbolizes the normative arrangements of a local group (stability?) rather than the individuated experience of each of its members (self?)." It shows the stability characteristics of simplicity, repetitiveness, little differentiation among categories, rigidity, categoric statements, among other characteristics. This is reminiscent of Hayakawa's "two-valued" language (Language in Thought and Action, 1964).

Elaborate language, on the other hand, expresses more complex meanings, relationships, differentiations, and individual qualification. Someone using the elaborate language can make his meaning more exact and specialized to fit his needs. One of the marks of this elaborate language is the increased use of the first person pronouns, phrases such as "in my opinion...I think...it seems to me...I believe...." This will reappear in the latter half of this discussion of language when we look at Mitchell's use of pronouns.

Bernstein gives examples of both elaborate and restricted language. He stresses differences in complexity of thoughts. In the restricted example the child has a range of potential learning cut off. The child's curiosity is blunted, causal chains are not established, and the process is more akin to verbal conditioning than to instrumental learning. While Bernstein's observations are accurate, I think we should also interpret this dialog as an example of stability behavior. The child is taught to obey his mother rather than to understand something about her (sociability) or the nature of the world or laws of physics (expertise). In the restricted example the final method of control is power assertation. In the elaborate example it is sociability, "Don't make such a fuss." Perhaps this could be restated, "Nice children don't make a fuss." What is important is the sociability trait of niceness. In fact, we might well speculate that if the mother were a teacher of physics she would be able to give a simplified statement of inertia, a more expertise explanation (Bernstein, 1967, p. 236):

Restricted (stability) example

Mother: Hold on tight.
Child: Why?
Mother: Hold on tight.
Child: Why?
Mother: You'll fall.
Child: Why?
Mother: I told you to hold on tight, didn't I?

Elaborate (sociability) example

Mother: Hold on tightly, darling.
Child: Why?
Mother: If you don't you will be thrown forward and you'll fall.
Child: Why?
Mother: Because if the bus suddenly stops you'll jerk

forward onto the seat in front.

Child: Why?

Mother: Now, darling, hold on tightly and don't make such a fuss.

As Bernstein pointed out, the conceptual organization of the elaborate example is more complex, allows for differentiations, and makes connections and sequences. The differences in language that he demonstrates, are, in my opinion, some of the differences in the language components that help establish and maintain subsystems. In the sociability subsystem the child is seen as having rights to ask questions, request explanations, and interact with his parents and teachers. He is not merely a recipient of orders.

In Alternative Futures: An Exploration of a Humanistic Approach to Social Forecasting, Arnold Mitchell says that the pronoun "they" is typical of the survival and stability orientation. This may reflect the feelings of powerlessness, of a dominance-submissive personality, and of a "malevolent other" which typifies the lower class life situation, perception, and cognition as well as that of members of higher income classes who still are in the stability subsystem in spite of income, occupation, or education. And we would expect this orientation to be strongest during early childhood, too, when obedience and compliance to a powerful authority is the basis for moral development.

The pronoun "we" is characteristic of the sociability subsystem, "belongingness motivation" to Mitchell. This value pattern, he says, is characteristic of the middle class, and is correlated with a "togetherness" way of life, conformity, a mass orientation, gregariousness, etc. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, I disagree with some particulars of the Mitchell analysis, but our analyses are generally parallel.

Mitchell associates the pronoun "I" with the esteem level of motivation (expertise). As noted above, Bernstein also spotted the use of personal reference phrases and the pronoun "I." Not only do these indicate and make possible more complex meanings and shades of meanings in the elaborate language, but these may also indicate the influence of the self subsystem, or at least one way the expertise subsystem prepares the way for the personalism of the self subsystem.

Bernstein associates the use of "I" with the elaborate language style, which spans 3 subsystems, although he notes that upper-class people may use the elaborate, or formal, language more than middle and lower classes, even when they are drunk, for example.

Mitchell specifically attributes the use of "I" to the expertise pattern, which includes upper-middle-class groups: business executives, political leaders, college professors, many professional and technical workers, and the nouveaux riches (Alternative Futures, 1969).

The frame of reference of the self person ("growth" to Mitchell) is larger than the they-vs.-us orientation of stability, larger than the socially inclusive we-us of sociability, and larger than the more limited "I" of expertise. "All" is the word which a self, or growth, person is most likely to use. While the self is important in both expertise and self stages, in the latter it is less ego-centered and important because it is part of the larger whole. "All" also expresses the idea of living up to all of one's potentialities and, through this, of being part of the world's living up to all its full potentialities as well.

The humanistic theory leads us to expect differences in symbol systems from subsystem to subsystem as well as in other components of the social system. I find this brief taste of Bernstein's and Mitchell's work tantalizing. Their observations can be embedded in the humanistic theory and contribute to our understanding of how the subsystems differ and how they may develop from one to another. The development of language as a whole seems to me to be a stability development because language, like any symbol system, categorizes objects and formulates and formalizes relationships among them. It functions as a codifier, routinizer, and orderer of thought and perception.

However, within the language component itself the characteristics of language vary from subsystem to subsystem in keeping with overall humanistic development. Among stability people language, and probably other symbol systems too, may be a way to systematize and order experience. Among sociability people it may increasingly take on the function of interpersonal communications, while among expertise types it may become more cognitive, rational, hypothetical, and exacting. In the self subsystem language may be used typically for personal expression and individuation. These hypotheses and others suggest a way for linking and jointly exploring psychological and sociological differences in language.

Reinforcement

The humanistic continuum suggests a possibility for a hierarchy of reinforcement. In this use we would consider the continuum to be a chain of the different sort of reinforcements that are most efficient. To someone in the survival stage we would expect food, water, escape from pain, etc. to be the most efficient reinforcers. To a stability person, whether an adult in that subsystem or a child in the stability stage, reinforcements such as approval by an authority, removal of ambiguity, and various forms of security and safety are the hypothetical reinforcers. Social contact and social approval may strengthen the behavior of a sociability type person more than they will strengthen the behavior of the other types. A reinforcement that contributes to one's special interests or hobbies, the intellect, and knowledge would be an expertise reinforcement. Social and professional recognition would count here too. All these reinforcements are more external than internal; although it may be possible to make a case that they become less so through the progression.

A self person is likely to be especially sensitive to those reinforcements he provides himself. He, of course, is likely to thrive on peak experiences of various kinds, especially the esthetic, mystical, and personally insightful. This continuum also suggests that it is parallel with a continuum from the material-concrete to the abstract-symbolic. The survival reinforcements seem to be most concrete and material, and the self rewards the most abstract and symbolic. I know of a few items that corroborate this humanistic subtheory of reinforcement hierarchy, and I am offering it as a possible avenue for further exploration rather than a thesis to be attacked or defended at this early stage of investigation.

In their study of the use of candy combined with a flashing light and of just the flashing light as reinforcers, Terrell, Durkin, and Wiesley found that middle- and upper-middle-class children, combined into "middle," learn faster with only the flashing light than with both the light and the candy ("Social Class and the Nature of the Incentive in Discrimination Learning," pp. 270-272, 1959). The reverse was true of lower-lower and upper-lower class children, combined into "lower." If we think of the flashing light as being a source of information, then it is a signal for knowledge of being correct or incorrect. On this basis we can assume that it is predominantly an expertise reinforcement, because knowledge, especially for developing a skill, is a desideratum for expertise people. In this case the children were being taught to make a "larger-than" discrimination. We might assume that candy would be a more survival reinforcement, hence more attractive to the lower classes.

The possible explanations that the authors cite (pp. 271-2) can be recast in humanistic terminology. They point out that parents of middle-class children place a greater emphasis on learning for learning's sake than do the parents of lower-class children. The higher emphasis in the middle class may be reinterpreted to be a manifestation of the expertise value of knowledge. Another explanation cites the finding that middle-class people would rather "do something for the fun of it" than to be "promised or given something for doing it." Here we see a lessening of intrinsic motivation and an increase of intrinsic motivation as we move along the humanistic continuum. Also the lower-class child is likely to be more deprived of candy than the middle-class and upper-middle-class child. In keeping with the assumption that the attainment of the goals of one stage leads to the succeeding stage, we might posit: Satiation breeds contempt. The middle-class and upper-middle-class children may have seen themselves as above candy.

In "The Effectivenss of Two Classes of Verbal Reinforcers in the Performance of Middle- and Lower-class Children," Zigler and Kanzer used the words "good" and "fine" as rewards of praise, and they used "right" and"correct" to signify correctness. The investigators found that the lower-class group learned best when told they were "correct" or "right." In both these cases knowledge of the outcome was mediated by verbal reinforcers, but the words "good" and "fine" worked best for the lower class (assumed survival-stability), while "right" and "correct" worked best for the middle class (sociability through self).

When we compare these pairs of words, we see that they are laden with different subsystem connotations. "Right" and "correct" are associated with information. For example, when a student answers a question accurately, it is more appropriate to say, "You are correct," or "You are right," than it is to say "You are good," or "Fine." Rightness and correctness are associated with the expertise value (upper middle-class) of knowledge. It is difficult to categorize "fine;" however, "good" has the connotations of being a "good boy" or a "good girl." These are characteristic of what I have reinterpreted as stability orientations toward moral questions, Kohlberg's "personal concordance" half of conventional morality. "Good" suggests that the child did as he was told or followed directions, stability traits.

These differences among subsystems, however, are differences among classes not ages. I expect that the same or isomorphic differences will appear when age differences rather than class differences are examined. Zigler and Kanzer summarize some developmental differences that have been found (p. 161):

> The concept of a developmentally changing reinforcer hierarchy may also be applied to the findings of this study. As has been suggested (Beller, 1955; Gewirtz, 1954; Heathers, 1955) the effectiveness of attention and praise (sociability and stability?) as reinforcers diminishes with maturity being replaced by the reinforcement inherent in the information that one is correct (expertise?). This latter type of reinforcement appears to serve primarily as a cue for the administration of self-reinforcement (expertise or self?). This process is central in the child's progress from dependence (survival and stability?) to independence (self).

In my judgment this humanistic social theory offers an alternative series of explanations based on the subsystems, but not a series of explanations that is always opposed to their theoretical formulations. While it provides covering laws for some observations, such as those mentioned above, it isn't comprehensive. For example, Terrell, Durkin, and Wiesley did not find differences between 5 and 6 year olds and 10 and 11 year olds. The humanistic theory leads me to expect that the older group would be more responsive to the expertise reinforcements than would the younger group. Studies of the variable incentive strength of reinforcers are by no means consistent.

The humanistic theory raises some questions about learning theory. It may be that people in different subsystems are able to learn different sorts of things or different ways more efficiently than people in other subsystems. For example, stability people may be able to learn to follow directions, to do what one is told by a powerful authority, better than a sociability person, who is sensitive to his equals. In the Hess et al studies mentioned under "Socialization" (above) the tasks that were given were to a large extent expertise oriented. The games the investigators gave the mother-child pairs stressed achievement in the sense of competition with a standard of excellence (expertise activities). The emphases on technique, skill, method, and efficiency are typical of an expertise orientation. The Hess studies wanted to see whether mothers of different social classes used different techniques in the cognitive socialization of their children. They wondered whether some of these techniques are more efficient than others. If we are an expertise-scientific-technological society, then these concerns may be most appropriate for our society. If we were a stability-obedience-authoritarian society, however, different tasks and different criteria of desired behavior might be more appropriate; for example, investigators might ask the mother to keep the child quiet and confined to a small space. In this case we would expect that middle-class and upper-middle-class socialization patterns would be at a disadvantage because of their high interpersonal interaction rates and self-direction, rather than other-direction.

The role of an experimenter is another site for investigation. When an experimenter gives a reward, how is it interpreted by children (or adults) in various subsystems? Disregarding, for the moment, the nature of the reinforcement, the act of reinforcing itself may have different meanings. To stability children a reward may be interpreted as reinforcement for doing what one is supposed to do; i.e., following directions of the experimenter, doing what one is told, being a good boy. When a sociability child is reinforced, he may feel that he has made the experimenter happy, and that is part of his reward. Among middle-class children reinforcing phrases such as "I'm happy you got the answer. I'm glad. I'm proud of you," etc. may be heavily reinforcing. If peer approval is important to sociability people, interesting variants of experiments might be done in which a peer delivers the reinforcement instead of the experimenter. The humanistic theory leads us to expect that this effect will be strongest among the middle class and early adolescents. The knowledge of being right or wrong, if it can be dis-associated from obedience and consideration of others, is likely to shape upper-middle-class and late-adolescent behavior. The experimenter-as-expert may be the view of expertise people in an experimental situation. Perhaps reinforcements are interpreted as evidence that one is learning to make the discimination, the subject is developing his skill.

The observations reported here and the conjectures based on the humanistic social theory open the gate to what may be a fertile field for further investigation. The evidence is by no means one-sided. As mentioned above, Terrell et al found that a difference between ages 5-6 and 10-11 did not appear. Spence and Segner found no difference in middle-class and lower-class children between material and nonmaterial reinforcements. Reinterpretation and replication controlling for subsystem factors may or may not make this aggregation of observations more orderly. Only that further investigation will tell.

LAGNIAPPE

Introduction

In the applications of this humanistic theory to socialization I spent some time outlining and justifying why I think they are worth further investigation. In this section the items are shorter, and I spend less effort going into each topic, because the general thrust of this work is more associated with education and children than it is with these brief items. I hope you will not assume that I think these items are unimportant, however. As I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, it is incumbent on theoreticians to point out how their ideas are linked to other ideas and theories. Of course this can never be done completely, but it is especially obligatory for someone working within a holistic tradition to try to do so. These items, although brief, point to some links of this theory to other theories and to other observations. They are by no means comprehensive. Some may be the nascent shadows of ideas yet to mature. Some may be instances of forcing unorganized and formless clouds into a conceptual straightjacket - the curse of theory-based thought. Some may be the germs of further thought and investigation. Whatever the cases, these are my suggestions for further probing.

While I cite literature and my own observations in the following topics, I want to point out that my selections are far from unbiased, random, or representative selections. I wish they were, but I do not have the time, energy, resources, or knowledge to do justice to these topics. I have not tried to load the citations in my favor, but I have not surveyed these fields in any way other than what I would consider adequate enough to indicate that further research may be rewarding. My only warning is: If you are skeptical anywhere, let it be here.

Cultural Development

Does this humanistic theory provide a theory for looking at the stages cultures go through? In my opinion it does. As cultures evolve they usually go through a beginning period when their primary concern is with staying alive, gathering food, and protecting themselves, a subsistence culture. Then, as agriculturization makes the survival stage less pressing, they typically develop in a religiously dominated vein, a stability direction. A period of transition from this traditional-stability culture to a democratic-sociability culture accompanies the problems of bringing many people together in one place, city-ization with its sociability problems. This seems followed by a period of emphasis on specialization, technique, and technology. Finally comes a self civilization with a new emphasis on the aesthetic, transcendental, and individual.

Do we have some evidence for this theory? In "A Typology of

Social Structure and the Patterning of Social Institutions: A Cross-Cultural Study," Melford E. Spiro (1965) examined 1 society from each of 60 cultural areas. Considering the whole sample, here are some of his conclusions. I have inserted the humanistic reinterpretation in (brackets). I have interpreted food gathering as early survival, food producing as late survival, social stratification as stability, and larger-than-local government as sociability. In each of these statements we see that the predicted order and/or correlation between structural elements occurs as expected using the humanistic sequence:

> Food production (late survival) is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for maximum government (sociability) (p. 1113)
>
> Social stratification (stability)...is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition, for maximum government (sociability) (p. 1113)
>
> Food production (late survival)...is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for social stratification (stability); food gathering (early survival) is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for classlessness (survival). (p. 1114)
>
> The patterning which characterizes the politico-economic domain is based on a causal chain of almost universal scope, viz., economics (survival) -- stratification (stability) -- government (sociability). (p. 1115)
>
> Food production (late survival) and social stratification (stability), jointly...comprise the necessary and sufficient conditions for maximum government (sociability). (p. 1115)
>
> Since (with a few exceptions) maximum government (sociability) does not occur without social stratification (stability), and since (with few exceptions) stratification (stability) does not

> occur without food production (late survival), it is not surprising to discover that, with only four exceptions, maximum government (sociability) is always accompanied by food production (late survival) and social stratification (stability). (p. 1115)
>
> ...change from food gathering (early survival) to food producing (late survival)...does not necessarily produce changes in government or stratification (sociability or stability) (p. 1116)

Evidence of the potential usefulness of a humanistic approach to cultural development is not limited to Spiro's study. In "Societal Complexity: An Empirical Test of a Typology of Societies," Linton C. Freeman and Robert F. Winch (1957) developed a typology based on 8 qualities which were dichotomized into less complex and more complex. Their study is especially interesting because they tried to subsume observations of others into their scheme (p. 464):

> Since these qualities are all subsumable under folk-urbanism, Gemienschaft-Gesellschaft, and other polar constructs of that order, the conclusion is that Redfield, Tönnes, et al have indeed been describing a unidimensional phenomenon - societal complexity.

My contention is that the humanistic theory outsubsumes these subsumers.

An analysis of their scalogram of societal complexity is too elaborate to go into in any detail here; however, of the 8 items they chose, 2 turned out not to be useful. These 2 are also those that I have found impossible to fit into a humanistic frame of reference; these are complexity of incest taboos and mate selection based on beauty. The other 6 items as arranged in a humanistic sequence do scale, although not perfectly. These are symbolic medium of exchange (survival), full-time, specialized priest (stability), full-time government bureaucrats unrelated to government head (sociability), government punishment (sociability), formal full-time teacher (expertise), and written language (expertise).

In _The Primitive World and Its Transformations_ (1958) and _The Folk Cultures of Yucatan_ (1941) Redfield looks at the changes in the human mind and the new mentality that develops as a folk society becomes an urban society. At first they are primarily concerned with the basic needs of hunger, sex, and avoidance of fatigue and pain. Redfield sees food production (success at survival) as providing a new mentality and necessitating a new set of social arrangements. This mentality is the urban mentality, and the problems it faces are the sociability problems. Redfield sees the folk mentality and the urban mentality as opposites on a continuum, but between these he describes intermediate stages that also show mixtures of survival, stability, and sociability.

How does a survival mentality become a stability mentality? How does sociability develop from stability? The questions about psychological development earlier in this chapter have their isomorphic questions in cultural development. When both types of questions are phrased in terms of this humanistic theory, some studies may help answer both questions. "The Relation of Child Training to Subsistence Economy" by Herbert Barry, Irwin Child, and Margaret Bacon (1959) reports that among food-producing and storing societies children are socialized to be more obedient, less assertive, more responsible, and more compliant than in food-gathering, non-storing societies. This is not merely a study of differences in socialization practices or in the anthropology of child rearing; it investigates differences in mentality between survival and stability subsystems. The reconceptualization of some parts of anthropology remains one of the most fascinating possibilities for a humanistic, holistic normal science.

Civilization and Its Contents

When this overall approach is applied to Western Civilization it results in an epochical view of our culture as a whole. Of course individual countries or areas may be advanced or retarded compared with the whole, and in these cases the humanistic theory may be a useful way to conceptualize these differences. The section on ancient Greece, which follows this, gives an example.

In the survival epoch, prior to the invention and development of agriculture, mankind's interests seem to have been predominantly those of providing for his physical necessities. This, of course, is not specific to Western man, but to all men. With the invention of agriculture and the solution of many of the most pressing day-to-day survival needs, a stability epoch began to emerge. Kenneth Boulding notes this transition from paleolithic to neolithic man following the invention of agriculture (The Meaning of the 20th Century, 1965, p. 1). He is more interested in the subsequent establishment of towns and cities (which intensity sociability problems) rather than in the solution of survival problems, however.

As people began to settle land and claim it for their own family, tribe, or village, we may suppose that the need for regularity and order emerged. If a man planted some crops in the spring, he would not want his neighbors or wandering groups to harvest them in the fall. He would want some sort of predictability too. If he put fish in with the seeds, if he said a prayer to the god of that area or crop, he would be making the assumption that these activities would effect his crop. As will be noted later, the survival-stability type of religion is concerned with providing these most basic goods and services. At this point early codes of law provide another way of providing stability to these early social groups. No longer is a family head of a wandering tribe the sole source of law, but law starts to become institutionalized. It is, of course, often a combination of religious law and secular law rolled into one. We can think of society as beginning to differentiate out these various roles. In the stability epoch the stability traits run through the economic base, religion, law, and so forth. I have mentioned that religion can in large measure be characterized as developing from and contributing to stability, and Boulding notes that there is some evidence that the earliest cities were organized theocratically (1965, pp. 3-4).

In Western Civilization this long epoch of stability consciousness emerged as agriculture emerged, spread, and developed enough to meet the most basic needs of the population. This would probably be from sometime in the neolithic period through the dominance of Rome and to the preponderant influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages through the Renaissance up to the Reformation. The Roman government and the Roman church were ingenious in many ways, but the paramount ability was that of far-reaching, varied, and long-lasting organization and administration. Whether the basis for this was civil law or sacred law, the traits of hierarchy, stability, order, social status, complex bureaucratic administration, predictability, all stability indicators, characterized this epoch. Medieval feudalism, for example, as founded on fief-holding and vassalage showed the stability traits of hierarchical status and obligation due to rank rather than contractual agreement between equals, a sociability characteristic (Stephenson, 1967). Of course these traits continue today, for our epoch is built from the materials of the past, and their achievements are our foundations.

The great transition from stability mentality to sociability mentality is marked by a change from a view of the world as naturally hierarchical to egalitarian, from set social order to social order based on agreement among men, from highly institutionalized religion toward a religion between each man and God, from a family or personal economic venture toward a group, or corporate venture, from political hierarchy toward political consensus and agreement, from organization by given or natural rank and status toward organization by agreement among equals (social contract), from the idea that there is a natural and best social organization to the idea that social organization is decided upon by men, from the given or revealed law to social rules built and enforced by men, from truth as defined by those in possession of the revealed word to truth as observed by any man who looks, from reason stemming from revealed truth to reason based on each man's ability to reason himself and to use his own observations, from education in the revealed truths to education for the ability to reason oneself, from divine and hereditary rights to human rights. Whether one looks at politics, religion, social organization, education, or knowledge, the idea of a set, given, eternal world gives way to the idea that mankind is capable of knowing and organizing the world through our own capacities. This second great transition is by no means straightforward or a simple switch from one way to another. There are steps forwards and backwards. The infusion of sociability was slow and irregular. If men substituted a hierarchical organization in which they themselves chose the members of the hierarchy, the organizational form may not seem to have changed, but the fact that slow development of a broadened decision-making is apparent as more people became contributors to the choice. An absolutism or totalitarianism based on the will of the people shows more sociability than one based on the power of a few. Much of the social strife from this beginning of sociability consciousness to the present can be viewed in terms of conflict between stability and sociability, or between groups that have differing degrees of sociability or stability.

Capitalism, nationalism, Protestantism, empiricism and modern science, representative government, contractual relations, and mass literacy - all these are based on the sociability values of egalitarianism, "majority-ism," and democracy. They all assume that we men can combine for our mutual advantage. Mankind starts looking to itself for the answers. Whether one chooses between corporate capitalism or committee socialism, the choice is still between one form of social agreement and another. Harbison's The Age of Reformation (1968), Kohn's Absolutism and Democracy (1965), The Idea of Nationalism (1967), and his "Nationalism" (1968) describe parts of this transition. Mankind must no longer adapt to the given order of the world; we are capable of changing that order for our own benefit, and the way to do this is through group effort for the mutual benefit of all. These are radical and heretical ideas to a stability world-view, but they form the foundation of modern, mass society.

Just as the stability mentality metamorphosized into the sociability mentality, the sociability mentality is transforming itself into an expertise mentality, and we may be seeing the inklings of a self mentality. I discussed these in Chapters 11 and 12.

Ancient Greece

When we look at some of the changes in ancient Greece, some intriguing possibilities begin to emerge. For example, the form of government seems to show the same humanistic transition that Western civilization as a whole showed many centuries later. From a monarchical stage an aristocratic stage developed. This sounds like the beginning of a breakup of stability. These were followed by tyrants, who obtained some of their strength in the underprivileged, perhaps marking the emergence of the sociability idea that one base of power is popularity. The oligarchy, or limited democracy, that followed may indicate the establishment of a limited sociability government. The Age of Pericles, with its encouragement of the arts, combining both the aesthetic and practical, shows traits of expertise and self in ancient Greek style. I am no scholar of these times and leave these thoughts for experts in this field. In the earlier parts of this dissertation I've tried to show that this theory is useful for understanding some of the conflicts, problems, agreements, and solutions of our times. If this theory is good throughout time and space, as I claim, then it may be useful in understanding them in ancient Greece too.

Institutional Dominance

If we look at the ways various societies are organized, their institutions, the humanistic theory underlines some of the changes that the society goes through. In Western Civilization, for example, we can suppose that during the survival epoch institutions that catered to the desire for survival became dominant in the culture. I speculate that the family, tribe, village or combination of these provided food and protection. Thus these would be the major institutions of this time and of groups in this stage. Other institutions, the military, church, education, etc. would be subservient to the dominant institution. People would think of themselves primarily as members of the dominant institution.

During the stability epoch the institution that most influenced civilization was the church. People would conceive of themselves and others in terms set by the church. This, of course, does not mean that all people all the time would think only this way, but that we can characterize this period this way. As Whitehead says, "...the mentality of an epoch springs from the view of the world which is, in fact, dominant in the educated sections of the communities in question," (Science and the Modern World, 1970, p. vii). During the Christian Era man's view of the world in Western Civilization was primarily that of the Roman Catholic Church. During this time we would expect that stability mentality, particularly as based in the Church, would predominate but not necessarily exclude others.

In the sociability epoch the institution that has emerged as dominant is the nation-state, as most maps of the world will show. We let the nation have the right of declaring war, levying taxes, making law, and controlling our lives. In fact, it seems we are able to allow freedom of religion precisely because it is more important to us to be loyal to our respective countries than to be loyal to our religions. Here again there are exceptions, but the primary institution that has the final right to decide is now the nation. The Supreme Court, for example, decided on what is officially a religion in the case of conscientious objectors.

Curricular Change

If we are emerging into an expertise stage in the advanced industrialized countries, what is emerging as the dominant institution of the future? This may be too early to tell, but the educational-informational complex is my nominee. Specialized knowledge and skill is endemic in our society, but this seems especially characteristic in the educational system. The expertise value on knowledge, per se, is certainly typical of higher education, where intellectual curiosity, research, and the exchange of knowledge are typically valued more than the application of knowledge. Scholars and specialists in various fields often feel more akin to their colleagues in the same fields in other countries than they do to their fellow national citizens. Professors' complaints about government restrictions on publication often press the point that knowledge should be for all men, not just those approved by the government.

If these suppositions are accurate, the conflicts between the nation and states on the one hand and the universities on the other take on new significance. This may be evidence of conflict between opposing subsystems. When faculty loyalties are not to the governmental body that employs them, but to their disciplines and colleagues, conflict about the goals and methods of education are bound to arise. In the public schools, for example, curricula are increasingly being decided not by boards of education or state offices of education, but by curriculum makers from colleges and universities. The various "new curricula," for example, are the products of professors esteemed by their colleagues, rather than by groups of citizens concerned primarily with education for citizenship or the sociability concern with fitting in a society. The new curricula are formed, for example, to teach Johnny to "think like a historian" not to be patriotic to his country. Social adjustment has given way to disciplinary specialization, and the academic preparation of teachers is being increasingly stressed. The academicians' fight against loyalty oaths demonstrates this conflict.

If we look back through the rationalization of education we note the sociability melting-pot argument in the last part of the last century and the early part of this century. Before that American education, although in the hands of the states or their lesser divisions, shows the stability trait of heavy influence of religion. Many teachers were educated as clergymen, for example, and strict moral (i.e., Protestant church criteria) were used to judge faculty, content, and goals of education. In addition to the stability goals, education served the survival goals by teaching basic arithmetic and writing, which would serve society's survival needs. As society moves through humanistic stages, it seems to pick up additional goals and switch emphases on educational goals. See Chapter 12 for some manifestations of self goals today.

English Curricular Changes

In the teaching of English literature we can see such changes too. On the survival level basic reading and writing are stressed. To be able to obtain most jobs today these skills are necessary. The rules of grammar seem to me to be examples of a stability approach. This orientation also stresses an emphasis on the eternal truths as portrayed in great works of literature of men throughout the ages. This shows the desire for the fixed and unchanging. The use of the Bible as basic reading material during much of the early educational history of this country is also an example of this. We might consider stability education to be education for moral character, as it is commonly conceived, although not always so. Sociability English education stresses the common heritage of a people and tries to make the diverse children feel part of their country or group. Part of the melting-pot theory of education was to provide a common background for students who would grow up as fellow citizens. The cultural heritage built in English classes was English-American literature. Children from various backgrounds were taught a common heritage through literature.

Today these goals linger on, and expertise goals have been added. As the influence of higher education increases in secondary schools through the new curricula, college admissions requirements, and discipline orientation in teacher education, the object of English education seems to be more and more to make high school students into miniature English graduate students. It takes little imagination to suppose that many high school English teachers would feel successful if they were told by an esteemed member of a university English department, "I look forward to many of your students joining me as some of my distinguished colleagues someday."

The self influence in English education seems to be coming in too. I mentioned some instances of this in Chapter 12, in which I pointed out that Lionel Trilling spotted the intensely personal and biographical orientation of today's self students. Self-expression, self-exploration, and self-fulfillment through literature seem to be gaining today. The emphasis on teaching the subject as a discipline is still strong and growing, but among the new educators the emphasis seems to be switching to personal growth by using English as one means. This trend is surveyed in "An Example of Heuristic Teaching: The Student-Centered English Classroom," by Joseph Strzepek and Herbert Kennedy, 1970.

More can be done in the examination of English teaching and in literary criticism in terms of this theory. The humanistic theory leads us to expect that similar goals and methods of education would be characteristic wherever the respective subsystems are dominant. Similarly, literary styles and criticisms are likely to vary from one subsystem to another.

Religious Evolution

If there is a progression of subsystems in cultural evolution, then we can expect this in the development of particular institutions as well. Bellah's "Religious Evolution" (1964), for example, has a 5-stage development of religious institutions, starting with a "primitive" religion, which is centered on obtaining food, harvests, etc. Then comes an "archaic" religion, which seems to be a transition between the survival concern with subsistence and the stability concern with order, hierarchy, and certainty. These latter qualities are most prevalent in "historic" religions, which are the third stage of religious evolution. "Early modern" religions show the sociability characteristics of equality and democracy in their social structure as well as in their view of mankind. "Modern" religion is self type and can be characterized by a view of society and each person in it as infinitely multiplex with many potentialities. Thomas Jefferson's, "I am a sect myself," is a characteristic

Outline for a Humanistic Study of Religions

Component:	Survival	Stability	Sociability	Expertise	Self
Religious evolution (Bellah)	primitive archaic	historic	early modern		modern
Socio-logical (Peterson)		Baptists Methodists	Presbyterians	mixed	Friends Unitarians
		Catholic	Protestants	Jewish	no formal religion
Anthro-pological (Redfield)	agricultural ritual	old Roman Catholicism	mixture	popular holiday	
Western culture	neolithic Greek Roman	medieval Christianity	Protestantism		

statement of this view.

It is possible to combine Bellah's cross-cultural, evolutionary data (1964), with historical studies, sociological data such as Peterson's (1965), and anthropological studies such as Redfield's (1941) into 1 approach by using a humanistic matrix. Similar analyses of education, law, and other institutions or components are likely to reinterpret their histories, put current practices in a humanistic perspective, and combine information from several sources.

Remapping the Social Sciences

If the subsystems are as pervasive as I assume, then we would expect them to show up in general patterns of thought as well as in specific observations. In Chapter 2, for example, I cited Hayakawa's "two-value orientation" as a characteristic stability way of thinking. It seems to me that many social theories can be placed on a humanistic matrix too, but I want to restress that my thinking is very exploratory at this point but may point to possibilities for further conceptual development. The number of holes in the accompanying chart indicate this tentative nature. The main purpose of this chart and of this section of the chapter is to indicate what might be done better, more completely, and with more care later.

In the survival column we see an overriding interest in the

A Humanistic Interpretation of Some Social Theories

SUBSYSTEM:	SURVIVAL	STABILITY	SOCIABILITY	EXPERTISE	SELF
Type of Theory:					
Psychological	physiological deprivation, S-R, mechanistic	equilibrium homeostasis	Lewin organic model peer theory	humanistic	Trans-personal
Psychoanalytic	Freud	*Escape From Freedom*	Sullivan Horney	Adler	existential humanistic ego
Sociological	original structure	bureaucratic Marx	Homans *Organization Man* human-rel.	status charateristics humanistic	
Economic	Malthus Theory X	*Acquisitive Society*		Veblen Theory Y	Galbraith Maslow Theory Z
Political	authoritarian leader	Hobbes	Locke Rousseau democratic leader tyranny of majority	expert leader	

physiological aspects of man. The systems of ideas in this subsystem see man primarily in terms of his physiological drives. Freud and Malthus, for example, built their theories in terms of survival subsystem drives. For the former, varieties of physiological pleasure were the prime human motivations, an appropriate assumption for a doctor. Malthus' formula for food and population centered on the physiological needs necessary to stay alive.

In the stability column the emphasis shifts from mere immediate satiation of the physiological drives to a desire to see that they will continue to be fulfilled in the future. The stability characteristics described in Chapter 2 are dominant in thinking and understanding based in stability, for example, the dislike of change, defending oneself against a hostile world, and authoritarianism. In Escape From Freedom (1941), Fromm describes man's desire for certainty and structure in the appeal of fascism and other forms of totalitarianism. In The Acquisitive Society (1920) R. H. Tawney described and attacked this subsystem in its economic manifestations. The fear of imminent want is the major motivation, according to this view, and the acquisition of wealth is a way of warding off this possibility. In political theory Hobbes pictured men's lives as naturally nasty, brutish, and short, but people gave up this conflict to a government in order to lessen the fear of violent death.

Here too we see a social arrangement (government) made to fit the survival needs. Hobbes' view was in opposition to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, and he saw some sort of agreement among men as the basis for government. Thus while recognizing government as a stabilizing force to calm the more base physiological drives, Hobbes picks up a tint of the sociability idea that governments are based on agreement among men, not a purely stability idea of a natural, or divine order.

From a sociability consciousness man is understood in terms of smooth social relations, democracy, equality, and other-directedness. The placement of Marx between stability and sociability is due to his split emphasis on basic economics and a class-based sociology and his desire for a classless state of equality. Much of his thought seems to be sociability-based criticism of stability, e.g., a classless society. However, his desire for self-fulfillment suggests self characteristics as well. I can foresee the possibility of many discussions, controversies, and analyses of this man's theories as seen by this theory. The formulations in this column stress a view which might be called man-among-other-men. In the psychological theories man is seen as reflecting the views of others and in understanding himself and the world as stemming from his interactions with others. This other-directed, human-group, interpersonal-relations, democratic-politics, complex of theories all stress the traits of the sociability subsystem.

In the expertise column we find people and approaches that emphasize specialization, status, and esteem. I have previously mentioned other expertise approaches such as Gouldner's study of cosmopolitans and Ellul's Technological Society. (See Chapters 11 and 12.)

The self column presents a 5th way of conceiving of the world. Many of the citations in Chapter 12 belong in this column, and the characteristics of the self types as described in Chapter 2 are usually derived from theorists in this column. Maslow, for example, amends McGregor's survival-stability-based Theory X and his sociability-expertise-based Theory Y to include a self-based Theory Z (McGregor, 1960; Maslow, 1969). In The Affluent Society (1958) Galbraith criticizes earlier conceptions of man in economic theories as based on what the humanistic theory calls the survival, stability, and sociability orientations. Galbraith sees men as being active in economic activities after these goals are met in order to win prestige (the expertise subsystem's desire for esteem) and because the work is enjoyable itself (shades of Maslow's being values).

As in the rest of this work I am presenting a predominant categorization of the items, not one that will fit every instance. For example, here I put status-oriented theories into the expertise column because esteem is part of the expertise subsystem. However, if one were to examine types of status, it might be more appropriate to ask how status varies across subsystems. We might find status due to providing the survival needs, status due to organizational and/or ideological position, status due to popularity, status from a skill or knowledge, and status derived from the ability to help others develop themselves or from constantly growing oneself.

Throughout this work I have tried to show that this humanistic social theory points to ways for further exploration, synthesis, and conceptualization. Remapping and comparisons of various social theories are 2 directions for further growth. Humanistic analyses of some of the particular theories, works, and their propounders are others.

Summary

This chapter went from a summary of detailed reinterpretations, through tentative exploration, to speculative conjecture. The first part of this chapter summarized Section 2 of this work. In that section this theory was used to examine some studies of higher education in detail, sometimes even analyzing individual items from these studies. The second part of this chapter pointed to other areas which may, in my opinion, also be clarified by the type of analysis used in

Section 2. To indicate how this might be done, I spent some time showing how some topics in socialization and developmental psychology may be reunderstood from a humanistic framework. We might think of the discussion of child development as being between the detailed examinations in Section 2 and the mere indications of possible value in the last part of this chapter. This chapter went from detailed analysis, to general discussion, to very broad possibilities. I think each of these possibilities and others are capable of detailed analysis. However intriguing these possibilities, they are not the work of this dissertation. This dissertation presents a social theory. It doesn't chase down all possible ways of using it or of developing it.

Chapter 14

EVALUATION, CRITICISM, AND SPECULATIONS

Introduction - The purpose of this dissertation was to present a social theory and to demonstrate how it may become a paradigm for a holistic and humanistic social science. Given these goals, it would be impossible to present all the potential evidence which would be relevant to them. Therefore, I have purposely been selective. Part 1 of this chapter points to some limits of this study of the theory presented in Section 1. Part 2 points to some possible changes in the theory itself. One criteria for evaluating a theory is whether it presents possibilities for future investigations. I consider the shortcomings which I present here to be signs for further investigation as well as limitations of this work itself.

Part 1

A Subsuming Typology - If a social theory is holistic, then it explains many sorts of social behavior. When doing this, it would explain many kinds of human action that lesser, more specialized theories also explained. By doing this, it would subsume these more specialized theories. From time to time in this dissertation I've noted others' typologies and theories that are subsumed by this one. In Chapters 4-6 I demonstrated that the Clark-Trow typology of college subcultures was a specific instance of this humanistic typology. These chapters did this by interpreting Richard Peterson's On a Typology of College Students (1965). More time was spent on this typology than on any of the others. Thus these chapters illustrate the type of reinterpretation that might be done on other typologies in this work and elsewhere.

In Chapters 9 and 10 I touched on the Allport-Vernon Study of Values (1931) as used in Theodore Newcomb's Personality and Social Change (1943). This typology, which is a forerunner of the Vernon-Allport-Lindzey Study of Values (1960), was based on Spranger's 6 "types of men" (1928). I hope that this dissertation will encourage further interpretation of studies based on Spranger's typology and on the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey derivation. Those interested in exploring this path may want to refer to the various Mental Measurement Yearbooks, edited by Oscar Buros (1938, 1941, 1949, 1953, 1959, 1965). These volumes contain bibliographies of studies which have used these tests. For those whose interests are centered on college students, The Impact of

College on Students by Feldman and Newcomb (1969) summarizes research which used this scale as well as other higher-education research. It is my opinion that humanistic reinterpretation of these instruments and of research which used them will suggest adaptations in the instruments and changes of replicating studies.

In the last part of Chapter 13 I suggested that some studies of cultural development may be subsumed under this humanistic theory. If these speculations are fruitful, then such well-known cultural continua as Tönnies' gemienschaft-gesellschaft (1957) and Redfield's folk-urban continuum (1941) may be open for subsumption. Here too further conceptual comparison is necessary in order to judge these speculations.

Since one value of a holistic approach is supposed to be that it combines a diversity of approaches into a unified field, more humanistically oriented information on these typologies is necessary in order to pass judgment by this criterion. So far the Clark-Trow typology has been investigated, but studies in other fields will be necessary before a more solid claim for holism can be established for this humanistic theory.

Unequal investigation of types - This study concentrated on the self subsystem and almost completely neglected the survival subsystem. The stability, sociability, and expertise subsystems were investigated more than survival was, but less than self. Chapter 12 examined the self subsystem as it is appearing in such things as student activism, New Left politics, and in education. The other types of subsystems were not described in such detail. This further description also remains to be done.

Limited to American higher education - The studies which were reinterpreted in Section 2 of this dissertation were all studies of American higher education with the exception of Robert Merton's "Patterns of Influence, Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials." Chapters 11 and 12, which applied the theory in an investigation of the self types in our society, also focused on colleges and universities, although other tangential interests were brought in there too.

The holistic basis of this theory leads us to presume that it can be useful in other parts of our society and in other societies and cultures too. But these further investigations are still to be accomplished. Chapters 4 through 12 demonstrate this humanistic approach on some studies of American higher education. Those chapters are prototypes for possible additional studies.

Since American higher education is a very restricted sample of the world, differences among types that show up within this limited sample may well be stronger in a less restricted sample. That is, if the typology works within a narrow band of differences, we may anticipate that a broader range of population will show even greater differences. When considering a wider sample of the United States or of the world, we are likely to be able to include the survival subsystem, for example.

Concentration on propositions 1 and 5 - Not only is this study of the humanistic theory incomplete because it neglects the survival subsystem and focuses on American higher education, but it is also concentrated on only 2 of the major propositions of the theory. Chapter 3 presented 5 propositions. Most of this development and application of the theory examined general proposition 1: The types exist.

Chapter 5 is an exception. Using Peterson's data on joining organizations, that chapter investigated general proposition 5: The further away a person or group is from a subsystem, the less he or it will show the characteristics of that subsystem. The 3 other propositions were barely touched on.

General proposition 2 states: The sequence of subsystems is:
survival → stability → sociability → expertise → self.

This important proposition gives the movement, or sequence of stages, to the theory. In various places in this dissertation I have assumed it in order to explain observations (the emergence of a self subculture from our expertise culture - Chapters 11 and 12, for example). But this central proposition has not been adequately attended to here. General proposition 3 reads A person or group may not successfully go through all stages of the sequence. General proposition 4 proposes The influence of a stage on social behavior is a function of the effort the person or group expended to achieve the stage. Although I sometimes assumed these were established in order to use them in explanations, these assumptions have yet to be tested.

Relationships in the family tree of thought - In Section 1 I pointed to the immediate parentage of this theory as Abraham Maslow's theory of human motivation (1954 and 1970). However, I have examined neither this theory's intellectual genealogy nor its relations with other social theories. How is this theory different from and similar to other social theories? What is its general systems lineage? How does it build upon, share, and conflict with theories and typologies in the social science and humanities disciplines? What is its place in intellectual history and in the sociology of knowledge? With its emphasis on the individual and on intuition (notably in the self subsystem) what are the theory's debts to existentialism and to phenomenology?

These questions and others are important. But the purpose of this dissertation is to present a theory, to partially examine it, to illustrate some uses, and to indicate paths for further development. While I recognize the importance and fun of working on the questions in the previous paragraph, I think they are outside the scope of this work. I hope someone else will find them within the scope of his work.

* * *

In the first chapter I nominated this theory as a paradigm. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1968) Thomas Kuhn writes that one of the criteria of a paradigm is that it provides all sorts of problems to be resolved. There is no lack of problems of many types associated with this theory. Whether an enduring group of people will care to work on these problems, Kuhn's second characteristic of a paradigm, remains to be seen.

Part 2

The first half of the last chapter summarized the findings of Section 2. The second part of that chapter picked out some areas for further exploration using the theory. The first part of this chapter indicated some limitations of this dissertation as it investigated this theory. Chapter 13 and the first part of this chapter accepted the theory as it is and worked within that acceptance. This part, however, suggests some possible alterations in the theory itself. Once again, exploring these possibilities in any detail is beyond the scope of this work. These may turn out to be long roads for further travel. They may be dead ends. Whatever the case, I think a just presentation of this theory should acknowledge these possible alterations.

Other conceptions of subsystems - This theory is built on a typology of 5 subsystems. Other typologies with different kinds or numbers of ideal types can be substituted in this theory. Comparisons among these various theories can then be made. In Policy Implications of a Hierarchy of Values, Elizabeth Drews reviews some of the better-known sequential typologies of individual development (1970, pp. 49-53). Just as I have based my typology and theory on Maslow's 5-stage theory of human motivation, she bases her typology on Loevinger's 7-stage sequence of individual development.

The other stage theories and nonstage descriptions she cites and subsumes to Loevinger's sequence are: Claire W. Graves, Levels of Existence, 1970; Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as

Moral Philosopher," 1968 (See also Chapter 13 of this work); Robert F. Peck and Robert J. Havinghurst, The Psychology of Character Development, 1960; Elizabeth Drews, The Creative Intellectual Style in Gifted Adolescents, due 1971; Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 1962; Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, 1961; John Arnold, "The Specialist vs. the Generalist: Productivity vs. Creativity," 1961; Erich Fromm, Man for Himself, 1947; Lewis Mumford, The Transformations of Man, 1956; Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 1959; Aldous Huxley, Island, 1962; Socrates, in The Scientific Conscience by Catherine Roberts, 1967; Richard Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness, 1959; Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 1958. Since Maslow's and Kohlberg's stages appear in both her typology and in mine, it may be possible to blend our theories in another step toward a holistic synthesis. It appears very much that we are describing the same sequence, or a similar one, with only slightly varied conceptual patterns.

Another varied idea of a sequence of stages comes from Maslow's recent work. In "Theory Z" (1970) he differentiates between 2 kinds of self-actualizing people. In other words, what I've called the "self subsystem" may be better divided into 2 subsystems. Maslow says that the self types can be divided into the "doers" and the "transcenders." The former are "clearly healthy, but with little or no experiences of transcendence...essentially practical, realistic, mundane, capable and secular people, living more in the here-and-now world."

The transcenders are more likely to be living at the level of intrinsic values and to have unitive consciousness and mystic, sacral, and ecstatic peak-experiences. A more thorough investigation of this theory would have to include an examination of this "cosmic" subsystem which, apparently, lies beyond the self subsystem. Readers interested in this may want to check Elizabeth Drews' Policy Implications of a Hierarchy of Values (1970) cited just above, Richard Bucke's Cosmic Consciousness (1959), and The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, which tries to keep abreast of this field.

Other conceptions of propositions - Just as there are many typologies that might be substituted in this theory, there are also many additional propositions that could be added and changes that could be made in those that I have used. I will mention what seem to me to be the most germane here; although these by no means exhaust the possiblities.

First, general proposition 2 gave a sequence of subsystems: survival → stability → sociability → expertise → self. How rigid is this sequence? Can a stage or stages be skipped? When I presented this continuum, I supposed that it is a main sequence, one that is usually followed, but the questions of how often and under what conditions it is or isn't followed remain to be looked into.

Second, perhaps the sequence is peculiar to our culture. In Chapter 13 I pointed to some evidence that the progression is cross-cultural. Perhaps, however, expertise comes before sociability in other cultures.

Another possibility is that the self stage, or the transcendental stage if we use Maslow's addendum, is some sort of usual, natural, or normal stage for mankind. Some Eastern religions and philosophies suggest this. If this is the case, then concerns with survival, stability, sociability, expertise, and self can be seen as impediments to this higher state. I am not familiar enough with these religions and philosophies to comment on them intelligently; however, I think it is necessary to realize that these alternative views do exist.

Proposition 4 claims that the more a person or group strived to achieve the goals of a subsystem, the more their behavior will be influenced by that subsystem and its goals. This proposition can easily be omitted from the overall theory as it now stands. This proposition seems useful in explaining such things as value differences between groups, for example, many parents' valuing the goods and services they have strived for and achieved while their children take them for granted. Further evidence on this proposition may well prune it from the theory.

There are, of course, many other possibilities. I have mentioned here some that seem most immediately relevant to the theory as it now stands.

In the last 4 pages I have stepped back from the theory in order to make some general comments about it and its relationships to some ways of thought outside itself. This critique would not be complete without repeating a warning from the first chapter. A theory is a sort of intellectual tool. Theories help us think efficiently and productively, but, like all tools, they help us do only certain things well, not everything. I have tried to show that this theory, as a set of tools, is quite versatile, but it would be a misuse of this theory in particular and of theory-building in general to try to make this theory do what it cannot do. Following William James' advice to try out a new theory in as many ways as possible, I tried this theory out on a broad range of data, usually, however, within the limits of studies of American higher education. Delineating the bounds of usefulness of this theory is one set of tasks for the future.

One misuse of this theory, and of theoretical thought in general, is slipping from what is a useful, efficient, or productive way of thinking into thinking that the theoretical constructs used are actual things. I have spoken of such things as manifestations of "stability," evidence of "sociability," the "expertise subsystem," the influence of "self," and so forth. I do not mean to imply that these useful constructs are, in fact, things in the world. An alternative way of writing and thinking (but one which is awkward) would be to use the subsystems as if they were adverbs. Instead of saying that a person's attempts to place everything in a rigid hierarchy is a manifestation of the stability subsystem, it might be more accurate to say he acts, behaves, or lives "stability-like" or "in the manner of stability." Another person's craving for popularity might be restated, "In his interpersonal relations he acts 'sociabilitily.'" The subsystems are names for 5 styles of being. One person exists in a self-way, another in a survival-way. Survival, stability, sociability, expertise, and self should not be reified into objects which then influence individuals and groups. They are not things "out there in the real world." These 5 subsystems are ways, styles, or methods of being, behaving, existing, and doing. They are ways of classifying and grouping together in our eyes and minds. They are useful conceptual boxes for me, and I've tried to give them to you so that you can use them if you like.

Chapter 1

THE BEGINNING AND THE END

Introductory summary - In this dissertation I've tried to help develop a different style of doing a dissertation and to help present and explore a holistic, humanistic social theory. As a doctoral dissertation this work is intended to be squarely within the expertise subsystem. Thus, one of the usual expertise styles is called for.

Part of the thesis of this dissertation, however, is that the self subsystem is becoming prevalent in our society, especially within the academic portions, where a concentration of self-type youth exists. Some characteristics of the self subsystem are idiosyncratic style, personal statements, reference to oneself, a valuing orientation, and an awareness of one's own acts or states as belonging to or originating within oneself - self consciousness. Thus, I am trying to blend the self subsystem with the expertise subsystem. I've blended in a little bit of the self way. Not much. I hope future dissertation writers will choose to make their works more self-like. And I hope they will be able to do so.

In this work I chose, and am choosing again, to emphasize the importance of personal decision. I am choosing to emphasize the internal interrelatedness, interdependence, and circularity within a system of thought by putting the so-called "first" part of this work at the "end."

I choose to present part of my personal way of thinking and being, rather than to demonstrate my expertise by performing one of the usual academic regimens,

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